SECOND SECTION
CASE OF STERBEK v. HUNGARY
(Application no. 9286/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
22 July 2008
FINAL
22/10/2008
This judgment may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Sterbek v. Hungary,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Françoise Tulkens, President,
Ireneu Cabral Barreto,
Vladimiro Zagrebelsky,
Danutė Jočienė,
András Sajó,
Nona Tsotsoria,
Işıl Karakaş, judges,
and Mrs Sally Dollé, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 1 July 2008,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 9286/04) against the Republic of Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Hungarian national, Mr János Sterbek (“the applicant”), on 20 January 2004.
2. The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr L. Höltzl, Agent, Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement.
3. On 12 October 2006 the Court decided to give notice of the application to the Government. Applying Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Táborfalva, Hungary.
5. In 1992 the applicant brought an action in compensation against his former employer. On 12 April 1995 the Budapest Regional Court found for him. On 18 July 1995 enforcement proceedings were instituted. Since the respondent’s liquidation had been initiated on 14 December 1995, the applicant’s claims were channelled into those proceedings in April 1996.
6. On 13 October 1997 the applicant brought an official liability action against the Budapest Regional Court, seeking compensation for the damage which the respondent court had allegedly caused by not having proceeded with the enforcement of the award due to the applicant (see paragraph 5 above) adequately or in good time. On 3 March 1998 the Pest County Regional Court was appointed to hear the case.
7. After two hearings, this procedure was suspended on 27 April 1999, pending the termination of the liquidation.
8. The liquidation was accomplished on 11 March 2002. The sum due to the applicant could not be recovered for want of assets.
9. The applicant requested that the official liability proceedings be resumed only on 10 June 2004; he had not been able to do so earlier because he had suffered a serious occupational accident.
10. After a hearing on 22 November 2004, on 9 March 2005 the Pest County Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s claims. He did not appeal.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
11. The applicant complained that the length of the official liability proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
12. The Government contested that argument.
13. The period to be taken into consideration began on 13 October 1997 and ended on 9 March 2005. It thus lasted almost seven years and five months. It is to be observed that the applicant requested the resumption of the suspended proceedings only after two years and three months (see paragraphs 8-9 above); however, in the Court’s view, this delay – whilst explained by the applicant’s ailment – cannot be imputed to the State and must be deducted from the overall length. The relevant period is therefore approximately five years and two months for one level of jurisdiction.
A. Admissibility
14. The Government submitted that this complaint should be declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies because the applicant did not appeal against the decision of 9 March 2005.
15. The Court reiterates that, in respect of the length of civil proceedings, a remedy can normally be considered effective only if it provides direct and speedy protection of the rights guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 (cf. mutatis mutandis Erdős v. Hungary (dec.), no. 38937/97,
3 May 2001), notably by accelerating the proceedings. However, it considers that an appeal on the merits, to be filed against the first-instance court judgment, was not capable of speeding up the procedure and had thus no bearing on the protraction of the case. It follows that the applicant’s complaint cannot be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
16. Moreover, the Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
17. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
18. The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present application (see Frydlender, cited above).
19. Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or convincing argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present circumstances. In particular, the Court observes that, until the finalisation of the liquidation, the proceedings were suspended for almost three years (see paragraphs 7-8 above), resulting in a substantial period of inactivity. However, in the Court’s view, this measure was not entirely reasonable given that the impugned proceedings concerned an issue of official liability which was related to an alleged judicial wrongdoing that had occurred well before the liquidation procedure and that was legally separate from the liquidation. In these circumstances, the Court is not convinced that the liquidation was a condition precedent for finding or not finding a breach of law on the part of the respondent court, necessitating the suspension of the case.
Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court finds that the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
20. Without relying on any particular provision of the Convention, the applicant also complained of the length of the liquidation procedure and of the outcome of both cases.
21. As regards the length and the outcome of the liquidation case, the Court observes that it ended on 11 March 2002, whereas the application was only introduced on 20 January 2004, i.e. more than six months later. Moreover, concerning the outcome of the official liability case, the Court notes that the applicant did not exhaust domestic remedies in that he did not appeal against the judgment of 9 March 2005. It follows that these complaints must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
22. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
23. The applicant claimed 5.5 million Hungarian forints[1] in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
24. The Government contested the claim.
25. The Court considers that the applicant must have sustained some non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards him EUR 4,000 under this head.
B. Costs and expenses
26. The applicant made no claim in this respect.
C. Default interest
27. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the complaint concerning the excessive length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 4,000 (four thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the national currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement,;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 22 July 2008, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Sally DolléFrançoise Tulkens
RegistrarPresident
[1] 21,634 euros (EUR)
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