THIRD SECTION
CASE OF SVETLANA VASILYEVA v. RUSSIA
(Application no. 10775/09)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
5 April 2016
FINAL
05/07/2016
This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Svetlana Vasilyeva v. Russia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Luis López Guerra, President,
Helena Jäderblom,
Helen Keller,
Johannes Silvis,
Dmitry Dedov,
Branko Lubarda,
Pere Pastor Vilanova, judges,
and Marialena Tsirli, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 15 March 2016,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 10775/09) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Ms Svetlana Gennadyevna Vasilyeva (“the applicant”), on 3 February 2009.
2. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights.
3. The applicant complained, in particular, of an interference with her property rights as a result of the quashing of a final domestic judgment delivered in her favour.
4. On 17 November 2009 the application was communicated to the Government.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
5. The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Kaliningrad.
6. On unspecified date the applicant bought a house in Kaliningrad. A third person, M., was her authorised representative for the conclusion of the purchase contract.
7. On 18 August 2003 her ownership of the house was registered in the Consolidated State Register of Real Estate Titles and Transactions (Единый государственный реестр прав на недвижимое имущество и сделок с ним, “the Land Register”) and it remains there to date.
A. Criminal proceedings against M.
8. On an unspecified date M. was charged with fraud against the Savings Bank of Russia (Сбербанк) (hereafter – “the Bank”) and a private person.
9. On 20 April 2005 a judge of the Lomonosovskiy District Court of Arkhangelsk issued an interlocutory injunction prohibiting the applicant from selling the house.
10. On 15 March 2006 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Arkhangelsk found M. guilty of fraud. The court found, inter alia, that M. was also the de facto owner of the house as she had paid for it and resided in it since 2003. The court ordered the seizure and sale of the house in order to pay M.’s debt to the victims of the crime.
11. On 9 June 2006 the Arkhangelsk Regional Court partly quashed M.’s conviction on appeal, notably as regards the District Court’s finding that she was the real owner of the house. It considered that this finding was not based on any legal provision and failed to take into account the purchase contract concerning the house. The Regional Court thus remitted that specific issue for fresh consideration in civil proceedings.
B. Civil proceedings brought by the Bank against M. and the applicant
12. On an unspecified date the Bank sued M. for additional damages and sought reimbursement by means of the sale of the house. The applicant was also summoned to the proceedings as a defendant.
13. On 17 September 2007 the Tsentralnyy District Court of Kaliningrad rejected the Bank’s civil claims and declared that the house was the applicant’s property. It held that the applicant had always demonstrated her intention to be the owner of the disputed house, notably by systematically paying all charges and taxes relating to the house, and that her mother was living in it. As regards the Bank’s request for annulment of the powers of attorney given by the applicant to M. for the purchase of the house and of the purchase contract itself, the District Court found that this claim was time-barred and consequently rejected it.
14. On unspecified date the Bank lodged an appeal against that judgment, notably arguing that the purchase contract should be declared null and void because the applicant had never intended to become the real owner of the house but was merely helping M. to cover up for her crimes.
15. On 19 December 2007 the Kaliningrad Regional Court upheld on appeal the judgment of 17 September 2007, which became final.
16. On 16 April 2008 the applicant applied to the Tsentralnyy District Court of Kaliningrad for the revocation of the interlocutory decision of 20 April 2005 by the Lomonosovskiy District Court of Arkhangelsk to seize the house.
17. On 28 April 2008 the Tsentralnyy District Court of Kaliningrad rejected the application on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction to decide on a measure imposed by another court in the framework of criminal proceedings.
18. On 4 May 2008 the Bank lodged an application for supervisory review.
19. On 18 August 2008 the Presidium of the Kaliningrad Regional Court quashed the judgment of 17 September 2007, as upheld on 19 December 2007, and ordered the seizure of the house from the applicant in order to pay M.’s debt to the Bank. The Presidium relied on the finding made by the Oktyabrskiy District Court in its judgment of 15 March 2006 that although the applicant was registered as the official owner of the house, it had been bought with funds belonging to M.
20. On 16 October 2008 and 10 March 2009 the applicant and M. challenged the judgment of the Presidium of the Kaliningrad Regional Court by way of supervisory review applications, which were rejected by the Supreme Court and the Deputy President of the Supreme Court, respectively.
C. Enforcement proceedings
21. On 8 June 2009 the bailiff decided to seize the house in accordance with the judgment of the Presidium of the Kaliningrad Regional Court.
22. On 2 April 2010 at the bailiff’s request the Tsentralnyy District Court stayed the enforcement proceedings pending examination of the applicant’s case by the Court.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
23. The relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure governing the supervisory review procedure at the material time are summarised in the Court’s decision delivered in the Martynets case (no. 29612/09, 5 November 2009).
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION AND ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 TO THE CONVENTION
24. Referring to Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the applicant complained that as a result of the quashing of the judgment in her favour delivered by the Tsentralnyy District Court on 17 September 2007 and upheld by the Kaliningrad Regional Court on 19 December 2007, she was at imminent risk of being deprived of her property. Those Articles, insofar as relevant, provide as follows:
Article 6 § 1
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal...”
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law...”
25. The Government considered that the present application should be declared inadmissible because the applicant had failed to comply with the six-month time-limit for lodging her application with the Court. They did not supply any further details to the Court in respect of their objection.
26. In their subsequent observations submitted on 7 July 2011, the Government argued that the civil courts, including that of supervisory review, only dealt with interim measures. They indicated in this respect that at the time of the proceedings before the supervisory review court the judgment of the Oktyabrskiy District Court of 15 March 2006 by which M. was convicted of fraud became final. That judgment established that M., and not the applicant, was the real owner of the house and under Article 61 § 4 of the Russian Code of Civil Procedure, a final judgment delivered in a criminal case was binding on the courts examining civil cases.
27. The Government further referred to the evidence gathered in the context of the criminal investigation, including the interview records of the applicant and her mother, which demonstrated that the disputed house had effectively been bought with the funds of M. and that the applicant was only a “frontman”. Lastly, the Government indicated that as the enforcement proceedings had been stayed, there were no reasons to believe that the applicant’s property rights had been violated.
28. The applicant contested some of those arguments. As regards compliance with the six-month time-limit, she considered that her rights had been infringed by the decision of the Presidium of the Kaliningrad Regional Court delivered on 18 August 2008. Consequently, the six-month time-limit for lodging her application with the Court had expired on 18 February 2009, whereas she had lodged her application on 3 February 2009. The applicant further contested the interpretation of different interview records submitted by the Government. She pointed out that nothing in those documents indicated that the house had been bought by M. or that it belonged to the latter in any way.
A. Admissibility
29. First, the Court cannot but agree with the applicant that she complied with the six-month time-limit, and accordingly dismisses the Government’s objection in this respect.
30. The Court further accepts the Government’s contention that the issue of the real ownership of the disputed house had first been examined in criminal proceedings brought against M. On 15 March 2006 the Oktyabrskiy District Court found that M., and not the applicant, was its real owner. However, it notes that on 9 June 2006 the Arkhangelsk Regional Court quashed that part of the judgment on appeal and sent this specific issue for consideration anew in civil proceedings (see paragraph 11 above). Consequently, the Court cannot accept the Government’s argument that the issue of the real ownership of the house had been determined in criminal proceedings by a final domestic judgment and that the civil courts only dealt with the consequences of that finding. The Court accordingly rejects the Government’s objection.
31. Lastly, the Court notes that the judgment of 18 August 2008 by which the sale of the applicant’s house was ordered remains in force and the Government did not argue that it was no longer enforceable. The Court thus dismisses the Government’s objection in this respect (see Baklanov v. Russia (dec.), no. 68443/01, 6 May 2003).
32. The Court further notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. They are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention
33. The Court notes that the applicant is still registered as the owner of the disputed house in the Land Register but could be deprived of her title at any time in accordance with the judgment of 18 August 2008 delivered by the Presidium of the Kaliningrad Regional Court. The Court thus considers that that judgment amounted to an interference with her right to the peaceful enjoyment of her possession. It must now examine whether the interference in question was lawful and was not arbitrary.
34. It is clear that the Court is not entitled to call into question the decisions reached by the Russian courts and tribunals. Nor does it have the power to reassess different evidence gathered in the framework of the domestic investigation, which had already been subject to assessment by the domestic courts in two different sets of proceedings. Its role is instead to verify whether the consequences of the interpretation and application of the domestic law by the national courts were compatible with the principles laid down in the Convention (see Buciaş v. Romania, no. 32185/04, § 39, 1 July 2014).
35. The Court has found above that the issue of the real ownership of the disputed house had not been determined in criminal proceedings (see paragraph 30 above). It results from the materials available to the Court that the examination of this issue took place before the Tsentralnyy District Court of Kaliningrad on 17 September 2007 following an application by the Bank aimed at recovering additional damages from M. (see paragraph 13 above). The Tsentralnyy District Court found that the applicant, and not M., was the real owner of the house. Its judgment was upheld on appeal by the Kaliningrad Regional Court and became final. However, on 18 August 2008 both judgments were quashed by the Presidium of the Kaliningrad Regional Court, which considered that M., and not the applicant, was the real owner of the house and consequently ordered its sale. In doing so, the Presidium based itself on the part of the judgment of the Oktyabrskiy District Court of 15 March 2006 which had been quashed on appeal by the Arkhangelskiy Regional Court, while ignoring the entire set of proceedings subsequent to that quashing, in which the domestic courts at two levels of jurisdiction had reached an opposite conclusion.
36. The Court thus considers that the judgment of the Presidium of the Kaliningrad Regional Court of 18 August 2008 constituted an unlawful interference with the applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of her possession, contrary to the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
37. There has accordingly been a violation of this provision.
2. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
38. In view of its finding under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the Court considers that it has dealt with the question at the heart of the applicant’s grievances. It therefore finds that it is not necessary to examine separately the same facts complained of under of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see, for a similar approach, Moskal v. Poland, no. 10373/05, § 83, 15 September 2009).
II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
39. Lastly, the applicant complained that the supervisory review proceedings in her case had been unfair, as the court had not referred to any evidence.
40. In the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.
41. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
42. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
43. The applicant indicated that she had been living in constant fear of losing her house. She thus considered that the mere finding of a violation would not be sufficient to compensate for the non-pecuniary damage she had suffered. She left the determination of the amount of compensation to be awarded to the Court’s discretion.
44. The Government disagreed, maintaining that the application was inadmissible.
45. The Court awards the applicant 3,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
B. Default interest
46. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
1. Declares the complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention concerning the quashing of final domestic judgments in the applicant’s favour admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention;
3. Holds that there is no need to examine separately the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
4. Holds,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months of the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement, simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 5 April 2016, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Marialena TsirliLuis López Guerra
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy