THIRD SECTION
CASE OF SHURYGINA AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA
(Applications nos. 2982/05, 5991/05, 9546/05 and 24130/06)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
15 March 2016
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Shurygina and Others v. Russia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Helena Jäderblom, President,
Dmitry Dedov,
Branko Lubarda, judges,
and Marialena Tsirli, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 23 February 2016,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in four applications (nos. 2982/05, 5991/05, 9546/05 and 24130/06) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by four Russian nationals (“the applicants”). The applicants’ details and the dates of their applications to the Court appear in the Appendix.
2. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights.
3. The applicants complained, inter alia, of the quashing of binding and enforceable judgments in their favour by way of the supervisory review procedure in force between 2003 and 2008.
4. On various dates indicated in the Appendix these complaints were communicated to the respondent Government.
5. By letter of 4 October 2007, the widow of Mr Valentin Aleksandrovich Kvitov, Ms Dolores Fedorovna Kvitova, informed the Court that her husband had died on 11 April 2007 and that she wished to pursue the application on his behalf.
6. By letter of 4 December 2008, the mother of Mr Viktor Vyacheslavovich Markov, Ms Nela Alekseyevna Markova, informed the Court that her son had died on 6 June 2008 and that she wished to pursue the application on his behalf.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
7. On various dates the applicants brought civil actions against the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, seeking to recover the monetary value of State promissory notes for purchases of Russian‑made cars.
8. The first-instance courts found in the applicants’ favour. Those judgments were upheld on appeal and became final. They were subsequently quashed by supervisory review courts upon applications lodged by the Ministry of Finance on the grounds of incorrect application of substantive law (for more details, see the Appendix).
9. All the judgments in the applicants’ favour remained unenforced until the date of their quashing.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
10. The relevant domestic law governing the supervisory review procedure in force between 1 February 2003 and 7 January 2008 is summed up in the Court’s judgment in the case of Kot v. Russia (no. 20887/03, § 17, 18 January 2007).
THE LAW
I. LOCUS STANDI AS REGARDS APPLICATIONS Nos. 5991/05 AND 9546/05
11. The Court notes that, in the Kvitov and Markov cases, the applicants passed away and their heirs expressed a wish to continue the proceedings before the Court in their stead (see paragraphs 5 and 6 above).
12. In the Markov case, without submitting further details, the Government argued that the late applicant’s mother had no legitimate interest in pursuing the claim under Article 6 of the Convention, since the right to compensation for State promissory notes was strictly linked to the late applicant.
13. The Court has previously accepted that close relatives of applicants who have died can maintain applications that include complaints concerning various aspects of Article 6 of the Convention (see Malhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no. 33071/96, ECHR 2000‑XII; Andreyeva v. Russia (dec.), no. 76737/01, 16 October 2003; Shiryayeva v. Russia, no. 21417/04, § 8, 13 July 2006 (concerning the non-enforcement of domestic judgments); and Horváthová v. Slovakia, no. 74456/01, § 26, 17 May 2005 (in the context of the length of proceedings); and contrast with Gorodnichev v. Russia (dec.), no. 52058/99, 24 May 2007; and, in so far as relevant, Stankevich v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 48814/07, 26 May 2009). The Court has also found in a number of cases relating to claims under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that applications concerning property rights are, in principle, transferable to heirs (see, among other authorities, Nerva and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 42295/98, § 33, ECHR 2002‑VIII, and Sobelin and Others v. Russia, nos. 30672/03 et al., §§ 43-45, 3 May 2007, for issues relating to both Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention). In assessing the transferability of complaints, the former Commission and the Court have taken into account, for example, the fact that the link between the complaints at stake and the deceased applicant was not exclusive, and that the late applicant’s next of kin had personally suffered consequences (see, in the context of Article 6 of the Convention, Funke v. France, no. 10828/84, Commission decision of 6 October 1988, Decisions and Reports 57, p. 18), that the heirs had an interest of their own (see, regarding Article 8 of the Convention, Armonienė v. Lithuania, no. 36919/02, § 29, 25 November 2008), or that the domestic proceedings concerned the late applicant’s pecuniary rights (see Jeruzal v. Poland, no. 65888/01, § 25, 10 October 2006).
14. As regards the Kvitov case, the Court observes that the applicant complained only under Article 6 of the Convention about the quashing of the judgment in his favour. The Court has already found in similar circumstances that an applicant’s widow – who was not a party to the domestic proceedings – could not claim to have a sufficient legal interest to justify the continued examination of the complaint of a violation of the legal certainty principle (see Matviyenko v. Russia (dec.), no. 53664/08, 25 November 2010, with further references). The Court sees no reason to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
15. In these circumstances, the Court considers that it is no longer justified to continue the examination of Mr Kvitov’s application, and concludes under Article 37 § 1 (c) of the Convention that it should be struck out of its list of cases.
16. The Court considers that the situation is different as regards the Markov case, in which the applicant complained only under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, and the applicant’s mother submitted a succession certificate confirming that she had accepted his succession. Although the Government objected to her standing, they did not explain why the right to compensation for State promissory notes should not be considered transferable. In these circumstances, and having regard to its case-law, the Court considers that Ms N.A. Markova has standing to pursue the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention on behalf of her late son (see Streltsov and other “Novocherkassk military pensioners” cases v. Russia, nos. 8549/06 et al., § 39, 29 July 2010, with further references).
II. JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS
17. Given that the remaining three applications concern similar facts and complaints, and raise almost identical issues under the Convention, the Court will consider them in a single judgment (see Kazakevich and 9 other “Army Pensioners” cases v. Russia, nos. 14290/03 et al., § 15, 14 January 2010).
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION AND ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 TO THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE QUASHING OF THE JUDGMENTS IN THE APPLICANTS’ FAVOUR
18. All the applicants complained about the quashing by way of supervisory review of the binding and enforceable judgments in their favour. They invoked Article 6 of the Convention and/or Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (Mr Markov had complained only under the latter provision). The relevant parts of the aforementioned provisions read:
Article 6 § 1
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law ...”
A. Admissibility
19. The Court notes that the applicants’ complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It also notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
20. The Government argued that the supervisory review proceedings resulting in the quashing of the judgments delivered in the applicants’ favour had been lawful: they had been initiated by the defendant authorities within the time-limits provided for by domestic law. The supervisory review courts had quashed lower court judgments that had been based on an incorrect application of substantive law, thus correcting flagrant injustices and eliminating dangerous precedents.
21. The applicants reiterated their complaints.
22. The Court observes that it has already found numerous violations of the Convention on account of the quashing of binding and enforceable judgments by way of supervisory review under the Code of Civil Procedure as in force at the material time (see Kot, cited above, § 29). Some of the violations were found in similar circumstances and also concerned the quashing of final domestic judgments granting the applicants’ claims to recover the monetary value of State promissory notes for purchases of Russian-made cars (see, among many other authorities, Bolyukh v. Russia, no. 19134/05, 31 July 2007; Sidorenko v. Russia, no. 3519/05, 26 July 2007; and Panasenko v. Russia, no. 9549/05, 1 April 2010). The Court sees no reason to reach a different conclusion in the present cases.
23. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the quashing of the binding and enforceable judgments in the applicants’ favour by way of supervisory review amounts to a breach of the principle of legal certainty, in violation of Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in respect of Ms Shurygina and Ms Borozdina, and in violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in respect of Mr Markov (see Panasenko, cited above).
IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION AND ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 TO THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-ENFORCEMENT OF THE JUDGMENTS IN THE APPLICANTS’ FAVOUR
24. Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the applicants in the Shurygina and Borozdina cases further complained about the non‑enforcement of the same judgments prior to their quashing (see the Appendix).
A. Admissibility
25. The Court notes that the applicants’ complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It also notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
26. The Government argued that the relevant judgments could not be enforced on account of their quashing by way of the supervisory review procedure.
27. The applicants maintained their claims. They pointed out that the judgments should have been enforced immediately, and that they had not been at fault as regards the delay.
28. The Court reiterates its established case-law to the effect that the subsequent quashing of final and enforceable domestic judgments does not constitute a valid reason for their prolonged non-enforcement (see Velskaya v. Russia, no. 21769/03, § 18, 5 October 2006). The domestic judgments delivered in the applicants’ favour remained unenforced for more than a year prior to their quashing, which, according to the Court’s practice, gives rise to a violation of the Convention (see Kulkov and Others v. Russia, nos. 25114/03 et al., § 35, 8 January 2009, with further references). The Government did not put forward any argument capable of persuading the Court to reach a different conclusion in the present cases.
29. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in the cases of Shurygina and Borozdina.
V. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
30. Lastly, in the Shurygina and Borozdina cases, the applicants complained under Article 13 of the Convention of the lack of an effective domestic remedy against non-enforcement and/or quashing. In the Shurygina case, the applicant also invoked Article 17 of the Convention.
31. In the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that these complaints do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that they are manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
VI. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
32. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
33. The Court notes at the outset that, in the Markov case, the applicant’s mother submitted no claim for just satisfaction.
34. In the cases of Shurygina and Borozdina, both applicants submitted claims in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage amounting to approximately 23,000 euros (EUR) each.
35. The Government disputed the applicants’ methods of calculation as regards pecuniary damage, and considered that the sums claimed in respect of non-pecuniary damage were excessive and unreasonable.
36. The Court notes that the present cases are similar to numerous other Russian cases that concern the same issues it has already addressed in numerous other judgments finding violations of the Convention on account of the quashing of final judgments by way of the supervisory review procedure and non-enforcement of domestic judicial decisions. In cases involving many similarly situated victims a unified approach may be called for. This approach will ensure that the applicants are treated as a group and that there are no disparities in the level of the awards, thus avoiding the possibility of a divisive effect on them (see, for instance, Moskalenko and Others v. Ukraine [Committee], nos. 1270/12 et al., § 23, 18 July 2013, and Goncharova and Others and 68 other “Privileged Pensioners” cases v. Russia, nos. 23113/08 et al., §§ 22‑24, 15 October 2009).
37. Having regard to the principles developed in its case-law on the determination of just satisfaction in similar cases (see Kovalenko and Others v. Russia, [Committee], nos. 36299/03 et al., §§ 41-43, 8 December 2015), the Court considers it reasonable and equitable to award Ms Shurygina and Ms Borozdina a lump sum of EUR 5,000 each to cover all heads of damage.
B. Costs and expenses
38. The applicants submitted no claims in respect of costs and expenses.
C. Default interest
39. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
1. Decides to strike the application of Mr Valentin Aleksandrovich Kvitov out of its list of cases;
2. Holds, in respect of application no. 9546/05, that Ms N.A. Markova has standing to continue the proceedings in Mr Markov’s stead;
3. Decides to join the remaining three applications;
4. Declares, in respect of the Shurygina and Borozdina cases, the complaints under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention concerning the quashing by way of supervisory review of binding and enforceable judgments in the applicants’ favour, and the non‑enforcement of the same judgments, admissible and the remainder of the applications inadmissible;
5. Declares Mr Markov’s application admissible;
6. Holds, in respect of the Shurygina and Borozdina cases, that there has been a violation of Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention on account of the quashing by way of supervisory review of the judgments in the applicants’ favour as well as of their prolonged non-enforcement prior to the quashing;
7. Holds, in respect of the Markov case, that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention on account of the quashing by way of supervisory review of the judgment in the applicant’s favour;
8. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, Ms Marina Pavlovna Shurygina and Ms Aleksandra Mikhaylovna Borozdina, within three months, EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros) each in respect of both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
9. Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 15 March 2016, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Marialena TsirliHelena Jäderblom
Deputy RegistrarPresident
APPENDIX
No.
Application
no. and date of
application
Date of communication
Applicant name
Date of birth
Place of residence
Nationality
Represented by
Final domestic judgment
a) date of delivery
b) date of becoming final
Defendant
Award(s) (Russian roubles)
Enforcement status (prior to the quashing)
Quashing
Length of non-enforcement prior to the quashing (separate complaint)
2982/05
22/12/2004
18/05/2010
Marina Pavlovna SHURYGINA
19/08/1948
Ulan-Ude
Russian
Ust-Yanskiy District Court of the Sakha Republic (Yakutiya)
30/05/2003
30/06/2003
Ministry of Finance
RUB 126,686
(lump sum for compensation of the car value)
Remained unenforced
Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic
22/07/2004
12 months and 22 days
5991/05
10/12/2004
25/04/2008
Valentin Aleksandrovich KVITOV
25/10/1947-11/04/2007
Kyiv
Russian
Ust-Yanskiy District Court of the Sakha Republic (Yakutiya)
30/05/2003
07/07/2003
Ministry of Finance
RUB 98,677
(lump sum for compensation of the car value)
Remained unenforced
Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic
22/07/2004
9546/05
05/02/2005
05/05/2008
Viktor Vyacheslavovich MARKOV
26/06/1959-06/06/2008
Perm
Russian
Legal successor
Nela Alekseyevna MARKOVA
Ust-Yanskiy District Court of the Sakha Republic (Yakutiya)
30/05/2003
09/07/2003
Ministry of Finance
RUB 138,967
(lump sum for compensation of the car value)
Remained unenforced
Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic
12/08/2004
24130/06
15/05/2006
18/05/2010
Aleksandra Mikhaylovna BOROZDINA
17/02/1950
Leninskiy
Russian
Boris Borisovich
OVCHINNIKOV
Blagoveshchenskiy Town Court of the Amur Region
30/07/2003
11/08/2003
Ministry of Finance
RUB 115,937
(lump sum for compensation of the car value)
Remained unenforced
Presidium of the Amur Regional Court
19/12/2005
28 months and 8 days
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