CASE OF TARVERDIYEV v. AZERBAIJAN

FIRST SECTION

CASE OF TARVERDIYEV v. AZERBAIJAN

(Application no. 33343/03)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG 

26 July 2007

FINAL

26/10/2007

This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Tarverdiyev v. Azerbaijan,

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

MrC.L. Rozakis, President,
MrL. Loucaides,
MrsN. Vajić,
MrK. Hajiyev,
MrD. Spielmann,
MrS.E. Jebens,
MrG. Malinverni, judges,
and Mr S. Nielsen, Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 5 July 2007,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in an application (no. 33343/03) against the Republic of Azerbaijan lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Azerbaijani national, Mr Bahram Bey oglu Tarverdiyev (Bəhrəm Bəy oğlu Tarverdiyev – “the applicant”), on 29 July 2003.

2. The applicant was represented by Mr S. Mammadov. The Azerbaijani Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr C. Asgarov.

3. The applicant alleged that the failure to enforce the judgment of 20 August 2001 violated his right to a fair trial and right to an effective remedy, as guaranteed by Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention.

4. On 26 November 2004 the President of the Chamber decided to give notice of the application to the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, the Court decided to examine the merits of the application at the same time as its admissibility.

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

5. The applicant was born in 1934 and lives in Ismayilli.

A. The applicant's dismissal from his job

6. The applicant worked as a director of the Ismayilli Region Forestry (İsmayıllı meşə təsərrüfatı), which was an enterprise under the control of the Azerbmeşe Production Union (“Azərbmeşə” İstehsalat Birliyi), a state authority responsible for administration of forests. In May 2001 he fell ill for a short time and was hospitalised from 21 May to 7 June 2001.

7. On 23 May 2001, while the applicant was in hospital, he was dismissed from his job by an order of the Azerbmeşe Production Union.

B. Liquidation of the Azerbmeşe Production Union

8. On 23 May 2001, on the same day that the applicant was dismissed from his job, the Azerbmeşe Production Union was liquidated by the Presidential Decree on Establishment of the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

9. The Statute of the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (“Ministry of Environment”), approved by a presidential decree of 18 September 2001, vested it with the duty to implement activities in the field of use, restoration, creation and protection of forests.

10. In accordance with the Cabinet of Ministers' resolution of 16 October 2001, enterprises and organisations previously under control of the liquidated Azerbmeşe Production Union, including the Ismayilli Region Forestry, were transferred to the Ministry of Environment.

C. Proceedings concerning the applicant's reinstatement in his job

11. In the meantime, the applicant filed a lawsuit against the Ministry of Environment, as the legal successor of the Azerbmeşe Production Union, arguing that his dismissal had been unlawful. By a judgment of 20 August 2001, the Narimanov District Court upheld the applicant's claim. The court noted that Article 79 § 1 of the Labour Code prohibited an employer from dismissing an employee from his job during his or her temporary inability to work, which included temporary illness and hospitalisation. The court ordered the applicant's reinstatement in his job as the director of the Ismayilli Region Forestry. The court also granted the applicant's request to leave the issue of material and moral compensation open.

12. No appeals were filed against the judgment of 20 August 2001 and it entered into legal force.

13. On 12 December 2001 the Minister of Environment issued an order on liquidation of regional forest authorities, including the Ismayilli Region Forestry.

14. On 31 January 2002 the Narimanov District Court issued a writ of execution which, on 14 February 2002, was sent to the Ministry of Environment through the Narimanov District Department of Judicial Observers and Enforcement Officers (Nərimanov rayon Məhkəmə Nəzarətçiləri və Məhkəmə İcraçıları şöbəsi; hereinafter the “Narimanov Department of Enforcement Officers”).

15. On 20 February 2002 the Ministry of Environment informed the Narimanov Department of Enforcement Officers that, upon the reorganisation of the Ministry, the Ismayilli Region Forestry had been liquidated on 12 December 2001 and that, therefore, it was not possible to reinstate the applicant in his previous job.

16. By a letter of 25 February 2002, the Ministry of Environment also informed the applicant of the impossibility of the judgment's execution.

17. On 10 May 2002 the writ of execution was returned to the Narimanov District Court.

18. On 1 May 2003 the applicant was hired as an economic manager (təsərrüfat müdiri) at the Ismayilli Enterprise for Forest Protection and Restoration (İsmayıllı Meşə Mühafizəsi və Bərpası Müəssisəsi) of the Ministry of Environment. On 1 December 2003 he was dismissed from this job upon his own request.

19. In the meantime, the applicant wrote numerous letters to the Ministry of Justice, the President's Office, the Ombudsman, the Parliament, and the Constitutional Court, complaining about non-enforcement of the judgment of 20 August 2001. These letters were forwarded to the Department of Judicial Observers and Enforcement Officers of the Ministry of Justice (Azərbaycan Respublikası Ədliyyə Nazirliyinin Məhkəmə Nəzarətçiləri və Məhkəmə İcraçıları İdarəsi – “Ministry of Justice”). In its similar reply letters of 16 May 2002, 4 July 2002, 30 November 2002, 23 July 2003 and 5 June 2004, the latter informed the applicant that, due to the impossibility of execution of the judgment of 20 August 2001, the writ of execution had been returned to the Narimanov District Court. The applicant was, therefore, advised to apply to this court in order to re-institute the enforcement proceedings.

20. The case was subsequently transferred to the Yasamal District Court, as the Ministry of Environment was located under the territorial jurisdiction of that district court. On 4 April 2004 the Yasamal District Court issued a new writ of execution, instructing the Yasamal Department of Enforcement Officers to proceed with the enforcement of the judgment of 20 August 2001.

21. By a letter of 23 July 2004, the Ministry of Justice, noting the impossibility to reinstate the applicant to his previous job, requested the Ministry of Environment to provide the applicant with a similar job adequate to his professional qualification.

22. On 3 September 2004 the Ministry of Justice informed the applicant that, due to impossibility of the judgment's execution, the Yasamal Department of Enforcement Officers had returned the writ of execution to the district court.

23. On 11 November 2004 the Ministry of Justice, noting that the matter had still not been resolved, again requested the Ministry of Environment to comply with the judgment and provide the applicant with another job in accordance with Article 74 of the Labour Code. It appears that the Ministry of Environment did not respond to this request.

24. In early 2005 the Ministry of Environment filed a petition with the Narimanov District Court, requesting that the period for filing an appeal against the judgment of 20 August 2001 be restored. At the time of the latest communication with the parties, the petition was pending before the domestic courts following a series of appeals.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW

A. Labour Code of 1999

25. In accordance with Article 74.2, if a court delivers a judgment ordering reinstatement to the former post of an employee who has been unlawfully or groundlessly dismissed from his or her job, the employer must immediately execute the court's judgment and reinstate the employee in his or her former post (or another post subject to the employee's consent).

B. Code of Civil Procedure of 2000

26. Article 231.1 provides as follows:

“The judge who examined the case may, upon application by persons participating in the case and having regard to the parties' property situation and other circumstances, decide to suspend the execution of the judgment, order its execution in instalments, or modify the method and manner of its execution.”

C. Law on Civil Service of 1 September 2001

27. According to Article 2, the provisions of this Law apply to civil servants performing their service duties in the state executive, legislative and judicial authorities, as well as in the prosecution, justice, national security, border service, internal affairs, customs, tax, foreign affairs, courier communication authorities and the National Bank. The Law does not apply to employees of various enterprises subordinated to state executive authorities. Issues related to employment of such employees are regulated by the Labour Code.

D. Law on Execution of Court Judgments of 27 December 2001

28. According to Article 23.7, in case the enforcement officer takes a decision to return the writ of execution to the district court, the parties to the enforcement proceedings may lodge, with the relevant court, a complaint against this decision within 10 days after receipt of its copy.

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 6 § 1 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION

29. Relying on Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention, the applicant complained about the non-enforcement of the Narimanov District Court's judgment of 20 August 2001. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention reads as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal...”

Article 13 of the Convention provides as follows:

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

A. Admissibility

1. The Court's competence ratione temporis

30. The Court recalls that it is only competent to examine complaints of violations of the Convention arising from events that have occurred after the Convention had entered into force with respect to the High Contracting Party concerned (see, for example, Kazimova v. Azerbaijan (dec.), no. 40368/02, 6 March 2003). The Court notes that the Convention entered into force with respect to Azerbaijan on 15 April 2002.

31. Accordingly, the Court's competence is limited to the part of the application relating to the events that occurred after 15 April 2002, whereas the remainder of the application falls outside of its competence ratione temporis. Nevertheless, where necessary, the Court shall take into account the state of affairs as it existed at the beginning of the period under consideration.

2. Applicability of Article 6 § 1

32. Referring to Pellegrin v. France ([GC], no. 28541/95, ECHR 1999‑VIII), the Government argued that Article 6 did not apply to the proceedings in question. The Government maintained that the applicant, in his former capacity as the director of the Ismayilli Region Forestry, had been a civil servant and had responsibilities affecting matters of general interest and participated in the exercise of powers conferred by public law, wielding a portion of the sovereign power of the State. The Forestry was an enterprise of the Azerbmeşe Production Union which was in turn subordinated directly to the Cabinet of Ministers. The applicant's duties involved a significant responsibility in the field of regulation of natural resources, which was an area where the State exercised its sovereign power.

33. The applicant did not comment on this objection.

34. At the outset, the Court notes that, even if the complaint concerns only lengthy non-enforcement of a final judgment as in the present case, the Court will examine whether Article 6 § 1 applies to the “trial” resulting in that judgment, because the ensuing enforcement proceedings must be regarded as an integral part of that “trial” (see Kanayev v. Russia, no. 43726/02, § 19, 27 July 2006; see also paragraph 58 below).

35. The Court recalls that, for Article 6 § 1 to be applicable under its “civil” limb, there must be a dispute over a “right” that can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised in domestic law. The dispute must be genuine and serious. It may relate not only to the actual existence of a right but also to its scope and the manner of its exercise. Moreover, the outcome of the proceedings must be directly decisive for the civil right in question (see, for example, Stojakovic v. Austria, no. 30003/02, § 38, 9 November 2006, and Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 27, ECHR 2000‑VII). In the present case, it is uncontested that there was a “dispute” over a right recognised under domestic law, that the dispute was genuine and serious and that the outcome of the proceedings was directly decisive for the right concerned.

36. Furthermore, in order to determine the applicability of Article 6 § 1 to civil servants, whether established or employed under contract, the Court previously used a functional criterion based on the nature of the employee's duties and responsibilities. The only disputes excluded from the scope of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention were those which were raised by civil servants whose duties typified the specific activities of the public service in so far as the latter was acting as the depositary of public authority responsible for protecting the general interests of the State or other public authorities (see Pellegrin, cited above, §§ 64-66).

37. However, the Court notes that it has recently changed this approach, finding that the functional criterion adopted in the Pellegrin case must be further developed (see Eskelinen and Others v. Finland [GC], no. 43803/98, §§ 50-56, 19 April 2007). Specifically, the Court held in the Eskelinen case that it is primarily for the Contracting States, in particular the competent national legislature, and not the Court, to identify expressly those areas of public service involving the exercise of the discretionary powers intrinsic to State sovereignty where the interests of the individual must give way. If a domestic system bars access to a court, the Court will verify that the dispute is indeed such as to justify the application of the exception to the guarantees of Article 6. If it does not, then there is no issue and Article 6 § 1 will apply. It is for the respondent Government to demonstrate, first, that a civil-servant applicant does not have a right of access to a court under national law and, second, that the exclusion of the rights under Article 6 for the civil servant is justified (ibid., §§ 61-62).

38. In the present case, it is undisputed that under national law the applicant had access to a court to challenge the lawfulness of his dismissal. It follows that Article 6 of the Convention is applicable.

3. The applicant's victim status

39. The Government submitted that, in accordance with Article 74.2 of the Labour Code, the judgment of 20 August 2001 had been enforced because, on 1 May 2003, the applicant was appointed as an economic manager to the Ismayilli Enterprise for Forest Protection and Restoration. The Court considers that, in substance, this submission amounted to an assertion that the applicant was no longer a victim of the alleged violation of the Convention.

40. The applicant disagreed, noting that he applied for this job himself, that it was a job of a lower profile than his previous job, that he continued to demand enforcement of the judicial order to reinstate him in his previous position, and that the enforcement proceedings had not been terminated after he started to work at the Ismayilli Enterprise for Forest Protection and Restoration.

41. The Court recalls that a decision or measure favourable to an applicant is not in principle sufficient to deprive him of his status as a “victim” unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for, the breach of the Convention (see Amuur v. France, judgment of 25 June 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-III, p. 846, § 36, and Dalban v. Romania [GC], no. 28114/95, § 44, ECHR 1999-VI). Only when these conditions are satisfied does the subsidiary nature of the protective mechanism of the Convention preclude examination of an application.

42. The Court finds that, in the present case, the authorities have neither acknowledged, nor afforded redress for the alleged breach of the Convention. The judgment of 20 August 2001 expressly ordered the applicant's reinstatement in his former full-time position as the director of the Ismayilli Region Forestry. The applicant had not been reinstated in that particular position before the Forestry was liquidated. Neither has he been offered an equivalent position in an equivalent institution after the Forestry's liquidation. Although the applicant was subsequently employed as an economic manager by the Ismayilli Enterprise for Forest Protection and Restoration during the period from 1 May 2003 to 1 December 2003, his position there was not comparable to the position of a director and was of a lower grade. There is no evidence in the case file showing that the applicant was hired by the Ismayilli Enterprise for Forest Protection and Restoration as a result of enforcement of the judgment of 20 August 2001, or that the applicant had ever waived his judgment claim or consented to accept the employment at the Ismayilli Enterprise for Forest Protection and Restoration in lieu of execution of the judgment of 20 August 2001. In fact, the enforcement proceedings had not been closed and were still pending after the applicant was hired for this job (see paragraphs 20-23 above).

43. Accordingly, the Court rejects the Government's objection as to the applicant's loss of victim status.

4. Domestic remedies

44. The Government argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies. In particular, when the writ of execution was returned to the Narimanov District Court on 10 May 2002 due to impossibility to reinstate the applicant to the same position, the applicant was informed of his right to lodge an application with the court for re-initiation of the enforcement proceedings. This avenue of redress was provided for in Article 23.7 of the Law on Execution of Court Judgments. However, the applicant failed to make use of this remedy. The Government also argued that, taking into account the fact that his position at the Ismayilli Region Forestry had been liquidated, he had a right to apply to the court asking for “modification of the method and procedure of execution” of the judgment in accordance with Article 231.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”).

45. The applicant contested these submissions, claiming that he had complained to various authorities about the non-enforcement of the judgment. The applicant submitted that he was not required to challenge the decision to return the writ of execution to the district court as he had not been informed about it when the decision was taken. Furthermore, the applicant claimed that, following his complaints to various organs, the Narimanov District Court had transferred the case to the Yasamal District Court which subsequently again forwarded the writ of execution for enforcement.

46. The Court reiterates that Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, which sets out the rule on exhaustion of domestic remedies, provides for a distribution of the burden of proof. It is incumbent on the Government claiming non-exhaustion to satisfy the Court that the remedy was an effective one available in theory and in practice at the relevant time, that is to say, that it was accessible, was one which was capable of providing redress in respect of the applicant's complaints and offered reasonable prospects of success (see Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803/94, § 76, ECHR 1999-V, and Mifsud v. France (dec.) [GC], no. 57220/00, § 15, ECHR 2002-VIII). The Court further emphasises that the domestic remedies must be “effective” in the sense either of preventing the alleged violation or its continuation, or of providing adequate redress for any violation that had already occurred (see Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 158, ECHR-XI).

47. The Court notes that the Government failed to provide any explanation as to how a complaint about the return of the writ of execution to the district court could have put an end to the continued violation or to the kind of redress which the applicant could have been afforded as a result of the complaint. In any event, the Court observes that the applicant did not complain about any unlawful act on the part of the enforcement officers but, rather, about the fact that the judgment was not enforced. Even if the applicant had brought a complaint against the enforcement officer and obtained a decision confirming that the decision to return the writ of execution had been unlawful in domestic terms, such an action would only have produced repetitive results, the only outcome being the issue of another writ of execution enabling the enforcement officers to proceed with the enforcement of the judgment of 20 August 2001 (see Yavorivskaya v. Russia (dec.), no. 34687/02, 15 May 2004, and Jasiūnienė v. Lithuania (dec.), no. 41510/98, 24 October 2000). The Court concludes that such an action would have been ineffective.

48. As to the Government's argument that the applicant should have used the procedure under Article 231.1 of CCP, the Court does not see its relevance in the context of the present case. The above-mentioned Article of CCP provides for a right to request the court to suspend the execution of a judgment, or to order its execution in instalments, or to otherwise modify the method of execution. The Government did not elaborate on or provide any specific examples of how, exactly, this provision could be applied in the present case and what results the applicant could expect to obtain by using it. In any event, it appears that, usually, this procedure may be used by a defendant in cases of inability to execute a judgment due to financial difficulties or other impeding circumstances. The Court does not see any reason why the applicant, a claimant whose claim of reinstatement had been granted by the final court judgment and was thus enforceable, should be required to resort to this procedure when no part of the responsibility for failure to execute the judgment is attributable to him. In sum, the Court finds that the Government have failed to substantiate their contention that the remedy at issue was an effective one.

49. For the above reasons, the Court finds that the application cannot be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.

5. Six-months rule

50. The Government argued that the “last decision” in the present case was taken on 10 May 2002 when the Narimanov Department of Enforcement Officers returned the writ of execution to the Narimanov District Court. According to the Government, more than six months elapsed between this “last decision” and the date of submission of the application form to the Court in December 2003.

51. For the purposes of clarification, the Court notes that, although the complete application form was submitted by the applicant at a later date, the formal date of introduction of the application was 29 July 2003, the date on which the applicant submitted his initial letter with the intention to lodge a complaint with the Court. Moreover, after the decision of 10 May 2002, new decisions were taken by enforcement authorities (see paragraphs 20 and 22 above).

52. In any event, the Court finds that the argument is irrelevant. The decision of 10 May 2002 is a decision taken by the enforcement officer in the course of enforcement proceedings. As stated above, the applicant did not complain about unlawful acts of the enforcement officers but, rather, about the fact that the judgment of 20 August 2001 was not enforced. Accordingly, in so far as the judgment is still in force and remains unexecuted, the situation the applicant complained about is of a continuing nature. In such circumstances, no issue arises under the six-month rule of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.

53. Accordingly, the Court rejects this objection.

6. Conclusion

54. Having regard to its findings above, the Court further notes that the application is not inadmissible on any other grounds and that it is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible in the part relating to the period after 15 April 2002.

B. Merits

55. The Government did not submit any observations on the merits other than reiterating their argument that the applicant's subsequent “appointment” as an economic manager at the Ismayilli Enterprise for Forest Protection and Restoration should be regarded as the full execution of the judgment of 20 August 2001 in accordance Article 74.2 of the Labour Code. The Court notes that it already rejected the identical argument in its findings concerning the applicant's victim status (see paragraphs 39-43 above).

56. The applicant reiterated his complaint. He also noted that the Government's position was self-contradictory. On the one hand, the domestic enforcement authorities repeatedly claimed that it had been impossible to enforce the judgment of 20 August 2001 due to the liquidation of the Ismayilli Region Forestry. On the other hand, the Government claimed before the Court that the judgment had been enforced.

57. The applicant further argued that the currently-existing Ismayilli Enterprise for Forest Protection and Restoration was an institution which in fact replaced, and was equivalent to, the liquidated Ismayilli Region Forestry. Therefore, in accordance with the judgment of 20 August 2001, he should have been appointed as a director of that institution by an order of the Minister of Environment.

58. The Court reiterates that Article 6 § 1 secures to everyone the right to have any claim relating to his civil rights and obligations brought before a court or tribunal; in this way it embodies the “right to a court”, of which the right of access, that is the right to institute proceedings before courts in civil matters, constitutes one aspect. However, that right would be illusory if a Contracting State's domestic legal system allowed a final, binding judicial decision to remain inoperative to the detriment of one party. It would be inconceivable that Article 6 § 1 should describe in detail procedural guarantees afforded to litigants – proceedings that are fair, public and expeditious – without protecting the implementation of judicial decisions; to construe Article 6 as being concerned exclusively with access to a court and the conduct of proceedings would be likely to lead to situations incompatible with the principle of the rule of law which the Contracting States undertook to respect when they ratified the Convention. Execution of a judgment given by any court must therefore be regarded as an integral part of the “trial” for the purposes of Article 6 (see Hornsby v. Greece, judgment of 19 March 1997, Reports 1997‑II, p. 510, § 40).

59. The Court further recalls that a delay in the execution of a judgment may be justified in particular circumstances. But the delay may not be such as to impair the essence of the right protected under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Burdov v. Russia, no. 59498/00, § 35, ECHR 2002‑III). In the instant case, the applicant should not have been prevented from benefiting from the success of the litigation which concerned reinstatement in his job after wrongful dismissal.

60. The Court notes that, from the date of the Convention's entry into force with respect to Azerbaijan on 15 April 2002, the Narimanov District Court's judgment of 20 August 2001 remained unenforced for more than five years (until the present date). Before 15 April 2002, the judgment had not been enforced for several months. The Court is prepared to accept that, in the instant case, the internal reorganisation of the enterprises under the control of the Ministry of Environment, including the liquidation of the Ismayilli Region Forestry, created certain difficulties in the execution of the judgment of 20 August 2001. Nevertheless, the judgment remained in force, but for several years no adequate measures were taken by the authorities to comply with it. No reasonable justification was advanced by the Government for this delay.

61. By failing to take the necessary measures to comply with the final judgment in the instant case, the authorities deprived the provisions of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention of all useful effect (see Burdov, cited above, § 37). There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

62. The Court does not consider it necessary to rule on the complaint under Article 13 of the Convention because Article 6 is lex specialis in regard to this part of the application (see, for example, Jasiūnienė v. Lithuania, no. 41510/98, § 32, 6 March 2003).

II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

63. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

64. The applicant demanded that the judgment of 20 August 2001 be enforced, but did not submit a claim for just satisfaction within the time‑limit set by the Court. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award him any sum on that account.

65. However, the Court considers that, in so far as the judgment of 20 August 2001 remains in force, the State's outstanding obligation to enforce it cannot be disputed. Accordingly, the applicant is still entitled to enforcement of that judgment. The Court recalls that the most appropriate form of redress in respect of a violation of Article 6 is to ensure that the applicant as far as possible is put in the position he would have been in had the requirements of Article 6 not been disregarded (see Piersack v. Belgium (Article 50), judgment of 26 October 1984, Series A no. 85, p. 16, § 12). Having regard to the violation found, the Court finds that in the present case this principle applies as well. It therefore considers that the Government shall secure, by appropriate means, the enforcement of the judgment of 20 August 2001.

66. The Court further points out that its judgments are essentially declaratory in nature. In general, it is primarily for the State concerned to choose the means to be used in its domestic legal order in order to discharge its legal obligation under Article 46 of the Convention (see Shofman v. Russia, no. 74826/01, § 53, 24 November 2005, with further references). By finding a violation of Article 6 § 1 in the present case, the Court has established the Government's obligation to take appropriate measures to remedy the applicant's individual situation, i.e. ensure the compliance with the applicant's enforceable claim under the judgment of 20 August 2001 (compare with Fadeyeva v. Russia, no. 55723/00, § 142, ECHR 2005-...). Whether such measures would involve reinstating the applicant in an equivalent job at an equivalent institution or, in case of impossibility to do so, granting him reasonable compensation for non-enforcement, or a combination of these and other measures, is a decision that falls to the respondent State. The Court, however, emphasises that any measures adopted must be compatible with the conclusions set out in the Court's judgment (see Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], no. 71503/01, § 202, ECHR 2004-II, with further references).

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1. Declares the application admissible;

2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;

3. Holds that there is no need to examine the complaint under Article 13 of the Convention;

4. Holds that the respondent State, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, shall secure, by appropriate means, the enforcement of the judgment of 20 August 2001.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 26 July 2007, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Søren NielsenChristos Rozakis
RegistrarPresident

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