CASE OF SZABO v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

SECOND SECTION

CASE OF SZABO v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

(Application no. 17387/17)

JUDGMENT
 

STRASBOURG

19 November 2024

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Szabo v. the Republic of Moldova,

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

 Jovan Ilievski, President,
 Diana Sârcu,
 Gediminas Sagatys, judges,
and Dorothee von Arnim, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 17387/17) against the Republic of Moldova lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 8 February 2017 by a Hungarian national, Mr Attila Szabo (“the applicant”), who was born in 1971, lives in Chișinău and was represented by Ms I. Mifsud Wismayer, a lawyer practising in Chișinău;

the decision to give notice of the complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention concerning the quashing of a judgment by upholding an allegedly time-barred appeal to the Moldovan Government (“the Government”), represented by their then Agent, Mr D. Obadă, and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application;

the decision to inform the Hungarian Government of their right to intervene in the proceedings in view of the applicant’s nationality (Article 36 § 1 of the Convention and Rule 44 of the Rules of Court) and the absence on their part of any indication that they wished to intervene;

the Government’s observations;

Having deliberated in private on 22 October 2024,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1.  The case concerns the quashing of a judgment in criminal proceedings by upholding an allegedly time-barred appeal, while the ensuing proceedings resulted in the increase of the applicant’s sentence and confiscation of his property. The applicant relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

2.  On 9 September 2014 the applicant attempted to enter the Republic of Moldova, driving a car. For border control, he presented his passport issued by the Republic of Guinea-Bissau and a car registration certificate issued by the Republic of Senegal indicating him as owner. The border agents suspected that the passport and the car registration were forged, which was subsequently confirmed by an expert report on 12 September 2014.

3.  The applicant was charged with forging official documents (Article 361 of the Criminal Code) and with attempted smuggling of the car (Article 248 of the Criminal Code), and his car was seized.

4.  On 3 April 2015 the Hîncești District Court convicted the applicant of forgery, sentenced him to a fine of 10,000 Moldovan lei (MDL) (equivalent to 516 euros (EUR)) and acquitted him of attempted smuggling, ordering the return of the car to the applicant. The judgment provided that it could be appealed against within fifteen days.

5.  On 9 April 2015 the prosecutor lodged an appeal against the sentence of 3 April 2015 with the registry of the Chișinău Court of Appeal.

6.  On 15 April 2015 the Chișinău Court of Appeal, by a letter, returned the appeal to the prosecutor, noting that under Article 405(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure appeals were to be lodged with the first-instance court.

7.  On 27 April 2015 the prosecutor lodged the same appeal with the Hîncești District Court.

8.  On 11 April 2016 the Chișinău Court of Appeal upheld the prosecutor’s appeal, partially quashed the judgment of 3 April 2015, upheld the conviction for forgery and additionally convicted the applicant of attempted smuggling of the car. The court sentenced the applicant to three years’ imprisonment and ordered the special confiscation of the car as proceeds of crime.

9.  The applicant appealed against that decision arguing, inter alia, that the prosecutor’s appeal had been time-barred. On 12 July 2016 the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law, concluding that the prosecutor’s appeal had been lodged on 9 April 2015, within the statutory time-limit. The judgment was served on 9 August 2016.

10.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that the first-instance judgment in the criminal proceedings against him was quashed after the courts upheld the prosecutor’s allegedly time-barred appeal, which resulted in the increase of his sentence and the confiscation of his property on appeal.

11.  The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in force at the time of the proceedings, read as follows:

Article 402.  Time-limit for lodging an appeal

“(1)  Unless the law provides otherwise, the time-limit for lodging an appeal is 15 days after the full judgment is delivered.”

Article 403.  Reinstatement in the term for lodging an appeal

“(1  An appeal lodged after the expiry of the time-limit provided by law is considered to have been lodged within the time-limit if the court of appeal finds that the delay was caused by valid reasons, and the appeal was lodged not later than 15 days after the start of service of the sentence ....”

Article 405.  Lodging an appeal

“...(4)  An appeal shall be filed with the court that issued the judgment being appealed against, accompanied with as many copies as there are participants in the proceedings.

(5)  After the expiry of the time-limit established for lodging an appeal, the court that delivered the judgment shall send, within 5 days, to the court of appeal the case file together with the appeal and its copies, informing the parties thereof.”

Article 466.  Judgment becoming final and its enforcement

“...(2)  The judgment shall become final:

1)  on the date of pronouncement, when it is not subject to appeal;

2)  on the expiry of the time-limit for lodging an appeal:

a)  when no appeal was lodged within the time-limit;”

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

12.  The Court notes that the applicant’s complaint under Article 6 § 1 concerning the quashing of a judgment by upholding an allegedly time-barred appeal is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

13.  The applicant submitted that the proceedings had breached the principle of legal certainty as safeguarded by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention because the domestic courts upheld a time‑barred appeal, after the criminal judgment against him had become final. He contended that the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure required the prosecutor to lodge the appeal exclusively with the first-instance court. A proper appeal was lodged with the Hîncești District Court only on 27 April 2015, which was more than fifteen days after the delivery of the first-instance judgment on 3 April 2015.

14.  The Government disagreed, arguing that the appeal had been lodged on 9 April 2015 directly with the Chișinău Court of Appeal and that the domestic courts had rightly upheld it. The Government argued that the prosecutor had corrected his error by subsequently sending the first-instance court the same appeal as the one originally filed within the statutory time‑limit with the Chișinău Court of Appeal.

15.  The general principles concerning the principle of legal certainty in criminal proceedings have been summarised in Salov v. Ukraine, (no. 65518/01, §§ 93 and 95, ECHR 2005-VIII (extracts)) and Ghirea v. Moldova (no. 15778/05, §§ 30-31, 26 June 2012). The right to a fair hearing under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention presumes respect for the principle of the rule of law. One of the fundamental aspects of the rule of law is legal certainty, which requires that where the courts’ judgment has become final their ruling should not be called into question (see also Brumărescu v. Romania [GC], no. 28342/95, § 61, ECHR 1999-VII). As to compliance with procedural time-limits, the Court reiterates that it is in the first place for the national authorities, and notably the courts, to interpret domestic law and that it will not substitute its own interpretation for theirs in the absence of arbitrariness. This applies in particular to the interpretation by courts of rules of a procedural nature such as time-limits governing the filing of documents or the lodging of appeals. The Court’s role is confined to ascertaining whether the effects of such interpretation are compatible with the Convention in general and with the principle of legal certainty in particular.

16.  The Court notes at the outset that the procedural law in force at the relevant time provided that the time allowed for lodging an appeal was fifteen days after the full judgment was delivered and that the appeal was to be filed with the first-instance court (see paragraph 11 above). There is nothing in the law concerning potential correction of errors.

17.  The Court further observes that on 15 April 2015 the Chișinău Court of Appeal returned the prosecutor’s appeal without examining it, by a simple letter citing the provisions of Article 405(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The letter does not appear to be a procedural document under the Code of Criminal Procedure, instructing the prosecutor to correct the error.

18.  The Government did not inform the Court about any provisions in domestic law which would interrupt the term for lodging an appeal if it was filed with the wrong court or would provide for any time-limits for correcting such an error. At the same time, the procedural law provides for a procedure for reinstatement in the term for lodging an appeal (see Article 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in paragraph 11 above), but this legal possibility had not been used by the prosecutor in the present case. Accordingly, the Government has not provided the Court with any relevant provision or case‑law showing that the prosecutor’s appeal filed on 9 April 2015 with the Chișinău Court of Appeal had interrupted the running of the fifteen-day time‑limit. For this reason, the appeal filed with the correct court on 27 April 2015 was lodged outside the legal time-limit and no procedure for its reinstatement was sought or considered. To hold otherwise would grant the prosecutor an unfettered discretion to lodge an appeal without any constraints of legal certainty. In the light of the above, the Court cannot but conclude that the domestic courts allowed a belated appeal.

19.  The courts examined the prosecutor’s appeal and adopted a new judgment on the merits, by which they increased the applicant’s sentence, thus altering a legal situation that had become final. The examination of the appeal, leading to the quashing of a final judgment, undermined the principle of legal certainty (compare also Ghirea, cited above, § 35).

20.  There has therefore been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

21.  The Court notes that the applicant’s complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention concerning the quashing of a judgment by upholding an allegedly time-barred appeal and the ensuing confiscation of his property is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

22.  The applicant submitted that his property rights, as guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, were violated by the Chișinău Court of Appeal’s order of special confiscation of his car in proceedings in breach of the principle of legal certainty.

23.  The Government submitted that in the present case the property rights, as guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, were not violated considering that the appeal had not been time-barred.

24.  The Court reiterates that any interference with the enjoyment of property must also satisfy the requirement of proportionality. As the Court has repeatedly stated, a fair balance must be struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights. The requisite balance will not be struck where the person concerned bears an individual and excessive burden (see Brumărescu, cited above, § 78 with further references).

25.  The Court has already noted that the domestic courts allowed a belated appeal contrary to the principle of legal certainty provided by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see paragraphs 18-20 above). Accordingly, the Court finds that the special confiscation of the applicant’s car, being the result of allowing a belated appeal against a judgment which had ordered the return of the applicant’s car, represented an interference with his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his property. Even assuming that such an interference may have been lawful and be regarded as serving the public interest, the Court finds that it was not justified, as a fair balance was not preserved and the applicant was required to bear an individual and excessive burden (compare also Agurdino S.R.L. v. Moldova, no. 7359/06, §§ 39-41, 27 September 2011 with further references).

26.  It follows that there has also been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

27.  The applicant did not submit a claim for just satisfaction. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award him any sum on that account.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

Done in English, and notified in writing on 19 November 2024, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

 Dorothee von Arnim Jovan Ilievski
 Deputy Registrar President