FOURTH SECTION
CASE OF VRABEC v. SLOVAKIA
(Application no. 1941/06)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
30 November 2010
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Vrabec v. Slovakia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Lech Garlicki, President,
Ján Šikuta,
Vincent Anthony de Gaetano, judges,
and Fatoş Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 9 November 2010,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 1941/06) against the Slovak Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Slovak national, Mr Igor Vrabec (“the applicant”), on 30 December 2005.
2. The applicant was represented by Ms Z. Kupcová, a lawyer practising in Bratislava. The Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mrs M. Pirošíková.
3. On 5 March 2009 the President of the Fourth Section decided to give notice of the application to the Government. In accordance with Protocol no. 14, the application was allocated to a Committee of three Judges.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Bratislava.
1. Enforcement proceedings against the applicant
5. On 7 November 1997 enforcement proceedings were initiated against the applicant.
6. On 21 January 1999 the Bratislava IV District Court dismissed the applicant's objections against the enforcement and its costs.
7. On 31 January 2000 the district court dismissed the applicant's request for adjournment of the enforcement. On 30 June 2000 the decision was upheld by the Bratislava Regional Court.
8. On 29 January 2001 the applicant requested the district court to issue an interim measure and to discontinue the enforcement.
9. On 21 May 2001 the district court adjourned the enforcement pending its decision on the applicant's request for the enforcement to be discontinued. On 30 November 2001 the regional court quashed the above decision.
10. On 29 October 2003 the applicant again requested discontinuation of the enforcement proceedings.
11. On 25 October 2007 the district court rejected the applicant's request for interim measures.
12. On 17 March 2009 the district court dismissed the applicant's request for discontinuation of the proceedings.
13. On 28 January 2010 the regional court, on the applicant's appeal, quashed the first-instance decision and remitted the case to the district court for further examination.
14. On 20 May 2010 the district court discontinued the proceedings and held that it would deliver a decision on costs once the decision to discontinue the proceedings became final.
15. On 24 June 2010 the applicant's representative informed the Court that the decision has not yet become final.
2. Constitutional proceedings
16. On 6 October 2003 the applicant complained to the Constitutional Court about length of the proceedings before the Bratislava IV District Court and claimed the equivalent of 2,426 euros (EUR) at that time as just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage suffered.
17. The Constitutional Court examined the period of the proceedings after 29 January 2001.
18. On 2 February 2005 it found that the district court had violated the applicant's right to a hearing without unjustified delay, ordered the latter to avoid further delays and to reimburse the applicant's legal costs.
19. It concluded that these represented a sufficient just satisfaction and did not award the applicant any award for non-pecuniary damage. It referred to the fact that the applicant was the liable party in the proceedings. It further held that the applicant had failed to specify the allegedly suffered harm.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
20. The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”Admissibility
21. The Government expressed the view that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim of a violation of his right to a hearing within a reasonable time. They argued that the Constitutional Court had expressly acknowledged such a violation, had ordered the district court to proceed without further delay and had ordered reimbursement of the applicant's legal costs. The applicant should have lodged a fresh constitutional complaint in respect of the subsequent period.
22. The applicant contested the Constitutional Court's finding as (i) in his opinion, the enforcement proceedings had been unlawful, (ii) in his constitutional complaint, and contrary to the Constitutional Court's reasoning, he had duly specified the harm suffered and (iii) the Constitutional Court had failed to examine a part of the proceedings complained of without providing any reasons for doing so. The applicant further alleged that the Constitutional Court's finding lacked both a compensatory and an accelerating effect. In view of the above, the applicant argued that he was still a victim and that he was not obliged to lodge a fresh constitutional complaint.
23. The Court notes that, at the time of the Constitutional Court's finding, the District Court, in respect of which the applicant complained to the Constitutional Court, had been responsible for a period of approximately six years and eight months.
24. Whether redress afforded to an applicant was adequate and sufficient having regard to Article 41 of the Convention falls to be determined in the light of the principles established under the Court's case-law (see, Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, §§ 178-213, ECHR 2006- V, and Cocchiarella v. Italy [GC], no. 64886/01, §§ 65-107, ECHR 2006-V). These include, most notably, the amount of the compensation awarded to the applicant and the effectiveness of any preventive measure applied (see Sika v. Slovakia (no. 3), no. 26840/02, § 54, 23 October 2007).
25. The Court cannot overlook the fact that the period imputable to the District Court was approximately six years and eight months and that the Constitutional Court itself had acknowledged the district court's responsibility for delays in the proceedings. In view of the above, in respect of the proceedings up to the Constitutional Court's finding of 2 February 2005, the Court concludes that the applicant did not lose his status as a victim within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention.
26. Since the effects produced by the finding of the Constitutional Court did not satisfy the criteria applied by the Court, the applicant was not required, for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, to have again recourse to the remedy under Article 127 of the Constitution in respect of the proceedings subsequent to the Constitutional Court's judgment (see the recapitulation of the relevant principles in Becová v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 23788/06, 18 September 2007). The Government's objections must therefore be dismissed.
27. Following the Constitutional Court' finding, the proceedings have lasted another five years and eight months.
28. It follows that this part of the application cannot be rejected for non‑exhaustion of domestic remedies within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention and it is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
29. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
30. The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present case (see Frydlender, cited above).
31. Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. In particular, at the time of the Constitutional Court's finding, the period under consideration had lasted approximately six years and eight months at one level of jurisdiction. Further delays occurred in the subsequent period which has lasted five years and eight months. The Court considers, having regard to its case-law, that the length of the proceedings in the instant case was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
32. There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION
33. The applicant further complained that he had no effective remedy at his disposal within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention, which reads:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
A. Admissibility
34. The Government argued that the applicant had an effective remedy at his disposal and that the fact that the redress obtained from the Constitutional Court was not sufficient for Convention purposes does not render the remedy under Article 127 of the Constitution in the circumstances of the present case incompatible with Article 13 of the Convention.
35. The applicant contested the above argument.
36. The Court notes that this part of the application is not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.Merits
37. The Court reiterates that the remedy under Article 127 of the Constitution is likely to provide appropriate and sufficient redress to applicants where it allows for examination of the entire duration of the proceedings complained of (see Andrášik and Others v. Slovakia (dec.), nos. 57984/00, 60237/00, 60242/00, 60679/00, 60680/00, 68563/01, 60226/00, 22 October 2002).
38. Since the applicant in the present case complained to the Constitutional Court about the overall duration of the proceedings before the district court and since, unlike in other decisions, the Constitutional Court excluded from its review their part (prior to 29 January 2001) and, in addition, its finding had no compensatory or accelerating effect, the Court considers that the applicant's right to an effective remedy has not been respected (see also A. R., spol. s r. o. v. Slovakia, no. 13960/06, §§ 59-60, 9 February 2010).
39. There has therefore been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
40. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
41. The applicant claimed EUR 10,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
42. The Government considered the claim exaggerated.
43. The Court considers that it should award the full sum claimed.
B. Costs and expenses
44. The applicant also claimed EUR 812,19 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court.
45. The Government had no objection against the award of a demonstrably incurred costs and expenses in the proceedings before the Court.
46. According to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers that the sum claimed should be awarded in full.
C. Default interest
47. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the application admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
3.Holds that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention;
4. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts:
(i) EUR 10,000 (ten thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 812,19 (eight hundred twelve euros and nineteen cents), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 30 November 2010, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Fatoş AracıLech Garlicki Deputy Registrar President
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy