FIFTH SECTION
CASE OF STARYGIN v. UKRAINE
(Application no. 10347/07)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
13 October 2011
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Starygin v. Ukraine,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Mark Villiger, President,
Karel Jungwiert,
Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre, judges,
and Stephen Phillips, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 20 September 2011,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 10347/07) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Ukrainian national, Mr Vasiliy Vladimirovich Starygin (“the applicant”), on 19 February 2007.
2. The Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms Valeria Lutkovska, of the Ministry of Justice.
3. On 1 October 2010 the President of the Fifth Section decided to give notice of the application to the Government.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Saki.
A. Criminal proceedings
5. On 31 March 1994 the local prosecutors instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant on account of military service evasion. On 20 January 1995 he was arrested. He remained in detention in the SIZO for three months. The applicant states that he was beaten and ill-treated by inmates and that, despite his cardiac diseases, he was not provided with proper medical examination while in detention.
6. According to the documents provided by the Government, on 17 November 2001, following two remittals of the case for additional investigations, the criminal proceedings against the applicant were discontinued.
B. Civil proceedings
7. On 30 April 1998 the applicant instituted civil proceedings in the Saki Court (“the court”) against the local prosecutors and the military enlistment office, seeking compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage caused to him by the allegedly unlawful prosecution.
8. Between 10 January 1999 and 5 September 2001 the proceedings were suspended pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings against the applicant.
9. On 15 November 2001 the court discontinued the proceedings in part of the applicant’s claim for compensation for pecuniary damage as, pursuant to the legislation then in force, he should have sought compensation directly from the prosecutors, and rejected as unsubstantiated his claim in part of compensation for non-pecuniary damage.
10. On 19 August 2002 the Crimea Regional Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) upheld the above judgment.
11. On 10 October and 25 November 2002, respectively, the applicant lodged an appeal in cassation against the above decisions and a request for the renewal of the procedural time-limits for lodging it.
12. Between 26 June 2003 and 8 April 2004 the case file remained in the Court of Appeal for unspecified reasons.
13. On 29 April and 4 May 2004, respectively, the court renewed the procedural time-limits and sent the applicant’s appeal in cassation to the Supreme Court, which on 7 November 2006 rejected it as unsubstantiated.
14. In the course of the proceedings one hearing was adjourned due to the applicant’s absence. Four times the courts requested the applicant to lodge his appeals in accordance with the procedural requirements. This delayed the proceedings by approximately four and a half months.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
15. The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”
16. The Government contested that argument. In respect of the criminal proceedings, they submitted that the applicant could not claim to be a victim, as he had not raised the complaint about their length in the application form. They further submitted that, in any event, the complaint had been lodged out of time and that, alternatively, it had been manifestly ill-founded. In respect of the civil proceedings, the Government acknowledged that some delay in the examination of the applicant’s case had been caused by the Supreme Court due to its backlog, a problem of the temporary nature resolved by the introduction of legislative measures in February 2007. However, they considered that the applicant had also contributed to the length of the proceedings and that their overall duration had not been unreasonable.
17. The periods to be taken into account are as follows. The criminal proceedings began on 31 March 1994 and ended on 17 November 2001. The civil proceedings began on 30 April 1998 and ended on 7 November 2006, having lasted for approximately eight and a half years before three judicial instances.
A. Admissibility
18. As regards the criminal proceedings, the Court notes that the applicant expressly mentioned in his application form that his right to the proceedings within a “reasonable time” had been breached; it therefore dismisses the Government’s argument about the applicant’s victim status. At the same time, the Court observes that the proceedings ended on 17 November 2001, while the application was lodged on 19 February 2007. It follows that the complaint about the length of the criminal proceedings was introduced out of time and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
19. As regards the civil proceedings, the Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
20. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
21. Turning to the circumstances of the case, the Court considers that neither the complexity of the case nor the conduct of the applicant, who somewhat contributed to the length of the proceedings (see paragraph 14 above) can explain the overall duration of the proceedings. On the other hand, it considers that the major delays were caused by the domestic courts. In particular, it notes the unexplained periods of procedural inactivity between 25 November 2002 and 8 April 2004 (see paragraphs 11 and 12 above) and the period of the examination of the case by the Supreme Court (see paragraph 13 above). As to the legislative measures referred to by the Government, they were introduced in February 2007, while the Supreme Court examined the case in November 2006 (see Marchenko v. Ukraine, no. 24857/07, § 30, 10 February 2011). As to the period during which the proceedings were suspended, the Court notes that the civil courts eventually decided not to wait until the outcome of the criminal proceedings, which finalized on 17 November 2001, and resumed their own proceedings already on 5 September 2001 (see paragraphs 6 and 8 above). Thus, the eventual necessity for such a suspension was not apparent.
22. The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present case (see Frydlender, cited above).
23. Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement. There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
24. The applicant also complained under Articles 2 and 5 of the Convention that his arrest and detention had been unlawful and that the SIZO authorities had failed to send him for proper medical examination. Finally, he complained under Article 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention about the unfavourable outcome of the civil proceedings and, without further details, about the courts’ bias and the infringement of the principle of equality of arms.
25. Having carefully examined the applicant’s submissions in the light of all the material in its possession and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention.
26. It follows that this part of the application must be declared inadmissible for being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
27. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
28. The applicant did not submit a claim for just satisfaction. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award him any sum on that account.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the complaint concerning the excessive length of the civil proceedings admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 13 October 2011, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stephen PhillipsMark Villiger Deputy Registrar President
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy