CASE OF TOPI v. ALBANIA

SECOND SECTION

CASE OF TOPI v. ALBANIA

(Application no. 14816/08)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

22 May 2018

FINAL

22/08/2018

This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Topi v. Albania,

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

Robert Spano, President,
Paul Lemmens,
Ledi Bianku,
Işıl Karakaş,
Nebojša Vučinić,
Jon Fridrik Kjølbro,
Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström, judges,
and Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 17 April 2018,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in an application (no. 14816/08) against the Republic of Albania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Albanian national, Arben Topi (“the applicant”), on 14 February 2008.

2. The applicant was represented by Mr A. Kasapi, a lawyer practising in Tirana. The Albanian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their then Agent, Ms L. Mandia of the State Advocate’s office.

3. The applicant alleged that he had been denied access to the Constitutional Court and that his trial in absentia had breached Article 6 of the Convention.

4. On 26 June 2012 the application was communicated to the Government.

5. The Government implicitly objected to the examination of the case by a Committee (Article 28 § 1 (b)), arguing that it included issues that were not the subject of the Court’s well-established case-law. The Court accepts that objection.

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

6. The applicant was born in Peqin in 1977. He is currently serving a prison sentence.

7. In 1998 the applicant was implicated in the commission of the criminal offence of setting up and being a member of an armed gang and of other criminal offences.

8. On 4 February 1999 the prosecutor charged him with the offences of membership of an armed gang, attempted intentional murder and other crimes. The notification of the prosecutor’s charges was acknowledged by the applicant’s officially appointed lawyer.

9. It appears that throughout the investigation proceedings the applicant was represented by an officially appointed lawyer.

10. On 12 February 1999 the Elbasan District Court ordered the applicant’s arrest. However, the order could not be enforced as the applicant could not be traced.

11. On 19 February 1999 the Elbasan District Court declared the applicant a fugitive from justice after unsuccessful attempts to locate him. The decision stated that it was impossible to find him as it appeared that he had escaped to an unknown destination (këto kërkime nuk kanë bërë të mundur kapjen e të pandehurit pasi ai rezulton të ketë ikur në drejtim të paditur).

12. On an unspecified date the prosecutor decided to commit the applicant for trial.

13. On 28 May 1999 the Supreme Court transferred the case for examination to the Durrës District Court.

14. On 2 June 1999 the applicant’s father appointed a lawyer to represent the applicant before the domestic courts.

15. The trial proceedings against the applicant were conducted in absentia and he was represented by a lawyer appointed by his family in accordance with Article 48 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CCP”).

16. On 15 February 2000 the Durrës District Court convicted the applicant in absentia of establishing and participating in an armed gang and attempted intentional murder. He was sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment. The decision was based on evidence from documents and witness testimony.

17. The applicant’s family-appointed lawyer and the other co-accused appealed against the conviction to the Durrës Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”). On 19 April 2000 the Court of Appeal declined to examine the applicant’s appeal on the grounds that the applicant’s family had not given any express authority to the lawyer for such a procedure. However, the Court of Appeal examined the applicant’s case as part of its overall examination, having regard to the appeals of the other defendants. It convicted the applicant of the same offences as before and sentenced him to thirteen years’ imprisonment.

18. On 7 December 2000 the Supreme Court dismissed appeals by the applicant and other co-accused against the Court of Appeal’s decision of 19 April 2000.

19. On 16 September 2005 the applicant was arrested by the Czech authorities on the basis of an arrest warrant issued by Albania.

20. On 25 January 2006 the applicant was extradited to Albania.

21. On 1 March 2006 the applicant was officially informed of his conviction in absentia.

22. On 13 September 2007 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal against the conviction in absentia.

23. On 24 October 2007 the Constitutional Court, sitting in camera, declared the appeal time-barred as the two-year time-limit had started to run on 7 December 2000. The Constitutional Court’s reasoning stated that throughout the proceedings the applicant had been represented by a court‑appointed lawyer or a family-appointed lawyer and that accordingly he had had the opportunity to become acquainted with the proceedings brought against him.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

24. The relevant domestic law and practice at the material time have been described in detail in the judgments of Shkalla v. Albania (no. 26866/05, §§ 28-35, 10 May 2011), and Izet Haxhia v. Albania, (no. 34783/06, §§ 19-42, 5 November 2013).

25. On 30 March 2017 the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”) was amended by Law no. 35/2017 and the new provisions entered into force on 1 August 2017. The relevant new provisions applicable to the present case read as follows:

Article 147 – Leave to appeal out of time (rivendosja në afat) (as amended in 2017)

“1. The prosecutor, the defendant, the victim or accusing victim, and the private parties are allowed to have the time-limit reset if they establish that they were unable to comply with the time-limit owing to unforeseen events or force majeure.

2. Leave to appeal out of time cannot be granted more than once in respect of each party and of each stage of the proceedings.

3. An application for the resetting of the time-limit for appeal must be lodged within ten days of the date of the cessation of unforeseen events or force majeure. The application shall be examined by the authority seized at the time of its introduction (për kërkesën vendos organi që procedon në kohën e paraqitjes së saj).

4. An appeal against a refusal to grant leave to appeal out of time may be lodged with the court within five days ...”.

Article 410 – The defendant’s appeal (as amended in 2017)

“2. Defence counsel may lodge an appeal against a conviction in absentia in so far as he has been specifically authorised by the defendant, by means of a power of attorney issued in accordance with the law, or a statement made at the hearing”.

Article 420 § 1 – Leave to appeal out of time (rivendosja në afatin e ankimit) (added in 2007)

“1. The parties are allowed to have the time-limit reset if they establish that they were unable to comply with the time-limit owing to unforeseen events or force majeure ...

2. In the event of trial in absentia [as a result of the defendant’s withdrawal from attending the proceedings], the defendant may request the resetting of the time-limit for appealing against the decision if he can establish that he has not been notified of the decision.

3. An application for the resetting of the time-limit for appeal must be lodged within ten days of the date of the cessation of unforeseen events or force majeure. For the case provided for in paragraph 2 of this Article, an application must be lodged within ten days of the date on which the defendant effectively acquires knowledge of the decision. Leave to appeal out of time cannot be granted more than once in respect of each party and of each stage of the proceedings.

...

8. An appeal against a refusal to grant leave to appeal out of time may be lodged with the court of appeal within five days ...”.

Article 450 – Cases for review (as amended in 2017)

“An application for review [of a final decision] may be lodged:

a) if the facts on which the decision was based do not comply with those of another final decision;

(b) if the [court rendering the] decision has relied on a civil or administrative court decision which has subsequently been quashed;

(c) if, subsequent to the decision, new evidence has emerged or has been found which, independently or together with previous evidence, proves that the decision is wrong;

(d) if it is proved that the decision was given as a result of the falsification of judicial acts or another fact that constitutes a criminal offence.

(e) if the European Court of Human Rights has adopted a judgment which makes a review of the case necessary ...

(f) if the extradition of a person convicted in absentia is granted on the explicit assurance that the case will be reviewed. The application for review shall be lodged within thirty days of the date on which the person is extradited...

(g) if the person is tried in absentia ... and is asking that the case be reviewed. The application for review should be lodged within thirty days of the date on which the defendant acquired knowledge [of the trial in absentia] ...”.

III. COUNCIL OF EUROPE MATERIAL

26. On 21 September 2017 the Committee of Ministers gave a decision on the execution of the judgment in the case of Shkalla (cited above) concerning, among other matters, the Albanian authorities’ failure to reopen proceedings in absentia. This decision, which was adopted at its 1265th meeting, stated, in so far as relevant:

“The Deputies

1. noted with satisfaction the individual measures taken in these cases, in particular that all the applicants have had an effective possibility to obtain reopening of the impugned proceedings and that, for those applicants who requested it, guarantees were given that the new proceedings either had been or would be conducted in accordance with the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention and that, pending these proceedings, the applicants could request release; considered accordingly that no further individual measures are required in this group of cases;

...

3. encouraged the authorities rapidly to finalise the ongoing reform of the judicial system to prevent further violations concerning the lack of guarantees surrounding criminal proceedings in absentia, the right to defend oneself in court and the appearance of witnesses; decided to continue their supervision of these measures in the cases of Caka, Cani and Izet Haxhia, and to close the similar cases Berhani and Shkalla”.

27. On 7 December 2017 the Committee of Ministers gave a decision on the execution of the judgment in the case of Izet Haxhia (cited above) concerning, among other matters, the Albanian authorities’ failure to reopen proceedings in absentia. This decision, which was adopted at its 1302nd meeting, stated, in so far as relevant:

“The Deputies

...

2. welcomed the general measures taken, in particular the legislative amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure adopted on 30 March 2017 concerning the guarantees surrounding criminal proceedings in absentia, the right to defend oneself in court and the appearance of witnesses; considered that the adopted general measures are sufficient to prevent similar violations and that these cases can be thus closed”.

28. In the resolution of the same day, the Committee of Ministers stated, in so far as relevant:

“The Deputies

...

Recalling the respondent State’s obligation, under Article 46, paragraph 1, of the Convention, to abide by all final judgments in cases to which it has been a party and that this obligation entails, over and above the payment of any sums awarded by the Court, the adoption by the authorities of the respondent State, where required:

- of individual measures to put an end to violations established and erase their consequences so as to achieve as far as possible restitutio in integrum;”

29. By this resolution, the Committee of Ministers closed the examination of the Izet Haxhia judgment.

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION

30. The applicant complained under Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention that he had been denied access to the Constitutional Court and that his trial in absentia had breached Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

31. The Court, which is master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, finds that the above complaints fall to be examined solely under Article 6 § 1 taken alone, which reads as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”

A. The parties’ submission

1. The Government’s submissions

32. The Government submitted that the Albanian State was in the process of judicial reform, with a view to improving legislation and guaranteeing the fundamental rights of individuals. In the framework of the reform programme, the State had made essential amendments to the criminal legislation by means of Law no. 35/2017 of 30 March 2017, namely to Articles 410 and 449-451 of the CCP and the introduction of a new provision, Article 420 § 1. They also submitted that the Committee of Ministers had closed the examination of the judgments in the cases of Shkalla v. Albania (no. 26866/05, 10 May 2011), and Izet Haxhia v. Albania (no. 34783/06, November 2013)

33. The Government also submitted that the domestic shortcomings identified in the cases of Shkalla and Izet Haxhia (cited above), which also concerned the present case, had been addressed by the general measures adopted in the framework of the judicial reform, in order to prevent similar violations in the future relating to the unfairness of criminal proceedings.

34. In their initial submissions, the Government submitted that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies. He could have lodged a request for leave to appeal out of time against the decision of the District Court in accordance with the then Article 147 of the CCP.

35. The Government accepted that the applicant had been tried and convicted in absentia. The applicant had been impossible to find. As a result, notifications had been sent to his officially appointed lawyer, in accordance with the law. The domestic courts had declared him to be a fugitive from justice and had continued the proceedings in absentia after unsuccessful attempts to trace him. However, they argued that the domestic proceedings had not been unfair. The applicant had been represented either by a family-appointed lawyer or a court-appointed lawyer and the applicant’s defence rights had been respected.

36. The Government also submitted that the applicant had been aware of his prosecution and trial. They had regard to the fact that the events had occurred in a small town where everyone knew each other. They also referred to the fact that there had been wide coverage in the national and local media of the events in question and that the applicant’s relatives had been aware of the trial against him.

37. They finally submitted that the time-limit to bring a constitutional complaint in proceedings held in absentia started to run from the date the final decision was notified to the accused. However, in the present case there had been no denial of access to court as the applicant had been aware of the proceedings against him.

2. The applicant’s submissions

38. The applicant submitted that the introduction of the general measures addressing the shortcomings identified in the cases of Shkalla and Izet Haxhia (cited above) were certainly welcome, but did not affect his case given that his complaints related to events that happened 10 years ago.

39. The applicant contended that an action for leave to appeal out of time was not an ordinary means of appeal. He further submitted that he had had recourse to the Constitutional Court pursuant to Article 131 (f) of the Constitution after the domestic courts had finally ruled on the merits of the case.

40. In his application form the applicant alleged that he had not been notified in person of any acts, nor had he had any information during the criminal investigation and the court proceedings. He had been notified only when he had been extradited to Albania. In his submissions he submitted that he had not been aware of the proceedings against him. Gaining informal knowledge of a prosecution and trial was not in accordance with Article 6 § 3 (a) of the Convention.

41. The applicant stated in addition that there had been a breach of his right of access to court as a result of the Constitutional Court’s dismissal of his constitutional appeal, as he had only been informed about the proceedings in absentia in March 2006.

B. The Court’s assessment

1. Admissibility

(a) As regards the new remedies introduced in 2017

42. The Court reiterates that the assessment of whether domestic remedies have been exhausted is normally carried out with reference to the date on which the application was lodged with it. However, this rule is subject to exceptions, which may be justified by the particular circumstances of each case (see, for example, Baumann v. France, no. 33592/96, § 47, ECHR 2001‑V (extracts). In this light, the Court will examine whether the Government in 2017 introduced any new effective remedy which the applicant could make use of, taking account of the Government’s explicit reference to those provisions, which the Court considers appropriate to treat as a preliminary objection.

43. Firstly, the Court notes that leave to appeal out of time introduced under new Article 420 § 1 of the CCP provides that such an application must be lodged within ten days of the date on which the defendant effectively “acquires knowledge” of the decision. Furthermore, leave to appeal out of time cannot be granted more than once in respect of each party and of each stage of the proceedings. The Court therefore concludes that as the applicant was informed of his conviction in absentia on 1 March 2006 (see paragraph 21 above), he cannot use such a remedy.

44. Secondly, the Court notes that under Article 450, subparagraphs (f) and (g) as amended, an application for review of a final decision must be submitted within thirty days of the date on which the person is extradited, or of the date on which the defendant became aware of the trial in absentia. Accordingly, having regard to the circumstances of the case, the Court concludes that the applicant cannot use that remedy either.

45. Thirdly, the Court notes that there is no new provision in the CCP allowing the domestic courts to examine without any time-limit old cases in which the trial was held in absentia.

46. Fourthly, the Court notes that the Government did not submit any domestic case-law where the new provisions of the CCP had been applied in circumstances similar to those in the present case.

47. Lastly, the Court notes that the Committee of Ministers considered that the general measures adopted were sufficient to prevent similar violations. However, in so far as the matter did not arise in the cases of Shkalla and Izet Haxhia (cited above), the Committee of Ministers did not decide that the general measures adopted would prevent similar violations in respect of old cases in which the trial had been held in absentia, where the time-limits for the use of remedies introduced under the new provisions of the CCP had already expired. In addition, the Court makes reference to the importance of the individual measures to put an end to violations established and erase their consequences so as to achieve as far as possible restitutio in integrum (see paragraph 28 above).

48. For all the above reasons, the Court concludes that the new remedies introduced in 2017, which may be effective in cases introduced after the entry into force of the new provisions of the CCP, are not applicable to the present case. Accordingly, the Court rejects the Government’s preliminary objection.

(b) As regards the Government’s remaining objections raised in their initial submissions

49. As regards the Government’s objection concerning the admissibility of the complaint that the proceedings were unfair, the Court reiterates the conclusions in Izet Haxhia (cited above, §§ 54-55):

“54. The Court observes that under Article 147 § 2 of the CCP an accused may lodge an application for leave to appeal out of time on condition that the conviction was given in absentia and that the accused was not notified of the conviction. The application for leave to appeal out of time must be lodged within ten days of the notification of the conviction in absentia with the court which convicted the accused (see paragraph 36 above). Under domestic case-law, the ten-day time-limit begins to run from the date on which the accused is handed over to the Albanian authorities, at which point he is supposed to be notified of the conviction in absentia (see the District Court’s decision in paragraphs 25-26 above). Once leave to appeal out of time is granted, the accused has the opportunity of appealing against the conviction in absentia, by submitting factual and legal arguments he considers necessary for his defence in the course of the appeal proceedings.

55. The Court further observes that, under the recent case-law of the Supreme Court, an accused’s application for leave to appeal out of time will not be granted where the family-appointed lawyer had previously and unsuccessfully appealed to the Supreme Court and where a co-accused had appealed against the decision and the merits of the case had been examined as a whole (see paragraphs 28-34 above)”.

50. Turning to the present case, the Court notes that not only did the applicant’s family-appointed lawyer previously and unsuccessfully appeal to the Supreme Court, but that the other co-accused also appealed unsuccessfully against all the courts’ decisions. In those circumstances, an application for leave to appeal out of time was doomed to failure (ibid., § 56).

51. The Court therefore rejects the Government’s objections.

(c) Conclusion

52. The Court notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill-founded. It further finds that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.

2. Merits

(a) Conduct of the proceedings in absentia

53. The Court notes that the general principles as regards proceedings in absentia have been described in Sejdovic v. Italy ([GC], no. 56581/00, §§ 81‑95, ECHR 2006‑II). The Court further notes that although proceedings that take place in the accused’s absence are not of themselves incompatible with Article 6 of the Convention, a denial of justice nevertheless undoubtedly occurs where a person convicted in absentia is unable subsequently to obtain from the court which has heard his case a fresh determination of the merits of the charge, in respect of both law and fact, where it has not been established that he or she has waived his or her right to appear and to defend him or herself (see Sejdovic, cited above, § 82 and Hokkeling v. the Netherlands, no. 30749/12, § 58, 14 February 2017).

54. In the present case it was not disputed by the parties that the applicant was tried and convicted in absentia. The Government disputed the suggestion that the applicant had not been aware of the proceedings brought against him. However, the Court finds that it has not been shown that the applicant had sufficient knowledge of them. In fact, it was established that he was not informed of the conviction in absentia until 1 March 2006, when he was surrendered to the Albanian authorities. Nor has it been shown that he explicitly or implicitly authorised his family members’ appeal or unequivocally waived his right to appear in court by deliberately evading justice. Under the domestic law there was no possibility for the applicant to request a retrial (see paragraphs 51-53 above, and Izet Haxhia, cited above, § 63).

55. In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the applicant did not have the opportunity of obtaining a fresh determination of the merits of the charges against him by a court which would have heard him in proceedings compliant with the fairness guarantees of Article 6 § 1.

56. There has therefore been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

(b) Right of access to court

57. The Court reiterates that it is in the first place for the national authorities, and notably the courts, to interpret domestic law and that it will not substitute its own interpretation for theirs in the absence of arbitrariness. This applies in particular to the interpretation by courts of rules of a procedural nature such as time-limits governing the filing of documents or the lodging of appeals (see Jensen v. Denmark, no. 8693/11, § 35, 13 December 2016).

58. The Court notes that the Constitutional Court Act provided at the time for a two‑year time-limit for lodging a constitutional appeal. The time‑limit started to run from the date of notification of the decision of the final-instance court.

59. Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the applicant’s constitutional appeal was rejected by the Constitutional Court as out of time on the grounds that the applicant had been aware of the proceedings against him. It therefore calculated the running of the two-year time-limit from the date of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court’s decision on 7 December 2000. However, the Court notes, as already found above, that the applicant’s proceedings and conviction were conducted in absentia. The Court therefore considers that by holding that the period started to run already from a moment when the applicant was not aware of the existence of the judgment of the Supreme Court, with the result that the time period had expired when the applicant became aware of that judgment at the earliest on 1 March 2006, the Constitutional Court made it impossible for the applicant to effectively exercise his right to file a constitutional complaint (see Shkalla, cited above, § 53).

60. The Court considers that the impugned decision amounted to an unjustified denial of the applicant’s right of access to the Constitutional Court. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION

61. In his application form the applicant complained on several grounds under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, namely of a lack of reasons in the domestic courts’ decisions; that he had been arbitrarily convicted by the domestic courts; and that the Supreme Court had not been impartial and independent when it had decided to transfer the case from Elbasan District Court to Durrës District Court. He also complained under Article 6 § 1 and Article 13 that he had been denied access to the Constitutional Court as his case had been examined in camera. He further complained of a breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence under Article 6 § 2 and of a breach of Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention since the Court of Appeal had refused an application lodged by the lawyer chosen by his father. He finally complained under Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention of a breach of the principle of ne bis in idem.

62. The Court has examined the above complaints as submitted by the applicant. However, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

63. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

64. The applicant did not submit a claim in respect of pecuniary or non‑pecuniary damage.

65. The Court reiterates its findings in Shkalla (cited above, §§ 77-79), and Izet Haxhia (cited above, § 70) that when an applicant has been convicted in breach of her or his rights as guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention, the most appropriate form of redress would be to ensure that the applicant is put as far as possible in the position in which she or he would have been had this provision been respected. The most appropriate form of redress would, in principle, be a new trial or the reopening of the proceedings if requested.

66. The applicant claimed euros 5,000 (EUR) for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and the Court.

67. The Government contested the applicant’s claim as ill-founded on the basis of the facts and the evidence. They were also not reasonable as to quantum.

68. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum (see, for example, Gjyli v. Albania, no. 32907/07, § 72, 29 September 2009). The Court notes that the applicant omitted to itemise particulars of his claims and provide the necessary supporting documents as required by Rule 60 of the Rules of Court.

69. The Court finds that the applicant must have incurred some costs and expenses in the proceedings. Accordingly, in the present case, regard being had to the information in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant the sum of EUR 1,000 for the proceedings before the Court.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Declares the complaints concerning the unfairness of the proceedings in absentia and a breach of the right of access to court, admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;

2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the conduct of the criminal proceedings in absentia;

3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of an unjustified denial of the applicant’s right of access to the Constitutional Court;

4. Holds,

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 1,000 plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses, to be converted into Albanian Lek at the rate applicable at the date of delivery of this judgment;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

Done in English, and notified in writing on 22 May 2018, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

              Stanley NaismithRobert Spano
RegistrarPresident

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