Information Note on the Court’s case-law No. 76
June 2005
Chmelíř v. the Czech Republic - 64935/01
Judgment 7.6.2005 [Section II]
Article 6
Criminal proceedings
Article 6-1
Impartial tribunal
President of a chamber judging an accused, who was his opposing party in a parallel procedure, disproportionately sanctioned the accused for his behaviour: violation
Facts: Criminal proceedings had been brought against the applicant. He was found guilty by the trial court and lodged an appeal. He then requested the withdrawal of the president of the High Court division before which his appeal was pending, alleging that he had previously had an intimate relationship with that judge. The High Court decided not to order the judge to stand down and considered that the applicant was in fact seeking to delay the proceedings. One month later the applicant brought an action for the protection of personality rights against the president of the division hearing his appeal and requested the withdrawal of the judge on that ground. A week later the president of the division decided that the applicant had insulted the court through the false allegations contained in his first request for withdrawal and declared that those allegations represented an insolent and unprecedented attack on him and were intended to delay the proceedings. The applicant was fined and warned that a similar attack could in the future be classified as a criminal offence. Two weeks later the division presided over by the same judge dismissed the applicant’s second request for his withdrawal, on the ground that it amounted to provocative obstruction and a fresh attack on the judge’s moral integrity. The applicant was unsuccessful in his appeals against the dismissal of his requests for withdrawal. The appeal he had lodged against his criminal conviction was dismissed, as was his further appeal in which he complained of a lack of impartiality in the appeal proceedings.
Law: Article 6 § 1 – The president of the division which had heard the appeal lodged by the applicant had also been the defendant in the civil action brought by the applicant for the protection of personality rights, and those two sets of proceedings had overlapped for almost seven months. For that reason, in the context of the criminal proceedings against him, it could not be excluded that the applicant had reason to apprehend that he continued to be perceived as an opponent by the president. In addition, that judge had not expressly addressed the grounds of the second application for withdrawal (action against him for the protection of personality rights) or commented on his feelings about that action brought against him by the applicant. He had made no formal statement capable of dispelling any doubts the applicant might have had. Those circumstances were capable of giving the applicant cause for fear, which had been strengthened by the decision to impose a fine on him because of his conduct in the proceedings. The reasoning of that decision suggested that the president of the division had been unable to distance himself sufficiently from the comments made about him by the applicant in the context of the first request for withdrawal. The applicant’s conduct had been assessed by the judge concerned in relation to his personal understanding, his feelings, his sense of dignity and his standards of behaviour, since he had felt personally targeted and insulted. Thus, his own perception and evaluation of the facts and his own judgment had been involved in the process of determining whether the court had been insulted in that specific case. To that could be added the severity of the penalty imposed (which consisted of the highest possible fine provided for by the Code of Criminal Procedure), and the warning given to the applicant to the effect that any similar attack in future was likely to be classified as a criminal offence. In short, the judge concerned had overreacted to the applicant’s conduct. As a result, the applicant had had objective cause to fear that the president of the division hearing his appeal against criminal conviction lacked the requisite impartiality, and the applications submitted by the applicant had been unsuccessful in remedying any shortcomings in the criminal proceedings.
Conclusion: violation (unanimously).
Article 41 – The Court held that the finding of a violation constituted in itself sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant.
© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
Click here for the Case-Law Information Notes
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy