CASE OF SIKA v. SLOVAKIA (No. 7)

THIRD SECTION

CASE OF SIKA v. SLOVAKIA (No. 7)

(Application no. 1640/07)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

25 June 2013

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Sika v. Slovakia (No. 7),

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

Luis López Guerra, President,
Ján Šikuta,
Nona Tsotsoria, judges,
and Marialena Tsirli, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 4 June 2013,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in an application (no. 1640/07) against the Slovak Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Slovak national, Mr Vladimír Sika (“the applicant”), on 2 January 2007.

2. The Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”) were represented by Ms M. Pirošíková, their Agent.

3. On 16 December 2010 the application was communicated to the Government.

THE FACTS

THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

A. Applicant and his employment

4. The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Trnava.

5. The present case concerns claims asserted by the applicant on the basis of his employment under a contract of 1980, amended as of 1982, and terminated by notice of his employer in 1997. This employment gave rise to three sets of proceedings, two of which are relevant for the present case.

6. The proceedings directly concerned by the present application are those in the applicant’s action of 2005 (see paragraphs 7 et seq. below). The proceedings concerned indirectly are those in his action of 1998 (see paragraph 9 below).

B. Action of 2005

7. On 1 February 2005 the applicant lodged an action with the Trnava District Court (file no. 26C 9/2005) arguing that in the period from the amendment of his employment contract of 1982 until the notice of 1997 he had been paid under a wrong salary grade. Accordingly, he sought an order for payment of the equivalent of some 75.850 euros (EUR) by way of compensation.

8. On 7 February 2005 the applicant extended his action in that he also sought a ruling declaring the 1982 amendment to his employment contract valid and still in force.

9. The applicant subsequently requested that the proceedings in his action of 2005 be joined with the proceedings in his action of 1998, in which he was contesting the notice of 1997.

10. On 15 November 2006 the Trnava District Court discontinued the proceedings in the action of 2005 but the decision was quashed by the Trnava Regional Court on 28 September 2007, following the applicant’s appeal.

11. As a consequence of the reorganisation of the judiciary as from 1 January 2008, the action of 2005 was transferred to Piešťany District Court (file no. 5C 28/2008).

12. On 23 March 2010 the applicant made a submission aimed at further specifying the subject-matter of his 2005 action.

13. On 8 June 2010 the Piešťany District Court dismissed the 2005 action because the applicant’s financial claims were statute‑barred and he had failed to demonstrate a pressing legal interest in having the declaratory ruling made. However, this judgment was quashed by the Regional Court on 31 January 2012, following the applicant’s appeal, on the ground that the first‑instance court had failed to take any decision in respect of the applicant’s submission of 23 March 2010.

14. On 3 December 2012 the Piešťany District Court allowed the extension of the applicant’s 2005 action as sought in his submission of 23 March 2010 and, on 26 February 2013, it dismissed the amended 2005 action. It found that the applicant’s financial claims were partly statute‑barred and partly unfounded and that, in any event, his employment had been effectively terminated by operation of the notice of 1997.

15. The applicant appealed and his appeal is still pending.

C. Complains to presidents of courts

16. The applicant made several complaints to the administration of courts about the length of the proceedings in his action of 2005, all to no avail.

D. Constitutional complaints

1. First complaint

17. On 15 November 2006 the applicant lodged a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution with the Constitutional Court contesting the length of the proceedings in his 2005 action before the Trnava District Court.

18. On 30 November 2006 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible as being manifestly ill‑founded. It concluded that, despite certain delays in the proceedings, their length had not reached a level incompatible with the reasonable-time requirement.

2. Second complaint

19. On 23 September 2009 the applicant resorted to the Constitutional Court again, alleging a violation of the reasonable-time requirement by the Trnava District Court and the Trnava Regional Court.

20. On 14 October 2009 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible as being belated. It observed that as from 1 January 2008 the 2005 action was no longer pending before the Trnava District Court but before the Piešťany District Court. Accordingly, from that time on the Trnava District Court could not have been violating the applicant’s right under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. For unclear reasons, the conclusion was extended to the Trnava Regional Court.

3. Third complaint

21. On 21 October 2009 the applicant made further submissions to the Constitutional Court which resulted into a third constitutional complaint about the length of the proceedings in the 2005 action. The complaint was considered formally to have been lodged on 10 December 2009 and it was directed both against the Trnava District Court and the Piešťany District Court.

22. On 31 March 2010 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible.

In so far as the complaint related to the Trnava District Court, it was inadmissible as the matter was considered a res iudicata by force of the Constitutional Court’s decision of 14 October 2009.

As to the Piešťany District Court, the Constitutional Court found that the applicant had failed to comply with the statutory requirement for the admissibility of constitutional complains to exhaust ordinary remedies in that he had failed to assert his length-of-proceedings complaint before the President of the Piešťany District Court.

E. State Liability for Damage

23. On 28 November 2011 the applicant lodged an action against the State in the person of the Ministry of Justice. He relied on the State Liability Act and argued that there had been unjustified delays in the proceedings in his actions of 1998 and 2005 and that these delays amounted to wrongful official action, for which he sought financial compensation.

24. On 26 October 2012 the Trnava District Court dismissed the action finding that the applicant had failed to show any unlawfulness or wrongful official action and neither had he shown having sustained any damage.

25. The applicant appealed and his appeal is still pending.

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 6 § 1 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION

26. Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant complained that the proceedings in his action of 2005 had lasted too long and that, being unable to secure their timely resolution, he had been put in a lasting situation of legal uncertainty.

27. The Court communicated the above complaints under Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows.

Article 6 § 1 of the Convention:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by a ... tribunal...”

Article 13 of the Convention:

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

A. Admissibility

28. The Government argued that the applicant had had at his disposal effective remedies, which he had failed to exhaust. In that respect, they advanced two separate lines of argument.

First, relying on the Constitutional Court’s decisions of 30 November 2006, 14 October 2009 and 31 March 2010 (see paragraphs 18, 20 and 22 above) and citing in extenso the Constitutional Court’s reasoning behind those decisions, the Government contended that the applicant had failed to bring his constitutional complaints in accordance with the applicable formal requirements. In particular, prior to his constitutional complaints, the applicant had failed properly to assert his complaints before the presidents of the general courts concerned.

Second, the Government argued that the applicant had failed to seek redress in respect of the alleged violation of his Article 6 rights by way of an action for damages under the State Liability Act.

29. In reply, the applicant emphasised that the proceedings in his action of 2005 were interrelated with the proceedings in his action of 1998, that they were to be viewed as such, and that he had also unsuccessfully contested the length the latter proceedings before the Constitutional Court.

The applicant further opposed to the findings of fact and law in the Constitutional Court’s decisions of 30 November 2006, 14 October 2009 and 31 March 2010 and submitted that he had properly asserted his length‑of-proceedings claims by all available means.

Lastly, the applicant submitted that, in response to the Government’s inadmissibly objection, he had ultimately also filed an action for damages under the State Liability Act (see paragraph 23 above), in the prospects of success of which he had however no faith.

30. The Court observes first of all that the scope of the present application is limited to the proceedings in the applicant’s action of 2005 (see paragraph 26 above).

31. The Court further observes that in its judgments in the cases of Ištván and Ištvánová v. Slovakia (no. 30189/07, §§ 52-55, 63-99 and 106, 12 June 2012) and Komanický v. Slovakia (no. 6) (no. 40437/07, §§ 51-54, 60-96 and 102, 12 June 2012) it examined at length and ultimately dismissed substantially the same objections as the Government raises in the present case. It finds no reasons for reaching a different conclusion now.

32. In addition, as the complaint to the president of the given court, as an intended requirement for the admissibility of the constitutional complaint, the Court is of the opinion that the problematic nature of this requirement is highlighted in cases such as the present one where the proceedings have taken place before several different courts.

33. For that matter, the Court observes that it has to satisfy itself in each individual case whether the protection of a person’s right granted by the Constitutional Court was comparable to that which the Court could provide under the Convention. In cases concerning the length of proceedings, this requirement will only be met where the domestic remedy in question is capable of covering all stages of the proceedings complained of and thus, in the same way as decisions given by the Court, of taking into account their overall length (see Bako v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 60227/00, 15 March 2005).

34. Viewed from this perspective, it has to be noted that a requirement to complain to the presidents of the given courts of the length of the proceedings before those courts prior to being allowed to assert the same claim in the Constitutional Court implies a separation of the proceedings into segments taking place before the courts involved, which is not conducive to the covering of the overall length of such proceedings.

35. Furthermore, as to the action under the State Liability Act, the Court reiterates that in its judgments in Ištván and Ištvánová (cited above, §§ 92-98) and Komanický (cited above, §§ 89-95) it found that this was not a remedy to be used in length-of-proceedings complaints in Slovakia. It finds no reasons for reaching a different conclusion in the present case.

36. Accordingly, the Government’s preliminary objections must be dismissed.

37. The period to be taken into consideration began on 1 February 2005 and has not yet ended. It has thus lasted more than eight years and two months for two levels of jurisdiction while at the first instance the action was examined at two different courts.

38. The Court notes that this part of the application is not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

39. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).

40. Furthermore, the Court reiterates that special diligence is necessary in employment disputes (Ruotolo v. Italy, 27 February 1992, § 17, Series A no. 230‑D). However, in that respect, the Court observes that although – formally speaking – the applicant’s action of 2005 did concern his employment, the importance of this fact is diminished because a large part of his 2005 claims has concerned a long-gone period of the years 1982 to 1997 without a direct link to the present time.

41. Nevertheless, the Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present case (see Frydlender, cited above).

Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.

There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

42. Furthermore, in view of the conclusions reached above as regards exhaustion of domestic remedies in respect of the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the Court finds that there has likewise been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention.

II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION

43. Lastly, in connection with the violations alleged above, the applicant has also complained of a violation of his rights under Article 14 of the Convention.

44. However, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the applicant’s rights under the provision invoked.

It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

45. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A. Damage

46. The applicant claimed EUR 381,700 in respect of pecuniary damage as well as EUR 130,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The claim in respect of pecuniary damage represented the amount of the applicant’s financial claims as asserted at the domestic level.

47. The Government contested these claims submitting that there was no causal link between the former claim and the subject-matter of the present application and that the latter claim was overstated.

48. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violations found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim.

49. On the other hand, the Court considers that the applicant must have sustained non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis, and having regard to all the circumstances – including what was at stake in the proceedings for the applicant (see paragraph 40 above) – it awards him EUR 2,000 under that head.

B. Costs and expenses

50. The applicant also claimed compensation in respect of legal fees and administrative expenses. For that matter, he submitted bills dating back to 1999 and 2000 showing that he had paid the equivalent of some EUR 680.48 in legal fees. He submitted that he was not in a position to specify and to show that he had paid further legal fees and that he had incurred administrative expenses. In that respect, therefore, he invited the Court to make an award of a lump sum.

51. The Government contested these claims.

52. The Court observes first of all that the violations found in the present case concern the proceedings in the applicant’s action of 2005, while the bills submitted in support of the applicant’s claim date back to the years of 1999 and 2000. It further observes that the remainder of those claims has been wholly unsubstantiated. Thus, regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case‑law, the Court considers that the claim for costs and expenses must be rejected.

C. Default interest

53. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1. Declares admissible the complaints under Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention and inadmissible the remainder of the application;

2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;

3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention;

4. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 25 June 2013, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Marialena TsirliLuis López Guerra
Deputy RegistrarPresident

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