Clarke v. the United Kingdom (dec.)

Information Note on the Court’s case-law No. 77

July-August 2005

Clarke v. the United Kingdom (dec.) - 23695/02

Decision 25.8.2005 [Section IV]

Article 6

Civil proceedings

Article 6-1

Impartial tribunal

Independent tribunal

Alleged lack of independence and impartiality of district and circuit judges in proceedings against the Lord Chancellor's Department: inadmissible

Judgment was given against the applicant in an action he had brought against a local authority and an insurance company, and costs were ordered against him. The applicant never met the judgment debt and he was declared bankrupt. The applicant subsequently brought proceedings against the Lord Chancellor's Department in respect of a form which the courts had supplied him in his original action which he claimed had misled him. The claim was dismissed in first and second instance by a district and circuit judge, respectively, on grounds that it had no real prospect of success, despite acknowledging that the issued form was ambiguous and to a certain extent incorrect. Leave to appeal was granted on a number of points, principally on the “point of constitutional importance” concerning the position of circuit and district judges in cases against the Lord Chancellor or his department.

Inadmissible under Article 6: The central question was whether the district and circuit judges which determined the applicant's action at first and second instance against the Lord Chancellor's Department were “independent and impartial”, as they had been appointed by the Lord Chancellor. Bearing in mind that the appointment procedures had been, inter alia, competitive, involved an interview and consultations with the legal profession, as well as being full-time appointments until retirement, the Court accepted that the manner of appointment of both these judges had been compatible with the requirements of Article 6. Moreover, there being no hierarchical or organisational connection between the judges and the Lord Chancellor's Department, there was no reason for concern or risk of any outside pressures for these judges to decide cases in a particular way. Concerning the subjective impartiality test, there was no claim in the case that either judge was animated by personal prejudice or bias. As to whether there were any elements which could give rise to an objective appearance of lack of independence, although the Lord Chancellor had power to remove circuit and district judges, any such removal was subject to judicial review. Moreover, there had been no cases where the power of removal had affected impartiality, and, in fact, practically no instances of removal of district or circuit judges had existed as such (only one case of removal of a district court judge). Thus, an objective observer would have no cause for concern about the removability of a judge in the circumstances of the present case: manifestly ill-founded.

© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.

Click here for the Case-Law Information Notes

 

Full & Egal Universal Law Academy