FIRST SECTION
CASE OF STAMATIS v. GREECE
(Application no. 41582/08)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
13 January 2011
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision
In the case of Stamatis v. Greece,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Anatoly Kovler, President,
Elisabeth Steiner,
Sverre Erik Jebens, judges,
and André Wampach, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 9 December 2010,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 41582/08) against the Hellenic Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Greek national, Mr Panagiotis Stamatis (“the applicant”), on 1st August 2008.
2. The applicant was represented by Mr Ch. Chrysanthakis, a lawyer practising in Athens. The Greek Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent's delegate, Mr K. Georghiadis, Senior Adviser at the State Legal Council.
3. On 1st September 2009 the President of the First Section decided to communicate the complaint concerning the length of the proceedings to the Government and, in due course, the admissibility and merits of the case to be considered together according to Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, as it was in force at the time. In accordance with Protocol no. 14, the application was allocated to a Committee of three Judges.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. The applicant is a retired military officer and lives in Athens.
5. On 31 January 2003 he lodged a recourse with the Athens Administrative Court of Appeal seeking the annulment of a presidential decree dated 26 November 2002, according to which compulsory retirement was ordered, because he had been found to be incapable of working, due to health problems. The applicant also challenged the legality of the medical opinion given by the members of the military committee who had evaluated his physical abilities.
6. On 10 February 2006 the Administrative Court of Appeal dismissed his recourse. First, the court held that the applicant's allegations regarding the legality of the medical opinion given by the members of the military committee had to be rejected as inadmissible because, under the national legislation, the applicant had to exhaust a preliminary administrative procedure before having recourse to a court. Moreover, the court found that the decree in question was well reasoned (judgment no. 214/2006).
7. On 14 July 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court.
8. On 3 April 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the findings of the Administrative Court of Appeal. In particular it found that the appellate court had rightly declared inadmissible a part of the applicant's allegations on the ground that he had not used the preliminary administrative remedy. Further, it was pointed out that the medical opinions in question had been brought to the applicant's notice in good time so that he could lodge an application with the responsible administrative authority. Finally, the court ruled that the Court of Appeal had adequately reasoned its findings concerning the legality of the abovementioned presidential decree (judgment no. 1148/2008). The judgment was finalised on 12 June 2008.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF UNREASONABLE LENGTH OF PROCEEDINGS
9. The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
10. The Government contested that argument.
11. The period to be taken into consideration began on 31 January 2003 when the applicant lodged a recourse with the Administrative Court of Appeal and ended on 12 June 2008, when judgment no. 1148/2008 of the Supreme Administrative Court became final. It thus lasted more than five years and four months for two levels of jurisdiction.
A. Admissibility
12. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
13. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
14. The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present case (see Frydlender, cited above).
15. Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1 in this regard.
II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
16. Firstly, the applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the rejection of one of his allegations as inadmissible infringed his right of access to court. Moreover, he argued that in general the domestic courts' judgments were not well reasoned. Finally, he complained that, because of the alleged shortcomings in the procedure, his allegations were not effectively addressed by the courts.
17. The Court recalls that, while Article 6 of the Convention guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence or the way it should be assessed, which are therefore primarily matters for regulation by national law and the national courts. In particular, it is not the Court's function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention (see, among many others, García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 28‑29, ECHR 1999‑I).
18. In this case, the complaints raised by the applicant regarding procedural unfairness are of a fourth instance nature. In particular, throughout the proceedings, the applicant was fully able to state his case and there is nothing in the case-file to indicate that the taking and the assessment of the evidence was arbitrary or the proceedings were otherwise unfair to raise an issue under Article 6. Moreover, the judgments of the Administrative Court of Appeal and the Supreme Administrative Court were sufficiently reasoned. Finally, the Court finds no appearance of a violation of Article 6 § 1 as regards the right of access to court. Indeed, through this complaint, the applicant appears to be reiterating his claim regarding the reasoning of the judicial decisions in question.
19. In view of the abovementioned, the applicant's complaints are therefore manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected under Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
20. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
21. The applicant did not submit a claim for just satisfaction. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award him any sum on that account.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the complaint concerning the excessive length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds that there is no call to award the applicant just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 13 January 2011, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
André WampachAnatoly Kovler
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy