CASE OF TEPLJAKOV v. ESTONIA

THIRD SECTION

CASE OF TEPLJAKOV v. ESTONIA

(Application no. 10753/21)

JUDGMENT
 

STRASBOURG

28 November 2023

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Tepljakov v. Estonia,

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

 Jolien Schukking, President,
 Peeter Roosma,
 Andreas Zünd, judges,
and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 10753/21) against the Republic of Estonia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 9 February 2021 by an Estonian national, Mr Jevgeni Tepljakov, born in 1976 (“the applicant”) who was represented by Mr M. Põbo, a lawyer practising in Pärnu;

the decision to give notice of the complaints under Articles 3, 8 and 10 of the Convention concerning conditions of detention, family meetings during detention and access to an online legal database to the Estonian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms M. Kuurberg, Representative of Estonia to the European Court of Human Rights, and subsequently by Mr T. Kolk, her successor in that office, and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated in private on 7 November 2023,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1.  The case concerns conditions of detention in Pärnu Arrest House where the applicant spent several separate periods in pre-trial detention (varying from 6 days to 100 days at a time, 345 days altogether) between August 2016 and December 2018. He spent the remainder of his pre-trial detention in Tallinn Prison.

2.  The domestic courts found that the ventilation and access to natural light were insufficient in Pärnu Arrest House; that the toilet was not adequately separated from the rest of the cell (which the applicant sometimes shared with other detainees); that the applicant had no possibility to spend time outdoors as there was no outside yard; that without any fault on the applicant’s part the authorities had limited his meetings with family members to approximately ten minutes at a time; and that the arrest house provided no technical possibilities for detainees to have access to a certain online legal database.

3.  Assessing all the above-mentioned shortcomings in conjunction, the domestic courts awarded the applicant 1,500 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage while the applicant had claimed EUR 3,450 before the Tallinn Court of Appeal.

4.  With regard to access to the online legal database, the first-instance court initiated constitutional review proceedings. By a judgment no. 5-19-41 of 18 December 2019 the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a part of the section 31(3) of the Regulation no. 21 of the Minister of the Interior on the Internal Rules of the Arrest House (Arestimaja sisekorraeeskiri). Under this provision detainees were authorised to have access to an online database containing legal acts and court judgments “in so far as the arrest house had technical conditions for it.” The Supreme Court observed that the restriction in question interfered with the constitutional right to freely obtain information disseminated for public use. It noted that that above-mentioned clause left it entirely up to each arrest house whether to provide access to the legal database in question or not. However, section 311 of the Imprisonment Act (as in force at the relevant time) provided that remand prisoners had the right to access that legal database. The Supreme Court found that the Imprisonment Act did not authorise the minister to set any further restrictions to such access. The impugned restriction was thus not based on law and was accordingly unconstitutional.

5.  The applicant invokes complaints about the physical conditions of detention in Pärnu Arrest House, about the meetings with family members and a lack access to the online legal database.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

 ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLEs 3, 8 and 10 OF THE CONVENTIONAdmissibility

6.  In view of the applicant’s complaints and the Government’s observations regarding admissibility and merits, the Court considers that the question of whether the redress afforded by the national courts was sufficient for the applicant to no longer be able to argue that he was a victim of a violation of Articles 3, 8 and 10 is inextricably linked to the merits of his complaints. It therefore joins the Government’s preliminary objection in respect of the applicant’s victim status to the merits of his complaints.

7.  The Court notes that the applicant’s complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention nor are they inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.MeritsThe Court’s assessment concerning the compatibility of the applicants’ conditions of detention with Articles 3, 8 and 10 of the Convention

8.  The Government disputed that the conditions of the applicant’s detention have reached the threshold of a violation of his Convention rights. The Court notes that in making their findings the domestic courts relied, inter alia, on the Court’s case-law and on the standards pronounced by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

9.  More specifically, as to the complaints under Article 3 of the Convention, the parties do not dispute that no issues have arisen in respect of overcrowding during the applicant’s detention. At the same time, it has been established that the applicant was unable to have any outdoor walks during his time in detention in Pärnu Arrest House, which amounted to a total of 345 days, combined with insufficient ventilation and access to natural light (as identified by the domestic courts) and the fact that the toilet was only partially separated from the rest of the cell, not offering sufficient hygiene and privacy in a multi-occupancy cell. In such circumstances, the Court finds that the applicant was subjected to hardship going beyond the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention (see, for example, Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42525/07 and 60800/08, §§ 149-59, 10 January 2012, and cases cited therein; Varga and Others v. Hungary, nos. 14097/12 and 5 others, § 78, 10 March 2015; and Fenech v. Malta, no. 19090/20, § 76, 1 March 2022, with further references, in particular in respect of the length of detention periods without access to outdoor activity). The fact that the applicant spent the periods when he was not in Pärnu Arrest House in Tallinn Prison (regarding which he has not raised any complaints) or that he could spend time outside his cell while meeting with his counsel or when being escorted in relation various procedural actions does not alter the above finding.

10. As to the access to the online legal database, the Court reiterates that Article 10 cannot be interpreted as imposing a general obligation to provide access to the Internet, or to specific Internet sites, for (remand) prisoners (see Kalda v. Estonia no. 17429/10, §§ 45, 19 January 2016). However, in the circumstances of the present case, the remand prisoners’ access to the legal database in question was, in fact, authorised under the Imprisonment Act (see paragraph 4 above; compare Kalda, cited above, §§ 45 and 49; and Ramazan Demir v. Turkey, no. 68550/17, §§ 35-38, 9 February 2021). Furthermore, the Supreme Court established that the limitation provided in the Internal Rules of the Arrest House, which allowed remand prisoners to access that legal database only if the arrest house had suitable technical conditions for it was unconstitutional, as the minister had had no legal grounds for enacting such a restriction. The Court therefore concludes that the restriction in question interfered with the applicant’s right to receive information under Article 10 and that such an interference was not “prescribed by law” within the meaning of that Article. Accordingly, it was not in accordance with Article 10 of the Convention.

11.  The fact that the applicant could consult with his State legal aid defence lawyer during the period in question in the present case does not alter the above finding. The Court notes that the applicant has explained that in parallel to the criminal proceedings against him he had also been involved in civil litigation where he had had to represent himself and thus had had a need to consult relevant law.

12.  As to the family meetings, the Court notes that save for the period when the applicant was banned from having such meetings between August 2016 and February 2017 following a prosecutor’s decision (which is not subject to the dispute in the present case), such meetings – altogether eleven of them – did take place. The domestic courts established that although under relevant domestic law remand prisoners were allowed to have meetings that lasted up to three hours at a time, Pärnu Arrest House authorities limited applicant’s meetings to ten minutes at a time. There was no indication that the short duration of the meetings could anyhow be attributed to the applicant.

13.  An interference with a prisoner’s right to respect for his family life does not need to amount to an outright ban on family visits (see, for example, Andrey Smirnov v. Russia, no. 43149/10, § 37, 13 February 2018). The Court finds that the impugned limitation to the family meetings interfered with the applicant’s rights under Article 8 of the Convention. Furthermore, in the light of the reasons provided by the domestic courts, this interference does not seem to have served any legitimate aim in the sense of that Article. In that respect the Government only noted that Pärnu Arrest House lacked a separate room for such meetings and that the short duration of the meetings was due to “technical engineering and security reasons”. Against this background, the Court finds that the interference was not in accordance with Article 8 of the Convention. The fact that the applicant was at the same time allowed to make telephone calls to his family members and correspond through written letters does not alter that finding.The applicant’s victim status

14.  It remains for the Court to ascertain whether the amount of compensation awarded by the domestic courts – in so far as they found a violation of the applicant’s rights – was sufficient to compensate the applicant for his grievances under Articles 3, 8 and 10 of the Convention.

15.  As to the complaint under Article 10, the Court notes that in the case of Kalda (cited above, § 58), it considered that a finding of violation constituted in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant. It sees no reason to reach a different conclusion in the case at hand. Given that the domestic courts acknowledged the violation of the applicant’s right to receive information and took this aspect into account when making an award in respect of non-pecuniary damage, the Court concludes that the Government’s objection should be upheld and the applicant can no longer be considered a “victim” of an Article 10 violation.

16.  As to the complaints under Articles 3 and 8, given the duration of the interference and its nature, the Government argued that the domestic courts have not only expressly acknowledged the alleged violations, but have granted sufficient redress to the applicant’s grievances. They pointed to the extensive reasoning of the domestic courts based on the applicable legislation, on the case-law of the Supreme Court explaining the principles of calculation of non-pecuniary damages in similar circumstances, as well as on the overall economic situation and the standard of living in Estonia at the relevant time. Referring to the principle of subsidiarity as explained and applied by the Court in similar cases (referring in particular to Domjan v. Hungary (dec.), no. 5433/17, §§ 27-28, 14 November 2017, with further references) and to several cases decided by the Court concerning inadequate conditions of detention, they contended that the compensation awarded to the applicant, i.e. a lump sum of EUR 1,500, had not been unreasonably low and could be considered as constituting approximately 30% of the amount that the Court could have awarded.

17.  The Court recalls that whether the amount of compensation awarded by the domestic courts may be regarded as reasonable and sufficient to compensate the applicants for their grievances under Article 3 falls to be assessed in the light of all the circumstances of the case. These include also the value of the award judged in the light of the ordinary living standards and the general level of incomes in the State concerned and the fact that the remedy in the national system is closer and more accessible than an application to the Court. The Court further accepts that the task of making an estimate of damages to be awarded is a difficult one, especially in a case where personal suffering, whether physical or mental, is the subject of the claim. There is no standard by which pain and suffering, physical discomfort and mental distress and anguish can be measured in terms of money. The domestic courts should, in each case, attempt to assess the cumulative effect which the conditions of detention have on the applicant’s well-being and determine the level of physical suffering, emotional distress, anxiety or other harmful effects sustained by the prisoner by reason of his detention in those conditions. The level of compensation awarded for non-pecuniary damage must not be unreasonable in comparison with the awards made by the Court in similar cases (see, among others, Nikitin and Others v. Estonia (nos. 23226/16 and 6 others, § 197, 29 January 2019, with further references).

18.  Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court is satisfied that, unlike the above-mentioned case of Nikitin and Others, the domestic courts have not applied a restrictive approach to time-limits or incorrect calculation of the personal space allocated to detainees (ibid., § 199). They examined the particular severity of the violations (see paragraph 2 above) and took into account the domestic guidance as concerns the discretion in making such awards as well as the length of different periods of detention.

19.  At the same time the Court has already noted above that the applicant has not been able to take daily outdoor walks for periods as long as 100 days in a row and that the overall period when the conditions of detention have been in contravention of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention has lasted for 345 days (see paragraph 9). The Court bears in mind the awards with respect to Article 3 it has made in comparable circumstances (see, for example, Ozarovskij and Others v. Lithuania [Committee], no. 17774/20 and 5 others, § 14, 1 March 2022, and Laniauskas and Januška v. Lithuania [Committee], nos. 74111/13 and 53460/15, §§ 24-51, 25 September 2018). It further stresses that in the present case violation of more than one Convention right was at stake. Taking into account the general economic situation as raised by the Government, the Court finds that the amount of EUR 1,500 awarded by the domestic courts in compensation was unreasonably low and cannot be considered to constitute appropriate redress for the violations complained of.

20.  The Court therefore dismisses the Government’s preliminary objection of loss of applicant’s victim status with regard to his complaints under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention.

21.  In the light of the above reasoning the Court concludes that there has been a violation of the applicant’s rights under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention.

APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

22.  The applicant claimed EUR 15,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 3,770.48 in respect of costs and expenses (representative’s fees and translation costs) incurred before the Court.

23.  The Government considered that given that the Convention had not been violated in respect of the applicant, there was no basis for awarding any compensation. Furthermore, they submitted that, should the Court find a violation of the applicant’s rights, such a finding would in itself constitute sufficient just satisfaction.

24.  The Court, acting in equity, taking into account the duration and scale of the violation of the applicant’s rights and the compensation already awarded by the domestic courts, as well as having regard to the national economic circumstances and comparable relevant case-law (see paragraph 19 above), awards the applicant EUR 6,800 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.

25. Regard being had to the documents in its possession and considering that in order to give rise to reimbursement, any costs and expenses must be necessarily incurred and reasonable as to quantum, the Court awards the applicant EUR 3,770.48 for the proceedings before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,Joins to the merits the Government’s preliminary objection of loss of applicant’s victim status;Declares the complaints concerning Articles 3, 8 and 10 admissible;Holds that the applicant may no longer claim to be a victim of a violation of Article 10 of the Convention;Dismisses the Government’s preliminary objection of loss of the applicant’s victim status in respect of his complaints under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention;Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention;Holds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention;Holds

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts:

(i)  EUR 6,800 (six thousand eight hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(ii)  EUR 3,770.48 (three thousand seven hundred seventy euros and forty-eight cents), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 28 November 2023, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

 Olga Chernishova Jolien Schukking
 Deputy Registrar President

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