CASE OF ŠTVRTECKÝ v. SLOVAKIA

THIRD SECTION

CASE OF ŠTVRTECKÝ v. SLOVAKIA

(Application no. 55844/12)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

5 June 2018

FINAL

05/09/2018

This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Štvrtecký v. Slovakia,

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

Helena Jäderblom, President,
Branko Lubarda,
Helen Keller,
Pere Pastor Vilanova,
Alena Poláčková,
Georgios A. Serghides,
María Elósegui, judges,
and Fatoş Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 15 May 2018,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in an application (no. 55844/12) against the Slovak Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Slovak national, Mr Miroslav Štvrtecký (“the applicant”), on 21 August 2012.

2. The applicant was represented by Mr R. Toman, a lawyer practising in Bratislava. The Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms M. Pirošíková.

3. The applicant alleged that the length of his detention on remand had been excessive, contrary to Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, and that he had been denied an enforceable right to compensation in that respect, in violation of Article 5 § 5 of the Convention.

4. On 7 December 2016 the complaints concerning the length of the applicant’s detention on remand and his right to compensation were communicated to the Government and the remainder of the application was declared inadmissible pursuant to Rule 54 § 3 of the Rules of Court.

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

5. The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Senica.

A. Pre-trial detention of the applicant

6. On 3 October 2006 the applicant and three others were charged with extorting money from P. P.

7. On 6 October 2006 the Senica District Court (okresný súd) remanded the applicant and two of his alleged accomplices in custody from 3 October 2006 onwards. The court held that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence with which he was charged, that the offence had been committed in an organised way, and that therefore there was a risk that he could put pressure on witnesses, contact other perpetrators and tamper with evidence. The court relied on the testimony of P.P., who allegedly had been warned by one of the applicant’s accomplices about instructions from the applicant not to cooperate with the police. On 24 October 2006 the Trnava Regional Court (krajský súd) dismissed an interlocutory appeal (sťažnosť) by the applicant.

8. On 6 December 2006 a police investigator charged the applicant and fifteen other people with establishing, masterminding and supporting a criminal group. The applicant was also charged with aggravated coercion, extortion, and causing bodily harm.

9. On 22 December 2006 the Pezinok Special Court (špeciálny súd, hereafter “the Special Court”), where the case had been transferred in the meantime owing to the organised nature of the crimes, dismissed an application by the applicant for release. It relied on the particularly serious and organised nature of the offences he was charged with, and held that there was a real danger that he might influence witnesses and contact other perpetrators in order to tamper with evidence. On 17 January 2007 the Supreme Court (Najvyšší súd) dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant.

10. On 16 March 2007 the Special Court extended the applicant’s detention until 3 October 2007. In addition to the reasons mentioned above, it relied on a reasonable suspicion that the applicant was the leader of a criminal group which had been operating for several years, and that not all of the members of that criminal group had been identified. The court pointed out that the criminal investigation was particularly complex. On 28 March 2007 the Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant.

11. On 17 April 2007 the police investigator charged the applicant with another count of extortion.

12. On 11 June 2007 the Special Court dismissed another application by the applicant for release. It relied on the testimony of several witnesses who were afraid to testify against him. The court took into account the complexity of the criminal investigation, finding that there had been no undue delays. On 22 June 2007 the Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant.

13. On 14 September 2007 the applicant was charged with two other counts of extortion.

14. On 18 September 2007 the Special Court extended the applicant’s detention until 3 April 2008, and extended the grounds for his detention by including the risk of his reoffending. It held that it was reasonable to suspect that, if released, the applicant would continue his criminal activities, taking into account: the motives for such activities and their duration and extent; the methods of intimidation and violence used by the criminal group; the hierarchical and organised nature of the group; and the fact that not all of the members of the group had been identified. On 26 September 2007 the Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant.

15. On 17 March 2008 the applicant’s detention was extended until 7 July 2008. The Special Court added that his detention assisted the investigation, since the victims were willing to testify, but still not all of the members of the criminal group had been identified. On 26 March 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant.

B. The applicant’s detention during trial

16. The applicant was indicted before the Special Court on 13 June 2008. The bill of indictment concerned sixteen criminal acts, eighteen defendants and fourteen victims. The applicant was charged with establishing, masterminding and supporting a criminal group, aggravated coercion, causing bodily harm, and ten acts of extortion. All the crimes were qualified as particularly serious crimes. The sums extorted ranged from 10,000 to 33,000 euros (EUR).

17. On 25 June 2008 the Special Court examined the grounds for the applicant’s detention and ruled that he should remain in detention. It pointed out that, according to the indictment, he was allegedly the leader of a criminal group, a group which had been conducting criminal activities for six years against people who were victims and witnesses in the trial, by means of threats and the use of physical and psychological violence. On 4 July 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant.

18. On 6 October 2008, when conducting a preliminary examination of the bill of indictment, the Special Court again reviewed the grounds for the applicant’s detention and ruled that he should remain in detention. On 15 October 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant.

19. On 16 July 2009 the Special Court dismissed another application by the applicant for release. It held that several witnesses were afraid to testify against him in his presence and had thus been heard in his absence. In particular, one witness had been contacted and threatened by unknown persons in an attempt to get him to change his testimony. The court also took into account that not all the witnesses had been heard by the trial court. On 19 August 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant.

20. On 27 May 2010 the Special Court extended the applicant’s detention until 13 December 2010. The court limited the grounds for his detention to the risk of his reoffending, because the trial court had already heard all witnesses. It stated that there was substantial evidence suggesting that the applicant was the leader of a criminal group which had operated systematically for several years, and therefore it was reasonable to assume that, if at liberty, he might continue with the criminal activities. The court further held that it was essential to protect victims and witnesses who had expressed a fear of the applicant when testifying at the trial.

21. On 10 June 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant.

22. On 23 June 2010 the applicant was convicted by the Special Court of establishing, masterminding and supporting a criminal group, four acts of extortion, three acts of aggravated coercion and fraud and was sentenced to twenty-five years’ imprisonment. He remained in detention pending the outcome of an appeal.

23. On 13 September 2010 a request for release lodged by the applicant was dismissed by the Special Court. The Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant on 6 October 2010.

24. On 22 November 2010 the Supreme Court extended the applicant’s detention until 3 April 2011.

25. On 11 February 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against his conviction, which thereby became final. The applicant started to serve a prison sentence, and the time spent in detention was taken into account when calculating his prison term.

C. Proceedings before the Constitutional Court

26. On 10 August 2010 the applicant filed a constitutional complaint (ústavná sťažnosť) against the Supreme Court’s decision of 10 June 2010 to dismiss his interlocutory appeal (see paragraph 21 above). Among other things, he complained that his detention was no longer justified, that it had lasted an excessively long time, and that the Supreme Court had not answered all the arguments raised in his interlocutory appeal (“the first constitutional complaint”). He complained under Article 5 §§ 3 and 4 and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, and under their constitutional equivalents.

27. On 17 December 2010 he filed another constitutional complaint, alleging a lack of speediness in relation to the judicial review of his detention by the decisions of the Special Court of 13 September 2010 and the Supreme Court of 6 October 2010 (“the second constitutional complaint” – see paragraph 23 above).

28. On 27 October 2010 the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd) accepted a part of the applicant’s first constitutional complaint for further examination, including the complaint regarding the length of his detention. It held that the formal requirements under sections 20 and 50 of the Constitutional Court Act had been satisfied. At the same time, it dismissed the rest of the complaint as manifestly ill-founded.

29. On 18 January 2011 the Constitutional Court accepted the second constitutional complaint for further examination, and joined the proceedings relating to the first and the second constitutional complaint.

30. On 8 December 2011 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant’s rights under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. It held that the Supreme Court, in its decision of 10 June 2010, had failed to respond to all of the applicant’s arguments. Although the Supreme Court had examined in detail the applicant’s arguments regarding the grounds for his detention, it had failed to respond to his other arguments, such as one about the impartiality and independence of the tribunal reviewing his detention, and another about alleged shortcomings in his representation during the judicial review, and thus the court had breached Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.

The Constitutional Court further held that the judicial review of the applicant’s detention between 13 September and 6 October 2010 had not been sufficiently speedy, and found another violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention on this account.

It quashed the Supreme Court’s decision of 10 June 2010 and awarded the applicant EUR 4,500 as just satisfaction. It did not order his release, since the applicant had been convicted in the meantime and had started to serve a prison term.

The Constitutional Court considered it unnecessary to examine the rest of the applicant’s complaints, including the one under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention regarding the length of his detention.

D. Conduct of the criminal proceedings against the applicant

31. Between the applicant’s arrest and the completion of the pre-trial investigation, the authorities conducted interviews with eighteen defendants, interviewed fifteen victims and twenty‑three witnesses, commissioned five expert opinions, analysed telecommunication recordings, conducted home searches and identity parades, and gathered a large amount of documentary evidence.

32. Between the lodging of the indictment with the trial court and the applicant’s conviction by the court of first instance, the trial court held hearings over the course of fifty-one days. The hearings were scheduled on a monthly or near monthly basis.

33. On 18 September 2008 the presiding judge of the Special Court appointed a substitute defence lawyer for the applicant to prevent the obstruction of court hearings.

34. On 15 December 2008 the presiding judge of the Special Court fined two of the applicant’s defence lawyers: one for failing to appear at three court hearings, and the other for obstructing justice.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

A. The Code of Criminal Procedure

35. Under Article 71 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (no. 301/2005 Coll.), as applicable at the relevant time, a person charged with a criminal offence could be detained where there were reasonable grounds for believing that he would: abscond (Article 71 § 1 (a)); influence witnesses or other defendants or otherwise hamper the investigation (Article 71 § 1 (b)); or continue his criminal activities, complete an attempted offence, or commit an offence which he had prepared or threatened to commit (Article 71 § 1 (c)).

B. The Constitutional Court Act 1993 and relevant practice

36. Section 20(1) provides that a complaint before the Constitutional Court must indicate the decision which the plaintiff seeks to obtain, specify the reasons for the request, and identify evidence in support. The Constitutional Court is bound by such a complaint unless the Act expressly provides otherwise (section 20(3)). Pursuant to section 50(1)(a), in addition to the information mentioned in section 20, a complaint must indicate the fundamental rights or freedoms which a plaintiff alleges have been violated.

37. In accordance with section 20(3) of the Constitutional Court Act 1993, the Constitutional Court has declared itself bound by a party’s submissions to initiate proceedings before it. The Constitutional Court has expressly stated that this is particularly relevant as regards the ruling which parties seek to obtain, as it can only decide on matters which a party has requested be determined (see, for example, decisions III. ÚS 166/02 of 6 November 2002 or III. ÚS 65/02 of 9 October 2002).

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE CONVENTION

38. The applicant complained regarding the excessive length of his detention on remand. He relied on Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows:

“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be ... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”

A. Admissibility

1. Victim status

39. The Government referred to the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 8 December 2011 (see paragraph 30 above) and argued that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim.

40. The applicant disagreed.

41. The Court reiterates that a decision or measure favourable to an applicant is not in principle sufficient to deprive the applicant of his or her status as a “victim” within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for, the breach of the Convention (see, among many authorities, Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978/05, § 115, ECHR 2010).

42. In the present case, the Constitutional Court found that the Supreme Court had breached the applicant’s right under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, in that in its decision of 10 June 2010 it had failed to give answers to all the arguments raised in his interlocutory appeal, and that the judicial authorities had breached the same provision when they had failed to review the applicant’s detention speedily. In view of those conclusions, the Constitutional Court considered it unnecessary to decide the rest of the applicant’s complaints, including the one under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention regarding the length of his detention (see paragraph 30 above).

43. The Court notes that the rights guaranteed under paragraph 3 of Article 5 are distinct from those under paragraph 4 of that provision (see Rosselet-Christ v. Slovakia, no. 25329/05, § 51, 26 October 2010). Since the Constitutional Court made no separate finding on the alleged breach of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention regarding the length of the applicant’s detention, the argument that he can no longer claim to be a victim in respect of this part of the application cannot be accepted. It follows that the preliminary objection of the Government concerning the applicant’s victim status must be dismissed.

2. Non-exhaustion of domestic remedies

44. The Government objected that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, in that he had not raised the complaint regarding the length of his detention before the Constitutional Court in accordance with the applicable procedural requirements. Relying on Obluk v. Slovakia (no. 69484/01, § 62, 20 June 2006), they argued that the applicant had formulated his first constitutional complaint only against the Supreme Court’s decision, and thus had failed to identify all authorities responsible for the alleged violation of his rights, notably the Special Court.

The Government furthermore contended that it was possible to lodge a constitutional complaint regarding the length of the applicant’s detention within two months after the delivery of the judgment by which he had been convicted by the court of first instance.

45. The applicant disagreed.

46. The Court notes at the outset that principles regarding the non‑exhaustion rule were reviewed in Koky and Others v. Slovakia (no. 13624/03, § 169, 12 June 2012).

47. As a general rule, the scope of the Constitutional Court’s examination of a case following an individual complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution is defined and limited by the summary of the complaint, as formulated in a standardised and prescribed form (petit) by the complainant (see Obluk, cited above, § 48; see paragraphs 36-37 above). However, in the present case, the Constitutional Court accepted the applicant’s constitutional complaint for further examination, including his complaint regarding the length of his detention, and expressly held that it had complied with the formal procedural requirements (see paragraph 28 above). In such a situation, the Government cannot successfully argue that the applicant wrongly formulated his complaint.

48. Nor is the Court convinced of the nature and relevance of the Government’s auxiliary argument in relation to the possibility of lodging a constitutional complaint about the length of the applicant’s detention within two months of the delivery of his first-instance judgment.

49. It follows that the preliminary objection of the Government concerning non-exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention must be dismissed.

50. The Court further notes that, given the length of the applicant’s detention, this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

1. The parties’ submissions

51. The applicant complained that his detention had been excessively long. He argued that the grounds given by the authorities to justify his detention had not been relevant and sufficient, and the competent authorities had not conducted the trial with special diligence.

52. The Government contended that the domestic courts had given sufficient and relevant reasons to justify the applicant’s detention. They pointed out that he had been charged with serious criminal activities of an organised nature and had faced a twenty to twenty-five-year prison term. The authorities had conducted the trial with special diligence. The authorities had needed to gather extensive evidence and hear a number of witnesses, but had also been obliged to adhere to the statutory time limits regarding summonsing defendants and preparing a defence. The trial court had taken necessary precautions to avoid the obstruction of justice and possible delays, for example by appointing a substitute defence counsel for the applicant and imposing fines for the obstruction of justice.

53. The applicant made no further arguments in reply to Government’s observations.

2. The Court’s assessment

54. The general principles as regards Article 5 § 3 of the Convention have recently been summarised in the case of Buzadji v. the Republic of Moldova ([GC], no. 23755/07, §§ 84-91, ECHR 2016).

(a) Period to be taken into consideration

55. The period of detention to be taken into consideration under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention starts when a person is arrested or remanded in custody and ends when he or she is released and/or the charge is determined, even if only by a court of first instance (see Buzadji, cited above, § 85).

56. In the present case, this period started on 3 October 2006, when the applicant was remanded in custody (see paragraph 7 above), and ended on 23 June 2010, when he was convicted by the court of first instance (see paragraph 22 above). Accordingly, the period of the applicant’s detention on remand to be considered in the present case is three years, eight months and twenty days.

(b) Reasonableness of the length of detention

57. The Court notes at the outset that the length of the applicant’s detention on remand – more than three and a half years – is a matter of great concern requiring a very strong justification (see Tsarenko v. Russia, no. 5235/09, § 68, 3 March 2011).

58. At the same time, the Court takes into account that the present case concerned a serious crime, namely leadership of a criminal group that had operated systematically for several years using methods of extortion, extreme violence and aggravated coercion with a view to obtaining financial gain. Thus, it was a classic example of organised crime, by definition presenting more difficulties for the investigating authorities, and later for the courts, in relation to determining the facts and the degree of responsibility of each member of the group. It is obvious that, in cases of this kind, continuous control and limitation of the defendants’ contact with each other and with other persons may be essential to avoid their absconding, tampering with evidence and, most importantly, influencing or even threatening witnesses. Accordingly, longer periods of detention than in other cases may be reasonable (see Bąk v. Poland, no. 7870/04, § 56, 16 January 2007; Luković v. Serbia, no. 43808/07, § 46, 26 March 2013; Mierzejewski v. Poland, no. 15612/13, § 42, 24 February 2015 and Podeschi v. San Marino, no. 66357/14, § 147, 13 April 2017). In the Court’s view, the fact that the case concerned the alleged leader of such a criminal group should be taken into account in assessing compliance with Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (see Tomecki v. Poland, no. 47944/06, § 30, 20 May 2008, and Luković, cited above, § 47).

59. The Court accepts that the reasonable suspicion that the applicant committed the offences he had been charged with was based on cogent evidence and persisted throughout the trial leading to his conviction. At the same time, it reiterates that the existence of reasonable suspicion cannot on its own justify pre-trial detention, and must be supported by additional grounds (see Buzadji, cited above, § 95). Thus, it will examine whether the other grounds given by the judicial authorities justified the applicant’s deprivation of liberty, and whether those grounds were “relevant” and “sufficient”.

60. When remanding the applicant in custody, the domestic authorities relied principally on two grounds: (i) the risk that he would frustrate the criminal proceedings by putting pressure on witnesses, contacting other perpetrators and tampering with evidence; and (ii) the risk that he might continue with his criminal activities. In addition, the authorities referred to the particularly serious and organised nature of the charges against the applicant, the fact that he was suspected of being the leader of the criminal group, and the complexity of the investigation (see paragraphs 7, 9, 10, 12, 14, 17, 19 and 20 above).

61. As regards the risk of collusion, the Court observes that this was the principal ground for the applicant’s detention from the time of his arrest until 27 May 2010, when all witnesses had been heard by the trial court (see paragraph 20 above). The Court acknowledges that, in cases such as the present one concerning organised criminal groups, the risk that a detainee, if released, might put pressure on witnesses or other co-accused, or otherwise obstruct the proceedings, is by the nature of things often particularly high (see Gładczak v. Poland, no. 14255/02, § 55, 31 May 2007). The Court observes that, apart from the general risk flowing from the organised nature of the applicant’s alleged criminal activities, the domestic courts relied on specific threats made to one of the victims, P.P., the testimony of one witness who had been threatened in an attempt to get him to change his testimony, and the testimony of several witnesses who were afraid to testify against the applicant if he were at liberty (see paragraphs 7 and 19 above). The domestic courts considered these fears to be serious, and allowed these witnesses to testify against the applicant in his absence. The Court accepts that the risk of collusion flowing from the nature of the applicant’s criminal activities actually existed, and justified holding him in custody on this ground for the relevant period (for similar reasoning, see Mkhitaryan v. Russia, no. 46108/11, §§ 94-98, 5 February 2013).

62. In addition to the ground analysed above, on 18 September 2007 the domestic authorities extended the grounds for the applicant’s detention by including the risk of his reoffending (see paragraph 14 above). They relied on the seriousness and nature of the charges against him at that time, and the fact that not all of the members of the criminal group had been identified. The Court reiterates that while the gravity of the crimes allegedly perpetrated by the applicant could not by itself justify the overall length of his detention, the judicial authorities relied on information relating to the applicant’s behaviour, the motives for his criminal activities, their duration, extent and methods, and his authority in the criminal group (see paragraphs 14, 17, and 20 above).

63. The Court further notes that between 27 May 2010 and 23 June 2010 the risk of reoffending was the sole ground for the applicant’s detention. During this period, the domestic courts relied heavily on the need to protect victims and witnesses who had expressed a serious fear of the applicant when testifying at the trial (see paragraph 20 above). The Court is of the opinion that, given the nature of the applicant’s alleged criminal activities, especially the methods of violence and extortion, it was reasonable for the authorities to presume, even at the later stage of the trial, that if released he might carry out his threats. Therefore, in the circumstances of the present case, the Court is prepared to accept that the authorities thoroughly evaluated the risk of the applicant’s reoffending, and were not unreasonable in fearing that he might reoffend if released.

64. The Court further observes that the Constitutional Court, in its judgment of 8 December 2011, found a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention in that the Supreme Court had failed to answer several procedural arguments posed by the applicant in its decision of 10 June 2010 (see paragraph 30 above). However, the Constitutional Court found no shortcomings in the Supreme Court’s examination of the applicant’s arguments regarding the grounds for detention, which were reviewed and answered in detail. The Court concurs with this assessment, and is of the view that the Supreme Court gave relevant and sufficient reasons for the applicant’s detention, even if it did not answer all his procedural arguments as identified by the Constitutional Court.

65. The Court further observes that the domestic authorities reviewed and extended the applicant’s detention every six months, and in the meantime regularly examined his applications for release. The judicial authorities referred to the specific facts of the case and did not use “general and abstract” arguments for his continued detention, nor can it be said that the authorities ordered or extended the applicant’s detention on identical or stereotypical grounds, using pre-existing template or formalistic and abstract language (see, a contrario, Tsarenko, cited above, § 70, and cases cited therein). The Court also notes that, with the passing of time, the courts’ reasoning evolved to reflect the state of the investigation and, later, the trial, and to verify whether the grounds for detention remained valid. In particular, on 18 September 2007 the Special Court extended the grounds for the applicant’s detention to include the risk of his reoffending, and on 27 May 2010 the same court lifted the grounds of a risk of collusion because all witnesses had already been heard (see paragraphs 14 and 20 above).

66. The Court concludes that the grounds given for the applicant’s pre‑trial detention were “relevant” and “sufficient” to justify holding him in custody for the entire period of his detention.

(c) Conduct of the proceedings

67. It remains to be ascertained whether the domestic authorities displayed “special diligence” in conducting the criminal proceedings against the applicant.

68. The Court reiterates that the proceedings were of considerable complexity and involved the collection of extensive evidence, numerous hearings, and the serving of summonses on various parties. The proceedings also required individual determination of the criminal responsibility of a number of the defendants in relation to a variety of separate criminal acts.

69. The Court observes that during the pre-trial investigation, that lasted one year and eight months, new crimes were continually revealed and investigated. In the course of the investigation, the authorities expanded the charges against the applicant on three occasions, interviewed a number of witnesses and suspects, and implemented multiple other investigative measures which appear to have been necessary and were carried out with sufficient frequency. Having regard to the fact that the pre-trial investigation concerned multiple crimes allegedly committed by a criminal group, the Court is of the view that the actions of the domestic authorities during that period could be considered as falling within the standard of special diligence under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.

70. After the case had been transferred to the first-instance court, the applicant remained in detention for another two years. During this period the trial court held hearings over the course of fifty-one days, and hearings were scheduled on a regular basis, allowing statutory time-limits for preparing a defence to be observed. At the same time, the authorities took special precautions to avoid possible frustration of the trial by the applicant by appointing him a substitute defence lawyer and imposing a fine on those who obstructed the proceedings (see paragraphs 33 and 34) (see Bąk, cited above, § 64; a contrario, Lisovskij v. Lithuania, no. 36249/14, §§ 79-80, 2 May 2017).

71. Taking into account the particular complexity of the trial and the fact that the domestic authorities took special precautions to avoid delays in the criminal proceedings, the Court does not find any delays or shortcomings in the proceedings which would indicate that the authorities did not proceed with special diligence as was required of them.

72. Having regard to the foregoing, the Court considers that there has been no violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.

II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 5 OF THE CONVENTION

73. The applicant complained of a violation of his right to obtain compensation for violation of the provisions of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention. He relied on Article 5 § 5 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.”

74. The Court reiterates that the right to compensation under Article 5 § 5 of the Convention arises only if the violation of other provisions of Article 5 has been established by a national authority or the Court (see Benham v. the United Kingdom, 10 June 1996, § 50, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑III).

75. In view of its finding that there was no violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention in this case, it concludes that Article 5 § 5 of the Convention is not applicable. It follows that this complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Declares the complaint under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention admissible and the remainder inadmissible;

2. Holds that there has been no violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 5 June 2018, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Fatoş AracıHelena Jäderblom
Deputy RegistrarPresident

 

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