THIRD SECTION
Application no. 65302/11
Ján ČIČMANEC
against Slovakia
lodged on 13 October 2011
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The applicant, Mr Ján Čičmanec, is a Slovak national, who was born in 1957 and lives in Sebedražie.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
1. Determination of the claim for right of way
In 2001 a person claimed right of way across the applicant’s plot.
On 27 August 2004 the Prievidza District Court granted the claim.
On 4 April 2005 the Trenčín Regional Court quashed that judgment as the first-instance court had committed errors of law.
On 20 April 2007 the District Court decided to obtain an expert opinion. It was submitted on 14 January 2008.
On 11 February 2009 the District Court ordered the applicant to remove fence from a part of his plot and allow the plaintiff to pass across it on a 3 metres wide field path.
With reference to extensive documentary evidence and witness statements, and after having inspected the site, the court established that the land used by the plaintiff had been put at his disposal in 1992 in the context of accelerated proceedings on the use of the land in the area in replacement for other land owned by him. Such arrangement was temporary pending a final land reform project which was expected to be completed by 2014. The plaintiff’s land had been accessible by a path crossing the neighbouring plot which had been given at the disposal of the applicant’s father in the same context in 1992. The applicant had acquired ownership of the land concerned in 1994 and 1995. When acquiring the ownership the applicant should have been aware of the neighbour’s right of way. However, in 2000 he had built a ramp and fence to prevent the plaintiff from passing without any relevant legal ground. The District Court did not accept the applicant’s arguments that (i) there had been no path on the land in 1992, (ii) the documentary evidence and statements of witnesses were not reliable, and (iii) the plaintiff did not use the land for agriculture purposes and had other possibilities of aceeding his land. The applicant further argued that the path in question was to lead in the vicinity of a railway track contrary to the relevant law.
On 27 January 2010 the Regional Court upheld the first-instance judgment. With reference to the evidence obtained by the District Court, it found no reason for departing from the conclusion that the path had existed at the time when the land had been put at the disposal of the plaintiff and the applicant’s father and that the applicant was obliged to respect the plaintiff’s temporary right of way until final approval of the land reform in the area.
2. Decisions on expert’s remuneration and court’s expenses
On 24 October 2008 the District Court determined the expert’s remuneration. The applicant appealed. He claimed that the sum granted should be reduced and that the expert opinion should be disregarded due to a number of shortcomings. On 27 January 2010 the Regional Court upheld the District Court’s decision of 24 October 2008.
On 4 February 2010 the District Court ordered the applicant to reimburse the expenses related to three inspections of the site as well as the sum which the court had paid to the expert for elaboration of an opinion. The applicant challenged the decision as being erroneous. On 16 April 2010 the Regional Court upheld the first-instance decision. It became final on 31 May 2010 upon the service of the appeal court’s decision on the applicant.
3. Constitutional proceedings
(a) Complaint of 3 May 2010
On 3 May 2010 the applicant complained that by their above decisions granting right of way to the plaintiff and remuneration to the expert the ordinary courts had breached his constitutional rights. In particular, he complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the restriction of his ownership right was neither lawful nor necessary. It was not in public interest and no compensation was granted. Under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention the applicant complained that the duration of the proceedings was excessive and that the proceedings had been unfair. In particular, the ordinary courts had disregarded his arguments and accepted evidence which was not reliable including an erroneous expert opinion. Their decisions were arbitrary. Under Article 8 of the Convention the applicant complained that the measuring carried out by the expert appointed by the court and granting right of way to the plaintiff breached his privacy.
On 14 April 2011 the Constitutional Court dismissed the complaint. At the Constitutional Court’s request the presidents of both the District Court and the Regional Court submitted their comments in writing on the applicant’s complaint. The Constitutional Court summed up their contents in its decision.
The Constitutional Court found no unfairness in the proceedings and held, in particular with reference to the reasons for the Regional Court’s decision, that the ordinary courts’ conclusion was sufficiently reasoned and not arbitrary. For similar reasons, the Constitutional Court dismissed as being manifestly ill-founded the complaint about the decision on expert’s remuneration.
As to the complaint about the length of the proceedings, the Constitutional Court held, with reference to its established practice, that it had been lodged belatedly. In particular the complaint had been lodged after the ordinary courts’ judgments on the merits had become final.
Finally, in view of the conclusion reached under Article 6 of the Convention the ordinary courts could not be held liable for any breach of his rights under Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
(b) Complaint of 16 July 2010
On 16 July 2010 the applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the ordinary courts’ above decisions of 4 February 2010 and 16 April 2010 on reimbursement of the costs and expenses incurred by the State. He argued that the courts disregarded his arguments and decided arbitrarily.
The Constitutional Court dismissed the complaint on 15 April 2011. There was no appearance of unfairness or arbitrariness in the proceedings and the courts’ decisions complained of.
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that:
(i) the length of the proceedings was excessive and that the Constitutional Court erroneously held that the proceedings had ended notwithstanding that the reimbursement of State’s costs had not been determined by a final decision at the moment of introduction of the applicant’s complaint;
(ii) the courts disregarded his arguments and decided arbitrarily; and
(iii) he had no possibility of reacting to submissions by the presidents of the District Court and the Regional Court on which the Constitutional Court relied in its decision of 14 April 2011.
2. Under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 the applicant complains that he had been restricted in the enjoyment of his possessions without any relevant legal ground and without any compensation, and that such restriction was not in public interest.
QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES
1. Did the applicant have a fair hearing in the determination of his civil rights and obligations, in accordance with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention? In particular, was the principle of equality of arms respected as regards the applicant’s argument that he had no possibility of reacting to comments which the presidents of the District Court and the Regional Court had submitted to the Constitutional Court (see also Milatová and Others v. the Czech Republic, no. 61811/00, § 65, ECHR 2005‑V; Hudáková and Others v. Slovakia, no. 23083/05, §§ 28-31, 27 April 2010; or Juričić v. Croatia, no. 58222/09, §§ 72-78, 26 July 2011?
2. Did the applicant exhaust domestic remedies, as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention as regards his complaint about the length of the proceedings? In particular, can the Constitutional Court’s conclusion be accepted given that the decision on reimbursement of State’s costs became final after the introduction of the applicant’s complaint to the Constitutional Court (see also Kopecká v. Slovakia, no. 69012/01, § 31, 31 May 2005; or Komanický v. Slovakia (no. 6), no. 40437/07, §§ 69-72, 12 June 2012 )?
If domestic remedies were exhausted, was the length of the proceedings in the present case in breach of the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention?
3. Has the interference with the applicant’s right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions been in accordance with the general interest and had it imposed an excessive individual burden on the applicant, contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1?
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy