Published on 1 June 2026
FIFTH SECTION
Application no. 23350/20
CHERKASYGAZINVEST, TOV
against Ukraine
lodged on 20 May 2020
communicated on 13 May 2026
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
The application concerns the lawfulness and proportionality of a tax penalty.
The applicant company is a petrol retailer. In March 2019 the tax authorities imposed on it a penalty of 463,938.77 Ukrainian hryvnias (equivalent to over 15,300 euros) for the late submission of 69 excise invoices («акцизні накладні»), special reports on fuel turnover. This decision was adopted pursuant to Article 1202 of the Tax Code, which established liability of excise duty payers for the late submission of excise invoices. The amount of fine was calculated based on the applicable excise duty rates, the volume of sold petrol and the length of each delay.
Arguing, inter alia, that, as a fuel retailer, it was not liable to pay excise duty and therefore it could not be held responsible under Article 1202 of the Tax Code, the applicant company challenged the fine before domestic courts. It also argued that the fine had been disproportionate. On 26 November 2019 the Sixth Appeal Administrative Court dismissed the applicant company’s claim and upheld the fine. While the court admitted that the applicant company had not been liable to pay excise duty, it held that under domestic law it was still considered an excise duty payer and, as such, Article 1202 of the Tax Code applied. On 21 January 2020 the Supreme Court refused to open cassation proceedings due to triviality of the dispute.
The applicant company complains that the imposed penalty was in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention as the domestic legal framework concerning the liability of petrol retailers for the late submission of excise invoices lacked clarity and foreseeability. It further argues that the imposed penalty was disproportionate.
QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES
1. Did the penalty imposed on the applicant company constitute an interference with the peaceful enjoyment of its possessions, within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention?
2. Has that interference been in the public interest, and in accordance with the conditions provided for by law, and, if so, did it impose an excessive individual burden on the applicant company (see Shchokin v. Ukraine, nos. 23759/03 and 37943/06, §§ 50-52, 14 October 2010; DELTA PEKÁRNY a.s. v. the Czech Republic, no. 97/11, §§ 125-26, 2 October 2014; S.C. Zorina International S.R.L. v. Romania, no. 15553/15, §§ 40-44, 27 June 2023)?