FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 485/05
by Leanne CODONA
against the United Kingdom
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 7 February 2006 as a Chamber composed of:
MrJ. Casadevall, President,
SirNicolas Bratza,
MrG. Bonello,
MrM. Pellonpää,
MrL. Garlicki,
MrJ. Borrego Borrego,
MsL. Mijović, judges,
and Mr M. O’Boyle, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 22 December 2004,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mrs Leanne Codona, is a British national who was born in 1982 and lives near Fenstanton, Cambridgeshire. She is represented before the Court by Christopher Johnson, a lawyer practising in Birmingham.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant is a gypsy. She lived with her young son and other members of her extended family in caravans on what has become known as Plot 7 Woodside Caravan Park at Hatch, near Sandy in Bedfordshire (‘the Site’). Mid-Bedfordshire District Council (‘the Council’) was responsible for planning control in relation to the Site and was also the responsible housing authority.
The applicant moved with other gypsies onto the Site with their caravans in mid-1997, in breach of planning control. Over time, the Site became divided into 27 plots. The Council first learned in early August 1997 that gypsies were occupying the Site. In October 1998, the Council served enforcement and stop notices on the occupiers of the Site under the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The occupiers appealed. It is not clear from the materials submitted whether the applicant was amongst those who appealed.
Following a local public inquiry held in May 1999, a planning inspector dismissed the appeals by decision letter dated 29 June 1999. He gave the occupiers 12 months within which to comply with the enforcement and stop notices, so as to enable them to apply for planning permission in respect of smaller area. It appears that they took no steps to comply with either set of notices. In late 1999 or early 2000 the Council resolved to take enforcement action by way of injunction or prosecution; at about the same time, the occupiers, styling themselves “the owners of Woodside Caravan Park” made a further planning application, essentially to continue its use, albeit with more landscaping. Again, it is not clear from the materials submitted whether the applicant was involved in the making of this application.
In July 2000, shortly after the expiry of the 12 month period of grace given by the inspector, the Council refused the application for planning permission. Following inquiry, the inspector dismissed the occupiers’ appeal in January 2001.
Early in 2001, before the Council could put into motion steps to evict the occupiers, the latter, including the applicant, made 19 planning applications in respect of individual plots on the site. In the summer of 2001, the Council refused the majority of the applications, including those of the applicant. The applicant and 10 other occupiers each appealed the refusal in their individual case.
In the meantime, in August 2001, the Council issued proceedings for injunctions against named and un-named occupiers of the Site. The latter responded in September 2001 by seeking and obtaining permission to apply for judicial review, it appears against the decision to issue these proceedings.
In late 2001 and early 2002 an inspector held an inquiry into the 11 individual appeals. In June 2002, the inspector dismissed each of them. The Council then immediately sought and obtained (after a three day hearing, at which evidence was given) an injunction against her and all the other occupiers of the Site to remove themselves, their caravans, all hard standings and associated materials from the Site by 1 November 2002 (‘the injunction’).
The applicant responded by making a further planning application, this time in relation to three plots on the land. The Council refused to determine this application because of its close similarity to the previous application. The applicant sought without success on paper to obtain permission to claim judicial review in respect of that decision. At about the same time she and other occupiers applied both to the High Court to vary the terms of the injunction as to the date when they should leave the Site and also to the Council for accommodation as homeless persons under the provisions of Part VII of the Housing Act 1996 (‘the 1996 Act’).
In early November 2002, the High Court refused the occupiers’ application for variation of the injunction and refused them permission to appeal. Very shortly thereafter the Council exercised its power under s.178 Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to clear the majority of the occupiers from the Site, but not the applicant, who with her family continued to occupy so-called Plot 7 (with some 6 or 7 caravans).
In late December 2002, the Court of Appeal refused the occupiers permission to appeal the decision of the High Court. The applicant did not seek to renew orally her judicial review application in respect of the Council’s refusal to entertain her application for planning permission, on the Council agreeing not to enforce the injunction without giving her and her family seven days notice of its intention to do so and to consider and determine their homeless applications (one made on 30 October 2002 and a revised one made on 31 October 2002, the former ultimately being subsumed into the latter).
In that homelessness application, the applicant explained that she had an aversion to conventional “bricks and mortar” and that she:
“...[did] not wish to be given bricks and mortar. She has always lived in a caravan, has only spent one night in a building in her life. Mrs Codona wishes to live in a caravan and have the support of her extended family around her.”
On 4 March 2003, the Council, acting through Aragon Housing Association (to which it had delegated its housing function) (‘the Association’), accepted its duty under section 193 of the 1996 Act to provide the applicant and her family with suitable accommodation. The Association concluded that they could only offer them “bricks and mortar” accommodation in a “bed and breakfast establishment” until it could make a final offer of accommodation acceptable to them. The letter read to the applicant read in relevant part as follows:
“The Association... have a duty to secure suitable accommodation is available for your occupation and, in doing so, shall have regard to all the relevant circumstances relating to you and those who normally reside with you or might reasonably be expected to reside with you.
The Association is aware that there are six/seven caravans on Plot 7, Woodside Caravan Park, Hatch, the occupants of which you have included in your homelessness application. The Association is also aware that you consider the occupants of these other vehicles as part of your immediate household and that you have requested that they be accommodated with you. In your application you have also indicated that you do not wish to live in accommodation made of bricks and mortar and that you would consider the offer of a plot/piece of land.
Unfortunately, as you aware from previous meetings, the Association is unable to offer land, and can only secure accommodation from either its own housing stock or, on some occasions, property owned by another Housing Association also operating within the Mid Beds Area. Further, it is also highly unlikely the Association will be able to secure a single property large enough to accommodate all the occupants of Plot 7, Woodside Caravan Park. However, given that each family occupying Plot 7 resided in their own separate unit of accommodation, the Association does not consider it unreasonable to offer an individual property for each family on Plot 7 and will endeavour to ensure the properties offered are in as close proximity to each other as is reasonably possible.”
The applicant sought to clarify what accommodation the Association was intending to offer her; they made it clear that they were intending, in the short term, to offer her bed and breakfast accommodation. Through her solicitor, the applicant sought an internal review of this decision pursuant to section 202 of the 1996 Act. On 8 May 2003, the decision was upheld. The Council wrote in the following terms:
“In relation to the question about reasonableness [sic] of an offer of Bed & Breakfast or other temporary accommodation I have reached the following conclusions:
...
[the 1996 Act and the Homelessness Code of Guidance for Local Authorities (July 2002)] ... provide clarity of what constitutes suitable accommodation. Bed & Breakfast is deemed to be suitable accommodation particularly as... the Council have already confirmed that they will take all reasonable steps to minimise its use. Wherever reasonably practicable the offer of any temporary accommodation would be within Mid Beds and that such accommodation as would be provided would be fit for occupation and would not result in statutory overcrowding [a reference to section 210 of the 1996 Act].
... I note your concerns regarding a stay in bricks and mortar accommodation and would certainly not underestimate the differences [sic] which you would have to face having always lived in a caravan. I understand that you are concerned about living without the support of your family but again... [the Council] have advised that all practical steps would be taken to accommodate you as a close family unit.
Therefore having fully considered the details of your case and your cultural aversion to bricks and mortar as detailed... I find that, while sympathetic to them, I must also take into consideration the general makeup and stock of the housing within the area and also the availability of suitable accommodation and this leaves us with no alternative but to offer bricks and mortar accommodation.”
The applicant then applied to the County Court for a statutory review pursuant to section 204 of the 1996 Act. She advanced multiple grounds, but only one of them, the question of whether the accommodation offered was suitable, was considered at length, the others being found to be entirely groundless. The County Court found: (1) that the Council had accepted and continued to accept that it owed a statutory duty to the applicant and her family to secure that suitable accommodation was made available to them; and (2) the applicant had a “cultural” aversion to living in “bricks and mortar” accommodation. However, the court also accepted that the Council did not have any land available for the applicant or members of her family to pitch their caravans, such that it was impossible for it to offer what she wanted. The County Court judge considered the position by reference to domestic decisions which had, in turn, considered the jurisprudence of this Court. The judge considered that he was bound by the decision in R (Price) v Carmathenshire County Council [2003] EWHC 42 (Admin) (in which the case of Chapman v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 27238/95, ECHR 2001‑I had itself been the subject of consideration). The High Court in Price found that, while it was necessary that special consideration be given to the position of gypsies as a minority, it could not be argued that an offer or bricks and mortar accommodation could never constitute a suitable alternative accommodation for a Gypsy with a cultural aversion to bricks and mortar.
The County Court found that “to impose on the Housing Authority a duty to produce a pitch or berth for six or seven caravans is not supported by statute or by case law, whether in this country or in Europe.” It also found that, while the Council had not expressly considered Articles 8 or 14, it had proceeded in a way compatible with their requirements. The court therefore found that, in the circumstances, the Council’s offer was an adequate discharge of its duty under section 193.
The applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed her application for permission to appeal on 15 July 2004. The Court of Appeal found that, while an empty pitch is not itself “accommodation” for purposes of section 193, a council could, by making it available as a site to pitch a caravan, and with the agreement of the individual, be said to have discharged its duty under the section. The Court of Appeal therefore considered at some length the question of whether bricks and mortar accommodation could be said to be “suitable” for a Gypsy with a cultural aversion to bricks and mortar. It considered the same domestic cases as had been considered by the lower court, as well as Chapman, and found there to be three main criteria for assessing the suitability of accommodation offered:
“1) suitability to a [Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223] minimum level of suitability in the nature, location and standard of condition of the accommodation having regard to the circumstances of the applicant and his or her resident family including the duration of their likely occupation of it; 2) the absolute nature of the duty which, though, coupled with an elastic concept of suitability is not elastic as to allow an offer below the Wednesbury minimum standard (or... outside the margin of appreciation); and 3) special consideration, in the regulatory and decision-making in individual cases, for the housing needs of particularly vulnerable applicants such as traditional gypsies with a view, so far as is practicable and when considered with all other circumstances, to facilitating their traditional way of life.”
The Court of Appeal found that, if the Council had carried out a genuine consideration of a Gypsy’s needs,
“where land is not available, or cannot readily be made available, on which a Gypsy applicant can station his or her caravan, it is open to a local authority to provide other accommodation of the conventional bricks and mortar kind, providing that it satisfies the Wednesbury minimum line of suitability.”
The Court of Appeal found that the Council and first instance judge had correctly identified and applied the relevant principles in the applicant’s case. It also considered that the first instance judge had properly considered the Article 8 question in his own right.
The Court of Appeal noted that the Council was required as “as a matter of relative urgency to find accommodation for an extended family occupying some six or seven caravans, who were insisting, because of their aversion to conventional housing, on being provided with an alternative site for all of their caravans on which they could continue to live together.” As with the first instance court, the Court of Appeal found that there was no such site available, nor was the Council immediately able to provide long-term conventional bricks and mortar accommodation for the extended family.
It therefore concluded that, “depending on the quality of bed and breakfast accommodation offered and, on the reasonable assumption that the Council will see to it that their stay will only be for a short time,” the Council by offering bed and breakfast accommodation had discharged its duty under section 193 and had acted compatibly with Articles 8 and/or 14. It added the caveat that bed and breakfast accommodation could become unsuitable either under domestic law or by reference to Article 8 if too long a period elapsed before the provision either of conventional housing or, if it could be found, a caravan site.
The House of Lords refused the applicant permission to appeal on 16 December 2004 on the basis that her petition did not raise an arguable point of law of general public importance which ought to be considered by the House at that time, given that it had already been the subject of judicial decision.
On 28 September 2004, the Council reassessed the applicant and made a further offer of temporary accommodation. This was refused by letter dated 30 September 2004. No details of the accommodation offered at that point have been provided by the applicant. It is in particular not clear whether the Council offered bed and breakfast or permanent settled accommodation and/or whether it restated its view that there were no suitable caravan sites available.
On 5 November 2004 (and again on 8 November 2004), the Council gave notice of its intention to enforce the injunction; the High Court dismissed an application for judicial review of the Council’s decision on 2 February 2005.
The applicant and her family vacated the Site on or before 23 February 2005. It appears that they are now on unauthorised sites, and the applicant’s family is split because they have been unable to find a site where they can remain together. She contends that she (and her family) are now vulnerable to proceedings for possession from local authorities and private landowners, and also to the imposition of removal directions and/or possible criminal proceedings under sections 61, 62A-E, 77 and 78 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994.
The applicant has submitted a press release from the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister dated 7 March 2005, from which it appears that the Government is consulting on a revision to the directions given to local authorities with a specific view to increasing the number of authorised caravan sites available for use by travellers and gypsies.
B. Relevant domestic law
Local authority duties to the homeless are provided in Part VII of the Housing Act 1996. Section 193 provides, in material part:
“(1) This section applies where the local housing authority are satisfied that an applicant is homeless, eligible for assistance and has a priority need, and are not satisfied that he became homeless intentionally.
(2) Unless the authority refer the application to another local housing authority (see section 198), they shall secure that accommodation is available for occupation by the applicant.”
Section 206 provides, again in material part,
“(1) A local housing authority may discharge their housing functions under this Part only in the following ways –
(a) by securing that suitable accommodation provided by them is available,
...”
There is no definition of the word “suitable” in this section.
By section 175 (2) of the 1996 Act
“A person is also homeless if he has accommodation but –
...
(b) it consists of a moveable structure, vehicle or vessel designed or adapted for human habitation and there is no place where he is entitled or permitted both to place it and to reside in it.”
The meaning of the word “suitable” within the context of sections 193 and 206 of the 1996 Act has been considered in several domestic cases. The most relevant is that of R (Price) v Carmathenshire County Council [2003] EWHC 42 (Admin), in which the main issue was whether the Gypsy in question had a cultural aversion to bricks and mortar. However, the High Court had to consider as a starting point whether such an aversion of itself could prevent an offer of such accommodation from amounting to an offer of suitable accommodation. The High Court, expressly considering itself to be following Chapman, accepted that it was incumbent on local authorities to give effect to the positive obligation imposed on contracting States under Article 8 to facilitate the Gypsy way of life, but found that, had the respondent council concluded that:
“the claimant’s cultural commitment to traditional life was so powerful as to present great difficulties in her living in conventional housing, it was not bound by duty to find her a pitch, but it would have been a significant factor in considering how far it should go to facilitate her traditional way of life.”
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention that she was offered conventional accommodation rather than an alternative site for her caravan. She contended that that this forced her to move to unauthorised encampments, where she remains subject to actual or threatened eviction on a constant basis, where her travelling way of life is subject to interference by the actual or threatened eviction, and her family life is similarly subject to interference. She contended that she would otherwise have been forced to abandon the accommodation that she currently had. She contended therefore that her rights to respect for family and private life under Article 8 § 1 had been breached. The applicant made specific reference to the apparent shift in Government policy with respect to authorised sites to contend that there could be no justification under Article 8 § 2 for the interference with her Article 8 § 1 rights.
The applicant complained under Article 14 of the Convention that sections 193 and 206 of the 1996 Act, as interpreted by the Court of Appeal, have the effect that she is treated less favourably than a homeless house dweller. The latter, she contended, would be offered suitable accommodation consistent with his or her lifestyle (because the accommodation that would be offered would be “bricks and mortar,” not a site to place a caravan), whereas she, as a Gypsy, could be offered accommodation inconsistent with her lifestyle (i.e. she could be offered “bricks and mortar” accommodation rather a new site for her caravan).
THE LAWArticle 8 of the Convention
The applicant complained that her right to respect for family and private life and for her home had been breached by the Council’s decision to offer her bricks and mortar accommodation, rather than an alternative site for her caravan, and by the decision of the Court of Appeal that such an offer constituted an offer of “suitable” accommodation for purposes of the 1996 Act. She invoked Article 8 of the Convention, which reads in relevant part as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home ...
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
The Court notes, firstly, that the applicant did not challenge the decision of the Council to remove her and her family and to take enforcement measures to that end. Rather, the applicant complained as to the failure to provide her with accommodation that she considered suitable, considering her “cultural aversion” to living in bricks and mortar accommodation. She contended that her rights to respect for her private life, family life and home have been infringed because she is now forced to live in unauthorised encampments since she could not accept an offer of bricks and mortar accommodation without abandoning her lifestyle, fundamental to her identity.
In the circumstances, the Court considers that the present case is distinct from the line of authority culminating in Chapman v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 27238/95, § 73, ECHR 2001‑I). in which the Grand Chamber gave consideration to planning controls affecting the rights of gypsies to reside or remain on caravan sites. In such cases, the Court recalls that it had no hesitation in finding that Article 8 was in play, and moreover that:
“a measure affecting the applicant’s ability to live in a caravan... can have an impact going beyond the right to respect for her home, and can also affect her ability to maintain her identity as a Gypsy and to lead her private and family life in accordance with that tradition” (Chapman, § 73)
Here, however, the Court considers that it is far from obvious that Article 8 is engaged. On a proper analysis, it considers that the applicant’s contention is that the United Kingdom is under a positive obligation by virtue of Article 8 to provide her with accommodation of her choosing.
The Court recalls that Article 8 does not in terms recognise a right to be provided with a home (Chapman, § 99), let alone a specific home or category of home – for instance one in a particular location (see mutatis mutandis Ward v. United Kingdom, (dec.) no. 31888/03, 9 November 2004). It recalls that the scope of any positive obligation to house the homeless is limited (see mutatis mutandis O’Rourke v. United Kingdom, (dec.) no. 39022/97, 26 June 2001). It therefore considers that that obligation must be even more limited as regards an obligation to house a homeless person in a specific class of accommodation chosen by that person and where the person has previously been living on land in breach of planning regulations.
Against this, the Court recalls that there is a positive obligation imposed on the Contracting States by virtue of Article 8 to facilitate the gypsy way of life (see Chapman, § 96). It notes that the domestic courts in the instant case found that the applicant had a “cultural aversion” to living in bricks and mortar accommodation, and is prepared to accept that this aversion can be identified as forming part of the applicant’s “gypsy way of life.”
Following Chapman, the Court does not rule out that, in principle, Article 8 could impose a positive obligation on the authorities to provide accommodation for a homeless gypsy which is such that it facilitates their “gypsy way of life.” However, it considers that this obligation could only arise where the authorities had such accommodation at their disposal and were making a choice between offering such accommodation or accommodation which was not “suitable” for the cultural needs of a gypsy.
In the instant case, however, it appears to be common ground that there were, in fact, no sites available upon which the applicant could lawfully place her caravan. In the premises, the Court cannot conclude that the authorities were then under a positive obligation to create such a site for the applicant (and her extended family). Such would be to extend the positive obligation imposed by Article 8 far beyond the – limited – bounds established in previous case-law. In particular, to accept that the authorities were under such an obligation would be to have the effect of imposing upon the respondent State the positive obligation to create either one or more caravan sites so as to equate supply with demand. The Court recalls that this was precisely the obligation that the Grand Chamber found that the contracting States could not be said to owe in Chapman (§ 98). The Court does not find that there are any compelling reasons in the present case to depart from the position adopted by the Grand Chamber in Chapman.
In coming to this conclusion, the Court also notes Burton v. United Kingdom ((dec.) no. 31600/96, 10 September 1996), an admissibility decision of the Commission which pre-dated Chapman, but which is entirely consistent with the reasoning in the latter case and on its facts raised a strikingly similar issue to that under consideration here. Here, the Commission had cause to consider the wish of a terminally ill gypsy to return from settled (bricks and mortar) accommodation to living in a caravan in the last days of her illness. The applicant complained that she had not been able to return to living in a caravan because her local authority failed to provide a site or an alternative mobile home. It appears that the Council had attempted to find such a site, but without success. In the circumstances, the Commission considered that Article 8 did not operate to extend a positive obligation on the respondent State to provide alternative accommodation of the applicant’s choosing.
As in Burton, the Council in the present case had attempted to find a suitable official site but it could not find one. It accepted that the provision of bed and breakfast accommodation was unsatisfactory, and solely a temporary measure. Moreover, the Court notes that the Court of Appeal explicitly considered that bed and breakfast accommodation offered by the Council could cease to be suitable by reference to Article 8 if it lasted too long “suitable long-term accommodation in the form of conventional housing or, if it can be found, a caravan site can be provided” (emphasis added). The Court therefore considers that the domestic authorities were alive to, and complied with, any positive obligation that they owed under Article 8 to facilitate the applicant’s “gypsy way of life,” to the extent that such was possible given the constraints of available accommodation.
The Court accepts that the applicant has been placed in an unenviable position. It also accepts that the applicant’s family and private life, as well as her ability to enjoy her home (in the form of her caravan) may well now be the subject of disruption because she and her family have placed their caravans on unauthorised encampments. However, it cannot accept that this constitutes an unjustified infringement of her rights under Article 8 of the Convention for which the respondent State is responsible. On analysis, her present plight is the result of two factors: (1) the decision of the Council to remove her from the Site; and (2) her choice not to accept accommodation offered by the Council (in March 2003 and September 2004) in pursuit of its obligations under the 1996 Act. As already noted, the applicant does not complain as to (1). As to (2), the Court recalls that it has already found that the Council was entitled in the premises to offer the applicant bricks and mortar accommodation. This being so, it cannot accept that the applicant’s refusal of such accommodation was anything other than a choice for the consequences of which the respondent State is not responsible.
Finally, the Court does not consider that the apparent change in the policy of the respondent State regarding the provision of caravan sites relied upon by the applicant is in fact of relevance to the present case. Although it welcomes any steps taken to increase the number of caravan sites, it must consider the situation by reference to facts as they stand, and the apparent change in policy does not alter the fact that there are no such sites available at the present time within mid-Bedfordshire for the applicant to use.
In conclusion, the Court finds that there is no appearance of a violation of Article 8 in either the decision of the Council to offer bricks and mortar accommodation (in March 2003, apparently repeated in September 2004) or the decision of the domestic courts that such accommodation was “suitable” for purposes of the 1996 Act.
It follows therefore that this complaint must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
B. Article 14 of the Convention
The applicant complained that sections 193 and 206 of the 1996 Act, as interpreted by the Court of Appeal, had the effect that she was treated less favourably than a homeless house dweller on the basis of her status as a gypsy, invoking Article 14, which provides:
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”
Although the applicant does not explicitly state that she complains by reference to Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8, this intention is clear in substance. The Court considers that the matter falls within the ambit of Article 8, such that it falls to be considered whether the applicant has suffered discrimination in the enjoyment of that right on a ground prohibited under Article 14.
The applicant framed her complaint in somewhat abstract terms. The Court recalls, however, that in cases arising from individual applications it is not its task to examine the domestic legislation in the abstract, but it must examine the manner in which that legislation was applied to the applicant in the particular circumstances. This means that it must consider whether the application of sections 193 and 206 of the 1996 Act (as interpreted by the Court of Appeal) in the present case has led to a different approach from that which would have ensued in the case of a homeless person who lacked the applicant’s “cultural aversion” to bricks and mortar accommodation (which the Court accepts in the present case constitutes an element of her status as a gypsy).
The Court notes that, in the instant case, it was, in fact, not possible to offer any accommodation other than bricks and mortar accommodation. Both the applicant and her comparator would, therefore, be treated identically because both would be offered the same accommodation. The Court recalls that it has already found that offering bricks and mortar accommodation to the applicant in the instant case would not violate her rights under Article 8 § 1.
In the premises, therefore, the Court does not consider that the applicant can be said to have been treated less favourably than a homeless person who lacked the applicant’s “cultural aversion” to bricks and mortar accommodation. There is, accordingly, no appearance of a violation of the provisions of Article 14 read together with Article 8 and it follows that this part of the application must also rejected as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
Michael O’BoyleJosep Casadevall
RegistrarPresident
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