CASE OF YERMAKOVICH v. RUSSIA

THIRD SECTION

CASE OF YERMAKOVICH v. RUSSIA

(Application no. 35237/14)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

28 May 2019

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Yermakovich v. Russia,

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

Helen Keller, President,
Pere Pastor Vilanova,
María Elósegui, judges,
and Stephen Phillips, Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 7 May 2019,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1.  The case originated in an application (no. 35237/14) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Belarussian national, Mr Valentina Dmitriyevna Yermakovich (“the applicant”), on 12 March 2015.

2.  The applicant was represented by Ms O. Tseytlina and Ms N. Shvechkova, lawyers practising in St Petersburg. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented initially by Mr G. Matyushkin, former Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and then by his successor in that office, Mr M. Galperin.

3.  On 7 November 2016 the complaints concerning the conditions of the applicant’s detention and transfers to and from court, the alleged lack of review of her detention, the denial of family visits and the annulment of her passport were communicated to the Government and the remainder of the application was declared inadmissible pursuant to Rule 54 § 3 of the Rules of Court.

4.  On 6 September 2018 the parties were invited to submit further written observations concerning the annulment of the applicant’s passport, pursuant to Rule 54 § 2 (c) of the Rules of the Court.

THE FACTS

THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

5.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Marusino, Moscow Region.

A.  The applicant’s arrest and detention with a view to extradition

6.  On 1 August 2000 the Ministry of the Interior of Belarus ordered the applicant’s arrest on suspicion of her having committed several criminal offences. On an unspecified date her name was put on the international wanted persons list.

7.  On 18 February 2014 the applicant was arrested in Lyubertsy, Moscow Region.

8.  On 20 February 2014 the Lyubertsy Town Court of the Moscow Region authorised the applicant’s detention for forty days pending her extradition to Belarus.

9.  On 28 March 2014 the Town Court extended the applicant’s detention until 18 August 2014.

10.  On 18 August 2014 the Town Court extended the applicant’s detention until 18 February 2015. On 18 September 2014 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the decision of 18 August 2014 on appeal. The applicant did not attend the hearing. The applicant’s lawyers were present and made submissions to the court.

11.  On 10 February 2015 the Town Prosecutor ordered the applicant’s release on an undertaking not to leave town.

12.  On 20 August and 21 September 2015 the investigative committee of the Republic of Belarus discontinued the criminal proceedings against the applicant.

13.  On 4 February 2016 the Town Prosecutor discontinued the extradition proceedings against the applicant.

B.  Conditions of the applicant’s detention and transfers

14.  From 21 February 2014 to 10 February 2015 the applicant was detained in remand prison SIZO-6 in the Moscow Region. According to the Government, she was held in the following cells:

Cell no.

Period of detention

Cell size (sq. m)

28

From 21 to 22 February 2014

21.4

94

From 22 February to 30 November 2014

13.1

97

From 1 to 3 December 2014

17.5

32

From 3 to 4 December 2014

34.2

31

From 4 December 2014 to 3 January 2015

21.5

98

From 3 to 16 January 2015

16.3

94

From 16 January to 10 February 2015

13.1

1.  Description provided by the Government

15.  According to the Government, the personal space afforded to the applicant during her detention in the remand prison was approximately 3.27 sq. m, which was below the statutory minimum standard of 4 sq. m. She was provided with an individual sleeping place, a mattress, a pillow, two bed sheets, a pillowcase, a towel and a blanket. She also received a bowl, a spoon and a mug. The inmates were allowed to take a shower once a week for at least fifteen minutes. The bed sheets were changed on a weekly basis. The applicant was provided with access to a radio, books and board games. The temperature in the cells was 22oC in summer and at least 18oC in winter. The food provided to the inmates was in compliance with the relevant norms and standards.

2.  Description provided by the applicant

16.  According to the applicant, the cells in which she was held were overcrowded and dirty. The walls were covered with mould and fungus. The lighting was insufficient during the day and was not turned off at night. The heating was also insufficient. On numerous occasions it was completely turned off. The mattresses, pillows and bed linen were too old and worn-out. The inmates were allowed to take a fifteen-minute shower once a week. The food was of poor quality. No fruit or vegetables were available. The inmates were allowed one hour of exercise a day in a prison yard with no sports facilities. If one of the inmates were sick or refused to take part in the daily exercise, the administration cancelled it for all the inmates held in the same cell.

17.  During her transfers between the remand prison and court, the applicant was placed in a compartment measuring 1 by 0.7 m, often with another inmate. The journey lasted for two and a half to three hours.

18.  Upon her return to the remand prison, the applicant was placed in a holding cell measuring 1 by 1.5 m with three other inmates. Prior to being admitted to their cells, the inmates were required to take off their clothes, do several sit-ups and then remain crouched down.

3.  Prosecutor’s compliance inspections

19.  On 26 February 2014 the Deputy Town Prosecutor carried out an inspection of remand prison SIZO-6. He established, inter alia, that it was overcrowded, noting in particular that the average personal space afforded to inmates varied from 1 to 3 sq. m and that in cells nos. 8, 69 and 97 the inmates were not provided with individual beds. According to the prison administration, the remand prison capacity was 327 inmates. However, at the time of the inspection the prison population exceeded that limit by 62%, holding a total of 530 inmates.

20.  On an unspecified date in 2014 the Regional Prosecutor’s Office carried out an inspection of the conditions of detention in remand prison SIZO-6. On 21 March 2014 the Regional Prosecutor issued a notice to the head of the regional penal service (FSIN), advising that the conditions of detention in the prison be brought in line with the statutory requirements. As to the issue of overcrowding, the prosecutor indicated as follows:

“As regards the number of beds ... in the cells ... the [statutory] requirement of 4 sq. m of personal space per inmate is not being complied with ... The average personal space afforded to detainees is 2.6 sq. m and in cells nos. 10, 14, 16, 25 etc. it varies from 1.6 to 1.55 sq. m per inmate.”

C.  Family visits

21.  According to the applicant, between February and March 2014 the Town Prosecutor authorised the applicant’s mother to visit her at the remand prison on three occasions.

22.  On 10 October 2014, in response to a request by the applicant to meet with her family, the Prosecutor General’s Office responded that, as stipulated in the Pre-trial Detention Act, suspects and defendants could have no more than two family visits per month, subject to written authorisation from the official or authority in charge of the criminal case, and advised the applicant to apply to the law-enforcement bodies in Belarus for approval of her relatives’ visits.

23.  On 21 January 2015 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow dismissed a complaint by the applicant against the prosecutor’s decision of 10 October 2014, without considering the merits.

24.  On 11 March 2015 the Moscow City Court quashed the decision of 21 January 2015 and remitted the matter to the District Court for fresh consideration.

25.  On 6 May 2015 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint against the decision of 10 October 2014.

26.  On 17 August 2015 the City Court upheld the decision of 6 May 2015 on appeal.

D.  Annulment of the applicant’s Russian passport

27.  On 24 January 2001 the applicant was issued with a Russian passport by the Russian Embassy in Minsk, Belarus. On an unspecified date she moved to Moscow, Russia.

28.  On 20 August 2004 a district police department in Moscow issued an internal passport in the applicant’s name.

29.  On 16 February 2012 the Moscow City Department of the Federal Migration Service decided, on the basis of an earlier inquiry, that the applicant had been wrongly issued with a Russian passport. They based their findings, inter alia, on information received from the Russian Embassy in Minsk indicating that there was no information in the relevant database confirming the issuance of a Russian passport in the applicant’s name in 2001.

30.  On 5 February 2015 the Lyublinskiy District Court of Moscow dismissed a complaint by the applicant against the decision of 16 February 2012. On 26 June 2015 the City Court upheld the decision of 5 February 2015.

31.  On an unspecified date the applicant, being a Belorussian citizen, applied for a residency permit in Russia. On 17 April 2017 the Federal Migration Service issued a residency permit.

THE LAW

I.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION

32.  The applicant complained that the conditions of her detention and transport had been in contravention of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

33.  The Government contested that argument. They considered that the conditions of the applicant’s detention had not reached the minimum level of severity necessary to raise an issue under Article 3 of the Convention.

34.  The applicant maintained her complaint. She pointed out that the Government had failed to submit any information concerning the number of inmates detained in each cell together with her. Nor had they challenged the veracity of her allegations as regards the conditions of her transfers to and from court. In her submissions of 12 October 2017, the applicant alleged that she had not received proper medical care while in detention.

A.  Admissibility

35.  As regards the part of the applicant’s complaint relating to the conditions of her transfers to and from court, the Court observes that the applicant’s most recent appearance before the national courts, during her detention in the remand prison, took place on 18 August 2014, while she lodged her application on 11 March 2015. Accordingly, it considers that the complaint has been lodged out of time and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

36.  The Court further notes that the applicant lodged her complaint concerning the quality of medical assistance in her observations of 12 October 2017, while the complaint related to her detention in the remand prison which ended on 10 February 2015. It follows that the complaint has been lodged out of time and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

37.  Lastly, the Court notes that the complaint concerning the conditions of the applicant’s detention in remand prison SIZO-6 from 18 February 2014 to 10 March 2015 is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B.  Merits

38.  The Court notes that, as established by the prosecutor’s office, the remand prison in which the applicant was detained was severely overcrowded during the period under consideration (see paragraphs 19-20 above). In this connection, the Court refers to the principles established in its case-law regarding conditions of detention (see, for instance, Muršić v. Croatia [GC], no. 7334/13, §§ 91-141, ECHR 2016; Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, §§ 90-94, ECHR 2000-XI; and Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42525/07 and 60800/08, §§ 139-65, 10 January 2012). It reiterates, in particular, that extreme lack of space in a prison cell or overcrowding weighs heavily as an aspect to be taken into account for the purpose of establishing whether the impugned conditions of detention were “degrading” from the point of view of Article 3 and may disclose a violation, both alone or taken together with other shortcomings (see, amongst many authorities, Karalevičius v. Lithuania, no. 53254/99, §§ 36‑40, 7 April 2005).

39.  Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court has not found any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. As a result of the overcrowding in the remand prison, the applicant’s detention did not meet the minimum requirements as laid down in the Court’s case-law. Having regard also to the fact that the applicant had to spend twenty-three hours a day in such conditions, the Court finds that she was subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the conditions of her detention in remand prison SIZO-6 from 18 February 2014 to 10 February 2015.

40.  In view of the above, the Court does not consider it necessary to examine the remainder of the parties’ submissions concerning other aspects of the conditions of the applicant’s detention during the period in question.

II.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 4 OF THE CONVENTION

41.  The applicant complained that there had been no effective procedure by which she could challenge her detention after 18 August 2014. She relied on Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”

42.  The Government contested that argument. They pointed out that the applicant had been able to lodge an appeal against the detention order of 18 August 2014. On 18 September 2014 the appellate court had reviewed the lawfulness of the extension of her detention and upheld the order of 18 August 2014 on appeal.

43.  The applicant maintained her complaint. In her opinion, it was incumbent on the domestic judicial authorities to review the lawfulness of her detention following her application for asylum and the deterioration of her health.

A.  Admissibility

44.  The Court notes that the complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B.  Merits

1.  General principles

45.  The Court reiterates that forms of judicial review satisfying the requirements of Article 5 § 4 may vary from one domain to another, and will depend on the type of deprivation of liberty in issue. It is not out of the question for a system based on an automatic periodic review of the lawfulness of detention by a court to satisfy the requirements of Article 5 § 4 (see Megyeri v. Germany, 12 May 1992, § 22, Series A no. 237‑A). However, long intervals in the context of such an automatic periodic review may give rise to a violation of Article 5 § 4 (see, among other authorities, Herczegfalvy v. Austria, 24 September 1992, § 77, Series A no. 244). By virtue of Article 5 § 4, a detainee is entitled to ask a “court” having jurisdiction to decide “speedily” whether or not his or her deprivation of liberty has become “unlawful” in the light of new factors which have emerged subsequent to the initial decision to order his or her remand in custody (see Ismoilov and Others, no. 2947/06, § 146, 24 April 2008).

46.  It is not the Court’s task to attempt to rule as to the maximum period of time between reviews which should automatically apply to a certain category of detainees. The question of whether the periods comply with the requirement must be determined in the light of the circumstances of each case (see Sanchez-Reisse v. Switzerland, 21 October 1986, § 55, Series A no. 107, and Oldham v. the United Kingdom, no. 36273/97, § 31, ECHR 2000-X). The Court must, in particular, examine whether any new relevant factors that have arisen in the interval between periodic reviews have been assessed, without unreasonable delay, by a court having jurisdiction to decide whether or not the detention has become “unlawful” in the light of these new factors (see Abdulkhakov v. Russia, no. 14743/11, § 215, 2 October 2012).

2.  Application of those principles in the present case

47.  Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes that on 18 August 2014 the Town Court extended the applicant’s detention for six months on the grounds that the extradition proceedings were still pending. The applicant challenged the lawfulness of her extension of her detention by lodging an appeal. On 18 September 2014 the Regional Court upheld the court order of 18 August 2014 on appeal.

48.  In this connection, the Court notes, firstly, that the proceedings for the extension of detention pending extradition can be considered a form of periodic review of a judicial nature (compare Khodzhamberdiyev v. Russia, no. 64809/10, §§ 109-10, 5 June 2012; Rustamov v. Russia, no. 11209/10, § 176, 3 July 2012; Niyazov v. Russia, no. 27843/11, § 153, 16 October 2012; and Sidikovy v. Russia, no. 73455/11, §§ 182-83, 20 June 2013). Accordingly, the Court finds that on 18 August and 18 September 2014 the national courts conducted the review of the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention.

49.  The Court also considers that the interval between the extension of the applicant’s detention on 18 August 2014 and her release on 10 February 2015 was not unreasonable. It further notes that during the period under consideration there were no new developments in the applicant’s extradition case which could have prompted an obligation on the part of the national courts to initiate another review as regards the lawfulness of her detention (contrast Abdulkhakov, cited above, §§ 216-17, in which it was incumbent on the national courts to review the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention pending extradition once the Court indicated an interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules to be applied to the applicant and his extradition proceedings were to be suspended for an indefinite period of time). The circumstances referred to by the applicant (her application for asylum and the alleged deterioration of her health) cannot be construed as the factors requiring such review.

50.  Regard being had to the above, the Court concludes that, in the circumstances of the present case, the applicant was thereby enabled to “take proceedings” by which the lawfulness of her detention could be effectively assessed by a court. There has therefore been no violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention on this account.

III.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE LACK OF FAMILY VISITS

51.  The applicant further complained that she had been denied family visits while in detention. She relied on Article 8 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:

“1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life ...

2.  There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

52.  The Government considered that the authorities’ refusal to allow the family visits to the applicant had not amounted to a violation of her rights under Article 8 of the Convention.

53.  The applicant maintained her complaint. She considered that the interference with her right to have family visits while in detention had not been in accordance with law and that the applicable law had lacked clarity, certainty and foreseeability as regards the authorisation of family visits in respect of people detained pending extradition. She further argued that the interference had not pursued a legitimate aim. It had placed a disproportionate burden on her and had not been necessary.

A.  Admissibility

54.  The Court notes that the complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B.  Merits

55.  Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court accepts, and the Government do not argue to the contrary, that the Prosecutor General’s Office’s inability to authorise family visits for the applicant while she was in detention constituted an interference with her right to respect for family life (compare Moiseyev v. Russia, no. 62936/00, § 247, 9 October 2008). Accordingly, the Court’s task is to ascertain whether the interference was “in accordance with the law”, pursued one or more of the legitimate aims listed in paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Convention and was “necessary in a democratic society”.

56.  The Court notes at the outset that it has previously held that the provisions of the Pre-trial Detention Act relied on by the authorities in the applicant’s case fall short of the requirements of “quality of law” and foreseeability because they confer unfettered discretion on the competent authorities in the matter of prison visits but do not define the circumstances in which leave to visit can be refused, for how long and on what grounds (see Vlasov v. Russia, no. 78146/01, § 126, 12 June 2008, and Moiseyev, cited above, § 250).

57.  The Court sees no reason to hold otherwise in the present case. In its view, the present case illustrates the manner in which that unlimited discretion can be, and has been abused. Between February and March 2014 the Town Prosecutor granted the applicant’s mother leave to visit (see paragraph 21 above). However, subsequently the Prosecutor General’s Office absolved itself from ruling on the issue, advising the applicant to seek authorisation in Belarus for family visits. As a result, the applicant was unable to meet with her family for almost a year.

58.  Having examined the parties’ submissions, the Court is not convinced by the Government’s line of reasoning that the Russian authorities did not have jurisdiction to decide whether the applicant should be allowed to meet with her relatives. The fact that the Town Prosecutor was able to authorised family visits would suggest the opposite.

59.  In view of the above, the Court reiterates its earlier position that the legal provisions governing the issue of family visits do not meet the “quality of law” requirement and deprived the applicant of the minimum degree of protection against arbitrariness or abuse to which citizens are entitled under the rule of law in a democratic society. Accordingly, the Court considers that the refusal of family visits cannot be regarded as having been “prescribed by law”. In the light of this finding, it is not necessary to assess whether the other conditions set out in paragraph 2 of Article 8 have been complied with.

60.  There has therefore been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention on account of the lack of family visits to the applicant during the relevant periods of her detention.

IV.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF ANNULMENT OF THE APPLICANT’S PASSPORT

61.  The applicant further complained that the annulment of her Russian passport had amounted to a violation of her rights set out in Article 8 of the Convention.

62.  The Government contested that argument. In their opinion, the applicant had obtained the Russian passport unlawfully and that she had been aware at all times that she had not been a Russian citizen. In any event, she had chosen not to apply for the Russian nationality while it was possible.

63.  The applicant maintained her complaint. She submitted that she had lawfully acquired the Russian passport and that its annulment by the authorities had been arbitrary, and that the relevant judicial proceedings had not afforded the necessary procedural safeguards. The authorities had not informed her of their decision to annul her passport. She had learnt of it two years later. When upholding the decision, the national courts had referred to unreliable information submitted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and had conducted the hearing in her absence. As a result, the applicant had encountered numerous problems in her daily life. She had been unable to consult medical practitioners or use postal, banking and notarial services. She had also been prevented from finding employment.

64.  The Court reiterates that an arbitrary revocation of already obtained citizenship might in certain circumstances raise an issue under Article 8 of the Convention because of its impact on the private life of the individual (see, for example, Ramadan v. Malta, no. 76136/12, § 85, ECHR 2016 (extracts)).

65.  Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that the proceedings in the applicant’s case did not concern the revocation of her citizenship. Rather, the domestic authorities concluded that the applicant had not acquired Russian citizenship (see paragraph 29 above). However, the Court does not consider that the qualification of the procedure under domestic law is of crucial importance in the present case and accepts that the principles referred to above are applicable. Accordingly, it is the Court’s task in the present case to examine whether the decision of the Russian authorities disclose such arbitrariness and have such consequences as might raise an issue under Article 8 of the Convention (ibid.).

66.  While the Court cannot exclude that, as argued by the applicant, the revocation of her Russian citizenship might have been arbitrary in that the relevant proceedings were not accompanied by adequate procedural safeguards, it cannot accept her argument that its impact on her private life was such as to raise an issue under Article 8 of the Convention. The applicant was not a stateless person. She had retained her Belorussian citizenship and, accordingly, was not left without an identity document necessary for her everyday life (contrast Smirnova v. Russia, nos. 46133/99 and 48183/99, §§ 95-100, ECHR 2003‑IX (extracts)). Her allegations to the contrary are not supported by any evidence. At no time was the applicant threatened with expulsion from Russia and continued to reside there, having obtained a residence permit.

67.  It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

V.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

68.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A.  Damage

69.  The applicant claimed non-pecuniary damage, leaving the amount to the Court’s discretion.

70.  The Government submitted that, in the event that the Court decided to make such an award, it should do so in line with its established case-law on the issue.

71.  The Court notes that it has found a violation of the applicant’s rights on account of the conditions of detention in the remand prison and the lack of family visits during that period. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant 8,450 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on this amount.

B.  Costs and expenses

72.  The applicant also claimed 985,000 Russian roubles (RUB) for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and the Court. She submitted copies of legal services agreements in connection with the domestic proceedings concerning (i) the annulment of the applicant’s passport, (ii) the application for asylum, (iii) the proceedings before the Court, which confirmed that she had incurred legal costs in the amount of RUB 225,000.

73.  The Government submitted that, in the event that the Court decided to satisfy the applicant’s claims for the costs and expenses, it should do so in line with its established practice.

74.  According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 1,170, covering costs under all heads.

C.  Default interest

75.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1.  Declares the complaints concerning the conditions of the applicant’s detention, alleged lack of review of her detention, and lack of family visits admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;

2.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention;

3.  Holds that there has been no violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention;

4.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention on account of the lack of family visits;

5.  Holds

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

(i)  EUR 8,450 (eight thousand four hundred and fifty euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(ii)  EUR 1,170 (one thousand one hundred and seventy euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

6.  Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 28 May 2019, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

              Stephen PhillipsHelen Keller
RegistrarPresident

 

Full & Egal Universal Law Academy