AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 26903/95
by Anthony COLLMAN
against the United Kingdom
The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting
in private on 18 January 1996, the following members being present:
Mr. C.L. ROZAKIS, President
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. E. BUSUTTIL
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
A. WEITZEL
M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
B. MARXER
B. CONFORTI
N. BRATZA
I. BÉKÉS
E. KONSTANTINOV
G. RESS
A. PERENIC
C. BÎRSAN
K. HERNDL
Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 24 January 1995
by Anthony COLLMAN against the United Kingdom and registered on
28 March 1995 under file No. 26903/95;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a British citizen born in 1953. He lives in
London. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be
summarised as follows.
The applicant was convicted of reckless driving at Middlesex
Guildhall Crown Court on 9 July 1992. He was fined £100.00 and ordered
to pay £30.00 compensation to each of the two policemen he had driven
at. He represented himself at the trial.
The applicant did not pay the sums due, and on 17 June 1993 was
committed to prison for 21 days by the Marlborough Magistrates' Court
that is, a period of 14 days in default in respect of the conviction
on 9 July 1992, and a further, consecutive, period of 7 days in default
in respect of a separate financial imposition (an order for costs by
the Knightsbridge Crown Court) of 27 January 1992.
The total of 21 days' detention in default was reduced to a total
of 14 days by the Marlborough Street Magistrates' Court on 21 June
1993. The applicant served the period of detention.
On 22 November 1993 the applicant applied, in connection with the
conviction of 9 July 1992, for an extension of time, for leave to
appeal against conviction and sentence, and for legal aid. The
application was refused by a single judge of the Court of Appeal on
9 June 1994. The judge stated "the judge was right to hold that this
was a case of all or nothing. The lesser verdict of careless driving
did not arise on the way in which the case was presented to the court.
The judge was perfectly entitled, when carrying out the sentencing
exercise, to make the compensation orders based on the evidence heard
by her during the trial". All applications were refused.
The applicant renewed his applications to the full Court of
Appeal, which rejected them on 19 August 1994. The Court held:
"... [The applicant] appeared at Middlesex Guildhall Crown Court
on 9 July 1992, where he was tried. [He] appeared in person.
The judge at the trial directed the jury that either the
defendant, as he then was, drove recklessly or he did not. She
was right to do so. The applicant now says that she should have
left careless driving to the jury, though at the time he agreed
that it was "an all or nothing case". It is the duty of the
judge to define the issue in the case for the jury. She did.
This application fails.
The applicant has submitted in writing further complaints about
his trial, none of which have any substance whatever. For all
those reasons this application is refused."
COMPLAINTS
The applicant alleges violation of Articles 6 paras. 1 and 3(c)
of the Convention, and of Articles 6 para. 2, 7, 13 and 14 of the
Convention.
In connection with Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention, the
applicant alleges that the trial judge erred in putting the case to the
jury in the way she did. He also complains that he was not permitted
to put his case in person before the Court of Appeal, and states that
he had neither funds to engage a legal representative for the hearing
nor legal aid for the Court of Appeal hearing.
The applicant also alleges that the absence of legal aid for the
proceedings before the Court of Appeal was in violation of Article 6
para. 3 (c) of the Convention, and that it discriminated against him
on the grounds of his status as a pauper, contrary to Article 14 of the
Convention.
The applicant also alleges a violation of Article 6 para. 2,
Article 7, and Article 13 of the Convention. In connection with
Article 7 of the Convention, he claims that a compensation order should
not have been made because the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 under
which the compensation order was made excludes "accidents".
THE LAW
1. The applicant alleges a violation of Article 6 para. 1
(Art. 6-1) of the Convention in connection with the way in which the
judge put the case to the jury.
The Commission notes that both the single judge of the Court of
Appeal and the Court of Appeal mentioned that at the trial, the
applicant had agreed that it was an "all or nothing case", that is,
that if the facts alleged were made out, then he was guilty of reckless
driving, and that if they were not made out, then he was guilty neither
of reckless nor of careless driving.
In these circumstances, the Commission finds no unfairness in
connection with this part of the application.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-
founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
2. The applicant also alleges violations of the Convention in
connection with the leave to appeal proceedings. In particular, he
complains that he did not have legal aid for those proceedings, and
that he was not permitted to put his case in person to the Court of
Appeal. He also alleges that the proceedings before the Court of
Appeal were not public as, although he was present and the judgment was
delivered publicly, a member of the public who had been present would
not have known the contents of the applicant's application for leave
to appeal, as he was not given a chance to address the Court of Appeal,
and the Court of Appeal did not refer to his arguments, but merely
dismissed them wholesale.
The Commission first notes that the applicant does not complain
that he did not have legal aid at first instance. It further notes that
he did not apply for leave to appeal within the prescribed time limit
of 14 days (for a description of leave to appeal proceedings, see Eur.
Court H.R., Monnell and Morris judgment of 2 March 1987, Series A
no. 115, p. 12- 14, paras. 23 - 27). The single judge and the Court
of Appeal did not, however, reject the application for leave as being
out of time, and so the Commission will deal with the substance of the
applicant's complaints.
The Commission recalls that in the above-mentioned Monnell and
Morris judgment, the European Court of Human Rights found that neither
the absence of an oral hearing nor the absence of legal aid before the
Court of Appeal in leave to appeal proceedings violated Article 6
para. 1 or para. 3 (c) (Art. 6-1, 6-3-c) of the Convention.
The present case is different from the case of Monnell and Morris
in that the applicant had not had legal aid at first instance -
apparently because he did not apply for it - and so did not have the
benefit of legal advice as to whether to appeal. However, it is also
different in that the applicant suffered no adverse consequence from
his unsuccessful application for leave to appeal, and in that he was
in fact present at the Court of Appeal's hearing on 19 August 1994.
In the light of the conclusions of the Court in the above-
mentioned Monnell and Morris case, the Commission finds in the
particular circumstances of this case that the absence of legal aid for
the leave to appeal proceedings did not conflict with the requirements
of Article 6 para. 3 (c) (Art. 6-3-c) of the Convention. Given that
the applicant, but not the prosecution, was present before the Court
of Appeal on 19 August 1994, the Commission also finds the principle
of equality of arms was met, and that the making of written submissions
only on the applicant's applications for leave to appeal did not
otherwise "put the accused at a disadvantage" (see above-mentioned
Monnell and Morris judgment, p. 24. para. 62, with further references).
It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
3. The applicant alleges that the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973
does not apply to accidents, and that it should therefore not have been
applied in his case. He considers that Article 7(Art. 7) has been
violated. Article 7 (Art. 7) of the Convention provides as follows.
"1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on
account of any act or omission which did not constitute a
criminal offence under national or international law at the time
when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed
than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence
was committed.
2. This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment
of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it
was committed, was criminal according to the general principles
of law recognised by civilised nations."
Section 35 (3) of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973
provides, so far as relevant, that "no [compensation] order shall be
made in respect of injury, loss or damage due to an accident arising
out of the presence of a motor vehicle on a road ...". The applicant,
however, was not involved in an "accident" but was convicted of driving
(recklessly) at two policemen. In any event, Article 7 (Art. 7) of the
Convention prohibits retroactive criminal legislation and penalties.
The Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 was in force when the applicant
committed the offence in issue in the present case, and so the
complaint under Article 7 (Art. 7) is misconceived.
It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
4. The applicant makes further complaints under Articles 6, 13 and
14 (Art. 6, 13, 14) of the Convention.
The Commission has examined these complaints, and finds, to the
extent that they are substantiated and are within its competence, that
they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the provisions
referred to.
It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
Secretary to the First Chamber President of the First Chamber
(M.F. BUQUICCHIO) (C.L. ROZAKIS)
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy