CASE OF YORDANOVA AND OTHERS v. BULGARIA

FIFTH SECTION

CASE OF YORDANOVA AND OTHERS v. BULGARIA

(Applications nos. 61432/11 and 64318/11)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

19 July 2018

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Yordanova and Others v. Bulgaria,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

Erik Møse, President,
Síofra O’Leary,
Lәtif Hüseynov, judges,
and Milan Blaško, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 26 June 2018,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in two applications (nos. 61432/11 and 64318/11) against the Republic of Bulgaria lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by three Bulgarian nationals, Ms Violeta Aleksandrova Yordanova (“the first applicant”), Ms Timka Aleksandrova Rusamanova (“the second applicant”) and Ms Rumyana Strashimirova Telyatinova (“the third applicant”, together “the applicants”), on 15 September 2011. The second applicant passed away in 2013 and her daughter, Ms Svetla Velichkova Gogova, expressed a wish to continue the application in her stead.

2. The first and third applicants and Ms Svetla Velichkova Gogova were represented by Ms S. Margaritova-Vuchkova, a lawyer practising in Sofia. The Bulgarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agents, Ms M. Kotseva and Ms I. Stancheva-Chinova, of the Ministry of Justice.

3. On 8 June 2017 the complaints concerning the authorities’ failure to provide compensation to the applicants for their fathers’ expropriated property were communicated to the Government and the remainder of the two applications was declared inadmissible pursuant to Rule 54 § 3 of the Rules of Court.

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

4. The applicants were born in 1937, 1934 and 1941 respectively. The first and third applicants live in Sofia.

A. Background

5. The applicants’ fathers owned printing houses in Sofia, which were nationalised by the Communist authorities in 1949 and 1950. After that their assets were taken over by a State-owned printing house. In 1991 the latter was registered as a State-owned company, currently named ‘Obrazovanie i nauka’ EAD. The company is managed by the Minister of Education. Among the tasks of the company is the printing of school textbooks.

6. In 1997 Parliament adopted the Compensation of Owners of Nationalised Real Property Act (hereinafter “the Compensation Act” – see paragraph 23 below).

B. Initial developments concerning the first and second applicants

7. In March 1998 the first and second applicants and their mother applied under the Compensation Act to receive compensation for the nationalised printing house. As to the manner of compensation, they expressed preference to receive shares in ‘Obrazovanie i nauka’ EAD. In a decision of 14 June 1999 the Minister of Education allowed their request, stating that the exact number of shares to be awarded would be determined after a valuation of the assets of the former printing house.

8. Despite that, in another decision dated 3 July 2000 the Minister rejected the request for compensation. That decision was quashed by the Supreme Administrative Court in a final judgment of 24 June 2002, on the ground that it impermissibly modified the previous one, which had become final.

9. After that an expert prepared a valuation of the nationalised property, which was confirmed by the Minister of Education on 5 June 2003. It stated that the first and second applicants and their mother were entitled to compensation for 57,932 Bulgarian levs (BGN, equivalent of 29,630 euros (EUR)), which equalled 579 shares in ‘Obrazovanie i nauka’ EAD, each with a face value of BGN 100 (EUR 51).

10. However, on 26 August 2003 the Minister adopted another decision, stating that the applicants and their mother were to receive compensation bonds instead of shares. He relied in particular on the fact that ‘Obrazovanie i nauka’ EAD had been included in the list under section 11 of the concluding provisions of the Privatisation and Post-Privatisation Control Act 2002 (hereinafter “the Privatisation Act” – see paragraph 24 below). Once again, that decision was quashed by the Supreme Administrative Court, in a final judgment of 18 October 2004, as it impermissibly modified the previous decisions awarding the first and second applicants and their mother compensation in the form of shares, which had become final. The domestic court held in particular that section 11 of the concluding provisions mentioned above could not justify such a modification.

11. In 2006 the first and second applicants and their mother filed with the Minister of Education and other State bodies several complaints, requesting that the compensation procedure be completed. In a letter dated 7 April 2006 the Council of Ministers (Government) informed them that the Ministry of Education was seeking “a lawful solution”, which “would not infringe upon the public interest and would not be in breach of the [Privatisation Act]”. In another letter dated 30 August 2006 the parliamentary Committee on Petitions informed the applicants and their mother that it had urged the Minister of Education to find a solution, pointing out that with the enactment of the Compensation Act Parliament had sought “to restore historical justice”.

12. The first and second applicants’ mother passed away in 2007 and was succeeded by them.

C. Initial developments concerning the third applicant

13. In August 1998 the third applicant, her mother and her sister applied under the Compensation Act to receive compensation for the nationalised printing house. They stated that they preferred to receive shares in ‘Obrazovanie i nauka’ EAD.

14. Their request was allowed by the Minister of Education in a decision of 22 December 1998.

15. In 1999, 2001 and 2003 an expert drew up three valuations of the expropriated property. The last of them, stating that the third applicant, her mother and her sister were entitled to compensation for BGN 26,309 (the equivalent of EUR 13,460), equalling 263 shares in ‘Obrazovanie i nauka’ EAD, each with a face value of BGN 100, was confirmed by the Minister of Education on 6 June 2003.

16. Despite the above developments, in another decision dated 26 August 2003 the Minister stated that the third applicant, her mother and her sister were to receive compensation bonds instead of shares. As in the procedure described above concerning the first and second applicants, he relied on the fact that the company had been included in the list under section 11 of the concluding provisions of the Privatisation Act (see paragraph 24 below). That decision was quashed by the Supreme Administrative Court in a final judgment of 31 March 2004, on the ground that it impermissibly modified the previous decisions concerning the compensation to be provided, which had become final. The domestic court again held that section 11 of the concluding provisions mentioned above could not justify such a modification, as it was not applicable to pending compensation proceedings.

17. The third applicant’s mother and sister passed away in 2006 and 2004 respectively, leaving the third applicant her father’s only surviving heir.

D. Subsequent developments

18. In 2007 the Ministry of Education requested the Privatisation Agency to authorise the transfer to private parties of shares in ‘Obrazovanie i nauka’ EAD. The authorisation, related to the claims of all applicants, was given on 23 April 2008.

19. The Ministry took no further measures to complete the compensation procedures.

20. In 2011 the third applicant wrote a letter to the executive director of ‘Obrazovanie i nauka’ EAD, urging him to enter into the company register her shareholding and to present to her copies of all decisions taken by the company’s general meeting after 2003. She received no response.

21. In a decision of 5 March 2013 the Council of Ministers authorised the sale by ‘Obrazovanie i nauka’ EAD of real properties owned by the company (such an authorisation was required by law). The applicants applied for the judicial review of that decision, arguing that it affected their rights as shareholders. In a judgment of 27 January 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed their application, noting that they were not shareholders in the company, since the compensation procedures had not been completed with the actual transfer of shares to them in accordance with the law.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

22. After the fall of the communist regime in 1990, Parliament enacted legislation providing for the restitution of different types of formerly nationalised property.

23. In November 1997 it enacted the Compensation Act (Закон за обезщетяване на собственици на одържавени имоти), which provided for the compensation of former owners of certain types of nationalised property, or their heirs, in cases where, for different reasons, restitution in kind was impossible. The manner of compensation was, as a rule, to be chosen by the former owners, respectively their heirs. Compensation could be through shares in the properties or companies in which the nationalised properties had been included, or through compensation bonds. The latter are financial instruments which can be used in privatisation tenders, and are usually bought up by investors at relatively low prices.

24. The Privatisation Act (Закон за приватизация и следприватизационeн контрол) was enacted in 2002. While it did not, in principle, deal with questions of restitution, section 11 of its concluding provisions stated that persons entitled to compensation, in particular under the Compensation Act, with regard to a number of specifically enumerated companies (such as public utilities companies, hospitals, etc., most of which are entirely owned by the State), would only receive compensation bonds.

25. The relevant provisions of the Code of Administrative Procedure concerning the enforcement of final administrative decisions, and the national courts’ practice in that regard, have been summarised in Dimitar Yanakiev v. Bulgaria (no. 2) (no. 50346/07, § 30-35, 31 March 2016).

THE LAW

I. PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS

26. The Court notes that the second applicant, Ms Timka Aleksandrova Rusamanova, passed away in 2013 and that her daughter, Ms Svetla Velichkova Gogova, expressed a wish to continue the application in her stead (see paragraph 1 above). It has not been disputed that Ms Gogova is entitled to do so, and the Court sees no reason not to accede to her request (see, for example, Bittó and Others v. Slovakia, no. 30255/09, §§ 73-74, 28 January 2014).

27. In addition, given that the two applications concern similar facts and complaints and raise identical issues under the Convention, the Court considers that the they should be joined pursuant to Rule 42 § 1 of the Rules of Court.

II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1

28. The applicants complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that they had not received the compensation due to them. That provision reads as follows:

“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”

A. Admissibility

29. The Government raised two objections relating to the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. In their observations on the admissibility and merits of the case they claimed, first, that the applicants had had to exercise their rights as shareholders in ‘Obrazovanie i nauka’ EAD. In their additional observations and submissions on the applicants’ claims for just satisfaction they argued, second, that the applicants should have initiated enforcement proceedings against the Minister of Education, as provided for under the Code of Administrative Procedure.

30. In their submissions the first and third applicants and the second applicant’s heir, Ms Gogova (see paragraphs 1 and 26 above), contested the first objection raised by the Government. They pointed out that, the compensation procedures not having been completed, they were not shareholders in ‘Obrazovanie i nauka’ EAD – a fact which had been confirmed by the Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 27 January 2015.

31. The Court is of the view that the first of the two questions raised, namely whether the applicants could be considered shareholders in ‘Obrazovanie i nauka’ EAD and whether they were entitled to exercise any rights in that regard, is closely linked with the substance of the applicants’ complaints and should therefore be joined to the merits.

32. As to whether the applicants had to initiate enforcement proceedings against the Minister of Education, as provided for under the Code of Administrative Procedure (see paragraph 25 above), the Court is of the view that the Government are estopped from raising an objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. The Government have failed to raise such an objection in their initial observations on the admissibility of the case, only doing so in their additional observations and submissions on the applicants’ claims for just satisfaction (see paragraph 29 above). They have not provided any justification for that delay (see Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 16483/12, §§ 52-54, ECHR 2016 (extracts)).

33. The Court notes furthermore that the applications are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

34. The Government argued that the Minister of Education “had not, at any time”, refused to complete the compensation procedures, but had, instead of that, sought a lawful manner of doing so. Moreover, public interest required that ‘Obrazovanie i nauka’ EAD should remain wholly State-owned. Lastly, the Minister had sought a way out of the standstill situation obtained after the enactment of the Privatisation Act, by replacing the shares due to the applicants with compensation bonds – a solution which the applicants had however successfully contested.

35. The first and third applicants and the second applicant’s heir reiterated the complaints, relying in particular on the Court’s findings in Mutishev and Others v. Bulgaria (no. 18967/03, 3 December 2009) and Nedelcheva and Others v. Bulgaria (no. 5516/05, 28 May 2013). They pointed out that the applicants’ entitlement to compensation in the form of shares in ‘Obrazovanie i nauka’ EAD had been recognised in 1998 and 1999, and that the national courts had treated as unlawful all subsequent attempts by the administration to deny or modify that entitlement. In addition, while acknowledging the difficulties encountered by the administration as a result of the conflict between the requirements of the Compensation Act and the Privatisation Act, the first and third applicants and the second applicant’s heir argued that the negative consequences of that did not have to be borne by them alone. In their view, the Minister of Education had not demonstrated any will to find an appropriate solution.

36. The Court has already examined several cases against Bulgaria concerning, similarly to the present one, failure of the administrative authorities to comply with final decisions acknowledging the applicants’ right to restitution or compensation. It found violations of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in three cases where the administration had refused to comply with final court judgments ordering restitution in kind (see Mutishev and Others, cited above, §§ 130-38; Hadzhigeorgievi v. Bulgaria, no. 41064/05, §§ 64-72, 16 July 2013; and Velcheva v. Bulgaria, no. 35355/08, §§ 36-50, 9 June 2015), and in a case where, similarly to the present one, the applicants had been entitled to receive compensation in the form of shares in a company, but the relevant administrative body had refused to provide such shares, invoking reasons which the national courts had rejected (see Nedelcheva and Others, cited above, §§ 67-70).

37. In the present case, in two decisions dated 22 December 1998 and 14 June 1999 the Minister of Education allowed the applications by the applicants and their relatives to receive compensation in the form of shares in ‘Obrazovanie i nauka’ EAD (see paragraphs 7 and 14 above). While the Minister attempted subsequently to amend these decisions, awarding the claimants compensation bonds instead of shares, or denying altogether their right to compensation, the Supreme Administrative Court found these subsequent decisions null and void, as they contradicted the initial ones, which had become final (see paragraphs 8, 10 and 16 above). After 2004 neither the Minister of Education nor any other body questioned the applicants’ entitlement to receive compensation. Measures were taken to ensure the provision of that compensation, such as the Privatisation Agency’s authorisation for the transfer of shares in ‘Obrazovanie i nauka’ EAD, given in 2008 (see paragraph 18 above). Accordingly, the 1998 and 1999 decisions, which determined with finality the applicants’ entitlement to compensation and were not subject to modification, gave rise to legitimate expectations for the applicants to receive such compensation, and thus to “possessions” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Mutishev and Others, § 123, and Hadzhigeorgievi, § 63, both cited above).

38. Turning to the question whether there was an interference with the applicants’ possessions, the Court will first examine the argument raised by the Government that the applicants could already be considered shareholders in ‘Obrazovanie i nauka’ EAD and could have exercised their rights as such (see paragraph 29 above). This would mean that the compensation procedure has in fact been completed and the authorities no longer have any obligation in that regard. However, the Government also stated – at the domestic level and in the proceedings before the Court – that the Minister of Education was looking for a lawful means to complete the compensation procedures (see paragraphs 11 and 34 above), which contradicts their argument that the applicants were shareholders. Moreover, in its judgment of 27 January 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court stated expressly that the applicants were not shareholders in ‘Obrazovanie i nauka’ EAD, dismissing on that ground their application for the judicial review of a governmental decision concerning the company (see paragraph 21 above). The Court thus concludes that the grant of compensation in two decisions of 1998 and 1999 which subsequently became final was not followed by the actual transfer of shares to the applicants – and that this continued failure of the Minister of Education to comply with the decisions acknowledging the applicants’ entitlement to compensation has constituted an interference with the applicant’s possessions.

39. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Government’s first objection on grounds of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, which it previously joined to the merits of the complaint (see paragraph 31 above).

40. Any interference by a public authority with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions should, first of all, be lawful (see, for example, Iatridis v. Greece [GC], no. 31107/96, § 58, ECHR 1999‑II). In the present case domestic law did not provide for any deadline for the completion of the compensation procedures initiated by the applicants and their relatives. However, this is not sufficient for the Court to conclude that the interference with the applicants’ possessions was lawful for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. In the earlier similar cases cited above it held that administrative bodies had no discretion to refuse to enforce final court judgments on the ground that they considered those judgments’ findings erroneous or otherwise contrary to law, and that the principle of legal certainty required, inter alia, that where the courts had finally determined an issue, their ruling should not be called into question, save for reasons of a substantial and compelling character (see Mutishev and Others, § 129, Hadzhigeorgievi, § 66, and Nedelcheva and Others, § 68, all cited above).

41. In the present case, the applicants’ entitlement to compensation in the form of shares in ‘Obrazovanie i nauka’ EAD was acknowledged in administrative decisions (see paragraphs 7 and 14 above), which were final and binding. Moreover, all attempts on the part of the Minister of Education to modify or quash those decisions were rejected in final judgments of the Supreme Administrative Court (see paragraphs 8, 10 and 16 above). Accordingly, the Court finds that, as stated above, the Minister was bound and could not refuse to comply with those decisions, save, as already mentioned, for reasons of a substantial and compelling character.

42. No such reasons have been shown to exist. In particular, the argument that section 11 of the concluding provisions of the Privatisation Act could justify such a refusal was rejected by the Supreme Administrative Court, on the ground in particular that it did not apply to pending compensation proceedings (see paragraphs 10 and 16 above). After the Minister of Education’s attempts to replace the shares due to the applicants with compensation bonds were rejected by the Supreme Administrative Court (see paragraphs 10 and 16 above), the Minister remained passive for many years and did not propose any solution.

43. Accordingly, as in the earlier similar cases (see Mutishev and Others, § 138, and Hadzhigeorgievi, § 71, both cited above), the Court concludes that the interference with the applicants’ possessions was contrary to the principle of lawfulness under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

44. This means that there has been a violation of that provision.

III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

45. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A. Damage

46. As concerns pecuniary damage, the first and third applicants and the second applicant’s heir stated that they acknowledged the “important social function” of ‘Obrazovanie i nauka’ EAD (see paragraph 5 above) and did not claim “at all events” to receive the shares in that company due to them under the respective decisions of the Minister of Education. Instead of that they claimed monetary compensation, equivalent to “the full current market value of the nationalised property”. In order to establish that value, the first and third applicants and the second applicant’s heir submitted valuations prepared by experts. On the basis of these valuations the first applicant and the second applicant’s heir claimed 218,813 Bulgarian levs (BGN), the equivalent of 112,000 euros (EUR), and the third applicant claimed BGN 226,000, the equivalent of EUR 115,600.

47. The third applicant claimed in addition lost earnings for the period from 1998 to 2017. She relied once again on one of the expert valuations submitted by her, according to which the dividend she would have received for this period, had she been a shareholder in ‘Obrazovanie i nauka’ EAD, was BGN 6,723, the equivalent of EUR 3,438. Accordingly, the applicant claimed that sum, plus additional BGN 4,920, the equivalent of EUR 2,516, in default interest on it.

48. The first and third applicants and the second applicant’s heir claimed EUR 5,000 each in non-pecuniary damage.

49. The Government asked the Court, in case it found a violation of the applicants’ rights, to reserve its decision on the question of pecuniary damage. Alternatively, they were of the view that any compensation to be awarded under this head had to equal the values affirmed by the Minister of Education in his decisions concerning the applicants’ compensation described in paragraphs 9 and 15 above. They did not comment on the third applicant’s claim in respect of loss of earnings (see paragraph 47 above). Lastly, the Government considered the claims in respect of non-pecuniary damage excessive.

50. The Court observes that a judgment in which it finds a breach of the Convention imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation to put an end to that breach and make reparation for its consequences in such a way as to restore as far as possible the situation existing before the breach.

51. In view of the above, the Court considers that an appropriate form of reparation in the present case would be the completion of the compensation procedure by the Bulgarian authorities. This would put the applicants in circumstances that are as far as possible equivalent to those in which they would have found themselves had there not been a breach of the Convention (see Mutishev and Others v. Bulgaria (just satisfaction), no. 18967/03, § 29, 28 February 2012, and Velcheva, cited above, § 57). Alternatively, it might be possible, as requested by the applicants, who recognised the company’s “important social function”, that reparation take the form of monetary compensation (see paragraph 46 above). However, based on the information available to it, were such a form of reparation to be chosen, the Court is not in a position to determine the value of the disputed shares for the purposes of calculating pecuniary damage.

52. Accordingly, the Court is of the view that the question of the application of Article 41 of the Convention, in so far as it concerns pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, is not ready for decision (Rule 75 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Thus, the Court reserves that question and the further procedure and invites the Government and the applicants, within four months, to submit their observations on the matter and in particular to inform it of any agreement that they may reach, bearing in mind the considerations set forth in the previous paragraphs.

B. Costs and expenses

1. In relation to the domestic proceedings

53. The first applicant and the second applicant’s heir claimed BGN 57.60, the equivalent of EUR 29, for costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts. In support of this claim they submitted documents showing that the first and second applicants had made payments on different dates between 2007 and 2010.

54. The third applicant claimed BGN 1,463.30, the equivalent of EUR 750, for costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and the administrative authorities. In support of this claim she presented documents, showing in particular that she had paid BGN 174.80, the equivalent of EUR 90, in different taxes and for legal representation in the proceedings described in paragraph 21 above, and had signed a contract undertaking to pay for legal representation a further BGN 250, the equivalent of EUR 128. The applicant submitted other invoices and documents, from which it is unclear on what ground the payments were made, or which concern different proceedings.

55. The Government contested the claims. They argued in particular that the third applicant had not shown that she had indeed paid the BGN 250 indicated in the contract for legal representation mentioned in the previous paragraph.

56. Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case-law, the Court dismisses the claim of the first applicant and the second applicant’s heir, since they have not shown that the expenses claimed by them have been incurred while they sought to prevent or to obtain redress for the violation of their rights. As to the claim of the third applicant, the Court awards her the EUR 90 which she actually paid for the proceedings described in paragraph 21 above, and dismisses the claim as regards the remainder. It notes in particular that the third applicant has not shown that she has actually paid the BGN 250 for legal representation mentioned in the contract submitted by her, or that this amount is still due.

2. In relation to the proceedings before the Court

57. For the proceedings before the Court, the first and third applicants and the second applicant’s heir claimed jointly EUR 2,570 for the work performed by the lawyer retained by them after the communication of the applications. The third applicant claimed in addition EUR 665 for the lawyer’s work on her just-satisfaction claims. The first applicant and the second applicant’s heir claimed further BGN 600, the equivalent of EUR 307, for the work performed by the applicants’ initial representative before the Court, and the third applicant claimed the same amount. In support of these claims the first and third applicants and the second applicant’s heir presented contracts for legal representation, receipts and a time-sheet. They requested that any amount awarded by the Court for legal representation in the proceedings before it be transferred directly into the bank account of their representative, Ms Margaritova-Vuchkova, save for EUR 460 already paid by the first and second applicant (respectively the second applicant’s heir) and EUR 483 already paid by the third applicant.

58. The third applicant claimed in addition BGN 1,322, the equivalent of EUR 676, for the expert valuation reports presented in support of her claims for pecuniary damage (see paragraphs 46-47 above). She presented the relevant invoices.

59. The first applicant and the second applicant’s heir claimed BGN 335, the equivalent of EUR 171, for translation, submitting a receipt, and the third applicant claimed BGN 203, the equivalent of EUR 104, for the same reason. Lastly, the first applicant and the second applicant’s heir claimed BGN 42.70, the equivalent of EUR 22, and the third applicant claimed BGN 24.60, the equivalent of EUR 12, for postage, presenting the relevant receipts.

60. The Government contested the claims, considering in particular the amount claimed for legal representation excessive.

61. Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case-law, the Court considers it reasonable to award the full amount claimed concerning legal representation, namely EUR 3,849 (see paragraph 57 above). As requested by the first and third applicants and the second applicant’s heir, that sum is to be paid directly to their representative, save for EUR 460 which are to be paid jointly to the first applicant and the second applicant’s heir and EUR 483 which are to be paid to the third applicant.

62. The Court also awards the sum paid by the third applicant for a valuation report on her claims for pecuniary damage (see paragraph 58 above), the sums paid for postage, and the sum paid by the first applicant and the second applicant’s heir for translation (see paragraph 59 above). It dismisses, on the other hand, the third applicant’s claim concerning translation costs, which has not been substantiated.

C. Default interest

63. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Holds that the second applicant’s heir, Ms Svetla Velichkova Gogova, has standing to continue the proceedings in her stead;

2. Decides to join the applications;

3. Decides to join to the merits the question of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies related to the applicants’ status as shareholders;

4. Holds that the Government are estopped from raising the objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies related to the applicants’ failure to initiate enforcement proceedings;

5. Declares the applications admissible;

6. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, and accordingly dismisses the Government’s objection for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies related to the applicants’ status as shareholders;

7. Holds that the question of the application of Article 41, in so far as it concerns the claims for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, is not ready for decision;

accordingly,

(a) reserves the said question;

(b) invites the Government and the applicants to submit, within four months, their written observations on the matter and to notify the Court of any agreement that they may reach;

(c) reserves the further procedure and delegates to the President of the Committee the power to fix the same if need be;

8. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay, within three months, EUR 4,820 (four thousand eight hundred and twenty euros), to be converted into Bulgarian levs at the rate applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the first and third applicants and the second applicant’s heir, in respect of costs and expenses, of which EUR 653 (six hundred and fifty-three euros) are to be paid jointly to the first applicant and the second applicant’s heir, EUR 1,261 (one thousand two hundred and sixty-one euros) are to be paid to the third applicant, and the remainder directly to Ms Margaritova-Vuchkova;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

9. Dismisses the remainder of the claims for just satisfaction in so far as they concern costs and expenses.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 19 July 2018, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

              Claudia WesterdiekErik Møse
RegistrarPresident

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