CASE OF SNOPOV v. UKRAINE

FIFTH SECTION

CASE OF SNOPOV v. UKRAINE

(Application no. 60716/10)

JUDGMENT
 

STRASBOURG

27 February 2025

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Snopov v. Ukraine,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

 Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström, President,
 María Elósegui,
 Diana Sârcu, judges,
and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 60716/10) lodged with the Court against Ukraine under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 4 October 2010 by a Ukrainian national, Mr Vadym Olegovych Snopov (“the applicant”), who was born in 1979, lives in Zouya and was represented by Mr S. Ponomaryov, a lawyer practising in Bilohirsk;

the decision to give notice of the applicant’s complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention concerning the quashing of the applicant’s acquittal, his inability to comment on the prosecutor’s appeal and the lack of public hearing before the court of appeal, to the Ukrainian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms M. Sokorenko, of the Ministry of Justice, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated in private on 30 January 2025,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1.  The case concerns the allegedly unfair conduct of the proceedings before the Court of Appeal of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (“the appellate court”) regarding charges brought against the applicant for an administrative offence of driving while in a state of intoxication and that court’s subsequent decision to quash the Bilohirsk Court’s (“the first-instance court”) final judgment, which had dismissed those charges as unfounded. The applicant complained of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

2.  On 12 August 2010 the appellate court examined an appeal lodged by the prosecutor on 27 July 2010 against the first-instance court’s final judgment of 24 June 2010 by which the applicant had been acquitted. The appellate court decided that the ten-day time-limit applicable to an appeal by the prosecutor ought to be extended, without giving any specific reason for this decision. It allowed the appeal on the merits, quashed the first-instance court’s decision of 24 June 2010, found the applicant guilty of driving while intoxicated and suspended his driving licence for a period of one year. Neither the applicant, nor the prosecutor were present at the appellate hearing.

3.  On 18 August 2010 the applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court against the appellate court’s decision, mainly alleging that he had not learned of the prosecutor’s appeal and the appellate court hearing until after 12 August 2010, that is, after the decision had been taken.

4.  On 16 September 2010 the Supreme Court informed the applicant that no cassation appeal lay against the appellate court’s decision.

5.  In a letter of 17 November 2010, the first-instance court, in whose premises the case file was held, informed the applicant that no minutes had been taken of the appellate hearing of 12 August 2010.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

6.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the appellate court’s failure to inform him of either the prosecutor’s appeal or the appellate proceedings prior to the hearing of 12 August 2010, which was not held in public. In consequence, he alleged that he had been unable to participate in those proceedings and to comment on the prosecutor’s appeal. He also alleged that the appellate court had acted unlawfully in quashing the first-instance court’s final judgment of 24 June 2010, in that it had disregarded the fact that the prosecutor’s appeal had been lodged out of time.

7.  The Government argued that they had no access to the case file, which was located within the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, outside their area of control. They also argued that the applicant’s submissions failed to provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that neither he nor his lawyer had been informed of the appellate proceedings. In any event, the applicant’s absence from the hearing of 12 August 2010 had not prevented the appellate court from reaching a decision fairly on his case. In the Government’s submission, there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1.

8.  The Court acknowledges the difficulties faced by the Government when preparing their observations in the present case, in that the domestic case file was unavailable to them. Nonetheless, the Court has in its possession the material necessary for the examination of the merits of the applicant’s complaints (compare, for instance, Tryapyshko v. Ukraine [Committee], no. 59577/12, §§ 14 and 17, 17 June 2021).

9.  The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

10.  The general principles concerning the right to an adversarial trial, and the principle of equality of arms in particular have been summarised in, among other authorities, Zahirović v. Croatia (no. 58590/11, §§ 42-43, 25 April 2013). The Court has also held, in a criminal context, that where an appellate court has to make a full assessment of the issue of guilt or innocence, it cannot determine the issue without a direct assessment of the evidence given in person by the accused for the purpose of proving that he or she did not commit the act allegedly constituting a criminal offence (see, for instance, Kashlev v. Estonia, no. 22574/08, § 38, 26 April 2016).

11.  The Court considers that these principles apply to the administrative‑offence proceedings before the appellate court which re‑examined the issue of the applicant’s guilt and which was required, by Article 294 of the Code of Administrative Offences, to notify him of the date and time of its hearing no later than three days in advance (see, for instance, Chernega and Others v. Ukraine, no. 74768/10, §§ 176-82, 18 June 2019).

12.  The Court observes that the appellate court’s decision of 12 August 2010 contains no indication that the applicant or his lawyer were informed of the prosecutor’s appeal or of the court hearing in question. Nor is there any indication in that decision that the appellate court considered whether the applicant had been properly notified and whether it was justified in choosing to examine the case in his absence. Regard being had to the first-instance court’s letter of 17 November 2010, which indicated that no minutes had been taken at the appellate hearing, there is arguably no document that could show that the appellate court addressed these matters (see paragraphs 2-5 above).

13.  Although the appellate court’s decision of 12 August 2010 was not subject to an ordinary appeal, the Court notes that the applicant raised the issue of his non-participation in the appellate proceedings shortly after the delivery of that court’s decision, in his cassation appeal to the Supreme Court (see paragraphs 3-4 above).

14.  Overall, the Court considers that the material before it contains sufficiently strong indications to conclude that the applicant was not informed of the prosecutor’s appeal or of the appellate proceedings prior to the hearing of 12 August 2010, and that he had no opportunity to defend himself before the appellate court reviewing the final judgment in his case.

15.  The Court therefore finds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the lack of equality of arms in the proceedings before the appellate court.

16.  In view of these findings, the Court considers that, in the particular circumstances of the present case, there is no need to examine separately the merits of the remainder of the applicant’s complaints under the same provision (see Perić v. Croatia, no. 34499/06, § 26, 27 March 2008; Sabadash v. Ukraine [Committee], no. 28052/13, § 35, 23 July 2019; and Zubenko v. Russia [Committee], no. 37397/15, § 21, 17 December 2019).

APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

17.  The applicant claimed 3,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

18.  The Government argued that the amount claimed was exorbitant.

19.  The Court, ruling on an equitable basis, awards the applicant the requested amount of EUR 3,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros), to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 27 February 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

 Martina Keller Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström
 Deputy Registrar President