SECOND SECTION
CASE OF WARE v. HUNGARY
(Application no. 8982/10)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
25 March 2014
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Ware v. Hungary,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Helen Keller, President,
András Sajó,
Egidijus Kūris, judges,
and Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 4 March 2014,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 8982/10) against the Republic of Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Hungarian national, Ms Borbála Ware (“the applicant”), on 6 February 2010.
2. The applicant was represented by Mr B. Lehner, a lawyer practising in Veszprém. The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr Z. Tallódi, Agent, Ministry of Public Administration and Justice.
3. On 3 January 2012 the application was communicated to the Government.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Hegyesd.
5. In a trespass dispute, on 15 April 2001 the applicant brought an action before the Tapolca District Court.
After a second-instance decision by the Veszprém County Regional Court and a remittal, the final judgment in the case was adopted by the Supreme Court and served on the applicant’s lawyer on 12 August 2009.
THE LAW
6. The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. She also invoked Article 13 in this respect.
This complaint falls to be examined under Article 6 § 1 alone, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by a ... tribunal...”
7. The Government contested that argument.
8. The period to be taken into consideration began on 15 April 2001 and ended on 12 August 2009. It thus lasted eight years and four months for three levels of jurisdiction.
In view of such lengthy proceedings, this complaint must be declared admissible.
9. The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present application (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
10. Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or convincing argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present circumstances. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
11. The applicant further complained that the length of the proceedings had infringed her right to the peaceful enjoyment of her possessions, as guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
12. The Court notes that this complaint is linked to the one examined above and must therefore likewise be declared admissible.
13. Having regard to its finding under Article 6 § 1 (see paragraph 10 above), the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine whether, in this case, there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Zanghì v. Italy, 19 February 1991, § 23, Series A no. 194-C).
14. Relying on Article 41, the applicant claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 5,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
The Government contested these claims.
15. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On the other hand, it considers that the applicant must have sustained some non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on the basis of equity, it awards her EUR 2,900 under that head.
16. The applicant also claimed approximately EUR 200 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court, corresponding to the amount billed by her lawyer.
17. The Government did not express an opinion on the matter.
18. Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case-law, the Court considers that the sum claimed should be awarded in full.
19. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
1. Declares the application admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds that there is no need to examine the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1;
4. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 2,900 (two thousand nine hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 200 (two hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 25 March 2014, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stanley NaismithHelen Keller
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy