CASE OF SHUKURDZHYYEV AND KUZMIN v. RUSSIA

 

 

FOURTH SECTION

CASE OF SHUKURDZHYYEV AND KUZMIN v. RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

(Applications nos. 45911/15 and 45913/15)

 

 

 

 

 

 

JUDGMENT
 

STRASBOURG

5 May 2026

 

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Shukurdzhyyev and Kuzmin v. Russia and Ukraine,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

 Faris Vehabović, President,
 Lorraine Schembri Orland,
 Anne Louise Bormann, judges,
and Uğur Erdal, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the applications against the Russian Federation and Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 8 September 2015 by Ukrainian nationals, Mr Veldar Samadynovych Shukurdzhyyev and Mr Leonid Oleksandrovych Kuzmin (“the applicants”), who were represented by Mr M. Tarakhkalo, Ms A. Martynovska and Ms O. Chylutyan, lawyers practising in Kyiv;

the decision to give notice of the complaint under Article 11 of the Convention to the Russian and Ukrainian Governments, represented by their Agents, Mr M. Vinogradov and Ms M. Sokorenko respectively;

the observations submitted by the Ukrainian Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants;

the decision to dismiss the Ukrainian Government’s objection to the examination of the applications by a Committee;

Having deliberated in private on 7 April 2026,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1.  The complaints raised in these applications arise out of the conflict between Ukraine and the Russian Federation in Crimea, following the latter’s occupation and assertion of jurisdiction over the peninsula as from 27 February 2014 (see Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], nos. 20958/14 and 38334/18, 25 June 2024). They concern administrative proceedings instituted against the applicants by the Russian authorities on account of their participation in peaceful assemblies in Crimea.

2.  The applicants were residents of Crimea. The second applicant, Mr Kuzmin, was an organiser of a demonstration in Simferopol on 9 March 2015 marking the anniversary of Taras Shevchenko’s birth. He informed the “City Administration” of Simferopol of this public event in advance. By a decision of 27 February 2015, the Russian authorities authorised the demonstration.

3.  On 9 March 2015 both applicants, along with around 50 other participants, took part in the demonstration. During the rally, the participants displayed Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar national symbols, such as flags, blue and yellow ribbons, and traditional clothing. After the demonstration the applicants were arrested by the police and escorted to the police department, where they were charged with administrative offences.

4.  On 12 March 2015 the “Zheleznodorozhniy Court of Simferopol”[1] established that since the participants in the demonstration had used Ukrainian flags featuring the statement “Crimea is Ukraine” (“Крим – це Україна”), they had changed the purpose of the planned event and had therefore held an unauthorised demonstration. The domestic “court” found the first applicant guilty under Article 20.2 § 5 of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation for participating in an unauthorised public event, during which he had displayed a Ukrainian flag. The second applicant was convicted under Article 20.2 § 1 of the same Code for breaching the established procedure for conducting public events as an organiser, on the grounds that he had failed to take measures to stop the actions of the participants who had been acting in breach of the regulations governing the conduct of the demonstration. Both applicants were sentenced to 40 hours of community service.

5.  The applicants appealed against the judgments. On 20 April and 19 May 2015 respectively the “Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea” upheld the first‑instance judgments but replaced the penalty with a fine of 10,000 Russian roubles (RUB) for each applicant.

6.  Mr Shukurdzhyyev and Mr Kuzmin left Crimea for mainland Ukraine in 2016 and 2017 respectively.

7.  On 10 March 2015 the Ukrainian authorities, proprio motu, launched criminal proceedings concerning the applicants’ arrest by the Russian authorities on 9 March 2015 under Article 340 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (unlawful obstruction of the organisation or holding of demonstrations). According to the materials in the pre-trial investigation case file, the authorities identified the individuals involved in the applicants’ prosecution in Crimea and established their personal details. They also took steps to determine the whereabouts of the victims and witnesses, with a view to questioning them. However, as the witnesses were located in the occupied territory, it was not possible to carry out investigative measures there. The first applicant was granted victim status in the proceedings and was interviewed on 24 February 2016. The pre-trial investigation remains pending.

8.  The applicants complained that their conviction by the Russian authorities for participating in a peaceful demonstration had breached their right to freedom of assembly, as guaranteed by Article 11 of the Convention. The applicants further complained that Ukraine had failed to fulfil its positive obligations under Article 11 of the Convention on account of its failure to conduct an effective investigation into their arrest and administrative conviction by the Russian authorities.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENTPreliminary issues   Joinder of the applications

9.  Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment.

   Consequences of the Russian Government’s failure to participate in the proceedings

10.  The Russian Government did not submit any observations in the present case. However, their failure to do so does not affect the Court’s examination of the applications (see Georgia v. Russia (II) (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 38263/08, §§ 25-27, 28 April 2023, and Svetova and Others v. Russia, no. 54714/17, §§ 29-31, 24 January 2023).

      ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 11 OF THE CONVENTION   Responsibility of the Russian Federation

11.  The Court observes that the facts giving rise to the alleged violations of the Convention occurred prior to 16 September 2022, the date on which the Russian Federation ceased to be a Рarty to the Convention (see Fedotova and Others v. Russia [GC], nos. 40792/10 and 2 others, §§ 68‑73, 17 January 2023). It also reiterates that the Russian Federation has exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction over Crimea, within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention, in the form of “effective control of an area” as from 27 February 2014 (see Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), cited above, §§ 864 and 873, and Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) (dec.) [GC], nos. 20958/14 and 38334/18, §§ 315‑35, 16 December 2020). Accordingly, the present applications fall within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation under Article 1 of the Convention.

12.  The Court further notes that the applicants’ complaint against the Russian Federation is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, nor is it inadmissible on any other grounds. Accordingly, it must be declared admissible.

13.  Both applicants were arrested by the police after the demonstration on 9 March 2015 and were subsequently convicted by the Russian “courts” under Article 20.2 of the Code of Administrative Offences for breaching the rules on conducting public events. It is not in dispute that those measures constituted an interference with their right to freedom of peaceful assembly under Article 11 of the Convention (see Navalnyy and Yashin v. Russia, no. 76204/11, §§ 51-52, 4 December 2014).

14.  The Court must next determine whether the interference was “prescribed by law” within the meaning of Article 11 § 2 of the Convention. It notes that the impugned measures taken by the Russian authorities were based on the domestic law of the Russian Federation. However, when the Russian Federation extended the application of its laws to Crimea, it did so in contravention of the Convention as interpreted in the light of international humanitarian law. Consequently, Russian law cannot be regarded as “law” within the meaning of the Convention, and any administrative practice based thereon cannot be considered “lawful” or “in accordance with law” (see Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), cited above, §§ 942 and 946). Accordingly, the Court concludes that the impugned measures cannot be regarded as “prescribed by law”. In view of this finding, the Court does not need to examine whether the remaining requirements of Article 11 § 2 – namely, the pursuit of a legitimate aim and the necessity of the interference – have been complied with.

15.  Furthermore, the Court has already established the existence of an administrative practice on the part of the Russian “authorities” in Crimea consisting of the prohibition of public gatherings and expressions of support for Ukraine, as well as the intimidation and arbitrary detention of organisers and participants of such demonstrations and the imposition of restrictive measures (including punitive ones) on them (ibid., §§ 1109-27). By participating in the demonstrations at issue and displaying the Ukrainian flag, the applicants publicly expressed their support for Ukraine and affirmed that Crimea forms an integral part of it. In these circumstances, the measures taken against them formed part of a broader pattern aimed at intimidating the local population and at suppressing pro-Ukrainian expressions.

16.  There has accordingly been a violation of Article 11 of the Convention by the Russian Federation in respect of both applicants.

   Responsibility of Ukraine

17.  The Court reiterates that where a Contracting State does not exercise effective control over part of its territory, it nevertheless remains bound by the positive obligations under the Convention. These obligations are limited in scope and concern, in particular, the measures that the State may reasonably be expected to take in order to re-establish control over the territory in question and to ensure respect for the Convention rights of individuals within that territory through diplomatic, legal or other appropriate means (see Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, §§ 332-35, ECHR 2004-VII, and Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 11138/10, § 151, 23 February 2016).

18.  In the present case, the applicants did not raise any complaint concerning the first aspect of Ukraine’s positive obligations, namely measures aimed at re-establishing control over Crimea. As regards the second aspect – namely, the obligation to ensure respect for their rights – the Court observes, firstly, that the applicants did not inform the Ukrainian authorities of the facts underlying their complaints. Nevertheless, the Office of the Prosecutor of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea initiated a criminal investigation of its own motion on the basis of information obtained from open sources; that investigation remains pending. In these circumstances, the fact that the matter was not formally referred to the Ukrainian authorities by the applicants cannot, in itself, be regarded as disclosing any lack of diligence on their part (see, mutatis mutandis, Rîbac and Rodina-Agro S.A. v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [Committee], no. 28857/14, § 34, 15 June 2021).

19.  The applicants’ complaint in that regard is confined to the alleged ineffectiveness of the investigation (see paragraph 8 above). The Court reiterates that the State’s positive obligations under Article 11 of the Convention primarily concern the duty to take reasonable and appropriate measures to ensure the peaceful conduct of demonstrations and to protect the safety of all citizens (see Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania [GC], no. 37553/05, §§ 158-60, ECHR 2015). It has recognised that, in certain circumstances, a procedural obligation to conduct an effective investigation may arise under Article 11, in particular where violent acts affecting the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly have been committed during the demonstration (see, for example, Ouranio Toxo and Others v. Greece, no. 74989/01, § 47, ECHR 2005-X (extracts), and Promo Lex and Others v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 42757/09, § 23, 24 February 2015).

20.  In the present case, the Court does not discern any elements capable of triggering such a distinct procedural obligation on the part of Ukraine under Article 11 of the Convention; in particular, no acts of violence were committed against the applicants in connection with the demonstration. In any event, having regard to the Ukrainian authorities’ lack of effective control over Crimea and their resulting inability to carry out investigative measures in the territory concerned (including the questioning of witnesses located there), the material before the Court does not disclose any failure by Ukraine to take steps reasonably within its power (see paragraph 7 above). In these circumstances, the Court concludes that Ukraine cannot be said to have failed to comply with its limited positive obligations under Article 11 of the Convention.

21.  It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

    remaining COMPLAINTS

22.  The applicants further raised complaints under Articles 7, 8, 10 and 18 of the Convention. Having regard to the facts of the case, the submissions of the applicants and the Ukrainian Government, and its findings above, the Court considers that it has dealt with the main legal questions raised by the applicants and that there is no need to examine these remaining complaints (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, § 156, ECHR 2014).

APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

23.  The applicants claimed 100,000 euros (EUR) each in respect of non‑pecuniary damage and EUR 3,750 each in respect of the legal costs and expenses incurred before the Court.

24.  The Ukrainian Government submitted that, since no violation could be attributed to Ukraine, it should not be required to pay any just satisfaction. Moreover, the sums claimed by the applicants in respect of legal fees were excessive.

25.  The Russian Government did not comment on the applicants’ claims for just satisfaction.

26.  The Court considers that the applicants must have sustained non‑pecuniary damage as a result of the violation of their right to freedom of peaceful assembly. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards each applicant EUR 7,500 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, to be paid by the Russian Federation. Furthermore, regard being had to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 3,000 for costs and expenses to both applicants jointly, to be paid by the Russian Federation directly into the bank account of Mr Tarakhkalo, as indicated by the applicants.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,     Decides to join the applications;     Holds that the facts complained of by the applicants fall within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation in so far as they relate to facts that took place in Crimea before 16 September 2022, and that the Russian Government’s failure to participate in the proceedings presents no obstacle to the examination of the case;     Declares the complaint under Article 11 against the Russian Federation admissible, and the applicants’ complaints against Ukraine inadmissible;     Holds that there has been a violation of Article 11 of the Convention by the Russian Federation in respect of both applicants;     Holds that there is no need to examine the admissibility and merits of the remaining complaints against the Russian Federation;     Holds  that the Russian Federation is to pay, within three months, the following amounts:  EUR 7,500 (seven thousand five hundred euros) to each applicant, plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;  EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros) jointly to both applicants, plus any tax that may be chargeable to them, in respect of costs and expenses, to be paid directly into the bank account of their representative Mr Tarakhkalo;  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;     Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claims for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 5 May 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

 

 Uğur Erdal Faris Vehabović
 Acting Deputy Registrar President

 

[1] The names of courts established under Russian law are indicated in inverted commas (see Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], nos. 20958/14 and 38334/18, § 41, 25 June 2024).

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