FOURTH SECTION
CASE OF VARJONEN v. FINLAND
(Application no. 63744/10)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
22 April 2014
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Varjonen v. Finland,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Nona Tsotsoria, President,
Päivi Hirvelä,
Faris Vehabović, judges,
and Fatoş Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 1 April 2014,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 63744/10) against the Republic of Finland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Finnish national, Ms Sirpa Varjonen (“the applicant”), on 25 October 2010.
2. The applicant was represented by Mr Jarmo Kinnunen, a lawyer practising in Espoo. The Finnish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Arto Kosonen of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
3. On 15 May 2012 the application was communicated to the Government.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
A. Ordinary proceedings
4. The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Pomarkku.
5. On 9 June 2005 the applicant’s husband was injured in a car accident and he received insurance benefits from an insurance company. However, on 2 and 5 March 2006 the insurance company refused his applications for compensation for rehabilitation. On 30 March and 4 April 2006 the husband appealed against these decisions to the Insurance Court (vakuutusoikeus, försäkringsdomstolen). The husband died on 3 August 2006 but the applicant and the estate decided to continue the appeals.
6. On 3 May 2010 the Insurance Court rejected the appeals. No appeal lies against these decisions. The judgment of the Insurance Court was sent to the applicant on 1 June 2010.
B. Proceedings before the Parliamentary Ombudsman
7. On 26 February 2010 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Parliamentary Ombudsman (eduskunnan oikeusasiamies, riksdagens justitieombudsman) complaining, inter alia, about the excessive length of the proceedings in the Insurance Court.
8. On 17 November 2011 the Ombudsman gave a reply, after having requested a statement from the Insurance Court which included reports from the referendary and the judges responsible for examining the applicant’s case. The Ombudsman considered that the proceedings in the applicant’s case had taken, in total, a long time. However, the Ombudsman accepted the reasons given by the Insurance Court, namely that the case had been exceptionally extensive, complex and time-consuming. The Insurance Court examined the case as a first instance, which required more preparation than when it examined appeals as a second instance. Also the case file had been incomplete and several requests for information had been made. The applicant, on her part, had sent a considerable number of documents during the course of the proceedings, which had also contributed to the length. The Ombudsman considered that there had been no particular inactivity in the Insurance Court. Hence it considered that, despite the lengthy proceedings, there had not been unjustified delays in the course of the proceedings.
C. Extraordinary proceedings
9. On 20 October 2010 the applicant initiated extraordinary proceedings before the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen), requesting that the decisions of the Insurance Court be quashed because the referendary in the Insurance Court had been biased.
10. On 29 July 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed the application for being outside its competence. As the proceedings before the Insurance Court were administrative, it was the Supreme Administrative Court (korkein hallinto-oikeus, högsta förvaltningsdomstolen) that was competent to examine an extraordinary appeal concerning an alleged procedural flaw.
11. On 5 October 2011 the applicant lodged an extraordinary appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court, claiming that the proceedings before the Insurance Court had been flawed due to the partiality of the referendary and the wrong application of law.
12. On 31 May 2012 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the complaint concerning the wrong application of law without examining the merits and rejected the partiality complaint after having examined it. The Supreme Administrative Court considered that the applicant had reasoned her complaint about the referendary’s partiality only with the fact that she had complained about the referendary to the Parliamentary Ombudsman. The court was of the opinion that the mere fact that the applicant had complained about the referendary to the Ombudsman did not put the impartiality of the referendary into question.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION IN RESPECT OF THE LENGTH OF THE PROCEEDINGS
13. The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which in relevant parts reads as follows:
“In the determination of ... his civil rights and obligations everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by a ... tribunal...”
14. The Government contested that argument.
A. Admissibility
15. The Government argued that, due to the nature of the case, the applicant had not suffered a significant disadvantage and that the application should be declared inadmissible under Article 35 §§ 3 (b) and 4 of the Convention.
16. The Court considers that this objection is closely related to the merits of the applicant’s complaint. It will therefore examine this preliminary objection together with the merits of the case. The Court therefore concludes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
17. The period to be taken into consideration began on 30 March 2006 when the applicant’s husband appealed against the decisions of the insurance company to the Insurance Court and ended on 1 June 2010 when the judgment of the Insurance Court was sent to the applicant. The proceedings thus lasted approximately four years and two months at one level of jurisdiction.
18. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicants and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicants in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
19. The Government argued that the case had been extensive and complex. It appeared from the procedural memoranda of the Insurance Court that they had sent out 23 hearing letters, requests for additional evidence or documents in the case and that the proceedings had included several different stages. The Government pointed out that the case had been more complicated than usual and also more time-consuming, partly because the Insurance Court had examined the case as a first appeal instance. Moreover, the documentary evidence had been defective and difficult to understand, for which reason the Insurance Court had requested additional evidence ex officio and provided the parties with the possibility to submit additional evidence. The additional submissions by the parties had been sent for comment to the other party in question and that had resulted in the prolongation of the proceedings.
20. The Government also noted that the case concerned rehabilitation benefits of the insured, who was the late husband of the applicant, such as disability equipment and alteration of the house in order to ease the use of a wheelchair. These had been personal benefits and there had no longer been any important personal interest in question after the death of the insured in August 2006, soon after his appeals had been lodged with the Insurance Court. What had been left for the Insurance Court to examine had been the compensation of legal costs and the question of the coverage of legal aid in an unusual case such as the present one in which the insured had died during the proceedings. Both questions in the present case had been particularly complex.
21. The Government further noted that when the proceedings had exceeded the average length, the chief judge and the senior judge had taken appropriate action by requesting the composition of the court examining the case to give an account of the reasons for the delay and had urged them to conclude the proceedings.
22. The applicant did not comment on the merits of the case.
23. The Court considers that there has not been any particularly long period of inactivity on the authorities’ side. The chief judge and senior judge of the Insurance Court requested explanations for the delay and they urged the case handlers to finalise the proceedings.
24. The Court considers, however, that even though the case was of some complexity it cannot be said that this in itself justified the entire length of the proceedings. The Court has difficulties in accepting the Government’s explanation that the question of compensation of legal aid and legal expenses alone was of such complexity that it took nearly four years.
25. As to the Government’s argument that the applicant had no particular interest in pursuing the case after the death of her husband who was the initial insured of the case, the Court considers that the question of compensation of legal fees must have been of importance to the applicant as it implied financial liability on her. Therefore, the Court is not convinced by the argument that the case no longer required expeditious processing after the death of the applicant’s husband.
26. The Court has frequently found a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present case (see Frydlender v. France, cited above).
27. Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that, even taking into account the complexity of the case and the delays in receiving replies to hearing requests, the Government has not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
28. There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1. For the above reasons, the Court considers that there is no longer any need to take a stand on the Government’s preliminary objection based on insignificant disadvantage.
II. REMAINDER OF THE APPLICATION
29. The applicant also complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the proceedings had been unfair as the referendary of the Insurance Court had been biased.
30. Having regard to the case file, the Court finds that the matters complained of do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the applicant’s rights under the Convention. Accordingly, this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
31. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
32. The applicant claimed 5,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.
33. The Government contested the claim and considered that the compensation for non-pecuniary damage should not exceed EUR 1,500.
34. The Court considers that the applicant must have sustained non‑pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards the applicant EUR 4,000 under that head.
B. Costs and expenses
35. The applicant also claimed EUR 1,987.14 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and EUR 2,717.50 for those incurred before the Court.
36. The Government contested entirely the claim for costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts as they were not related to the alleged violation of the Convention. As to the costs and expenses incurred before the Court, the Government considered that the amount awarded to the applicant should not exceed EUR 2,000 (including value-added tax).
37. Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case‑law, the Court rejects the claim for costs and expenses in the domestic proceedings and considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 2,500 (including value-added tax) for the proceedings before the Court.
C. Default interest
38. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
1. Declares the complaint concerning the length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts:
(i) EUR 4,000 (four thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 2,500 (two thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 22 April 2014, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Fatoş AracıNona Tsotsoria
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy