Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/114 of 15 January 2026 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of fused alumina originating in the People’s Republic of China

Official Journal
of the European Union

EN

L series

2026/114

16.1.2026

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2026/114

of 15 January 2026

imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of fused alumina originating in the People’s Republic of China

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union (1) (‘the basic Regulation’), and in particular Article 9(4) thereof,

Whereas:

1.   PROCEDURE

1.1.   Initiation

(1)

On 21 November 2024, the European Commission (‘the Commission’) initiated an anti-dumping investigation with regard to imports of fused alumina originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘the country concerned’ or ‘PRC’) on the basis of Article 5 of the basic Regulation. It published a Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union (2) (‘the Notice of Initiation’).

(2)

The Commission initiated the investigation following a complaint lodged on 9 October 2024 by Imerys S.A. (‘Imerys’ or ‘the complainant’). The complaint was made on behalf of the Union industry of fused alumina in the sense of Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation. The complaint contained evidence of dumping and of resulting material injury that was sufficient to justify the initiation of the investigation.

1.2.   Registration

(3)

The Commission made imports of the product concerned subject to registration by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/260 (3) (‘the registration Regulation’).

1.3.   Provisional measures

(4)

In accordance with Article 19a of the basic Regulation, on 26 June 2025, the Commission provided parties with a summary of the proposed duties and details about the calculation of the dumping margins and the margins adequate to remove the injury to the Union industry. Interested parties were invited to comment on the accuracy of the calculations within three working days.

(5)

Sampled exporting producers, Chongqing Saite Corundum Co., Ltd. (‘Saite’) and Luoyang Runbao Abrasives Co., Ltd. (‘Runbao’), noted the absence of calculation details concerning the non-injurious price, which were referred to in the documentation but not made available. Runbao further highlighted that the Commission had applied the same benchmark price to two distinct inputs – aluminium hydroxide of different purities – which they argued was factually and economically inaccurate. They requested that the benchmark for the lower-purity input be adjusted proportionally.

(6)

The request for disclosure of calculation details concerning the non-injurious price could not be accommodated, as this information is confidential, highly sensitive and its disclosure could be detrimental to the parties concerned. The Commission also explained that aggregate figures cannot be provided without risking disclosure of confidential data from a very limited number of Union producers. With regard to the alleged clerical error concerning aluminium hydroxide benchmarks, the Commission noted that such comments did not relate to the accuracy of the calculations and could not be addressed at that stage of the investigation. This comment is addressed in Section 3.2.3.1.

(7)

Union users and importers, such as Reckel GmbH (‘Reckel’) and Tyrolit – Schleifmittelwerke Swarovski AG & Co. KG (‘Tyrolit’), expressed serious methodological concerns. They argued that the Commission’s analysis focused only on brown fused alumina, while ignoring the wide variety of fused-alumina grades with differing applications and cost structures, leading to distorted price and cost comparisons. They also criticised the reliance on broad, heterogeneous tariff-line trade statistics for key inputs such as calcined bauxite and aluminium oxide, noting that these covered products of very different qualities and prices. In some cases, the same raw material (calcined bauxite) appeared to have been counted twice under separate headings.

(8)

These comments did not relate to the mathematical accuracy of the calculations as disclosed. Hence, these comments were addressed in Section 3.2.3.1 of this Regulation.

(9)

Further concerns were raised by Tyrolit and Reckel regarding the selection of the sources for reasonable amounts for SG & A costs and for profit. The relevant companies from which both rates were sourced were said to operate in unrelated sectors and thus provided unrepresentative data. Tyrolit stressed that this, combined with reliance on benchmark prices from Brazil for certain FOPs, including alumina and bauxite, resulted in inflated cost benchmarks. Both Tyrolit and Reckel warned that provisional anti-dumping duties of up to 136 % on the product under investigation, while leaving downstream finished abrasive products duty-free, would risk closures of Union production plants of downstream users, loss of skilled jobs, and greater dependency on imported finished products.

(10)

Similarly, the points raised regarding the selection of companies for sourcing financial data on SG & A costs and profit, the alleged distortion of input benchmarks, and the wider economic consequences of the measures do not pertain to the accuracy of the mathematical calculations presented in the pre-disclosure. These matters fall under the Commission’s broader methodological assessment and Union interest analysis and were dealt with in detail in Section 3.2.3.2.

(11)

On 17 July 2025, the Commission imposed provisional anti-dumping duties on imports of fused alumina originating in the People’s Republic of China by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1456 (4) (‘the provisional Regulation’).

1.4.   Subsequent procedure

(12)

Following the disclosure of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which a provisional anti-dumping duty was imposed (‘provisional disclosure’), the following parties filed written submissions making their views known on the provisional findings within the deadline provided by Article 2(1) of the provisional Regulation:

—

the Union producers Imerys and Alteo Fused Alumina (‘AFA’),

—

the sampled exporting producers Saite and Runbao,

—

the importers TRAXYS Europe SA and Reckel,

—

the users Calderys Deutschland GMBH, Calderys France S.A.S., Calderys Magyarorszag K.F.T., Calderys Italia SRL, Calderys Nordic AB, Calderys The Netherlands B.V. (‘Calderys’), Tyrolit, ABRANOVA s.r.o. (‘Abranova’), ANDRE ABRASIVE ARTICLES SP. Z O.O. SP.K, Vesuvius Poland Sp. z o.o. (‘Vesuvius’), August Rüggeberg GmbH & Co. KG, PFERD-Rüggeberg S.A., Smirdex, ABRASIENNE, ArcelorMittal Refractories Sp. z o. o. (‘ArcelorMittal’), MOLITAL ABRASIVI SRL, Federchimica–Aispec–Gruppo abrasive, G.W.S. GRINDING WHEELS SYSTEM SRL, GRANDINETTI SRL, Industria Mole Abrasive S.r.l., Mabtools France, RHI Magnesita GmbH, , SAINT-GOBAIN ABRASIFS (‘Saint-Gobain’), Syndicat National des Abrasifs et Superabrasifs, Granit Grinding Wheel Ltd., Techniflex Sp. z o.o. and ZAI AD, and

—

the exporting producers Binzhou Qinai New Material Co., Ltd, Chongqing Saite Corundum Co., Ltd., Henan Ant Advanced Materials Co., Ltd., Henan Hengxin Industrial & Mineral Products Co., Ltd., Henan Tuorui Abrasive Material Co., Ltd., Jiygo Refractory & Abrasive Ltd., Luoyang Runbao Abrasives Co., Ltd., Qingdao Sisa Abrasives Co., Ltd., Shandong Bosheng New Materials Co., Ltd., Shanxi Lvliangshan Minerals Co., Ltd., Yichuan Abrasives Industry Union, Zhengzhou Sinabuddy Mineral Co., Ltd. and Zhengzhou Goohe Co., Ltd. represented by the China Chamber of Commerce of Metals Minerals & Chemicals Importers & Exporters (‘the exporting producers represented by the CCCMC’),

—

the users’ associations Deutsche Feuerfest-Industrie e.V. (‘DFFI’), Verband Deutscher Schleifmittelwerke e.V. (‘VDS’), Federation of European Producers of Abrasives (‘FEPA’) and European Refractories Producers Federation (‘PRE’).

(13)

The parties who so requested were granted an opportunity to be heard. Following the publication of the provisional Regulation, the Commission invited the parties to provide additional input in particular for the purpose of assessing the Union interest, in light of the differing interests of the parties concerned. Hearings took place with AFA, Imerys, PRE, VDS, Tyrolit, Saint-Gobain, ArcelorMittal, the exporting producers represented by the CCCMC, Saite and Runbao.

(14)

The Commission continued to seek and verify all the information it deemed necessary for its final findings. When reaching its definitive findings, the Commission considered the comments submitted by interested parties and revised its provisional conclusions when appropriate.

(15)

The Commission informed all interested parties of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it intended to impose a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of fused alumina originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘final disclosure’). Comments submitted by parties after the disclosure were addressed in the relevant sections below.

(16)

Following the disclosure referred to in recital (15), the Commission subsequently made an additional final disclosure to all interested parties. This additional disclosure contained updated findings and considerations. Parties were given the opportunity to comment on this additional disclosure, and the comments received were addressed in the relevant sections below.

1.5.   Claims on procedure

(17)

Following provisional disclosure, Reckel, Tyrolit and VDS argued that Article 19a(1) of the basic Regulation required provisional disclosure to take place three weeks before the imposition of provisional measures. The parties argued that the Commission, by providing information on the planned imposition of provisional duties to the parties on 26 June 2025, violated Articles 19a(1), 7(1) and 5(10) of the basic Regulation, as well as the terms of its Notice of Initiation.

(18)

The Commission noted that Article 7(1) of the basic Regulation provides that provisional duties shall not be imposed within three weeks of the information being sent to interested parties in accordance with Article 19a. Therefore, this provision defines the minimum interval between the communication of such information and the adoption of provisional measures. In the present case, the Commission sent the information on 26 June 2025 and imposed provisional measures on 18 July 2025. The interval was three weeks. The requirements of Article 7(1) were thus respected.

(19)

The Commission further recalled that Article 19a, as amended by Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/1173 (5), governs the content and purpose of provisional disclosure, whereas Article 7(1) sets the procedural framework for the timing of provisional measures. The amendment of Article 19a did not modify the temporal rule laid down in Article 7(1). Consequently, the Commission considered that the argument concerning an alleged violation of the requirements of the provisional disclosure period was unfounded and therefore rejected this claim.

1.6.   Claims on initiation

(20)

Following provisional disclosure, no interested party submitted any further claims or comments on initiation than those referred to in Section 1.4 of the provisional Regulation. The Commission therefore confirmed its findings and conclusions as set out in recitals (6) to (11) of the provisional Regulation.

1.7.   Sampling

(21)

In the absence of comments regarding the sampling of Union producers, importers and exporting producers, the Commission confirmed recitals (12) to (28) of the provisional Regulation.

1.8.   Questionnaire replies and verification visits

(22)

Following provisional disclosure, no interested party submitted any claims or comments on questionnaire replies and verification visits. The Commission therefore confirmed its findings and conclusions as set out in recitals (29) to (32) of the provisional Regulation.

1.9.   Investigation period and period considered

(23)

As stated in recital (33) of the provisional Regulation, the investigation of dumping and injury covered the period from 1 October 2023 to 30 September 2024 (‘the investigation period’). The examination of trends relevant for the assessment of injury covered the period from 1 January 2021 to the end of the investigation period (‘the period considered’).

2.   PRODUCT CONCERNED AND LIKE PRODUCT

2.1.   Product under investigation

(24)

The Commission recalled that, as set out in recital (34) of the provisional Regulation, the product under investigation is artificial corundum, whether or not chemically defined, also known as fused alumina (‘the product under investigation’).

(25)

Due to its hardness and thermal resistance, fused alumina is primarily used in two industrial sectors, abrasives and refractories. In the abrasives industry, it is used in a wide range of applications, including grinding, polishing, cutting and blasting. In the refractories industry, it functions as a refractory material in high-temperature settings, such as furnace linings, crucibles, and refractory bricks. Beyond these principal uses, fused alumina is also used in the manufacture of technical ceramics and as a wear-resistant additive in surface coatings within the laminated products industry.

2.2.   Product under investigation

(26)

The Commission recalled that, as set out in recital (38) of the provisional Regulation, the product concerned is the product under investigation originating in the PRC, currently falling under CN code 2818 10 11 , 2818 10 19 , ex 2818 10 91 , and 2818 10 99 (TARIC codes 2818 10 91 20, 2818 10 91 40, 2818 10 91 91, 2818 10 91 99) (‘the product concerned’).

2.3.   Like product

(27)

In the absence of any related claim or comment, the conclusions in recitals (40) and (41) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

2.4.   Claims regarding product scope

(28)

Certain Union users from the refractory industry claimed that substitution between abrasive-grade and refractory-grade fused alumina is not possible, based on their different physical and chemical characteristics, particle size distribution, properties, applications and consumer perception. In particular, ArcelorMittal also argued that there is insufficient production and production capacity of refractory-grade fused alumina. ArcelorMittal based its claim on an estimation of the total Union consumption of fused alumina at 400 000 tonnes, including 170 000 tonnes of refractory-grade fused alumina. The parties argued that refractory-grade fused alumina should thus be excluded from the product scope of the investigation.

(29)

The Commission recalled that these arguments had already been examined and addressed in recitals (42) to (45) and (307) to (308) of the provisional Regulation. The Commission reiterated that both grades share the same basic physical, chemical and technical characteristics, including comparable alumina content, hardness, density and melting point. Variations in particle size distribution were found to stem from post-fusion processing rather than any inherent product difference. The Commission also observed a substantial overlap in particle sizes enabling interchangeability for certain applications.

(30)

Furthermore, the Commission noted that the claim concerning limited Union production and production capacity of refractory-grade fused alumina does not relate to the essential nature of the product. As set out in recitals (307) and (308) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission found that the Union industry is capable of supplying the Union market in the required quantities, including specific types of the product concerned. Although the Union industry’s production volumes substantially decreased over the period considered due to dumped imports from China, the Commission noted that the Union industry significantly underutilised its production capacity during this period. The Commission further confirmed that the available additional capacity includes production of refractory-grade fused alumina, which is available immediately or can become operational within a very short period of time. The claim regarding insufficient Union production capacity is further addressed in Section 7.4.

(31)

Additionally, regarding the Union consumption, the Commission recalled that, as set out in recitals (188) to (190) of the provisional Regulation, Union consumption amounted to 305 360 tonnes during the investigation period (‘IP’). ArcelorMittal’s claim regarding the estimated consumption of refractory-grade and overall fused alumina not only contradicts the verified data but also diverges from the assessment provided by the European Refractories Producers Federation, the users association representing several Union operators in the sector, which estimated the consumption of refractory-grade fused alumina at 80 000 tonnes.

(32)

Accordingly, the Commission maintained its conclusion in recitals (42) to (45) of the provisional Regulation that both grades constitute a single product, as the variations described by the parties did not demonstrate any material differences that would justify the exclusion of refractory-grade fused alumina from the product scope.

(33)

Reckel claimed that sol-gel corundum differs from other types of fused alumina in its basic physical, chemical and technical characteristics, including hardness, fracture toughness, and thermal properties, and argued that it cannot be substituted in high-end precision applications without significant operational difficulties. Reckel thus argued that sol-gel corundum should be excluded from the product scope of the investigation.

(34)

The Commission recalled that these arguments had already been examined and addressed in recitals (46) to (48) of the provisional Regulation. The Commission reiterated that sol-gel corundum has similar physical, chemical, and technical characteristics as other fused alumina, including comparable hardness, thermal resistance, and chemical stability. Although produced by a different process and from different raw materials, these differences do not materially affect the functional properties of the product. Additionally, cost differences alone are insufficient to treat sol-gel as a separate product. The ability of other types of fused alumina to replace sol-gel, even with reduced performance in demanding applications, demonstrates sufficient functional similarity and interchangeability for most abrasive uses.

(35)

Accordingly, the Commission maintained its conclusion in recitals (46) to (48) of the provisional Regulation that sol-gel corundum falls within the scope of the product under investigation.

(36)

A number of interested parties claimed that brown fused alumina should be excluded from the scope of the measures, noting that it differs from white fused alumina in its chemical composition, including lower Al2O3 content and higher impurity levels. They further claimed that brown fused alumina is either not produced in the Union or is available only in insufficient quantities to meet Union demand. In addition, the interested parties argued that switching production between brown fused alumina and white fused alumina is technically challenging, and market evidence indicates that the two products are not readily substitutable in terms of technical characteristics or price.

(37)

The Commission considered that, while brown fused alumina has slightly lower Al2O3 content and higher impurity levels than white fused alumina, these differences do not constitute a material distinction in physical, chemical, or technical characteristics sufficient to define a separate product. Furthermore, the Commission noted that the claim concerning limited Union production and production capacity of brown fused alumina does not relate to the essential nature of the product. However, the Commission noted that brown fused alumina is currently produced by the Union industry. Regarding the quantities, as set out in recitals (307) and (308) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission found that the Union industry is capable of supplying the Union market in the required quantities, also for brown fused alumina. The Commission further confirmed that a substantial proportion of the available additional capacity, which is either immediately available or can be made operational within a very short period of time, relates to the production of brown fused alumina. The claim regarding insufficient Union production capacity is further addressed in Section 7.4.

(38)

For these reasons, the Commission considered that brown fused alumina falls within the product scope of the investigation and rejected the claim for its exclusion.

(39)

Accordingly, the Commission concluded that all comments received regarding the product scope did not provide sufficient justification for the product exclusions. Consequently, all claims were rejected.

3.   DUMPING

3.1.   Procedure for the determination of the normal value under Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation

(40)

In the absence of any related claim or comment, the conclusions in recitals (49) to (55) of the provisional Regulation were hereby confirmed.

3.2.   Normal value

3.2.1.   Existence of significant distortions

(41)

Following provisional disclosure, Abranova, Tyrolit and VDS submitted comments related to the presence of significant distortions.

(42)

Abranova rejected the Commission’s reliance on the concept of significant distortions in China. They argued that cost advantages of Chinese producers derive mainly from natural factors: access to raw materials, lower energy costs, and long-standing investments in pollution control technology. They insisted that Union producers’ difficulties are instead due to high electricity prices and dependence on imported raw materials. Abranova strongly contested the view that China’s political system or CPC congress targets amount to proof of systemic distortions in production costs. They stressed that even state-owned and private firms in China must operate profitably and cannot survive on subsidies alone. Therefore, the Commission’s reliance on state influence as evidence of distortions was, in their view, unsubstantiated.

(43)

As set out in recitals (74) to (110) of the provisional regulation, the Commission carried out a detailed assessment under Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation and established the existence of significant distortions in the PRC affecting the formation of production costs and prices. The evidence showed pervasive state influence in the economy, including in energy, raw materials, labour, and access to finance, which affects cost structures across the sector. The arguments presented by Abranova did not alter these findings. The claim was therefore rejected.

(44)

Tyrolit submitted that the Commission’s reliance on generalised evidence to establish the existence of raw material distortions in alumina and bauxite was not supported by substantive positive evidence. They argued that alumina and bauxite are traded in an integrated global market and that Chinese domestic prices for these commodities closely tracked international benchmarks. In their view, the Commission’s reliance on generalised policy evidence, while disregarding specific pricing data from sources such as S & P Global Commodity Insights, was unsubstantiated. Tyrolit maintained that although distortions may exist for some factors of production (e.g. energy, labour), such considerations did not apply uniformly, and, in particular, not to alumina and bauxite. VDS supported this position, pointing to evidence that Chinese alumina and bauxite prices largely mirrored global levels, which undermined the Commission’s finding of distortions.

(45)

As detailed in recitals (59)-(110) of the provisional regulation, the evidence on the file, including the Commission’s Report on significant distortions in China, the complaint, and the Commission’s own research, demonstrated substantial state intervention in the Chinese economy, including in the alumina and bauxite sectors. The Government of China was sent questionnaires regarding the existence of significant distortions and raw material distortions, but it did not reply. Similarly, no Chinese exporting producer submitted substantiated evidence showing that their input costs, including for alumina and bauxite, were free from distortions. On the contrary, the investigation established that both SOEs and private operators in these sectors operate under the ownership, control, or policy supervision of the Chinese authorities, with extensive planning documents and industrial policies specifically targeting alumina and bauxite. In this context, the Commission concluded that prices and costs of alumina and bauxite in the PRC cannot be considered the result of free market forces.

(46)

The Commission therefore maintained its position and the conclusions in recitals (56) to (115) of the provisional Regulation were hereby confirmed.

3.2.2.   Representative country

(47)

Following provisional disclosure, Andre Abrasives Articles and VDS criticised the selection of Brazil as the representative country.

(48)

Andre Abrasives Articles requested a reassessment, arguing that Brazil is inappropriate due to its very different energy-cost structure and smaller market size, which undermined its comparability to China.

(49)

The request for a reassessment of the normal value methodology and for the rejection of Brazil as representative country due to the cost structure or market size were not substantiated. The Commission recalled that Brazil was selected in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, based on the availability of reliable and representative data as noted in recital (141) of the provisional Regulation. The claim was therefore rejected.

(50)

VDS additionally stressed that the Commission had initially rejected Mexico due to an alleged lack of production but then shifted to Brazil without clear justification.

(51)

The Commission recalled that the choice of Brazil as representative country was made after it was established that, contrary to Brazil, there was no genuine production of the product under investigation in Mexico. Such determination was also made following comments on the absence of production in Mexico by interested parties including VDS. The claim was therefore rejected.

(52)

The Commission therefore maintained its position and the conclusions in recitals (116) to (143) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

3.2.3.   Sources used to establish undistorted costs

(53)

Following provisional disclosure, several interested parties submitted comments related to the benchmarks used for certain factors of production and to the selling general and administrative (‘SG & A’) costs used to construct the normal value.

3.2.3.1.   Factors of production

(54)

Saite, Runbao, DFFI, PRE and Vesuvius raised concerns about the Commission’s reliance on Brazilian import prices for bauxite as a source for undistorted prices. They argued that Brazil is a major exporter of bauxite, so imports only represent niche, high-priced products, that are unrepresentative of fused alumina production costs. Moreover, a significant share of Brazil’s imports originated from China, which raised the risk of distortions. By contrast, Mexico’s import structure was considered more diverse and economically relevant, providing a more reliable basis for calculating normal value.

(55)

The Commission noted that the use of Brazilian import prices, as a reflection domestic prices, was consistent with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation. The fact that Brazil is a significant exporter of bauxite did not undermine the reliability of its import statistics, which covered a sufficient volume and a variety of origins. As explained in the first Note on factors of production, imports originating in the PRC were excluded from the calculation of the benchmark for bauxite. Also, in spite of their relative share, imports from the PRC did not have a significant impact on import prices from the rest of the world, which were made at significantly higher prices. The claim was therefore rejected.

(56)

Tyrolit also challenged the benchmarks for alumina and bauxite, emphasising that these inputs are globally traded commodities with Chinese prices tracking international market levels, and therefore benchmark pricing was unnecessary. Tyrolit and Saite also criticised the use of Brazilian import data that included high-quality Spanish exports of calcined bauxite not comparable to standard industrial feedstock, and highlighted inconsistencies such as changes in HS codes that did not affect dumping margins. They argued that normal values should have reflected undistorted domestic Brazilian prices, or export prices where appropriate, but ultimately maintained that there was no evidence of raw material distortions in China justifying surrogate benchmarks.

(57)

The Commission recalled that benchmarks had to be established because domestic Chinese prices and costs could not be used due to the existence of significant distortions in the PRC, as set out in recitals (74)–(110) of the provisional Regulation. Brazilian import data were used as the most appropriate source of undistorted benchmark prices, in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a). The presence in the import statistics of data related to specialised types of products does not invalidate the import dataset as a whole, which covered sufficient volumes from a variety of origins. In addition, these parties did not provide supporting evidence that the benchmarks did not reflect undistorted domestic Brazilian prices. The claim was therefore rejected.

(58)

FEPA and Smirdex s.a. argued that Brazilian fused alumina producers source bauxite domestically, making import statistics irrelevant for cost benchmarking. Both parties recommended using, what they referred to as, transparent and internationally recognised indices, such as those from S & P Global Commodity Insights or CBIX, which according to the interested parties, better capture market realities. Smirdex further pointed to evidence that Brazilian market prices for bauxite and alumina were only around 10–15 % higher than Chinese levels, which does not support the very high dumping margins established in the provisional regulation.

(59)

The Commission applied Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation by using data from a representative country where the relevant data was readily available. The benchmark for bauxite sourced in the representative country i.e. Brazil was considered as appropriate. Besides, the alleged price differentials between Brazil and China were not supported by evidence, they were only the result of unverified allegations. Consequently, interested parties did not demonstrate that the benchmark selected for bauxite was inappropriate and that the Commission should resort to an alternative methodology to establish an undistorted benchmark for this factor of production. The Commission further noted that the benchmark price for bauxite was in the same range as the Chinese export price for bauxite, refractory grade, 85 %/2,0/3,15–3,2 (0–6 mm), FOB Xingang, as reported in Metal Bulletin’s independent industry benchmarks for the global metal and mining industry (Fastmarkets’ prices). The claim was therefore rejected.

(60)

Vesuvius argued that the Commission failed to disclose clearly which HS codes were used to construct benchmarks for bauxite and calcined bauxite. They noted that while the pre-disclosure documents referred to HS 2508 30 , the provisional regulation mentioned customs code 2606 00 12 and 2606 00 90 . In their view, this inconsistency creates uncertainty about the data actually relied upon and undermines the transparency of the methodology. Vesuvius therefore requested that the Commission provide proper disclosure of the exact HS codes used for the determination of normal value.

(61)

The Commission noted that calcined bauxite was initially listed under HS code 2508 30 in the first Note on factors of production , corresponding to aluminium ores and concentrates in general. Following further examination and verification at the premises of the sampled exporting producers, it confirmed that calcined bauxite is properly classified under CN codes 2606 00 12 and 2606 00 90 , which were used to construct the benchmarks in the provisional regulation. This change ensured the correct customs classification of the factor of production actually used by the exporting producers and did not alter the underlying methodology. The reference to HS 2508 30 in earlier documents reflected preliminary information supplied by the exporting producers. In Table 1 of the provisional regulation, only calcined bauxite was retained as an input since exporting producers used calcined, not raw, bauxite. The Commission therefore concluded that the methodology was applied consistently and transparently, and the claim was rejected.

(62)

Vesuvius argued that the Commission’s method for determining the net-of-tax energy costs for Chinese exporters, based on Brazilian electricity and gas prices, inaccurately used a 17,5 % ICMS tax deduction. They asserted that the ICMS rates in Brazil ranged from 17 % to 20 %, with many sources indicating that intra-state transactions, such as energy supply, typically fell within this range. Therefore, Vesuvius suggested that an average rate of 18,5 % should have been used instead of 17,5 %.

(63)

The Commission established that for the investigation period most Brazilian states applied ICMS rates of 17–18 % to industrial electricity consumption. While a few states did set higher rates, these were applied primarily to residential consumption above certain thresholds and not to industrial users. The Commission therefore considered that the 17,5 % deduction applied in the provisional calculations accurately reflected the average conditions faced by industrial users and provided a reasonable and representative basis for establishing the net-of-tax energy costs. The claim was therefore rejected.

(64)

The Commission therefore maintained its position and the conclusions in recitals (144) to (160) of the provisional Regulation were hereby confirmed.

(65)

Upon final disclosure, Vesuvius commented that the Commission relied on ILO data for weekly hours actually worked in the general manufacturing sector in Brazil (40,4 hours), which, in Vesuvius’ view, does not reflect the economic activity relevant to the product under investigation. Vesuvius argued that sector-specific ILO data for economic sector 23 (‘Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products’), showing 41,3 weekly hours actually worked, were available and should have been used instead.

(66)

The Commission examined this claim and confirmed that the ILO dataset provides disaggregated information for economic sector 23. Since the production of the product concerned falls within this sector, the Commission accepted the comment. Accordingly, the Commission recalculated the benchmark for labour costs by replacing the previously used weekly hours actually worked (40,4 hours) with the sector-specific figure of 41,3 hours. All other methodological steps remained unchanged. This adjustment resulted in a reduction of the hourly labour cost from 58,36 CNY/hour to 57,09 CNY/hour.

3.2.3.2.   SG & A costs and profits

(67)

DFFI and PRE submitted comments that the selected Brazilian companies – Tecnosulfur, Bozel Brasil S.A., and Trevo Industrial – were not reliable proxies for the fused alumina industry, as they operated in unrelated fields with distinct production processes and markets. According to DFFI and PRE, these companies did not reflect the economic or technical characteristics of fused alumina production.

(68)

Tyrolit similarly argued that the comparability of the selected Brazilian companies with fused alumina industry was limited. While Bozel, as a ferroalloy producer operating arc furnaces, had some resemblance to fused alumina producers, Trevo and Tecnosulfur were deemed unsuitable. Trevo operated in plasterboard manufacturing (6), a completely different sector, and Tecnosulfur’s business model required significantly higher SG & A spending linked to marketing, R & D, and sales support. Tyrolit urged the Commission to replace these companies with data from more appropriate Brazilian producers in the ferroalloy sector, which use arc furnaces for processing ores, making them highly energy-intensive, such as Ferbasa, RIMA, Nova Era Silicon, or Ferro Ligas, whose published financial statements would provide a closer benchmark.

(69)

Vesuvius added that two of the three companies selected – Trevo and Tecnosulfur – had no connection to fused alumina production. Trevo’s activity is confined to drywall manufacturing, which does not involve electrofusion, while Tecnosulfur supplies desulfurising products for liquid metals (7). Although Bozel operates electrofusion furnaces, Vesuvius emphasised that, overall, the Commission’s chosen companies lack sufficient comparability to fused alumina producers, making them unsuitable for establishing a reliable undistorted and reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits.

(70)

In light of these new observations it was found that the companies initially selected were not sufficiently connected to the fused alumina industrial sector due to their activities or that the level of SG & A costs found for Bozel 2-3 % were considered not reasonable within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation since they were too low in comparison with the level SG & A costs normally observed for companies operating in this sector (8) during the period considered which exceeded 10 %. Hence, they were not considered representative of the fused alumina sector. Consequently, the Commission reassessed its selection to identify companies with activities more technically and economically comparable to fused alumina production, even if classified under a different but related NACE code 24.1 (Manufacture of basic iron and steel and ferroalloys). The newly identified companies are FERBASA, RIMA Industrial, Aço Verde do Brasil, MINASLIGAS and Viena Siderúrgica.

(71)

The Commission considered that these companies were more appropriate proxies for fused alumina producers, as their operations in ferroalloy sector involve production processes and costs structures closely aligned with those of fused alumina production. Specifically they share key technical and economic characteristics: (i) production in electric arc or electric furnaces; (ii) high-temperature reduction/smelting processes; (iii) energy- and capital-intensive cost structures; (iv) mineral-based raw material supply chains; (v) by-product recovery and environmental controls; and (vi) strong links to steelmaking industries, in which fused alumina also plays a crucial role as a refractory input.

(72)

The Commission therefore accepted that companies originally selected at provisional stage were not sufficiently representative. The calculations were performed again based on the financial data of companies in the ferroalloys and steel sector, who are considered to be more connected to the production of the product under investigation. This modification ensured that the SG & A costs and profit benchmarks used for the construction of normal value more accurately reflect the realities of producers operating in comparable energy-intensive industries. On this basis, the SG & A costs and profit percentages amounted to 11,41 % and 5,63 % of the cost of goods sold.

(73)

Upon final disclosure, Imerys commented that the SG & A costs and profit benchmark should be revised, arguing that it did not reflect ‘undistorted and reasonable’ levels within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation. In their view, two of the selected companies – Aço Verde do Brasil and Viena Siderúrgica – are not technically comparable to fused alumina producers, as they do not operate in the ferroalloy sector and use blast-furnace rather than electric-arc-furnace. Imerys further claimed that the SG & A costs and profit levels of these companies were not representative, citing Viena’s size and profitability and Aço Verde do Brasil’s lower SG & A costs ratio based on Imerys’ SG & A costs calculations. In this regard, Imerys claimed that net financial expenses should not be subtracted from the numerator when determining the SG & A costs calculation. Imerys also referred to publicly reported labour-rights investigations involving certain suppliers linked to Viena as evidence of conditions allegedly not reflecting normal market behaviour. On this basis, Imerys requested that these two companies be excluded and that the benchmark be recalculated using only producers they consider genuinely comparable.

(74)

The Commission considered that the arguments raised did not demonstrate that the SG & A costs and profit levels of the companies concerned were distorted or unrepresentative. While the type of furnace used may differ, the underlying production processes and cost structures remain comparable for the purposes of establishing a reasonable proxy under Article 2(6a)(a).

(75)

The Commission further noted that the assertions concerning differing supply-demand dynamics or cost structures were not substantiated. The size of the companies is likewise nor a relevant factor for determining representativeness. With respect to SG & A costs, the Commission confirmed that the SG & A costs ratios were calculated in line with standard practice, whereby relevant financial income and expenses were taken into account for the determination of the SG & A costs rate. Based on the Commission’s own verified calculations, the SG & A ratios of both companies fall within the range normally observed for comparable operators.

(76)

Finally, the Commission notes that the labour-related allegations raised by Imerys concern ongoing proceedings involving certain upstream suppliers rather than the companies themselves and therefore did not affect the suitability of their financial data for establishing the benchmark.

(77)

On this basis, the Commission maintained that the selected companies were appropriate and that no revision of the benchmark was warranted.

(78)

Following the additional final disclosure, Imerys reiterated the same comments it had already submitted after the final disclosure, without providing any new factual evidence or information. The additional final disclosure concerned solely the elements that had been modified in light of the comments received on the final disclosure, and interested parties were invited to comment only on those specific changes. As Imerys’ reiterations did not relate to the elements that had been amended, these comments were not taken into account.

3.3.   Export price

(79)

In the absence of any related claim or comment, the conclusions in recitals (170) to (172) of the provisional Regulation were hereby confirmed.

3.4.   Comparison

(80)

Following provisional disclosure, Tyrolit and VDS submitted comments related to the comparison.

(81)

VDS and Tyrolit argued that the Commission failed to disclose which specific qualities of fused alumina were used in the normal value calculations, stressing that meaningful comparisons can only be made on a like-for-like basis given the wide price variation between grades. They claimed that Brazilian prices of product under investigation are generally only 10–15 % higher than Chinese levels and pointed to discrepancies between Runbao and Elfusa, a known producers of the product under investigation in Brazil, prices ranging from – 18 % to +16 %. They further argued that the excessive dumping margins reported in the provisional regulation are the result of methodological errors, such as overly broad product coverage, reliance on unrepresentative data, and the use of flawed Brazilian pricing, while also noting that Elfusa itself indicated that a fair price for certain alumina qualities would be 30–35 % above Chinese prices.

(82)

The Commission recalls that all relevant parameters forming the basis of the dumping calculations were disclosed in accordance with Article 19 of the basic Regulation, allowing parties to comment on the essential facts. Claims that Brazilian prices of product under investigation are only 10–15 % higher than Chinese levels, that discrepancies between Runbao and Elfusa prices show methodological flaws, or that ‘fair’ prices should be 30–35 % above Chinese levels were not substantiated with evidence. The Commission’s findings were based on verified data from sampled exporting producers and benchmarks as described in Section 3.2.3.1 of the provisional Regulation. The Commission therefore considered that its methodology follows the relevant legal provisions of the basic anti-dumping regulation and was consistent with established practice and that the provisional dumping margins were correctly determined.

3.5.   Dumping margins

(83)

As described in recital (72), following substantiated and accepted claims from interested parties, the Commission revised the dumping margins.

(84)

Following provisional disclosure, August Riiggeberg GmbH & Co. KG, PFERD-Riiggeberg S.A. and VDS submitted comments on dumping margins.

(85)

August Riiggeberg GmbH & Co. KG and PFERD-Riiggeberg S.A. submitted that the residual dumping margin of 136,36 % was disproportionate and did not reflect actual market conditions. They argued that the residual duty was derived from a small subset of sales by the producer with the highest margin, making it unrepresentative. The parties further stated that they were unable to verify the calculation due to insufficient transparency, but considered it likely to be erroneous, possibly as a result of incompatible product comparisons. In their view, the actual price differences between Chinese and Brazilian artificial corundum are significantly smaller than those indicated by the Commission, even during recent market fluctuations linked to the Ukraine war and the energy crisis.

(86)

The residual dumping margin was established on the basis of verified findings from a subset of sales by Saite, the sampled exporter with the highest dumping margin. This subset, accounting for 7 % of its exports of the product concerned to the Union (and [4,8] % of the exports of the product concerned by the sampled exporting producers) during the investigation period, was deemed an appropriate and representative basis for determining the residual duty applicable to non-cooperating exporters, in line with Article 18 of the basic Regulation. The Commission disclosed the essential facts and considerations forming the basis of the calculation, while ensuring an appropriate balance between transparency and the protection of confidential information. Unsubstantiated allegations of possible error or disproportionality could not have been accepted. The product comparisons and the determination of normal value were carried out on the basis of the relevant legal provisions and consistent Commission’s practice. Therefore, these claims were rejected.

(87)

The definitive dumping margins expressed as a percentage of the cost, insurance and freight (CIF) Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows:

Company

Definitive dumping margin (%)

Chongqing Saite Corundum Co., Ltd.

99,8

Luoyang Runbao Abrasives Co., Ltd.

88,7

Other cooperating companies

94,5

All other imports originating in the PRC

110,6

4.   INJURY

4.1.   General remarks

(88)

Certain interested parties claimed that the provisional analysis of injury and causation was flawed because it did not analyse certain parts of the market separately. They argued that a segmented injury analysis for different product types was warranted because of differences in the physical, chemical and technical characteristics of the product types. More specifically, ArcelorMittal, Saite and the exporting producers represented by the CCCMC claimed that separate analyses were required for refractory-grade fused alumina. The exporting producers represented by the CCCMC also argued for a segmented injury analysis for sol-gel. Reckel and Tyrolit claimed that the injury calculations for Runbao are based on a mismatch in the product mixes because Runbao predominantly produced brown fused alumina, whereas Union industry’s production primarily focuses on white fused alumina. Similarly, Tyrolit claimed that the injury calculations for Saite are even less representative because Saite produces only brown fused alumina.

(89)

The investigation established that the sampled Union companies do produce brown fused alumina. The sampled Chinese exporting producers were found to compete directly with the products manufactured by the Union industry, including brown fused alumina. Therefore, the injury analysis is representative and reflects actual market competition.

(90)

Furthermore, for the reasons mentioned in recitals (42) to (48) of the provisional Regulation and reiterated in recitals (28) to (39), the Commission confirmed that the product under investigation should be treated as one single product. The Commission noted that the absence of full interchangeability of the product types and the fact that products belong to different grades is not sufficient to necessitate an assessment by segment. The submissions received after provisional disclosure do not change these findings. Additionally, all product types are distributed through the same channels and sold to the same customer groups. These facts demonstrate that the products are part of the same competitive market. The Commission confirmed that the various types of fused alumina share core functional characteristics to a sufficient degree and that the price differences among different product types is already considered under the PCN method used to analyse price undercutting.

4.2.   Definition of the Union industry and Union production

(91)

In the absence of any comments with respect to the definition of the Union industry and Union production, the conclusions set out in recitals (186) to (187) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed

4.3.   Union consumption

(92)

In the absence of any comments with respect to the Union consumption, the conclusions set out in recitals (188) to (190) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.4.   Imports from the country concerned

4.4.1.   Prices of the imports from the country concerned and price undercutting

(93)

Saite and Runbao argued that the adjustment in the PCN regarding brown fused alumina, as explained in recitals (11) and (199) of the provisional Regulation, was inaccurate in view of the technical distinction between the two grades. Consequently, Saite and Runbao claimed that, in the absence of Union production of second grade brown fused alumina, second grade brown fused alumina produced by the exporting producers should be either removed from the price comparison or adjusted appropriately.

(94)

Furthermore, the exporting producers represented by the CCCMC argued that the analysis of price undercutting is undermined by the fact that it lacks analytical context and relies on an average price comparison that does not account for distinctions between the different product types. The exporting producers represented by the CCCMC claimed that the wide range of import prices of fused alumina, observed not only in imports from China but also from third countries, reflects divergences in the nature of the products manufactured, leading to a flawed comparison.

(95)

Additionally, the exporting producers represented by the CCCMC argued that no substantiated assessment of price suppression was conducted.

(96)

Concerning the claim on the PCN adjustment, the Commission noted, as explained in recital (11) of the provisional Regulation, that the investigation established that the distinction between first and second grade brown fused alumina in the PCN was artificial, does not reflect industry-recognised standards and is subject to interpretation. Thus, an adjustment in the PCN was necessary regarding brown fused alumina. The Commission considered that when comparing products, the critical elements are the contents of Al2O3 and Fe2O3, which are reflected in values A1/A2 and F1/F2 within the PCN. The claim was therefore rejected.

(97)

Concerning the undercutting analysis claim the Commission noted that the PCN methodology used in the investigation already accounts for price differences among product types. This ensures that comparisons are made between products with similar physical and chemical characteristics, thereby preserving the integrity of the price undercutting analysis. The claim was therefore rejected.

(98)

Regarding the claim that no substantiated assessment of price suppression was conducted, the Commission noted that, as detailed in Section 4.3.2, and Section 5.1 of the provisional Regulation, the Commission conducted a thorough analysis of price trends, cost developments, and profitability of the Union industry. The investigation revealed that despite rising costs, the Union industry was unable to increase its sales prices, accordingly, leading to price suppression and a deterioration in profitability. As the Commission noted in recitals (196) and (278) of the provisional Regulation, the Union industry’s average non-injurious price during the IP was EUR 1 880 per tonne in contrast to an average import price of EUR 878 per tonne from China. This confirms the existence of material injury caused by dumped imports. The claim was therefore, rejected.

4.5.   Economic situation of the Union industry

4.5.1.   Macroeconomic indicators

4.5.1.1.   Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

(99)

The exporting producers represented by the CCCMC argued that the decrease in the Union industry’s production by 37 % is not causally related to the increase of Chinese imports. Regarding capacity utilisation, the exporting producers represented by the CCCMC claimed that capacities were underutilised even prior to the increase in imports from China and before the start of the period considered, as evidenced by the fact the Union industry’s capacity utilisation was already at 69 % at the beginning of the period considered. The exporting producers represented by the CCCMC also argued that the decline of the Union industry’s exports was not a result of the pressure exerted by Chinese exporting producers.

(100)

The Commission considered the arguments to relate to causation rather than the macroeconomic indicators as such and addresses the arguments in Section 5 below. However, the Commission noted that, irrespective of the Union industry’s capacity utilisation at the start of the period considered, utilisation rates sharply decreased from 69 % in 2021 to 43 % during the IP, as found in recital (206) to (208) of the provisional Regulation, which demonstrates that the industry’s production capacity utilisation was significantly affected during the investigation period.

(101)

In the absence of any further comments with respect to the production, production capacity and capacity utilisation, the conclusions set out in recitals (206) to (208) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.5.1.2.   Sales volume and market share

(102)

The exporting producers represented by the CCCMC argued that that the increase in Chinese imports and Chinese prices in 2022 did not exert downward pressure on Union industry prices or market share, as the Union industry was able to raise prices while losing only limited sales. The exporting producers represented by the CCCMC further noted that Chinese imports captured only a small portion of the market previously held by third countries, and that the Union industry’s subsequent market share loss in 2023 occurred despite a decline in the volume Chinese imports, reflecting an overall decline of the Union market rather than the impact of Chinese imports.

(103)

The Commission noted that the entire period considered was examined for trends in import volumes, market share, and the injury indicators, and price suppression. Furthermore, the Commission noted that the argument does not take into account the variation in the size of the Union market between 2022 and 2023. As explained in recital (189) to (190) of the provisional Regulation, the Union consumption decreased from 367 672 tonnes in 2022 to 294 891 tonnes in 2023. Any assessment of market share developments and their relationship to import volumes should be made taking into account the overall contraction of the market. The Commission found that, despite a decrease in import volumes from China between 2022 and 2023, China’s market share increased from 48 % to 51 %, while the Union industry’s share declined from 38 % to 35 %. The Commission also noted that in 2022 the Union industry increased its prices in line with the price rises from China, but nevertheless experienced an 11 % reduction in sales and an 8 % decline in market share. The Commission therefore rejected the claim in its entirety.

(104)

In the absence of any further comments with respect to the sales volume and market share, the conclusions set out in recitals (209) to (210) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.5.1.3.   Growth

(105)

In the absence of any comments with respect to the growth, the conclusions set out in recital (211) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.5.1.4.   Employment and productivity

(106)

The exporting producers represented by the CCCMC argued that the impact on employment was negligible and that notable changes only took place in the IP and not during the period considered.

(107)

As set out in recitals (212) to (214) of the provisional Regulation, the number of employees producing the product concerned decreased by 8 % from 2021 to 2023 and 16 % over the period considered. The fact that the decrease peaks during the IP did not change the conclusions on the trend seen during the period considered. Absent any further comments with respect to employment and productivity, the conclusions set out in recitals (212) to (214) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.5.1.5.   Magnitude of the dumping margin and recovery from past dumping

(108)

In the absence of any comments with respect to the magnitude of the dumping margin and recovery from past dumping, the conclusions set out in recitals (215) to (216) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.5.2.   Microeconomic indicators

4.5.2.1.   Prices and factors affecting prices

(109)

The exporting producers represented by the CCCMC argued that that the increase in Chinese imports and Chinese prices in 2022 did not exert downward pressure on Union industry prices or market share, as the Union industry was able to raise prices while losing only limited sales.

(110)

The Commission considered the argument in recital (103).

(111)

In the absence of any further comments with respect to the prices and factors affecting prices, the conclusions set out in recitals (217) to (219) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.5.2.2.   Labour costs

(112)

In the absence of any comments with respect to the labour costs, the conclusions set out in recitals (220) to (221) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.5.2.3.   Inventories

(113)

In the absence of any comments with respect to the inventories, the conclusions set out in recitals (222) to (225) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.5.2.4.   Profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital

(114)

The exporting producers represented by the CCCMC argued that the Commission’s assessment of declining profitability was flawed because profitability and investments increased in 2022 despite a 25 % increase in Chinese imports. The exporting producers represented by the CCCMC claimed that subsequent decrease in profitability resulted from substantial increases in investments and rising production costs, including energy, raw materials and production processes, which continued to escalate even as electricity prices declined in 2023, thereby demonstrating that the alleged injury was not caused by Chinese imports.

(115)

The Commission considered the arguments to relate to causation rather than the microeconomic indicators as such and addresses the arguments in Section 5 below.

(116)

In the absence of any further comments with respect to the profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital, the conclusions set out in recitals (226) to (231) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.6.   Conclusion on injury

(117)

In the absence of any other comments with respect to the injury, the Commission confirmed the conclusions set out in recitals (232) to (237) of the provisional Regulation.

5.   CAUSATION

5.1.   Effects of the dumped imports

(118)

In recital (270) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission concluded that the material injury suffered by the Union industry was caused by the dumped imports of the product concerned originating in the country concerned.

(119)

The exporting producers represented by the CCCMC argued that the decrease in the Union industry’s production by 37 % is not causally related to the increase of Chinese imports. The exporting producers represented by the CCCMC claimed that the Union industry’s production volume dropped from 187 988 tonnes in 2022 to 139 354 tonnes in 2023 during a time where imports from China fell from 175 343 tonnes in 2022 to 151 650 tonnes in 2023.

(120)

The Commission noted that the argument does not take into account the variation in the size of the Union market between 2022 and 2023. As explained in recital (189) to (190) of the provisional Regulation, the Union consumption decreased from 367 672 tonnes in 2022 to 294 891 tonnes in 2023. When considering this reduction in market size, the Commission observed that, despite a decrease in import volumes from China between 2022 and 2023, China’s market share nevertheless increased from 48 % to 51 %, while the Union industry’s share declined from 38 % to 35 %. The Commission therefore rejected the claim in its entirety.

(121)

Additionally, Abranova argued that the fluctuations in Chinese import volumes during the period considered were not causally linked to dumped imports, but rather were the result of extraordinary external factors. In particular, Abranova claimed that imports declined during the COVID-19 pandemic when container shipping costs increased four to five times above normal levels. Conversely, imports rose markedly after the war in Ukraine due to the EU ban on Russian imports of fused alumina, lower freight rates, and insufficient production capacity of the Union industry. Therefore, Abranova claimed that the variations in import volumes between 2020 and 2024 were driven by unprecedented external developments, and that a proper comparison with pre-COVID levels would demonstrate that the observed import trends cannot be attributed to the effects of dumped imports.

(122)

The Commission acknowledged that external factors such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine influenced overall trade flows. However, these developments do not call into question the existence of a causal link between the dumped imports from China and the material injury suffered by the Union industry. The investigation established that, irrespective of broader market disruptions, imports from China entered the Union in significant volumes, gained market share, and were consistently priced below the Union industry’s sales prices and cost of production. The Commission confirmed that these elements clearly demonstrated that the dumped imports were causally linked to the injury sustained by the Union industry, as the Union industry was unable to increase its sales prices in line with the increase in the cost of production, resulting in price suppression and a deterioration in profitability.

(123)

In the absence of any comments with respect to the effects of the dumped imports, the conclusions set out in recitals (239) to (242) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

5.2.   Effects of other factors

5.2.1.   Imports from third countries

(124)

The exporting producers represented by the CCCMC argued that imports from third countries attenuates the causal link between the dumped imports and the injury suffered by the Union industry. The CCCMC claimed that imports from third countries maintained a significant market share of around 15 % during the period considered and were consistently priced well below the Union industry’s sales prices.

(125)

The Commission noted that compared to China, other third countries had a limited presence on the Union market during the period considered. As explained in recital (244) of the provisional Regulation, the combined market share of imports from all third countries other than China decreased from 22 % in 2021 to 15 % in the investigation period. The main exporting third countries, namely Ukraine, the United States, Brazil and Bahrain, each accounted for between 2 % and 5 % of the Union market, and their respective market shares remained broadly stable over the period considered.

(126)

The Commission further observed that, although Ukraine and Bahrain sold at lower prices than China during the IP, their limited market shares meant that their overall effect on the Union market was minimal. Other third-country imports were generally priced above those from China. The Commission concluded that the impact of the imports from third countries does not attenuate the causal link between dumped Chinese imports and the material injury suffered by Union producers and confirmed the conclusions set out in recitals (243) to (246) of the provisional Regulation.

5.2.2.   Export performance of the Union industry

(127)

The exporting producers represented by the CCCMC, PRE, DFFI and Reckel submitted that the deterioration in the Union industry’s export performance attenuates the causal link between the dumped imports and the injury suffered by the Union industry. It was further claimed that the decrease in export performance could not have been caused by Chinese exports to third markets and the Union industry’s inability to at least maintain its volume of exports is not causally linked to the price pressure from Chinese exports.

(128)

The Commission confirmed that it did not attribute the deterioration in the Union industry's export performance to Chinese exports to third markets. The Commission noted that exports represented only around 14 % of the Union industry’s total sales through the period considered. Therefore, the Commission considered that exports to third countries could only have had a marginal effect on the injurious situation of the Union industry during the investigation period, and therefore could not break the causal link between the Chinese dumped imports and the material injury suffered by the Union industry.

(129)

The Commission concluded that the impact of the Union industry’s export performance does not attenuate the causal link between dumped Chinese imports and the material injury suffered by Union producers and confirmed the conclusions set out in recitals (247) to (250) of the provisional Regulation

5.2.3.   Union consumption

(130)

The exporting producers represented by the CCCMC, PRE, DFFI and Reckel submitted that the contraction in demand and the decrease in consumption in the Union breaks or considerably attenuates the causal link between the dumped imports and the injury suffered by the Union industry. PRE and DFFI argued that the substantial decrease in demand for fused alumina in the Union market was primarily attributable to adverse macroeconomic conditions since 2021. In particular, PRE and DFFI referred to the combined effects of a short-lived post-pandemic recovery, high energy costs, low growth, inflation, and geopolitical tensions, which significantly reduced demand in downstream sectors such as steel, construction and automotive.

(131)

The Commission noted, as per recital (252) of the provisional Regulation, that the Union consumption decreased by 20 % during the period considered and Union sales declined by 37 %, leading to a loss of 9 % of market share. Similarly, imports from all other third countries also declined significantly. In contrast, Chinese imports increased their market share by 16 % over the same period.

(132)

The Commission recalled that the existence of other factors affecting the Union industry does not break the causal link where dumped imports, taken in isolation, are found to have caused material injury. In the present case, although the contraction in consumption may have had some impact, it could only have played a limited role and cannot explain the magnitude of the deterioration observed.

(133)

The Commission concluded that the decrease in consumption in the Union does not attenuate the causal link between dumped Chinese imports and the material injury suffered by Union producers and confirmed the conclusions set out in recitals (252) to (253) of the provisional Regulation.

5.2.4.   Increased cost of production

(134)

Reckel, Abranova, PRE, DFFI, and the exporting producers represented by the CCCMC argued that the increase in the Union industry’s production costs, in particular due to higher electricity prices, inflation and the rising cost of imported raw materials, breaks or at least considerably attenuates the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury suffered by the Union industry.

(135)

The Commission had already examined this claim in the provisional Regulation and concluded that the increases in energy and raw material does not explain the deterioration observed. In particular, the investigation showed that in 2022, when energy prices were at their highest, the Union industry remained profitable. This was possible because part of the increased energy costs could be passed on to the users. What allowed the Union industry to pass on the energy cost increase in 2022 was the exceptional price increase of imports from China (by 44 % from 2021, see Table 4 of the provisional Regulation), which substantially alleviated the supportive force of these imports. However, in 2023 the prices of imports from China sharply decreased to close to 2021 levels, significantly increasing the suppressive pressure on the prices of the Union industry. In those circumstances the Union industry was no longer capable of passing on the energy costs, even though these costs went down when compared to 2022. The Commission noted that in 2023 and in the investigation period, when energy prices had declined, the Union industry was no longer able to adjust its prices accordingly due to price suppression from low priced imports from the PRC, which resulted in the collapse of the profitability. Similarly, no systematic disadvantage in respect of raw materials prices was identified.

(136)

Since no new evidence was submitted at the definitive stage that would warrant a different conclusion, the Commission confirms its assessment set out in recitals (254) to (259) of the provisional Regulation that increased production costs cannot break the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury suffered by the Union industry.

5.2.5.   Cumulative effect of other factors

(137)

PRE and DFFI argued that all factors contributing to the injury should be assessed cumulatively, including the decline in Union consumption, poor Union export performance, rising energy and raw material costs, and imports from China and other third countries. They claimed that, both individually and collectively, these factors attenuate the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury allegedly suffered by the Union industry.

(138)

As explained in recital (132) above, the Commission recalled that the existence of other factors affecting the Union industry does not break the causal link where dumped imports, taken in isolation, are found to have caused material injury. The investigation established that, irrespective of other factors, considered individually or cumulatively, imports from China entered the Union in significant volumes, gained market share, and were consistently priced below the Union industry’s sales prices and cost of production. The Commission further confirmed that, notwithstanding rising production costs, the Union industry was unable to adjust its prices accordingly, resulting in price suppression and a deterioration of profitability. This demonstrates that the material injury suffered by the Union industry was causally linked to the dumped imports.

5.3.   Conclusion on causation

(139)

In the absence of any other comments with respect to the causation, the Commission confirmed the conclusions set out in recitals (267) to (270) of the provisional Regulation.

6.   LEVEL OF MEASURES

6.1.   Injury margin

(140)

As explained in recitals (88) to (90), the Commission confirmed that the injury analysis is representative and reflects actual market competition. In the absence of further comments, recital (280) of the provisional Regulation is confirmed. Therefore, the final injury elimination level for the cooperating exporting producers and all other companies is as follows:

Country

Company

Definitive injury margin (%)

PRC

Chongqing Saite Corundum Co., Ltd.

233,9

PRC

Luoyang Runbao Abrasives Co., Ltd.

116,9

PRC

Other cooperating companies

178,4

PRC

All other imports originating in the PRC

259

6.2.   Conclusion on the level of measures

(141)

Following the above assessment, definitive anti-dumping duties should be set as below in accordance with Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation:

Country

Company

Definitive anti-dumping duty (%)

PRC

Chongqing Saite Corundum Co., Ltd.

99,8

PRC

Luoyang Runbao Abrasives Co., Ltd.

88,7

PRC

Other cooperating companies

94,5

PRC

All other imports originating in the PRC

110,6

7.   UNION INTEREST

7.1.   Interest of the Union industry

(142)

As explained in recitals (285) to (288) of the provisional Regulation, the Union industry is composed of nine producers located across various Member States, employing approximately 962 workers. A majority of these producers supported the complaint with no opposition to the initiation of the investigation.

(143)

The Union industry is currently operating under conditions that are economically unsustainable leading to an untenable level of profitability. The dumping margins, as established in Section 3.5, are exceptionally high. These dumped imports have inflicted substantial injury on the Union industry, as per Section 4.6, threatening its viability and capacity to operate under normal market conditions..

(144)

The absence of measures is likely to have a significant negative effect on the Union industry in terms of further price suppression and a further reduction of sales, thus translating into more losses and likely closure of production facilities, dismissals and ultimately, the shutdown of entire businesses.

(145)

Such outcomes could disrupt the continuity of European fused alumina production and pose long term risks to the Union’s industrial resilience and strategic autonomy. Fused alumina is an essential input in the production of a wide range of downstream goods, including refractory materials, abrasives and advanced ceramics, which are in turn indispensable for critical sectors such as the production of steel, other metals, glass, and related materials. It is considered as a sensitive product due to its strategic importance, including military and dual-use applications (9). Owing to its unique properties, including its exceptional hardness and thermal stability, few materials can substitute fused alumina. The strategic importance and sensitivity of this product highlights the necessity of maintaining a stable and secure supply chain in the Union. Disruptions could directly affect the Union’s economic security by impacting critical industrial, energy and defence infrastructure that relies on fused alumina-based components and by threatening the resilience of supply chains against external shocks, coercion, or other risks.

(146)

The Commission therefore concluded that it is in the Union’s interest to impose measures that enable the Union industry to recover part of its lost market shares and restore fair competition.

7.2.   Interest of unrelated importers and traders

(147)

The importer Traxys claimed that the imposition of anti-dumping measures would result in a significant reduction of competition in the Union market. Traxys further argued that increased costs cannot be passed on to refractory producers and that the imposition of measures would lead to plant closures of refractory operators, loss of skilled employment, and greater reliance on imports of finished refractory products. It was also claimed that measures on brown fused alumina, in particular, would have severe and disproportionate effects on the European steel industry.

(148)

The Commission observed that Traxys’ arguments concerned a general assessment of the market, including the impact on users and the steel industry, but did not provide additional information on the interests of unrelated imports and traders beyond what was already provided and addressed in recitals (290) to (294) of the provisional Regulation. The Commission noted that the arguments concerning increased costs for users, including refractory producers, are addressed in Section 7.3 below. Additionally, the Commission addresses the arguments regarding market concentration in Section 7.4 below.

(149)

In the absence of any further comments regarding this section, the conclusions set out in recitals (289) to (294) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

7.3.   Interest of users, consumers or suppliers

(150)

Following the provisional Regulation, several users submitted information highlighting the negative effects that they were already experiencing after the imposition of provisional measures, particularly the inability to transfer the increase in prices to customers. These concerns had also been raised and explained at provisional stage, where users argued that the imposition of anti-dumping duties would significantly raise their costs, which would be difficult to pass on to customers. Users claimed that this could threaten their profitability and competitiveness. Some users further warned that the cost increases linked to the duties could jeopardize their operational sustainability, putting at risk the continued viability of certain production activities within the Union. Potential consequences cited included downsizing, relocation outside the Union, and business closures.

(151)

The Commission noted that the information collected during the investigation was widely documented, as detailed in recital (295) of the provisional Regulation. Around 50 users and user associations came forward and actively participated in the proceedings. Many of these users provided complete responses to the questionnaire, enabling the Commission to conduct a thorough and representative assessment of the situation. Industry associations in the abrasives and refractory sectors were particularly active, submitting substantial and detailed information. These associations represent a wide spectrum of operators, including a considerable number of small and medium sized enterprises, as well as larger users. This ensures that the data reflects the diversity and scale of the Union’s downstream industries.

(152)

From a socio-economic perspective, based on information from industry associations, it is estimated that the refractory industry employs around 20 000 people across the Union and generates an annual turnover of around EUR 4 billion. As for the abrasives industry, it accounts for around 8 400 jobs in Germany and Italy alone, generating a combined annual turnover of approximately EUR 2,3 billion in these two Member States. Based on the information provided by user associations in both sectors, the Union refractory and abrasive industries together account for approximately EUR 6,6 billion in annual turnover and 39 000 direct jobs within the Union, of which more than 22 600 would be significantly and immediately at risk.

(153)

Thus, these sectors contribute significantly in economic terms and employment in the countries in which they are based. In addition, the abrasive and refractory industries play a critical role in the producing steel, metals and glass as well as cutting, grinding, polishing and finishing tools, tools that are critical for manufacturing processes in sectors such as automotive, aerospace and construction.

(154)

The Commission noted that, according to responses to the users' questionnaire, around 50 % of the fused alumina used in the abrasives sector and around 65 % of that used in the refractory sector originates from China. This data reflects the significant dependency of downstream industries on fused alumina of Chinese origin. While a substantial proportion of the supply is sourced from alternative origins, which could mitigate the overall cost impact of the duties for some companies, the Commission also observed that reliance on low-priced, dumped imports from China remains significant. For users who heavily rely on Chinese material, any price increase resulting from the imposition of duties would impact production costs.

(155)

When evaluating the potential impact on production costs, the Commission, as explained in recital (300) of the provisional Regulation, estimated that the imposition of duties could result in cost increases for user industries ranging between 10 % and 30 %, depending on the specific company and sector, assuming 100 % of fused alumina was sourced from China. More specifically, the refractory industry could face cost increases of 10 % to 30 %, while the abrasives industry could experience increases in the range of 10 % to 23 %. Thus, the Commission concluded that users exhibit a high degree of exposure in their production cost to fluctuations in the price of fused alumina.

(156)

The Commission, therefore, acknowledged the economic vulnerability of user industries. User industries are highly fragmented, comprising a wide range of operators with varying capacities to absorb cost increases. For some users, the cost increases resulting from anti-dumping duties could jeopardise their operational sustainability. This could lead to downsizing, relocation of operations outside the EU, or business closures.

(157)

Given the composition of user industries, which includes both large global companies and numerous small and medium-sized enterprises, smaller or more cost-sensitive operators could be particularly severely impacted. The Commission acknowledged that smaller companies may be unable to absorb the additional costs and could be forced to shut down. Larger companies, on the other hand, would be more likely to shift their production to existing facilities outside the Union.

(158)

Based on the above the Commission recognised a high risk of deindustrialisation in the downstream sectors. Many companies in the refractories and abrasives sectors are already operating at a loss, and their financial fragility poses a direct threat to the sustainability of industrial activity in areas that are of strategic interest to the Union.

7.4.   Other factors: Availability of supply and market concentration

(159)

Some parties within the refractories industry claimed that substituting imports from China would compromise the security of supply for the Union refractory industry, given the limited production capacity of the Union industry in the product types most relevant to this sector, in particular refractory-grade and brown fused alumina. It was claimed that the Union industry has traditionally been oriented towards the production of abrasive-grade fused alumina, which represents a larger share of overall demand, is traded at higher prices, and benefits from economies of scale allowing for more efficient cost rationalisation. In addition, it was claimed that imports from third countries could not constitute a viable alternative source of supply, as their market share remains limited.

(160)

VDS further argued that it is insufficient to assess production capacities in aggregate terms, as there is a lack of capacity for producing specific qualities, treatments, and grain sizes of fused alumina. Additionally, VDS submitted that, even in third countries, it is often not possible to obtain products of the same quality as those originating in China.

(161)

The Commission found that the Union industry is capable of supplying the Union market in the required quantities, including for different types, qualities, treatments and grain sizes of the product concerned. Although the Union industry’s production volumes substantially decreased over the period considered due to dumped imports from China, the Commission observed that the Union industry significantly underutilised its production capacity during this period, as set out in recitals (206) to (208) and (308) of the provisional Regulation. The Commission confirmed that the available additional capacity includes the production of refractory-grade fused alumina and brown fused alumina. In particular, the Commission further confirmed that a substantial proportion of the available additional capacity relates to the production of brown fused alumina, which is either immediately available or can be made operational within a very short period of time.

(162)

Additionally, the Commission reiterated that, beyond the production of the Union industry, imports from third countries continue to represent a reliable source of fused alumina, as set out in recitals (304) and (305) of the provisional Regulation. While third countries had a limited presence in the Union market compared to China during the IP, the Commission noted that, following the imposition of the provisional measures, a moderate increase in imports from third countries has already been observed on the basis of the most recent available data. This development confirms that the adjustment process is unfolding as expected and, given its progressive nature, further increases in imports from third countries can reasonably be anticipated as operators expand or establish their presence in the Union market. Furthermore, the Commission did not find evidence supporting the claim that products from third countries are of inferior quality compared to those originating in China. Information available to the Commission indicates that producers in third countries are capable of supplying fused alumina of comparable specifications and performance characteristics.

(163)

Additionally, some parties argued that Chinese exports to the Union of fused alumina have been essential for maintaining competition in the Union market, particularly in view of the limited alternative sources. The parties argued that while the Commission’s intention is not to exclude Chinese producers, the proposed anti-dumping duties would effectively do so by raising their prices above Union levels, leading to market concentration, reduced competition, and potential harm to downstream users.

(164)

The Commission recalled that the purpose of anti-dumping measures is to restore fair trading conditions distorted by dumped imports, not to exclude Chinese exporting producers from the Union market. As set out in recital (311) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission confirmed that no substantiated evidence was provided demonstrating that the imposition of measures would result in severe adverse effects on market structure, including anti-competitive conduct by the Union industry, that would negatively affect downstream operators.

7.5.   Conclusion on Union interest

(165)

The investigation revealed that the confirmation of the provisional measures as designed would create a high risk of deindustrialisation in downstream sectors. Many companies in the refractories and abrasives sectors are already operating at a loss, and their financial fragility poses a direct threat to the sustainability of industrial activity in areas that are of Union’s strategic interests.

(166)

At the same time, the non-imposition of measures would have negative and irreversible consequences for the Union industry since continued price suppression and declining sales would accelerate financial losses and lead to the closure of production facilities. This could jeopardise the continuity of European fused alumina production, which is an essential material for strategic sectors such as steel and defence, as well as for other sensitive applications. This would undermine the Union’s industrial resilience and strategic autonomy.

(167)

Therefore and to avoid the disappearance of the Union industry or of the downstream industry, the Commission deemed it appropriate to adjust the form of the measures as discussed in Section 8.

8.   DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES

8.1.   Definitive measures

(168)

The Commission, following the publication of the provisional measures, continued gathering information and engaged in an extensive consultation process. This process was marked by a high level of interaction with interested parties, including hearings, written submissions, presentations, and detailed exchanges of information with both Union producers and users.

(169)

A proposal was submitted by Saint-Gobain to extend the anti-dumping duties to the product concerned integrated in downstream products. Saint Gobain argued that this proposal would level the playing field and ensure fair competition in the downstream markets as it would prevent third-country producers using unfairly priced Chinese fused alumina from gaining a competitive advantage over Union producers operating in those markets.

(170)

The Commission considered that such approach would be impossible withing the scope of the current investigation. The Commission noted that the anti-dumping investigation on imports of fused alumina was initiated with a limited scope, covering only the product concerned. Accordingly, the findings concerning dumping and injury cannot legally be applied to downstream products without a separate investigation. The Commission further found that implementing such a proposal would pose substantial practical difficulties, as verifying the content of fused alumina in downstream finished products would be extremely complex. The proposal was therefore rejected.

8.2.   Form and level of measures

(171)

Considering the interests involved, described in Section 7 above, the Commission considers that a duty-free tariff-rate quota is the best form of measure to balance the various interests at stake, namely protecting the position of Union producers, while, on the users’ side, avoiding cost shocks, mitigating cost impact, ensuring sufficient time for adaptation, and reducing dependencies on China.

(172)

In light of the need to protect Union producers suffering injury from dumped imports, while mitigating costs for users and reducing dependencies on China, the definitive anti-dumping measure should take the form of a duty-free tariff-rate quota. Imports of the product concerned within the limits of this quota shall be exempted from the anti-dumping duty. However, imports exceeding the quota volume shall be subject to the full anti-dumping duty, as established in this Regulation.

(173)

The Commission proceeded to determine the appropriate level for such a quota. The starting point was to assess what Union producers require to remain viable. This involved identifying the volume of sales necessary to maintain a stable market presence, based on historical data from periods when the industry was both competitive and profitable.

(174)

The next step was to consider how imports from third countries might evolve. Finally, the Union market size was taken into account. Based on the Union supply and projected third-country imports, the remaining volume was set as the level to be covered by the duty-free quota.

(175)

Following this assessment, the Commission set a duty-free tariff-rate quota with an initial volume of 60 000 tonnes for 2026. This quota is designed to decrease gradually by 7 500 tonnes per year over a five-year period, reaching 30 000 tonnes by 2030, the end of the period.

(176)

The duty-free tariff-rate quota operates on a first-come, first-served basis. To ensure broad and equitable access, the quota was divided (1) by product, with separate allocations for brown fused alumina and white fused alumina; (2) by granularity, to ensure balanced distribution across various applications; and (3) by time, with quarterly distributions to maintain availability throughout the year. This structure ensures that the measure supports proportional access across sectors and is responsive to industry-specific needs.

(177)

In terms of how the volume of the duty-free tariff-rate quota was expected to affect interested parties, the Commission noted the following:

(178)

For the Union industry, the duty-free volume was based on a reference point when the industry was already achieving reasonable profit margins. It was designed to maintain this level of profitability while boosting sales, market share, and production. By reducing the volume of unfairly priced Chinese imports, the Union industry was expected to operate in a more stable environment, enabling better price management and sustained profitability.

(179)

Specifically, Union industry sales were projected to increase by 84 % in 2026, reaching a 95 % rise by 2031, nearly doubling the sales recorded during the IP. Capacity utilisation was expected to grow from 43 % during the investigation period to 67 % in 2026, peaking at 71 % by 2031, representing a 65 % improvement. Market share was projected to increase from 32 % during the investigation period to 59 % in 2026, reaching 63 % by 2031 an increase of 96 %, nearly doubling the level observed during the IP. Concerning prices, due to limited data, precise forecasts was uncertain. Several factors such as consumption trends, international price comparisons, the Chinese product mix, and changes in production costs could influence future price levels.

(180)

Given these projected improvements in sales, capacity utilisation, and market share, the duty-free tariff-rate quota was designed to ensure the continued viability of the Union industry. By providing a predictable framework for imports, the measure allows producers to benefit from the anticipated growth, adapt their production and investment plans, and maintain their position in the market.

(181)

For the user industries, it was challenging to assess the precise impact of the proposed measure, given the wide variety of companies involved. However, the duty-free tariff-rate quota approach offers a transitional period to mitigate the initial cost impact, giving users time to adapt by identifying alternative suppliers, securing necessary product certifications, and aligning with client requirements. Furthermore, the measure continues to offer a substantial duty-free volume and introduces a predictable and transparent framework that is designed to supports strategic planning and facilitates a less disruptive transition.

(182)

Specifically, taking the IP as a reference, the measure would allow 37 % of the Chinese imports to enter the Union duty-free in the first year, 2026. The duty-free quota was designed to be progressively reduced, reaching 19 % by 2030. Access to these volumes free of duty was mean to provide an immediate and substantial reduction in cost impact for companies, depending on their product mix and supply sources, compared to the standard imposition of duties.

(183)

Following the final disclosure and the additional final disclosure, a number of parties challenged the volumes established in the duty-free quota. On one side, parties representing the Union industry claimed that they were operating under economically unsustainable conditions, with their viability directly threatened by price suppression. In their view, measures were therefore essential to restore fair competition and recover lost market share. They further maintained that, in designing the duty-free quota volume, the capacity utilisation of Union industry should be increased and, accordingly, that either no duty-free quota should be allowed or that such quotas should be substantially reduced. Additionally, they argued that a three-year instead of five-year duration for the duty-free quota would be more appropriate, as it provides adequate time for users to reduce reliance and diversify their suppliers.

(184)

On the other side, user industries argued that quotas at current levels were insufficient to address the concerns of the downstream operators and called for further reductions in duties together with significant increases in quota volumes. They contested the Commission’s methodology for assessing capacity utilisation and argued that quota reductions were too steep. Additionally, they argued that a higher initial volume of free quota is needed to give user industries adequate opportunity to adjust their operations and diversify their supply sources, and that the progressive reduction of the duty-free quota should be removed for the first three years.

(185)

The Commission confirmed its methodology to be sound, grounded in historical data and in factual evidence collected during the investigation, including information on costs, capacity utilisation, sales volumes, dependence on Chinese imports, and overall import levels. Similarly, the Commission noted that its methodology takes into account what Union producers require to remain viable. This involved identifying the volume of sales necessary to maintain a stable market presence. At the same time, the Commission also considered the interests of users in the design of the duty-free quota, the measure continues to provide a substantial duty-free volume and facilitate a less disruptive transition. In particular, the measure allows more than 37 % of Chinese imports registered during the investigation period to enter the Union duty-free in the first year (2026). The quota is then progressively reduced, reaching 19 % by 2030. This design significantly mitigates the impact on user’s costs, offers a transitional period to mitigate the initial effects, and provides time to adapt by identifying alternative suppliers and securing the necessary product certifications. The claims were therefore rejected.

(186)

Following the final disclosure, a number of parties challenged the Commission’s reliance on third-country imports. a number of users argued that these countries could not realistically fill the supply gap and that the Commission’s assumptions were overly optimistic. On this basis, they claimed that the duty-free quota volumes should be increased. In particular, they pointed out that Brazil had withdrawn from the Union market due to United States’ tariffs, that Ukraine’s production was disrupted by the ongoing war, and that India itself depended on imports from China. By contrast, the Union industry claimed that there were strong reasons to foresee that third-country imports would enter the Union market more rapidly once anti-dumping duties were in place. Accordingly, they argued that the duty-free quota volumes should be substantially decreased. They referred in particular to Ukraine, which has increased its production capacities and publicly offered to expand exports to the Union.

(187)

The Commission noted that its estimation of increased third-country imports was based on historical import data. On the one hand, this methodology took into account that any increase would not occur suddenly, but rather progressively to reach the maximum level of imports observed in 2021. On the other hand, the Commission also considered the actual import flows from third countries following the imposition of the provisional measures. These data showed that imports were increasing, contrary to the claims of users, but neither rising sharply as alleged by the Union industry. In view of the opposing and contradictory arguments presented by the different parties, the Commission noted that its methodology relied both on established historical import data and on the observed import activities of third countries in the months following the imposition of the provisional measures. The Commission therefore considered its approach to be sound, robust, and grounded in factual evidence. The claims were accordingly rejected.

8.3.   Administration of the quotas

(188)

As explained in the above section, the duty-free tariff-rate quota should operate on a first-come, first-served basis.

(189)

In order to ensure broad and equitable access, the quota is fragmented as follows: by product, with separate allocations for brown fused alumina and white fused alumina; and by granularity, to ensure balanced access for the main user sectors. Furthermore, the quota should be distributed on a quarterly basis to ensure availability throughout the year.

(190)

This structure is intended to guarantee that the duty-free tariff-rate quota is fairly distributed and responsive to the specific needs of the different industries.

8.3.1.   Product type quotas

(191)

For the separation among product types, the Commission focused on the main distinctive categories: brown fused alumina and white fused alumina, taking into account the feasibility of existing nomenclature and TARIC code differentiation.

(192)

The Commission assessed, based on historical import data, information gathered through questionnaires, as well as submissions from interested parties, the consumption levels of brown fused alumina and white fused alumina within the Union, the sales and production of the Union industry, its production capacity, and the degree of user dependency on imports from China. The assessment also considered the feasibility of sourcing from alternative suppliers, whether Union-based or from third countries, at cost levels that would not cause disruptive price shocks for users.

(193)

Based on the above, the Commission allocated 70 % of the duty-free quota to brown fused alumina and 30 % to white fused alumina. Given sol gel’s price specificity, including it within the volume allocated to white fused alumina would lead to inappropriate use of the quota. A separate quota for sol gel corundum is established.

8.3.2.   Granularity requirements by users

(194)

To ensure a balanced distribution of volumes among the main user industries, namely, abrasives and refractories, the Commission allocated the quota in a way designed to allow both sectors to secure access to appropriate shares of the duty-free quota.

(195)

To this end, the Commission assessed, based on the information gathered during the investigation, including historical import data and market consumption proportions for both sectors, the relative needs and supply dependencies of each industry.

(196)

Based on the above, the Commission allocated 60 % of the quota to the abrasive sector and 40 % to the refractory sector.

(197)

Specific TARIC codes, based on the granularity and technical description of the product are created. While overlap exists, these codes effectively distinguish between applications in the abrasive and refractory sectors, while the classification remains grounded in the physical characteristics of the product.

8.3.3.   Distribution of the duty-free quota over time

(198)

The duty-free is to be divided quarterly in order to ensure that imports are evenly distributed over the year and to prevent that significant imports of products are stockpiled at the beginning of the period in order to avoid possible duties. Unused quarterly tariff-rate quota is to be automatically transferred to the next period.

8.3.4.   Duration and evolution of the duty-free quota

(199)

The volume of the duty-free tariff-rate quota are to be progressively reduced. The reduction takes place annually following entry into force of this Regulation, starting with 60 000 tonnes and decreasing by 7 500 tonnes per year, reaching 30 000 tonnes.

(200)

This annual reduction in the volume quota was expected to gradually limit the injury suffered by the Union industry, allowing Union producers to recover and regain viability over time.

(201)

For users, this approach is designed to support cost management by avoiding sudden price impacts on critical inputs. It is meant to allow time to reduce dependency on China, diversify suppliers, and meet certification and client standard requirements. The proposed timeline ensured predictability, enabling users to plan and adjust operations accordingly.

8.3.5.   Comments after final disclosure

(202)

Following the final disclosure, a number of interested parties argued that the duty-free tariff rate quota system, particularly its operation on a first-come, first-served basis, was inappropriate. They claimed that such a system disproportionately benefits large purchasers, disadvantages small and medium-sized enterprises, and encourages speculative behaviour and stockpiling. According to these parties, SMEs would be harmed, as unlike large traders they cannot stockpile or clear customs rapidly, leaving them dependent on intermediaries. To ensure fair access, they called for protective allocation methods, such as daily import limits and SME specific quotas.

(203)

The Commission noted that the duty-free tariff-rate quota system has been designed to ensure broad and equitable access. It establishes distinctions by product, differentiating between BFA and WFA, by time, through quarterly distribution, and by granularity, thereby de facto creating differences by type of users. This fragmentation of the quota is intended to prevent concentration and to allow a wide range of operators to benefit. Regarding the proposal for daily import limits per company, the Commission observed that such a mechanism would be difficult to implement and would create disproportionate administrative burdens at national customs level. Moreover, the Commission noted that SMEs could benefit from the system on their own and through established importers, who, as confirmed during the investigation, act as the transmission channel between Chinese exporters and SMEs. Since SMEs in many instances do not import directly, the role of established importers is essential in ensuring their access to the material. Introducing daily limits per company would risk blocking this channel and, in practice, undermine the access that SMEs require. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

(204)

Following the final disclosure, a number of interested parties argued that the Commission’s distinction between abrasive and refractory grades was artificial and technically unsound. They claimed that the two categories are physically and chemically interchangeable and that customs authorities lack the means to enforce such differentiation. These parties further argued that, without stricter controls, part of the quota could be consumed by industries other than the intended users. To address these concerns, they called for the introduction of end-user certification.

(205)

The Commission noted that while the product under investigation is the same, specific TARIC codes have been established on the basis of granularity and the technical description of the product. Although some overlap exists, these codes effectively distinguish, to a large extent, consumption between applications in the abrasive and refractory sectors. The classification is therefore firmly grounded in the physical characteristics of the product, ensuring that differentiation is both technically sound and enforceable. The Commission further noted that the introduction of an end-use exemption would be difficult to implement and would create disproportionate administrative burdens given the large number of potential users. In addition, such an exemption would risk disrupting the role of traditional importers, who act as the de facto transmission mechanism between Chinese exporters and SMEs. As SMEs in many cases do not import directly, they rely on established importers to secure access to the material. The introduction of end-user certification could block this channel and undermine SME access rather than protect it. The claim was therefore rejected.

(206)

Following the final disclosure, certain parties challenged the duty-free quota volumes under product categories. a number of interested parties claimed that refractory-grade fused alumina should be exempted from the measures or that a specific end-use exemption should be introduced for fused alumina imported for the manufacture of refractory products intended for the steel industry. Other parties argued that certain product forms, such as sol-gel and lumps, should be excluded from the scope of the tariff rate quota or that the volumes of certain product types, such as brown fused alumina, should be increased. Additionally, a number of interested parties representing the refractories industry contested the allocation between the refractories and abrasives, arguing that the decisive criterion for the allocation between the user industries should be dependency and not consumption.

(207)

The Commission noted that, when defining the quota volumes, it took into account the entire product scope and applied a consistent methodology to all products falling within that scope. Specifically, the Commission established a total quota volume of 60 000 tonnes, as explained in recitals (173) to (175). Of this amount, 70 % was allocated to brown fused alumina and 30 % to white fused alumina, also as set out in Section 8.3.1. The volumes were then proportionally distributed across the relevant TARIC codes of these categories, based on the share of imports recorded during the investigation period.

(208)

The Commission considered this methodology to be sound, balanced, and proportionate, treating the product concerned as a whole rather than favouring or excluding any particular typology. As already established in Section 222, all forms are regarded as part of the same product concerned. Additionally, the Commission noted that the methodology used to determine the allocation between user industries was sound, taking into consideration both user dependencies and consumption levels. Accordingly, the claims were rejected.

(209)

Following the final disclosure, a number of interested parties argued that a review clause should be included to address possible changes in circumstances, including developments in Union production, imports from third countries and the Union market size, which would warrant an adjustment of the duty-free quota.

(210)

The Commission noted that, in accordance with the basic Regulation, it may initiate a review where changes in circumstances occur, including changes in overall Union production, Union consumption of fused alumina, and imports from third countries. Accordingly, the Commission considered that the inclusion of a separate review clause is not warranted.

(211)

Following the definitive, disclosure the exporting producers represented by the CCCMC claimed that exporting producers who cooperated during the investigation should be given priority in the quota allocation.

(212)

The Commission noted that the duty-free tariff-rate quota was established, based on the Union interest, to mitigate the impact of the measures on user industries and balance the interests of all parties, not to provide preferential treatment to individual exporting producers. For this reason, the claim that cooperating producers should be given priority in the quota allocation was rejected.

(213)

Following the final disclosure, a number of parties claimed that the inclusion of TARIC code 2818 10 91 20, destined to blue sol-gel, under brown fused alumina was inaccurate. They argued that, for purposes of distinguishing product types in line with their TARIC classification, blue sol-gel should not be regarded as a specialty type of brown fused alumina. They claimed that blue sol-gel has an aluminium oxide content below 98,5 %, which is why it falls under CN code 2818 10 91 , yet it has limited interchangeability with standard brown fused alumina products. They further argued that sol-gel uses boehmite as its main raw material, which is a special type of alumina, whereas alumina is also the main raw material for white fused alumina products, while brown fused alumina relies on bauxite. In addition, they claimed that a higher level of interchangeability exists between blue sol-gel and white sol-gel, classified under TARIC codes 2818 10 11 10 and 2818 10 11 20, rather than with standard brown fused alumina grades. Similarly, they argued that the inclusion of blue sol-gel under BFA would disproportionately allocate volumes to a niche product type, creating the risk that disproportionate levels of blue sol-gel could enter the Union under the duty-free quota. On this basis, the parties requested that blue sol-gel be excluded from the brown fused alumina category and treated separately under the duty-free tariff-rate quota framework.

(214)

The Commission carefully assessed this request and, following the arguments presented, concluded that although all product types within the scope of the investigation constitute the same product concerned and share key physical, chemical, and technical characteristics, for purposes of distinguishing product types in line with their TARIC classification, blue sol-gel should not be regarded as a specialty type of brown fused alumina. It should instead be included in the white fused alumina category. This conclusion was technically justified but also based on the consideration that the inclusion of blue sol-gel under brown fused alumina would disproportionately allocate volumes to a niche product type, creating the risk that disproportionate levels of blue sol-gel could enter the Union under the duty-free quota.

(215)

In addition, the Commission noted that the intention of the duty-free quota and the larger allowance of 70 % for brown fused alumina was to mitigate the impact on the substantial volumes of consumption of brown fused alumina by the majority of users. Covering blue sol-gel within this category, however, would not materially alter the overall availability of volumes for users given its small consumption, but could, on the other hand, significantly harm the Union industry.

(216)

Therefore, the Commission decided to include TARIC code 2818 10 91 20 under white fused alumina for the purposes of the repartition of volumes.

(217)

Additionally, a number of interested parties claimed that certain modifications in the TARIC descriptions for sol-gel were required for the purposes of technical accuracy and to avoid potential misclassification of imported sol-gel products. These modifications included the clarification that both sintered and pre-sintered sol-gel is included in TARIC codes 2818 10 11 10 and 2818 10 91 20. Additionally, some parties claimed that an adjustment was required in TARIC code 2818 10 91 20 to avoid the import of certain sol-gel products with less than 98,5 % aluminium oxide under the TARIC code 2818 10 91 99.

(218)

The Commission carefully assessed this request, and following the arguments presented, concluded that the modifications are warranted for the purposes of technical accuracy and to avoid potential misclassification of imported sol-gel products. In addition, the Commission noted that the intention of the duty-free quota was to mitigate the impact on the substantial dependency volumes of consumption by the users. Modifying the TARIC codes pertaining to a variety of the product would not materially alter the overall availability of volumes for users given its small consumption and could avoid misclassification that could significantly harm the Union industry.

(219)

Following the additional final disclosure, Imerys pointed to a technical inaccuracy in the description of one of the newly created TARIC codes for sol-gel products and requested its revision.

(220)

The Commission noted that the observation was accurate and adjusted the description of the relevant TARIC codes accordingly.

8.4.   Level of measures

(221)

On the basis of the above, the definitive anti-dumping duty rates, expressed on the CIF Union border price, customs duty unpaid, should be as follows:

Country

Company

Dumping margin (%)

Injury margin (%)

Definitive anti-dumping duty (%)

PRC

Chongqing Saite Corundum Co., Ltd.

99,8

233,9

99,8

PRC

Luoyang Runbao Abrasives Co., Ltd.

88,7

116,9

88,7

PRC

Other cooperating companies

94,5

178,4

94,5

PRC

All other imports originating in the PRC

110,6

259

110,6

(222)

The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation were established on the basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, they reflect the situation found during this investigation in respect to these companies. These duty rates are thus exclusively applicable to imports of the product under investigation originating in the country concerned and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product concerned manufactured by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, cannot benefit from these rates and should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other imports originating in China’.

(223)

A company may request the application of these individual anti-dumping duty rates if it changes subsequently the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission (10). The request must contain all the relevant information enabling to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it, a regulation about the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

(224)

To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the proper application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The application of individual anti-dumping duties is only applicable upon presentation of a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this Regulation. Until such invoice is presented, imports should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other imports originating in China’.

(225)

While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this Regulation, the customs authorities of Member States should carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.

(226)

Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume, in particular after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances, an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated, provided that the conditions for doing so are met. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.

(227)

To ensure a proper enforcement of the anti-dumping duties, the anti-dumping duty for all other imports originating in China should apply not only to the non-cooperating exporting producers in this investigation, but also to the producers which did not have exports to the Union during the investigation period.

(228)

Exporting producers that did not export the product concerned to the Union during the investigation period should be able to request the Commission to be made subject to the anti-dumping duty rate for cooperating companies not included in the sample. The Commission should grant such request provided that three conditions are met. The new exporting producer would have to demonstrate that: (i) it did not export the product concerned to the Union during the IP; (ii) it is not related to an exporting producer that did so; and (iii) has exported the product concerned thereafter or has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to do so in substantial quantities.

8.5.   Definitive collection of the provisional duties

(229)

Following the final disclosure, certain parties argued that the collection of provisional duties at the level of the dumping margins was unwarranted. They claimed that such collection would impose an undue burden on users and, given that the form of the definitive measures was modulated, the provisional duties should not be collected in their current form.

(230)

The Commission noted that the definitive measures establish a duty-free tariff rate quota covering part of the import volume from China. Based on imports from China during the investigation period, 62,6 % of the total import volume would not benefit from the duty-free quota and would therefore be subject to anti-dumping duties. In order to reflect the actual share of imports subject to duties and to prevent over-collection beyond what was imposed under the definitive measures, the Commission considered that, for the period between the imposition of the provisional measures and the entry into force of the definitive measures, the duties collected should correspond to the same proportion of imports not falling within the tariff-rate quota, taking the investigation period import volumes as reference, namely 62,6 % of the definitive duty level. This approach ensures imports are treated consistently, duties are applied proportionately, and no excess is collected beyond the definitive measures.

(231)

In view of the dumping margins established and the level of injury suffered by the Union industry, the amounts secured by way of provisional anti-dumping duties imposed under the provisional Regulation should be definitively collected at 62,6 % of the duty levels established in the present Regulation.

(232)

In view of the dumping margins found and given the level of the injury caused to the Union industry, the amounts secured by way of provisional anti-dumping duties imposed by the provisional Regulation, should be definitively collected at 62,6 % of the duty levels established under the present Regulation.

8.6.   Retroactive collection

(233)

As mentioned in Section 1.2, the Commission made imports of the product under investigation subject to registration.

(234)

During the definitive stage of the investigation, the data collected in the context of the registration was assessed. The Commission analysed whether the criteria under Article 10(4) of the basic Regulation were met for the retroactive collection of definitive duties.

(235)

The Commission’s analysis showed no further substantial rise in imports in addition to the level of imports which caused injury during the investigation period, as prescribed by Article 10(4)(d) of the basic Regulation. To this end, the Commission compared import volumes between (i) the period from the first full month following initiation up to the last full month before registration and the period from the first full month following initiation up to the last full month before the adoption of provisional measures on one hand and the corresponding calendar months of the investigation period on the other, to account for seasonality; and (ii) the monthly average for these periods with the monthly average over the full investigation period.

(236)

The outcome of this analysis indicated a decline in import volumes. Specifically, the data showed a 9 % decrease in the monthly average volume of imports when comparing the seven-month period from the initiation of the investigation to the publication of the provisional measures with the monthly average during the investigation period. A similar comparison over the two-month period from initiation to registration of imports revealed an 8 % decrease in monthly average import volumes. The Commission also compared the import volumes during the seven months following initiation with the same calendar months during the investigation period. This comparison showed a 10 % decrease in import volumes. Furthermore, when comparing the two months following initiation until the registration of imports with the same months during the investigation period, a decrease of 3,2 % in import volumes was observed.

(237)

In light of the above, the evidence did not support the existence of a substantial rise in imports following initiation. Accordingly, the Commission concluded that the conditions for imposing measures with retroactive effect were not met.

9.   FINAL PROVISION

(238)

In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council (11), when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.

(239)

The Committee established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 did not deliver an opinion on the measures provided for in this Regulation,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

1.   A definitive anti-dumping duty is imposed on imports of fused alumina, currently falling under CN codes 2818 10 11 , 2818 10 19 , ex 2818 10 91 , and 2818 10 99 (TARIC codes 2818 10 91 20, 2818 10 91 40, 2818 10 91 91, 2818 10 91 99) originating in the People’s Republic of China. The anti-dumping duty shall not apply to imports falling within the duty-free tariff-rate quota established under Article 2.

2.   The rate of the definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to the net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty, of the products described in paragraph 1 and produced by the companies listed below, shall be as follows:

Country of origin

Company

Definitive anti-dumping duty (%)

TARIC additional code

PRC

Chongqing Saite Corundum Co., Ltd.

99,8

89RI

PRC

Luoyang Runbao Abrasives Co., Ltd.

88,7

89RJ

PRC

Other cooperating companies listed in Annex I

94,5

See Annex I

PRC

All other imports originating in PRC

110,6

8999

3.   The application of the individual duty rates specified for the companies mentioned in paragraph 2 shall be conditional upon presentation to the Member States’ customs authorities of a valid commercial invoice, on which shall appear a declaration dated and signed by an official of the entity issuing such invoice, identified by name and function, drafted as follows: ‘I, the undersigned, certify that the (volume in unit we are using) of (product concerned) sold for export to the European Union covered by this invoice was manufactured by (company name and address) (TARIC additional code) in [country concerned]. I declare that the information provided in this invoice is complete and correct.’ Until such invoice is presented, the duty applicable to all other imports originating in the People’s Republic of China shall apply.

4.   Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply.

Article 2

1.   A duty-free tariff-rate quota is established for imports of fused alumina, currently falling under CN codes 2818 10 11 , 2818 10 19 , ex 2818 10 91 , and 2818 10 99 (TARIC codes 2818 10 11 10, 2818 10 11 20, 2818 10 11 30, 2818 10 11 40, 2818 10 11 91, 2818 10 11 99, 2818 10 91 20, 2818 10 91 40, 2818 10 91 91, 2818 10 91 99) originating in the People’s Republic of China.

2.   Imports of the product concerned within the quota volume shall not be subject to any anti-dumping duty. The volume of the duty-free tariff-rate quota, the product types (defined by reference to TARIC codes), and the periods to which it applies are specified in Annex II.

3.   The duty-free tariff-rate quota shall be allocated on a first-come-first-served basis, based on the tariff-rate quota established equally for each quarter of the period of imposition, as specified in Annex II.

4.   The drawings on each quarterly quota shall be stopped on the twentieth working day of the Commission following the end of the quarterly period. At the end of each quarter, the unused balances of the tariff-rate quota shall automatically be transferred to the next quarter. No unused balance at the end of the last quarter of each year of application of the definitive tariff-rate quota shall be transferred.

5.   Where the relevant quota defined under paragraph 2 is exhausted, imports from the People’s Republic of China shall be subject to the applicable definitive anti-dumping duty in accordance with Article 1.

Article 3

1.   The amounts secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty under Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1456 shall be definitively collected at a level corresponding to 62,6 % of the duty rates established in Article 1 of this Regulation. The amounts secured in excess of the definitive rates of the anti-dumping duty shall be released.

2.   The rate of provisional anti-dumping duty that is to be collected in accordance with Article 10(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 shall be as follows:

Country of origin

Company

Provisional anti-dumping duty (%)

TARIC additional code

PRC

Chongqing Saite Corundum Co., Ltd.

62,4

89RI

PRC

Luoyang Runbao Abrasives Co., Ltd.

55,5

89RJ

PRC

Other cooperating companies listed in Annex I

59,1

See Annex I

PRC

All other imports originating in PRC

69,2

8999

Article 4

Article 1(2) may be amended to add new exporting producers from the People’s Republic of China and make them subject to the appropriate weighted average anti-dumping duty rate for cooperating companies not included in the sample. A new exporting producer shall provide evidence that:

(a)

it did not export the goods described in Article 1(1) during the period of investigation (1 October 2023 to 30 September 2024);

(b)

it is not related to an exporter or producer subject to the measures imposed by this Regulation, and which could have cooperated in the original investigation; and

(c)

it has either actually exported the product concerned or has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to export a significant quantity to the Union after the end of the period of investigation.

Article 5

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 15 January 2026.

For the Commission

The President

Ursula VON DER LEYEN

(1)   OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/1036/oj.

(2)   OJ C, C/2024/7049, 21.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/7049/oj.

(3)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/260 of 10 February 2025 making imports of fused alumina originating in the People’s Republic of China subject to registration (OJ L, 2025/260, 11.2.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/260/oj).

(4)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1456 of 17 July 2025 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of fused alumina originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L, 2025/1456, 18.7.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/1456/oj).

(5)  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/1173 of 4 June 2020 amending Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union and Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Union as regards the duration of the period of pre-disclosure (OJ L 259, 10.8.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2020/1173/oj).

(6)   https://www.trevodrywall.com.br/.

(7)   https://www.tecnosulfur.com.br/en/about/.

(8)  In the absence of available financial statements for a fused alumina producer in any of the potential representative countries with similar level of economic development as the PRC, the Commission relied on the financial statements of companies producing fused alumina in other countries to assess whether the SG & A costs of Bozel were representative of the sector concerned. This includes the information from an Indian producer, Carborundum Universal Limited (https://www.cumi-murugappa.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/CUMI-Annual-Report-2025.pdf), a Japanese producer, Resonac Holdings Corporation (https://www.resonac.com/sites/default/files/2025-02/e_tanshin2024q4.pdf), and data collected and verified from the sampled Union producers.

(9)  Fused alumina is produced from alumina and bauxite, which are both listed as strategic inputs under the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act (2024/1252). Additionally, its strategic importance and relevance for the iron and steel, aerospace and defence industries are confirmed by Singh et al. (2023) Applications and Developments of Thermal Spray Coatings for the Iron and Steel Industry and Grigaitienė et al. (2025) Effect of TiO2 Content on the Corrosion and Thermal Resistance of Plasma-Sprayed Al2O3-TiO2 Coatings.

(10)  Email: TRADE-TDI-NAME-CHANGE-REQUESTS@ec.europa.eu, European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, Directorate G, Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 170, 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel, BELGIQUE/BELGIË.

(11)  Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj).

ANNEX I

PRC cooperating exporting producers not sampled

Country

Name

TARIC additional code

PRC

Art Abrasives (Guizhou) Co., Ltd.

89RK

PRC

Bedrock Corundum Co., Ltd.

89RL

PRC

Binzhou Qinai New Material Co., Ltd.

89RM

PRC

Guizhou Guxin New Materials Co., Ltd.

89RN

PRC

Guizhou Kaicheng Fused Minerals Co., Ltd.

89RO

PRC

Henan Ant Advanced Materials Co., Ltd.

89RP

PRC

Henan Haochen Advanced Materials Co., Ltd.

89RQ

PRC

Henan Hengxin Industrial & Mineral Products Co., Ltd

89SI

PRC

Henan Jinfeng New Material Technology Co., Ltd.

89RR

PRC

Imerys Fused Minerals (Guizhou) Co., Ltd.

89RS

PRC

Qinai (Shandong) New Material Co., Ltd.

89RT

PRC

Qingdao Reckel Advanced Materials Co., Ltd.

89RU

PRC

Qingdao Sisa Abrasives Co., Ltd.

89RV

PRC

Saint-Gobain Ceramic Materials (Zhengzhou) Co Ltd

89RW

PRC

Shandong Imerys Mount Tai Co., Ltd.

89RX

PRC

Shanxi Lvliangshan Mineral Co., Ltd.

89RY

PRC

Yichuan Kingsino Refractories Co., Ltd

89RZ

PRC

Zhengzhou Sinabuddy Mineral Co., Ltd.

89SA

PRC

Zhengzhou Yufa High-Tech Material Co., Ltd.

89SB

PRC

Zibo Jin Chun Tai Abrasives Co., Ltd.

89SD

PRC

Zibo Jinjiyuan Abrasives Co., Ltd.

89SC

ANNEX II

TARIC or CN code

Description of the product

2026

2027

2028

2029

2030

Order number

 

 

Volume of duty-free tariff-rate quota (net tonnes)

 

2818 10 11 10

Sol-Gel corundum (CAS RN 1302-74-5) with an aluminium oxide content of 99,6 % or more by weight, having a micro crystalline structure in the form of rods with an aspect ratio of 1,3 or more, but not more than 6,0

103,8

90,8

77,8

64,9

51,9

090520

2818 10 11 30

(NEW TARIC)

Sintered Sol-Gel corundum or pre-sintered Sol-Gel with an aluminium oxide content of 99,6 % or more by weight, having a microcrystalline structure in the form of rods with an aspect ratio of 1,3 or more, but not more than 6,0

2818 10 11 40

Sintered Sol-Gel corundum or pre-sintered Sol-Gel with a microcrystalline structure, consisting of aluminium oxide, with a composition by weight (as oxides) of at least 98,5 % aluminium oxide, other than with an aluminium oxide content of 99,6 % or more by weight, having a microcrystalline structure in the form of rods with an aspect ratio of 1,3 or more, but not more than 6,0

2818 10 11 20

Sintered corundum with a micro crystalline structure, consisting of aluminium oxide (CAS RN 1344-28-1) and magnesium aluminate (CAS RN 12068-51-8), with a content by weight (calculated as oxides) of:

—

92 % or more of aluminium oxide, and

—

8 % or less of magnesium oxide

281810 11 91 (NEW TARIC)

Fused alumina where both of the following apply: (i) between 5 % and 35 % of the product by weight is below the lowest grain size limit set out in the specification for the product; and (ii) between 1 % and 10 % of the product by weight is above the upper grain size limit set out in the specification for the product

7 177,6

6 280,4

5 383,2

4 486,0

3 588,8

090521

2818 10 11 99

(NEW TARIC)

Other

10 087,7

8 826,7

7 565,7

6 304,8

5 043,8

090522

2818 10 19

With 50 % or more of the total weight having a particle size of more than 10 mm

56,1

49,1

42,1

35,0

28,0

090523

2818 10 91 20

Sintered corundum with a micro crystalline structure, consisting of aluminium oxide (CAS RN 1344-28-1), magnesium aluminate (CAS RN 12068-51-8) and the rare earth aluminates of yttrium, lanthanum and neodymium, with a content by weight (calculated as oxides) of:

—

92 % or more, but less than 98,5 % of aluminium oxide,

—

2 % (± 1,5 %) of magnesium oxide,

—

1 % (± 0,6 %) of yttrium oxide, and

—

either 3 % (± 2,2 %) of lanthanum oxide, or

—

2 % (± 1,2 %) of lanthanum oxide and neodymium oxide,

with less than 50 % of the total weight having a particle size of more than 10 mm

574,9

503,0

431,2

359,3

287,5

090524

2818 10 91 40

(NEW TARIC)

Sintered Sol-Gel corundum or pre-sintered Sol-Gel with a microcrystalline structure, consisting of aluminium oxide, with a composition by weight (as oxides) of at least 92 % but less than 98,5 % aluminium oxide

2818 10 91 91 (NEW TARIC)

Fused alumina with a titanium dioxide content of 1 % by weight or more, where both of the following apply: (i) between 5 % and 35 % of the product by weight is below the lowest grain size limit set out in the specification for the product; and (ii) between 1 % and 10 % of the product by weight is above the upper grain size limit set out in the specification for the product

16 243,2

14 212,8

12 182,4

10 152,0

8 121,6

090525

2818 10 91 99

(NEW TARIC)

Other

24 364,8

21 319,2

18 273,6

15 228,0

12 182,4

090526

2818 10 99

With 50 % or more of the total weight having a particle size of more than 10 mm

1 392,1

1 218,1

1 044,0

870,0

696,0

090527

2026

TARIC or CN code

2026

 

1st quarter

(16.1.2026–31.3.2026)

2nd quarter

(1.4.2026–30.6.2026)

3rd quarter

(1.7.2026–30.9.2026)

4th quarter

(1.10.2026–31.12.2026)

 

Volume of duty-free tariff-rate quota (net tonnes)

2818 10 11 10

2818 10 11 30

2818 10 11 20

2818 10 11 40

25,95

25,95

25,95

25,95

2818 10 11 91

1 794,39

1 794,39

1 794,39

1 794,39

2818 10 11 99

2 521,91

2 521,91

2 521,91

2 521,91

2818 10 19

14,02

14,02

14,02

14,02

2818 10 91 20

2818 10 91 40

143,73

143,73

143,73

143,73

2818 10 91 91

4 060,79

4 060,79

4 060,79

4 060,79

2818 10 91 99

6 091,19

6 091,19

6 091,19

6 091,19

2818 10 99

348,01

348,01

348,01

348,01

2027

TARIC or CN code

2027

 

1st quarter

(1.1.2027–31.3.2027)

2nd quarter

(1.4.2027–30.6.2027)

3rd quarter

(1.7.2027–30.9.2027)

4th quarter

(1.10.2027–31.12.2027)

 

Volume of duty-free tariff-rate quota (net tonnes)

2818 10 11 10

2818 10 11 30

2818 10 11 20

2818 10 11 40

22,71

22,71

22,71

22,71

2818 10 11 91

1 570,09

1 570,09

1 570,09

1 570,09

2818 10 11 99

2 206,67

2 206,67

2 206,67

2 206,67

2818 10 19

12,27

12,27

12,27

12,27

2818 10 91 20

2818 10 91 40

125,76

125,76

125,76

125,76

2818 10 91 91

3 553,19

3 553,19

3 553,19

3 553,19

2818 10 91 99

5 329,79

5 329,79

5 329,79

5 329,79

2818 10 99

304,51

304,51

304,51

304,51

2028

TARIC or CN code

2028

 

1st quarter

(1.1.2028–31.3.2028)

2nd quarter

(1.4.2028–30.6.2028)

3rd quarter

(1.7.2028–30.9.2028)

4th quarter

(1.10.2028–31.12.2028)

 

Volume of duty-free tariff-rate quota (net tonnes)

2818 10 11 10

2818 10 11 30

2818 10 11 20

2818 10 11 40

19,46

19,46

19,46

19,46

2818 10 11 91

1 345,79

1 345,79

1 345,79

1 345,79

2818 10 11 99

1 891,44

1 891,44

1 891,44

1 891,44

2818 10 19

10,51

10,51

10,51

10,51

2818 10 91 20

2818 10 91 40

107,79

107,79

107,79

107,79

2818 10 91 91

3 045,60

3 045,60

3 045,60

3 045,60

2818 10 91 99

4 568,39

4 568,39

4 568,39

4 568,39

2818 10 99

261,01

261,01

261,01

261,01

2029

TARIC or CN code

2029

 

1st quarter

(1.1.2029–31.3.2029)

2nd quarter

(1.4.2029–30.6.2029)

3rd quarter

(1.7.2029–30.9.2029)

4th quarter

(1.10.2029–31.12.2029)

 

Volume of duty-free tariff-rate quota (net tonnes)

2818 10 11 10

2818 10 11 30

2818 10 11 20

2818 10 11 40

16,22

16,22

16,22

16,22

2818 10 11 91

1 121,50

1 121,50

1 121,50

1 121,50

2818 10 11 99

1 576,20

1 576,20

1 576,20

1 576,20

2818 10 19

8,76

8,76

8,76

8,76

2818 10 91 20

2818 10 91 40

89,83

89,83

89,83

89,83

2818 10 91 91

2 538,00

2 538,00

2 538,00

2 538,00

2818 10 91 99

3 806,99

3 806,99

3 806,99

3 806,99

2818 10 99

217,51

217,51

217,51

217,51

2030

TARIC or CN code

2030

 

1st quarter

(1.1.2030–31.3.2030)

2nd quarter

(1.4.2030–30.6.2030)

3rd quarter

(1.7.2030–30.9.2030)

4th quarter

(1.10.2030–31.12.2030)

 

Volume of duty-free tariff-rate quota (net tonnes)

2818 10 11 10

2818 10 11 30

2818 10 11 20

2818 10 11 40

12,97

12,97

12,97

12,97

2818 10 11 91

897,20

897,20

897,20

897,20

2818 10 11 99

1 260,96

1 260,96

1 260,96

1 260,96

2818 10 19

7,01

7,01

7,01

7,01

2818 10 91 20

2818 10 91 40

71,86

71,86

71,86

71,86

2818 10 91 91

2 030,40

2 030,40

2 030,40

2 030,40

2818 10 91 99

3 045,60

3 045,60

3 045,60

3 045,60

2818 10 99

174,01

174,01

174,01

174,01

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2026/114/oj

ISSN 1977-0677 (electronic edition)

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