SECOND SECTION
PARTIAL DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 8937/04
by Taylan ÇOKLAR
against Turkey
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 22 September 2009 as a Chamber composed of:
Françoise Tulkens, President,
Ireneu Cabral Barreto,
Vladimiro Zagrebelsky,
Dragoljub Popović,
Nona Tsotsoria,
Işıl Karakaş,
Kristina Pardalos, judges,
and Françoise Elens-Passos, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 16 February 2004,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Taylan Çoklar, is a Turkish national who was born in 1961 and lives in Tarsus. He is represented before the Court by Mr H. İlter, a lawyer practising in Ankara.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
On 15 July 1981 the applicant was arrested and taken into custody on suspicion of murder, attempted murder and forming an organisation to commit crimes.
On 27 August 1981 the applicant was remanded in custody.
On 22 May 1987 the Ankara Martial Law Court convicted the applicant.
On 19 June 1991 the applicant was released pending his appeal.
On 6 May 1992 the Military Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the Ankara Martial Law Court.
Following promulgation of the Law of 26 December 1994 abolishing the jurisdiction of the martial law courts, the Ankara Assize Court acquired jurisdiction over the case.
On 30 May 2000 the Ankara Assize Court found the applicant guilty on various accounts of murder and armed robbery.
On 25 October 2001 the applicant was taken into detention once again.
On 18 February 2002 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the Ankara Assize Court.
On 16 January 2003 the applicant was released pending the retrial.
On 26 June 2007 the Ankara Assize Court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to life imprisonment.
On 17 April 2008 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the Ankara Assize Court.
COMPLAINTS
Without relying on any Articles of the Convention, the applicant made the following complaints.
The applicant firstly complained that he had been subjected to ill‑treatment which had violated his right to life.
He further contended that the length of his pre-trial detention had been excessive and that he had been denied compensation.
The applicant maintained that the criminal proceedings against him had not been concluded within a reasonable time and that he had not been tried by an independent and impartial tribunal.
The applicant alleged that a travel ban imposed on him during the course of the proceedings, together with the negative impacts of the trial on his employability and family life, had violated his right to the presumption of innocence.
THE LAW
1. The applicant maintained that the length of the criminal proceedings against him had exceeded the reasonable time requirement.
The Court considers in the first place that this complaint should be examined under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. It further considers that it cannot, on the basis of the case file, determine the admissibility of this complaint and that it is therefore necessary, in accordance with Rule 54 § 2 (b) of the Rules of Court, to give notice of this part of the application to the respondent Government.
2. The applicant complained that the length of his pre-trial detention had been excessive and that there was no compensatory remedy for this violation in domestic law. The Court considers that these complaints should be examined under Articles 5 §§ 3 and 5 of the Convention.
As regards the first limb of the applicant’s complaint, the Court notes that the applicant was released from detention on 16 January 2003. The application was, however, only introduced on 16 February 2004, more than six months later. It follows that this complaint has been introduced out of time and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
With regard to the second limb of the applicant’s complaint, the Court reiterates that under Article 5 § 5 of the Convention the right to compensation for any material or non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of detention is conditional upon a breach of one of the paragraphs of Article 5 first being established (see Wassink v. the Netherlands, 27 September 1990, § 38, Series A no. 185). Accordingly, the Court cannot consider the applicant’s claim under this provision as no breach of Article 5 §§ 1 to 4 has been found in the circumstances of the present case. It follows that this aspect of the complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
3. The applicant contended that he had not been tried by an independent and impartial tribunal. The Court considers that this complaint should be examined under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
The Court notes that the applicant’s conviction by the Martial Law Court was quashed by the Military Court of Cassation on 6 May 1992. A retrial was ordered and the case file sent to the Ankara Assize Court, whose independence and impartiality was not challenged by the applicant. In these circumstances, the Court finds that the alleged violation of the applicant’s right under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of his conviction by the Martial Law Court and the proceedings concerned were rectified at the domestic level (see Ramazanoğlu v. Turkey (dec.), no. 39810/98, 10 September 2002). Consequently, the applicant cannot claim to be a victim of a violation of his rights under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on this basis.
It follows that this part of the application is also to be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
4. As regards the applicant’s remaining complaints, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence.
It follows that this part of the application should be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Decides to adjourn the examination of the applicant’s complaint concerning the right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time;
Declares the remainder of the application inadmissible.
Françoise Elens-PassosFrançoise Tulkens
Deputy Section RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy