FIFTH SECTION
CASE OF VARVA v. UKRAINE
(Application no. 24427/15)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
11 June 2026
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Varva v. Ukraine,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
María Elósegui, President,
Diana Sârcu,
Sébastien Biancheri, judges,
and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 24427/15) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 13 May 2015 by a Ukrainian national, Mr Mykola Vasylyovych Varva (“the applicant”), who was born in 1955, lives in Kharkiv and, having been granted legal aid, was represented by Mr V.V. Lukashov, a lawyer practising in Kharkiv;
the decision to give notice to the Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) of the complaints under Article 3, Article 5 §§ 1, 3 and 4, and Article 8 of the Convention, as well as Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention, as specified in the judgment below, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 21 May 2026,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The case mainly concerns several alleged violations of the applicant’s rights under Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention in the context of his detention in 2014.
Background2. A detailed chronology of the conflict in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, which is relevant to the present case, can be found in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia ([GC], nos. 8019/16 and 3 others, §§ 35-56, 9 July 2025). Unrest also gripped the adjacent Kharkiv region, where the applicant lived. Notably, there was a series of explosions there in summer and autumn 2014, mainly targeting military facilities and buildings associated with those supporting the Ukrainian military effort in the east of Ukraine.
3. On 16 November 2014 a certain Ms K. was arrested on suspicion of involvement in those explosions. The police found weapons, bombs and explosives in her garage. During her questioning on the same date Ms K. admitted having received arms and explosives from Russia with a view to using them for destabilising the situation in the Kharkiv region. She also admitted her and some other people’s involvement in the explosions under investigation and provided a detailed account of the relevant events. Ms K. named the applicant as one of the individuals who had undergone military training in Russia on sabotage and subversive activities.
The applicant’s alleged ill-treatment and related events4. According to the applicant, on 16 November 2014, while walking near his home, he was apprehended by officers of the Security Service of Ukraine (“the SBU”), who then subjected him to ill-treatment. As a result, on 18 November 2014 he signed “all the documents as instructed” (without any further details provided).
5. According to the Government, the applicant was arrested on 18 November 2014 as documented in the relevant arrest report (see paragraph 11 below) and was not subjected to any ill-treatment.
6. Late in the evening on 18 November 2014 the applicant was admitted to the Kharkiv Temporary Detention Facility (“the Kharkiv ITT”).
7. On 19 November 2014 the administration of that facility informed the Kharkiv city prosecutor’s office that it had documented several sores (including on the wrists) and haematomas on the applicant.
8. On 25 November 2014 that information was forwarded to the Kharkiv regional prosecutor’s office. That fact is known from that prosecutor’s office’s letter to the Government Agent of 2 July 2021. The subsequent developments were described as follows in the above-mentioned letter:
“The information in question was not confirmed during the pre-trial investigation within the criminal proceedings in respect of [the applicant]. Accordingly, there were no response measures (including making the relevant entry in the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations) in respect of the alleged torture of and use of special restraint means on [the applicant] by the SBU in November 2014.”
9. In the meantime, on 21 November 2014, upon his arrival at the Kharkiv SIZO (see also paragraph 18 below), the applicant underwent a medical examination, which also documented some sores and fading bruises, including crusted sores on both wrists. It was noted that, as stated by the applicant, he had sustained those injuries in a fight with an unknown person on 16 November 2014.
10. According to the information provided by the regional prosecutor’s office to the Government Agent on 2 July 2021, the SIZO administration informed the then Kharkiv Ordzhonikidze district prosecutor’s office of the applicant’s injuries. That information was then forwarded to the local police, which made a relevant entry in its logbook on 28 November 2014. On 12 February 2020 the relevant documents were, however, destroyed following the expiry of the time-limit provided for their storage.
The applicant’s arrest and pre-trial detention11. At 11.50 a.m. on 18 November 2014 the investigator drew up a report on the applicant’s arrest. It stated that the applicant had been arrested at 10.50 a.m. that day on the following grounds:
“[The applicant] was arrested near his place of residence ... while walking towards a car parking area. The grounds for [his] arrest stem from the fact that he has been directly and actively participating in [the activities of] the terrorist organisation ‘Kharkiv partisans’. In other words, [the applicant] has been arrested while committing a criminal offence under Article 258-3 § 1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, which warrants the application of an arrest measure in accordance with Article 208 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.”
12. During his questioning as a suspect in the presence of a lawyer on 18 November 2014, the applicant admitted having undergone military training in Russia, comprising courses on handling firearms and explosives, terrain orientation and first aid, as well as practical drills on group coordination and interaction in field combat conditions. The applicant also stated that he had found out about the possibility of being remunerated by certain people in Russia for carrying out an anti-Government information campaign in Ukraine. He had been interested but had not had a chance to explore that possibility any further. Lastly, the applicant noted that in mid-October 2014 Ms K. had told him that she had become acquainted with people calling themselves “Kharkiv partisans” who had given her several firearms and mines and that she had been supposed to use them without delay. According to the applicant, he had strongly objected to such violent methods.
13. On 19 November 2014 the investigator applied to the Kyivskyy District Court of Kharkiv (“the Kyivskyy Court”) for the applicant to be remanded in custody as a preventive measure pending trial. It was noted that the applicant was reasonably suspected of participation in a terrorist organisation. Having pointed out the applicant’s close contacts with Russian citizens and pro-Russian activists involved in ongoing sabotage and terrorist activities in Ukraine, the investigator considered that there were risks that, if at liberty, the applicant might commit another criminal offence or abscond.
14. On 20 November 2014, in a hearing attended by the applicant and his lawyer, the Kyivskyy Court granted the investigator’s application and remanded the applicant in custody. The applicant generally repeated his earlier statements (see paragraph 12 above). He submitted that he had had no criminal record, had neither committed nor intended to commit any terrorist acts and was willing to cooperate with the investigation. Furthermore, the applicant pointed out that he had a permanent place of residence in Kharkiv, where he lived with his wife, his daughter and a grandchild, as well as his elderly mother who was bedridden and required assistance. He therefore requested a non-custodial preventive measure be applied in his case. The Kyivskyy Court, however, decided to remand the applicant in custody as a preventive measure for 60 days, having upheld the investigator’s arguments. It stated in its reasoning:
“The investigating judge considers established the existence of the risks under paragraphs 1 and 5 of Article 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure – namely, the possibility that [the applicant] might abscond or re-offend.
In addition to the seriousness of the criminal offence committed, the existence of the above-mentioned risks is confirmed by the absence of information about the strength of [the applicant’s] social ties.
Having regard to Article 176 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and bearing in mind that [the applicant] is reasonably suspected of a criminal offence under Article 258-3 § 1 of the Criminal Code, the application of more lenient preventive measures is impossible.”
15. The applicant’s lawyer appealed against the decision. Having repeated the applicant’s arguments in favour of a non-custodial preventive measure, she requested that he be placed under house arrest. The lawyer noted that the investigating judge’s reference to “the absence of information about the strength of [the applicant’s] social ties” could only be interpreted as meaning that the risk assessment was incomplete.
16. On 27 November 2014 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal rejected the above appeal, having found that the investigating judge had correctly assessed the circumstances of the case and the existing risks. The appellate court also referred to Article 176 § 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ruling out the application of non-custodial preventive measures in respect of those facing terrorism-related charges.
17. On 25 December 2014 the regional prosecutor’s office discontinued the criminal proceedings in respect of the applicant for want of evidence of his guilt and ordered his release. The prosecutor noted that, as it had been established, the applicant “had important weight in the circles linked to the “Lugansk People’s Republic” and the “Donetsk People’s Republic” terrorist organisations [and] his detention could have a negative impact on the liberation from captivity of the Ukrainian army servicemen, as well as other individuals being kept hostage in the area of the anti-terrorist operation in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions”. It was stated in the ruling that it was adopted with a view to the implementation of the Peace Plan of the President of Ukraine[1].
Conditions of the applicant’s detention in the Kharkiv SIZO18. Upon his arrival at the Kharkiv SIZO on 21 November 2014, the applicant had his hair and beard shaved off. The same concerned all the other newly arrived detainees.
19. The applicant described the conditions of his detention as follows. During the initial two days he had been detained in cell no. 604, which had four beds for five inmates. There were dirty mattresses and no bedding. The door to the toilet was missing. The temperature in the cell was very low and the lighting poor. There was no hot water supply. Subsequently, the applicant had been transferred to cell no. 643, with largely similar conditions. During the entire period of his detention in the Kharkiv SIZO he had no access to a shower.
20. The Government submitted a series of certificates issued by officials of the Kharkiv SIZO and the Department for the Enforcement of Criminal Sentences after notice of the case had been given to the Government. As indicated therein, cell no. 604 measured 13.9 sq. m and cell no. 643 measured 13.4 sq. m. Both cells were designated to accommodate five inmates. The bedding was changed and inmates were provided with access to a shower on a weekly basis. Each cell had sufficient natural and artificial light and properly functioning heating. The toilet was separated from the living area by a brick wall. The applicant had not raised any complaints before the SIZO administration.
Prisoner exchange of 26 December 2014 and subsequent events21. On 26 December 2014 the first big prisoner exchange took place between the Ukrainian Government and the self-proclaimed entities the “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”) and “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”), pursuant to the Minsk Protocol (see also paragraph 17 above and the footnote thereto), in the presence of representatives of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. The Ukrainian Government handed over to the “DPR”/“LPR” some detainees facing, in particular, separatist-related terrorism charges, whereas the self-proclaimed entities released Ukrainian army servicemen.
22. The applicant was among those handed over to the “DPR”. According to him, he had not agreed to participate in the prisoner exchange.
23. The applicant described the relevant events as follows.
24. Early in the morning on 26 December 2014 he was taken out of his cell with all his belongings. He was familiarised with the prosecutor’s ruling of 25 December 2014 (see paragraph 17 above) and was handed a release certificate dated 26 December 2014. He was then informed that he was “on the list for the exchange”. Together with several other prisoners, he was taken to the SBU where they joined a bigger group. They were placed on several buses, which then left in an unspecified direction. After several hours of driving the buses stopped. Some buses from the side of the “DPR” also arrived. In the presence of the SBU and representatives of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine[2] (see also paragraphs 50 and 51 below), the detainees from both sides were made to leave the buses on which they had arrived, and walk to and take seats on the buses from the other side.
25. As further submitted by the applicant, after having changed buses, he, together with other detainees, was driven to Donetsk. Certain armed persons allegedly subjected him to extensive questioning as to the reasons for him being included in the group for the prisoner exchange.
26. The case file contains a copy of the applicant’s “temporary ID card” issued by the so-called “War Prisoners’ Commission of the Defence Ministry of the Donetsk People’s Republic” on 5 January 2015. It contains the applicant’s photo, his residence address in Makiyivka (Donetsk region) and the following text:
“The holder of the present temporary ID was in captivity – he was illegally detained on enemy-controlled territory; he has no other ID documents. Status: ‘political prisoner’.”
27. On 27 January 2015 the regional prosecutor’s office quashed its ruling of 25 December 2014 (see paragraph 17 above) as “unfounded and premature”. It stated that the suspicion against the applicant was based on extensive witness evidence, as well as material evidence collected during the search of Ms K.’s garage. According to the applicant, his lawyer accidentally found out about that ruling in May 2015.
28. On 28 January 2015 the applicant’s wife applied to the SBU investigator for the return of the property seized from the applicant following his arrest (several mobile telephones, USB keys and a laptop). She observed that the applicant had been transferred to the “DPR” as part of the prisoner exchange and that he was not therefore able to seek the return of property himself. Her application was rejected.
29. On 4 February 2015 the SBU put the applicant on the wanted list, given that “he was not residing at his official domicile and his whereabouts were unknown.”
30. On 11 February 2015 the investigation was stayed owing to the inability to establish the applicant’s and other suspects’ whereabouts.
31. On 27 July 2015 the SBU wrote to the applicant’s lawyer, in reply to his unspecified enquiry on the applicant’s behalf, that the applicant had been released from detention with a view to the implementation of the Minsk Protocol and the Peace Plan of the President of Ukraine.
32. In late July 2015 the applicant’s lawyer applied to the Kyivskyy Court for temporary access to the data of three mobile operators pertaining to the location of the applicant’s mobile telephones during the period from 9 a.m. on 16 November 2014 to 11.50 a.m. on 18 November 2014. According to the applicant, his lawyer lodged that application “in order to make known to the public the circumstances of [the applicant’s] kidnapping by the SBU and [his] unrecorded detention ... from 16 November to 18 November 2014.” The case file before the Court does not contain a copy of the application in question, and its contents are known to the Court from the relevant ruling of the Kyivskyy Court of 5 August 2015. As stated therein, the lawyer lodged that application with the reference to the right of the parties in criminal proceedings to seek temporary access to items and documents of relevance for the proceedings. The investigative judge rejected the application, given that it did not indicate how the requested information was relevant for establishing the facts in the criminal proceedings in respect of the applicant. Furthermore, it was noted that the applicant was on the wanted list and that the investigation had been stayed on those grounds. In such circumstances, no investigative measures other than those aimed at locating him were possible.
33. On 10 February 2017 the applicant’s wife wrote a letter to the Ombudsperson that on 26 December 2014 she had witnessed her husband being taken from the Kharkiv SIZO in a bus going in an unknown direction and that she had found out from mass media that he had been on the prisoner exchange list. She submitted that she had not had any news from him since then. The applicant’s wife contended that he had never given his consent for the exchange and asked the Ombudsperson for help in establishing his whereabouts.
34. On 18 May 2017 the Ombudsperson replied to the applicant’s wife that a number of enquiries had been sent to various authorities following the above complaint. The police had not received any reports on the applicant’s alleged disappearance. Furthermore, the Ombudsperson found out that the applicant was a criminal suspect put on a wanted list, and that, according to the information provided by the SBU, he was in the Donetsk region, in territory beyond the Ukrainian Government’s control. Accordingly, the Ombudsperson stated that establishing the applicant’s whereabouts was the responsibility of the investigating authorities and that there was nothing she could do for the applicant’s wife.
35. In October 2018 the SBU allegedly informed the applicant’s wife that they planned to discontinue the criminal proceedings against him.
36. On 28 November 2018 the applicant entered Ukrainian territory, having crossed the Ukrainian-Russian border in the Kharkiv region. According to him, he was immediately brought to the SBU, where he was briefed as to his further conduct.
37. The case file contains a copy of the applicant’s handwritten statement of 29 November 2018 addressed to the SBU. He stated that, after his release on 26 December 2014, he had temporarily moved to Khabarovsk in Russia. Having found out from his lawyer about being put on a wanted list, the applicant had decided to return to Ukraine and to cooperate with the investigation authorities. More specifically, he expressed his willingness to make statements concerning Ms K. and her role in the criminal activities of the “Kharkiv partisans” terrorist group (see, in particular, paragraphs 2 and 3 above).
38. On 10 December 2018 the applicant was questioned in the presence of his lawyer. He made statements similar to those of 18 November and 20 November 2014 (see paragraphs 12 and 14 above). Both the applicant and the lawyer signed the report of the questioning without any reservations or comments.
39. On 8 January 2019 the Kyivskyy Court exempted the applicant from criminal liability under Article 258-3 § 2 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 44 below). It held that, although the applicant had admitted to having participated in military training in Russia in August 2014 with a view to destabilising the situation in the Kharkiv Region, he had voluntarily offered his cooperation to the authorities in disclosing criminal activities of the “Kharkiv partisans” terrorist group and had shared all the information in his possession as regards, in particular, the preparation of the terrorist attack in Kharkiv in November 2014[3].
40. On 17 September 2019 the Kyivskyy Court ordered that the property seized from the applicant following his arrest be returned to him.
41. On 11 November 2021 the SBU informed the Government Agent, in reply to the latter’s enquiry, that the prisoner exchange had taken place under “the Minsk Protocol” according to the principle “all against all”. There had been no complaints from the applicant in that respect.
Facts concerning the application form and the applicant’s correspondence with the Court42. On 18 May 2015 the Court received the application form concerning the present case. As stated therein, it was signed by the applicant on 17 March 2015. The applicant’s signature in the application form appeared identical to his signature in his passport, a copy of which was sent to the Court among the annexes to the application form. The envelope containing the application form and its enclosures was sent to the Court on 13 May 2015 from Poland[4]. The address for the Court’s correspondence with the applicant indicated on the application form was the applicant’s registered domicile in Kharkiv, where his wife continued to live. The Court sent its correspondence to the applicant to that address. As part of the standard procedure, a set of barcode labels was also sent to the applicant with an instruction to put one such label on top of every subsequent letter to the Court. The applicant’s replies, which appeared to be signed by him in person, contained the above-mentioned barcode labels as instructed by the Court.
Relevant legal framework Constitution of Ukraine (1996)43. Articles 28 and 29 of the Constitution, which are relevant to the case, are quoted in Nechiporuk and Yonkalo v. Ukraine (no. 42310/04, § 121, 21 April 2011).
Criminal Code (2001)44. Article 258-3 § 1 of the Criminal Code provided for imprisonment for a period of between 8 and 15 years for the creation of a terrorist group or organisation, or its management or participation therein, or aiding and abetting its activities by any means. Under Article 258-3 § 2, a person (except for the organiser or leader of a terrorist group or organisation) was exempt from criminal liability if he or she voluntarily informed the authorities of terrorist activities, contributed to putting an end to those activities or disclosed related crimes, provided that there was no indication of any other criminal offence in his or her actions.
Code of Criminal Procedure (2012)45. Article 176 § 5 (also referred to as “the Bail Exclusion Clause”) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as well as its legislative history and the related decision of the Constitutional Court, can be found in Grubnyk v. Ukraine (no. 58444/15, §§ 40, 50 and 53, 17 September 2020).
46. Article 208, concerning arrest without a court order, is also quoted in Grubnyk (cited above, § 45).
47. The relevant provisions of Article 214 of the Code, as worded at the material time, read as follows:
“1. An investigator or a prosecutor shall make an entry in the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations and shall start an investigation immediately but in any case no later than 24 hours after having received a statement or information on a criminal offence or after having become otherwise aware, from any sources, of circumstances suggesting that a criminal offence was committed ...
2. A pre-trial investigation shall begin from the moment an entry is made in the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations ...
3. Carrying out a pre-trial investigation before an entry has been made in the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations or without such an entry shall be prohibited and shall be punishable according to the law ...”
Pre-trial Detention Facilities Regulations (2013)[5]48. Paragraph 3.9 of the Pre-Trial Detention Facilities Regulations reads as follows:
“Upon their arrival at the SIZO (including for transit purposes), detainees and prisoners shall be examined by a doctor or a paramedic ... and shall undergo hygienic washing and disinfection of their personal clothing with a view to identifying any individuals who pose an epidemic risk or require urgent medical assistance.”
49. Other relevant provisions concerning the conditions of detention in SIZOs are summarised in Sukachov v. Ukraine (no. 14057/17, §§ 66-67, 30 January 2020).
Other material of relevance50. The applicant provided to the Court the link to a report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (“OSCE SMM”) concerning the prisoner exchange of 26 December 2014 (https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/133021[6]). The relevant part of that report reads as follows:
“On 26 December the SMM was present and monitored the simultaneous release of 367 hostages/prisoners in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (18 km North-East of Donetsk). The UA handed over 222 “DPR” members, including 21 women, whilst the “DPR” side handed over 145 UA servicemen. One of the prisoners held by the “DPR” side decided not to be released. Three of the “DPR” prisoners from the UA side were transported in an ambulance to the site.”
51. The applicant also provided to the Court the link to the video recording of the exchange posted by the SBU on its YouTube channel on 27 December 2014 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c3WpyTxWqco[7]).
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT The Government’s preliminary objection52. The Government asked the Court to declare the application inadmissible on the ground of abuse of the right of individual application, in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
53. The Government observed that the applicant’s whereabouts between the prisoner exchange of 26 December 2014 and his crossing of the Ukrainian border from Russia on 28 November 2018 had been unknown and, according to his wife’s submissions to the Ombudsperson in 2017, she had had no contact with him. Although the application form was worded as submitted by the applicant in person and contained what appeared to be his signature, in the Government’s view, it would have been impossible for the applicant to fill and sign the application form given the circumstances.
54. The Government also pointed out the absence of any explanation for the fact that, although the applicant had been either in Russia or in the “DPR” self-proclaimed entity, supposedly with no contact with his family, his letters to the Court contained the barcode labels sent by the Court’s Registry to his address in Kharkiv (see paragraph 42 above).
55. The applicant submitted, without providing any details, that he had personally signed the application form and other relevant correspondence addressed to the Court.
56. The Court reiterates that rejection of an application as abusive is an “exceptional procedural measure” and that the concept of “abuse” refers to its ordinary meaning, namely, the harmful exercise of a right by its holder in a manner that is inconsistent with the purpose for which such right is granted (see Miroļubovs and Others v. Latvia, no. 798/05, § 62, 15 September 2009). The Court may resort to that measure where, for example, an application was knowingly based on untrue facts or if incomplete and thus misleading information was submitted to the Court, especially if that information concerns the very core of the case and no sufficient explanation has been provided for the failure to disclose it (see Gross v. Switzerland [GC], no. 67810/10, § 28, ECHR 2014, and the case-law references therein). The Court has also held that misleading procedural manipulations, such as forging the signature of a deceased person in the application form suggesting that he or she is alive and willing to lodge an application with the Court, are obviously incompatible with the purpose of the right of individual application (see, for example, Gogitidze and Others v. Georgia, no. 36862/05, § 78, 12 May 2015).
57. The Court does not discern any indication of an abuse of the right of individual application in the present case. It observes, in particular, that the applicant has clearly confirmed the validity of his signature in the application form (see paragraph 55 above). While the Government argued that his signature might have been falsified, they failed to support that argument with any evidence, such as a forensic report (compare O.O. v. Russia, no. 36321/16, § 35, 21 May 2019). The applicant’s silence as to how he managed to keep in touch with his family and, more specifically, how he arranged for the exchange of information and documents with his relatives in Kharkiv and Poland with a view to introducing his application and maintaining his subsequent correspondence with the Court (see paragraph 42 above), neither amounts to any abusive procedural manipulation (compare Vasiliciuc v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 15944/11, §§ 27-29, 2 May 2017) nor discloses an attempt to conceal from the Court any information of relevance to the very core of the case (compare Ugulava v. Georgia, no. 5432/15, § 58, 9 February 2023).
58. The Court therefore rejects the Government’s objection that there has been an abuse of the right of individual application.
ALLEGED VIOLATION of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the alleged ill-treatment of the applicant and the related investigation59. The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that he had been ill-treated by SBU officers and that there had been no effective investigation in that regard.
Admissibility60. The Government submitted that the applicant had not complied with the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies, given that he had never raised that complaint at the domestic level. The applicant objected to that argument in general terms.
61. As regards the specific features of the State’s obligations under Article 3 of the Convention and the requirement of the exhaustion of domestic remedies, the Court reiterates that when there is reason to believe that an individual has been subjected to ill-treatment by a State official, the State is required to conduct an effective official investigation. It cannot be left to the initiative of the victim either to lodge a formal complaint or to take responsibility for the conduct of any investigative procedures since the authorities must act of their own motion (see, for example, Tadić v. Croatia, no. 10633/15, § 41, 23 November 2017, and the case-law references therein).
62. It is undisputed in the present case that the administrations of two detention facilities considered it necessary to inform the prosecution authorities of the applicant’s injuries as soon as he was arrived at them (see paragraphs 7 and 10 above). In other words, the matter was brought to the prosecution authorities’ knowledge as early as 19 November 2014 (see paragraph 7 above) thus triggering their procedural obligation to carry out an effective investigation in compliance with Article 3. The Court therefore dismisses the Government’s objection based on non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. It further notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention nor inadmissible on any other grounds. The Court therefore declares it admissible.
Merits The parties’ arguments63. The applicant alleged that he had been seriously ill-treated by State agents and that the investigating authorities had not even tried to establish the origin of his injuries let alone bring those responsible to justice.
64. The Government noted that the applicant’s allegations were not corroborated by evidence. They further submitted that, once having been informed by the Kharkiv ITT and the SIZO about the applicant’s injuries, the domestic prosecution authorities had thoroughly investigated the matter.
The Court’s assessment Procedural aspect65. The Court refers to the general principles set out in, inter alia, El‑Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 39630/09, §§ 182-85, ECHR 2012, and Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380/09, §§ 115-23, ECHR 2015).
66. The Court has already held in the present case that the domestic authorities were under the obligation to investigate the circumstances in which the applicant had sustained his injuries (see paragraph 62 above).
67. The Court observes that, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, any investigation into an allegation or suspicion of a criminal offence was supposed to begin with making a relevant entry in the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations (see paragraph 47 above). Furthermore, the applicable legal provision explicitly prohibited carrying out any investigative measures without that initial procedural step (ibid.).
68. The Court notes, however, that, in spite of having been informed by two detention facilities’ administrations of the applicant’s injuries, the prosecution authorities did not make an entry in the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations (see paragraph 8 above). Regard being had to the unequivocal wording of the applicable legal provision (see paragraph 47 above), this means that no investigative measures were undertaken. That being so and noting the fact that the existence of the applicant’s injuries documented by the ITT and the SIZO upon his arrival in those facilities (on 18 November and 21 November, respectively) was not in dispute, it is unclear what was meant by the prosecutor’s phrase that the information transmitted by the detention facilities’ in question “[had not been] confirmed during the pre-trial investigation within the criminal proceedings in respect of [the applicant]” (see paragraph 8 above).
69. The Court finds the foregoing sufficient to conclude that the State failed in its procedural obligation under Article 3 of the Convention. There has therefore been a violation of that provision in its procedural aspect.
Substantive aspect70. The relevant case-law principles are summarised, in particular, in Bouyid (cited above, §§ 81-90).
71. In the present case it is established that, at the time of the applicant’s arrival at the Kharkiv ITT on the evening on 18 November 2014, he had several haematomas and sores (see paragraphs 6-7 above). The only available explanation for the origin of those injuries alternative to the applicant’s allegation of ill-treatment by the SBU officers was his reported statement to the SIZO staff that he had sustained those injuries “in a fight with an unknown person on 16 November 2014” (see paragraph 9 above). Even assuming that the applicant indeed made that statement and that he did so without coercion, the nature of at least some of his injuries was clearly incompatible with that version of events. This concerns, in particular, the sores on his wrists. It is difficult to imagine how they could have been inflicted on the applicant by any other means than by him being handcuffed.
72. The absence of any investigative measures at the domestic level (see paragraphs 68-69 above) and the particular scarceness of relevant documents available in the case file before the Court make it impossible for it to establish the facts with more precision and to reach any further-reaching conclusions as regards the origin and the timing of all the injuries sustained by the applicant. However, the Court considers it sufficiently established that he sustained at least the sores on his wrists while being under the control of State agents. The authorities’ failure to provide any explanation for those injuries alone is a sufficient indication that the responsibility of the State was engaged.
73. It follows that there has also been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in its substantive aspect.
OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS UNDER WELL-ESTABLISHED CASE-LAW74. The applicant submitted other complaints which also raised issues under the Convention, given the relevant well-established case-law of the Court (see appended table). Those complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, nor are they inadmissible on any other grounds. Accordingly, they must be declared admissible. Having examined all the material before it, the Court concludes that they also disclose violations of the Convention.
Alleged violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the applicant’s participation in the prisoner exchange75. The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that he had been forcefully transferred to the “DPR” within the prisoner exchange of 26 December 2014.
76. The Government submitted that the applicant had never complained about that issue at the domestic level and could not therefore be regarded as having exhausted domestic remedies.
77. The applicant contested the Government’s objection by referring to his wife’s letter to the Ombudsperson of 10 February 2017, in which she had explicitly raised that complaint, albeit to no avail. The applicant further submitted that he had been “constantly detained by the DPR terrorists” and had not therefore been able to lodge any complaints. He noted that he had introduced his application before the Court at the earliest opportunity.
78. The relevant general principles as regards the exhaustion of domestic remedies are set out in Vučković and Others v. Serbia ((preliminary objection) [GC], nos. 17153/11 and 29 others, §§ 69-77, 25 March 2014). One of those principles implies the need to apply the exhaustion rule with some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism (ibid., § 76).
79. The Court has recognised that the rule of exhaustion is neither absolute nor capable of being applied automatically; for the purposes of reviewing whether it has been observed, it is essential to have regard to the circumstances of the individual case. This means, in particular, that the Court must take realistic account not only of the existence of formal remedies in the legal system of the Contracting State concerned but also of the general context in which they operate, as well as the personal circumstances of the applicant. It must then examine whether, in all the circumstances of the case, the applicant did everything that could reasonably be expected of him or her to exhaust domestic remedies (see İlhan v. Turkey [GC], no. 22277/93, § 59, ECHR 2000-VII, and, for a more recent reference, Durdaj and Others v. Albania, nos. 63543/09 and 3 others, § 250, 7 November 2023). This includes a requirement to take sufficient steps at the domestic level to bring a complaint to the attention of the national authorities before submitting it to the Court (see Sylenok and Tekhnoservis-Plus v. Ukraine, no. 20988/02, § 76, 9 December 2010, and Salakhov and Islyamova v. Ukraine, no. 28005/08, § 104, 14 March 2013).
80. Turning to the present case, the Court notes that, according to the applicant’s wife’s submissions, she was in the territory of the Kharkiv SIZO on 26 December 2014 and witnessed his departure in an SBU bus (see paragraph 33 above). As she subsequently indicated in her letter to the investigator on 28 January 2015, she knew that her husband had been part of the prisoner exchange and wished to recover his property (see paragraph 28 above). At no point did she, however, consider it necessary to alert any domestic authorities to what the applicant purported to be his kidnapping from the SIZO territory. Given that the bus with detainees had left the Kharkiv SIZO early in the morning on 26 December 2014 (see paragraph 24 above) and the prisoner exchange itself took place late in the evening on that date (as it can be seen in the available video material – see paragraph 51 above), the applicant’s wife had the entire day to at least try to prevent his transfer to the “DPR” self-proclaimed entity. However, she did nothing.
81. The Court also finds it relevant to note that, although the applicant mentioned in his submissions to the Court that the prisoner exchange had taken place in the presence of OSCE observers (see paragraphs 21, 24, 50 and 51 above), he did not explain why, if he had indeed objected to being transferred to the “DPR”, he did not signal that, be it to those easily identifiable observers if not to the law-enforcement officials in charge.
82. Nor did the applicant provide any explanation to the Court why his wife (who, as it has already been established, kept regular contact with him after the exchange – see paragraph 42 above) had waited for more than two years before raising for the first time at the domestic level (namely, in her letter to the Ombudsperson of 10 February 2017) the allegation about her husband’s forceful participation in the prisoner exchange (see paragraphs 33 and 77 above).
83. As regards the applicant allegedly being unable to lodge any complaints after the prisoner exchange owing to his “[constant detention] by the DPR terrorists” (see paragraph 77 above), the Court notes that, according to the available documents, even assuming that the applicant had indeed been detained while in the “DPR”, he was released on 5 January 2015 at the latest (see paragraph 26 above). Furthermore, his reference to the expenses incurred in the Russian Federation in his just satisfaction claim (see paragraph 89 below) implies that he had been living in Russia rather than in the “DPR”. Lastly, the Court has already noted that the applicant did have the possibility to transmit to his family members documents for the proceedings before the Court (see paragraph 42 above). It is therefore unclear what prevented him from doing the same for initiating, through his relatives or lawyers, judicial proceedings in Ukraine in respect of his allegedly forceful participation in the prisoner exchange.
84. Lastly, the Court observes that, even after his return to Ukraine on 28 November 2018, the applicant never tried to lodge a complaint with the domestic courts in that regard. He did not explain to the Court the reasons for that.
85. In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the Court does not consider that the applicant did everything that could reasonably be expected in order to exhaust available domestic remedies.
86. It therefore declares this part of the application inadmissible under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
Remainder of the application87. The applicant also complained under Article 3 of the Convention about the conditions of his alleged detention in the SBU Kharkiv Regional Department from 16 November to 18 November 2014, as well as the conditions in the Kharkiv ITT from 18 November to 21 November 2014. Furthermore, he complained under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention about having his hair and beard shaved off upon his arrival in the Kharkiv SIZO. In addition, the applicant complained under Article 5 § 3 about not having been brought promptly before a judge after his arrest, and under Article 5 § 4 (additionally relying on Articles 6 and 13) about the alleged failure of the appellate court to conduct a due examination of his arguments against the detention order. Lastly, the applicant complained that his alleged kidnapping by the SBU from the SIZO and his subsequent, allegedly forceful, transfer to the “DPR” had been in breach of Article 5 § 1 and Article 8 of the Convention, as well as Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention.
88. Having regard to the facts of the case, the submissions of the parties, and its findings (see paragraphs 69, 73, 74 and 86 above and the appended table), the Court considers that it has dealt with the main legal questions raised by the case and that there is no need to examine the remaining complaints (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, § 156, ECHR 2014).
APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION Damage89. The applicant claimed the following amounts in respect of pecuniary damage: 1,750 euros (EUR) for the property seized upon his arrest; EUR 683 for the expenses allegedly borne by his family with a view to improving the conditions of his detention; EUR 70,500 for his living expenses in the Russian Federation until his return to Ukraine on 28 November 2018; and EUR 780,000 for lost income.
90. He also claimed EUR 3,970,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
91. The Government contested the above claims as unsubstantiated and exorbitant.
92. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violations found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. However, it awards the applicant EUR 16,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.
Costs and expenses93. The applicant claimed EUR 2,473.92 for the legal fees incurred at the domestic level and the following amounts for those in the proceedings before the Court: EUR 4,819.28 – in respect of his legal representation in 2014-2019 and EUR 2,790 “plus 1% of the amount awarded to the applicant by the Court” in respect of his legal representation, at a later stage, by Mr Lukashov. He submitted a copy of the legal assistance contract signed between him and Mr Lukashov on 16 August 2021 and modified on 9 January 2022, according to which the payment would be due “within five days after the delivery by the Court of its final judgment on the case and its execution ... at the national level.”
94. The Government contested the above claim as well.
95. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. Furthermore, costs and expenses are only recoverable to the extent that they relate to the violations found (see, among many other authorities, Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], no. 76639/11, § 146, 25 September 2018).
96. In the present case, having regard to the documents in its possession and to its case‑law, the Court notes that the applicant has not provided evidence showing that the expenses referred to have been actually incurred within the meaning of the Court’s case-law (see Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], no. 72508/13, §§ 370-72, 28 November 2017).
97. It follows that the applicant’s claim for costs and expenses should be rejected in its entirety.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,Declares the complaint under Article 3 of the Convention concerning the alleged ill-treatment of the applicant by State agents and the lack of an effective domestic investigation thereof, as well as the other complaints under the well-established case-law of the Court, as set out in the appended table, admissible;Declares the complaint under Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the applicant’s participation in the prisoner exchange inadmissible;Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under both its substantive and procedural limbs in respect of the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment by State agents and the lack of an effective domestic investigation thereof;Holds that there has been a violation of the Convention as regards the other complaints raised under the well-established case-law of the Court, as set out in the appended table;Holds that there is no need to examine the admissibility and merits of the remaining complaints;Holds that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, EUR 16,000 (sixteen thousand euros) plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement; that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.Done in English, and notified in writing on 11 June 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Martina Keller María Elósegui
Deputy Registrar President
APPENDIX
Convention provisions
Complaints
Well-established case-law references
Key considerations leading the Court to find a violation
Article 3
Allegedly poor conditions of detention in the Kharkiv SIZO
Muršić v. Croatia [GC], no. 7334/13, §§ 137-41, 20 October 2016,
Sukachov v. Ukraine, no. 14057/17, §§ 84-86, 30 January 2020
No primary evidence provided by the Government in respect of the specific cells in which the applicant had been detained, and the specific period of his detention in the Kharkiv SIZO (compare, for example, Shaykov and Others v. Ukraine [Committee], nos. 56961/22 and 15 others, § 9, 24 October 2024).
The Court has already found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of poor conditions of detention in the Kharkiv SIZO at about the same period as in the present case (see D. S. v. Ukraine [Committee], no. 24107/13, §§ 6-11, 9 November 2017).
Article 5 § 1
Allegation of unrecorded detention between 16 November and 18 November 2014
Nagiyev v. Azerbaijan, no. 16499/09, § 57, 23 April 2015,
Čamans and Timofejeva v. Latvia, no. 42906/12, § 129, 28 April 2016,
Makarenko v. Ukraine, no. 622/11, § 60, 30 January 2018
The applicant’s allegation about his unrecorded detention is closely linked to the one under Article 3 concerning his alleged ill-treatment, in respect of which a violation has been found (see paragraphs 69 and 73 above). In the Court’s view, this provides grounds for drawing inferences in support of the applicant’s version of the events. The Court also notes that the applicant’s pertinent argument about the localisation of his mobile telephones in the SBU’s premises as evidence proving his unrecorded detention was not refuted (see paragraph 32 above).
Article 5 § 1
Alleged unlawfulness of the arrest on 18 November 2014 without a court order
Korban v. Ukraine, no. 26744/16, § 145, 4 July 2019,
Grubnyk v. Ukraine, no. 58444/15, §§ 74-85, 17 September 2020
No explanation was provided how the legal ground allowing a person’s arrest without a court order (“while committing a criminal offence”) was applicable to the applicant’s case, given that he was arrested “while walking towards a car parking area”, without any arms or explosives having been found on him, or in his car or residence, and without him being suspected of direct involvement in the preparation or execution of any specific terrorist acts (see paragraphs 11 and 46 above).
Article 5 § 3
Allegedly unjustified pre-trial detention, in particular, owing to the Bail Exclusion Clause relied on by the domestic courts
Buzadji v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], no. 23755/07, §§ 87 and 102, 5 July 2016,
Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], no. 72508/13, § 223, 28 November 2017,
Grubnyk, cited above, §§ 110-30
The risk of his absconding was gauged solely on the basis of the severity of the possible sentence and there was no assessment of the applicant’s social ties in spite of his relevant argument. Furthermore, not only did the domestic courts fail to examine the possibility of applying any non-custodial preventive measures in the applicant’s case, but they explicitly ruled out that option with reference to the Bail Exclusion Clause.
[1] Referring to the “Protocol on the outcome of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group on joint steps aimed at the implementation of the Peace Plan of the President of Ukraine, P. Poroshenko, and the initiatives of the President of the Russian Federation, V. Putin”, more known as “Minsk Protocol” (see Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia, cited above, § 56). One of its points concerned the “immediate release of all hostages and illegally detained persons.”
[2] As confirmed by publicly available video evidence (see, in particular, paragraph 51 below), the OSCE representatives were easily identifiable by their vests bearing the “OSCE” inscription.
[3] Apparently, the reference was made to the explosion in the “Stina” pub (a popular gathering spot for local pro-Ukrainian activists and volunteers) of 9 November 2014, which caused many casualties. As known from public sources, on 7 October 2019 the Kyivskyy Court found Ms K. guilty of that terrorist attack.
[4] It appears that the applicant’s daughter lived in Poland at the material time.
[5] In force until 2019.
[6] Last accessed on 11 December 2025.
[7] Last accessed on 11 December 2025.