Information Note on the Court’s case-law No. 152
May 2012
Colon v. the Netherlands (dec.) - 49458/06
Decision 15.5.2012 [Section III]
Article 8
Article 8-1
Respect for private life
Police powers to stop and search individuals in city-centre areas designated as a security risk owing to the prevalence of violent crime there: inadmissible
Facts – In response to a rise in violent crime in the city, the Amsterdam Burgomaster issued orders under section 151b of the Municipalities Act designating certain parts of the city as security-risk areas for set periods. This in turn empowered the public prosecutor to issue orders, valid for twelve hours, allowing the police to search anyone present in the designated area for weapons. In two reports issued on May 2006 and May 2007 the COT Institute for Safety and Crisis Management noted a significant and continuing decline in the number of weapons-related incidents in the designated areas since the use of the preventive searches.
In his application to the European Court, the applicant, who had on one occasion been convicted, but ultimately not sentenced, for refusing to comply with an order to submit to a search, complained that the public prosecutor had been given the power within the designated areas to invade his privacy without any form of prior judicial control.
Law – Article 8: The stop and search power constituted interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life, which interference was in accordance with the law and pursued the legitimate aims of protecting public safety and preventing disorder or crime.
In assessing whether the interference had been necessary in a democratic society, the Court first had regard to the legal framework within which the preventive-search system operated. Under the applicable legislation the Burgomaster’s powers to designate a security-risk area were dependent on the prior adoption of a bye-law by the local council. The designated area could be no greater than strictly necessary and the order was to be revoked when no longer needed. The Burgomaster’s powers were subject to review and control by the local council, an elected representative body and, before making a designation order, the Burgomaster was required to consult with the public prosecutor and the local police commander. Preventive-search operations had to be ordered by the public prosecutor, whose powers were also statutorily defined. The public prosecutor had to issue an order defining the area within which searches could be made and such orders were only valid for twelve hours at a time and were not renewable. Accordingly, no single executive authority had the power by itself to order a preventive-search operation.
As regards the factual situation, it was apparent from the figures given by the Burgomaster and from the reports of the COT Institute for Safety and Crisis Management that preventive searches were having their intended effect of helping to reduce violent crime in Amsterdam. There was always a possibility the applicant might be subjected to a preventive search he found unpleasant and inconvenient if he ventured into the city centre when a designation order was in force. Nevertheless, in the light of the legal framework surrounding such searches and the effectiveness of such searches for their intended purpose, the domestic authorities had been entitled to consider that the public interest outweighed any subjective disadvantage caused to the applicant and had given “relevant” and “sufficient” reasons for the interference with his right to respect for his private life.
Conclusion: inadmissible (manifestly ill-founded).
(See also Gillan and Quinton v. the United Kingdom, no. 4158/05, 12 January 2010, Information Note no. 126)
© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
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