AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 27554/95
by Ursula F. COXHEAD
against the United Kingdom
The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting
in private on 9 April 1997, the following members being present:
Mrs. J. LIDDY, President
MM. M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
E. BUSUTTIL
A. WEITZEL
C.L. ROZAKIS
L. LOUCAIDES
B. MARXER
B. CONFORTI
I. BÉKÉS
G. RESS
A. PERENIC
C. BÎRSAN
K. HERNDL
M. VILA AMIGÓ
Mrs. M. HION
Mr. R. NICOLINI
Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 9 February 1995
by Ursula F. COXHEAD against the United Kingdom and registered on
9 June 1995 under file No. 27554/95;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a Swiss national born in 1941. She is a
housewife and resides in London. She claims to be suffering from a form
of arachnoiditis, a disease causing severe pain in the back and legs,
as a result of a myelogram she underwent in December 1977 in which
Myodil, a spinal dye, was used.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be
summarised as follows.
A. The Myodil litigation in general
When the potential link between Myodil and arachnoiditis was
realised, civil proceedings for negligence were instituted against
Glaxo Laboratories Ltd (hereinafter Glaxo), the manufacturers of
Myodil, and the Health Authorities of England and Wales.
On 19 December 1991 the High Court of Justice gave permission to
the plaintiffs in the action against the Health Authorities to
discontinue the proceedings before 15 January 1992. The court decided
that it would not make any order as to costs for plaintiffs who
discontinued before that date. It also ordered the Health Authorities
to continue to supply copies of their medical records to the plaintiffs
or potential plaintiffs in the proceedings against Glaxo.
The proceedings against Glaxo were organised as follows. There
was the generic claim concerning the liability of Glaxo for damages
caused through arachnoiditis being brought about by Myodil myelography.
All plaintiffs were parties to this claim, which was conducted as a
group action by a Steering Committee designated by the Group of
Solicitors involved in Myodil litigation. In addition to the generic
claim, there was a series of individual claims as to whether each
plaintiff was suffering from Myodil induced arachnoiditis. These were
handled by each plaintiff's solicitors.
The statement of claim in the generic action and Glaxo's defence
thereto were served before the end of June 1992. By the same time, the
consultants of the Steering Committee of the Myodil Solicitors Group
had met with the consultants of Glaxo and had agreed on "the essential
diagnostic criteria for Myodil-induced symptomatic arachnoiditis"
(hereinafter "the essential criteria").
It appears that the High Court judge appointed to hear the
litigation issued an order approving the essential criteria. Only the
persons who satisfied the essential criteria were admitted to the
litigation and were allowed to lodge individual claims. As agreed
between the Steering Committee and Glaxo, each potential plaintiff
would be examined by a neurologist who would provide a clinician's
report. Where appropriate the neurologist would refer the potential
plaintiff to a radiologist or neuro-radiologist to undergo a Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (hereinafter MRI) scan.
The essential criteria were clinical and radiological criteria.
The patient should have been injected with Myodil. There should be
radiological evidence of arachnoiditis not just at the site of the
initial pathology or surgery, but also at other levels. There should
have been no other exclusive cause for arachnoiditis. Finally, the
symptoms and clinical findings should match the anatomical distribution
of the arachnoiditis which had been demonstrated radiologically.
A number of potential litigants who had been granted legal aid
limited to all steps up to but excluding the issue of proceedings and
who were found not to satisfy the essential criteria agreed to have
their legal aid certificates "discharged". According to the rules
governing the granting of legal aid by the Legal Aid Board, persons who
have their legal aid certificate "discharged", are covered by legal aid
up to the date of the notice of "discharge". A "discharge" of a legal
aid certificate is to be distinguished from its "revocation". If a
legal aid certificate is "revoked", it is as if the person concerned
never had legal aid. As a result, the person concerned has to bear the
full cost of the work done under the "revoked" certificate.
On 23 November 1992 a directions hearing took place at the High
Court. The judge instructed that all individual claims had to be
notified to Glaxo by 1 February 1993 and that the court proceedings had
to be served by 1 March 1994. The general claim was to be heard in
October 1994.
The deadline for serving the individual claims was subsequently
extended to 1 September 1994 and the hearing of the generic action was
adjourned until 26 April 1995. On 21 December 1994 the court ordered
a further adjournment until October 1995 in the generic action. In
January 1995 the court authorised the belated serving of additional
individual claims. The Steering Committee promised that it would seek
no further extension in respect of individual cases.
In March 1995 Glaxo and the Steering Committee exchanged expert
evidence. On 5 July 1995 Glaxo made an offer to settle the action which
the Steering Committee advised the plaintiffs to accept. On
31 July 1995 the judge approved the settlement terms.
It is not clear whether a second action was ever brought by
persons who were found not to fulfil the essential criteria.
B. Particular circumstances of the applicant's case
The applicant was awarded legal aid with a view to instituting
proceedings against Glaxo. However, the legal aid certificate appears
to have been limited to all steps up to but excluding the issue of
proceedings including obtaining counsel's opinion.
The applicant was examined by a neurologist and had an MRI on
14 December 1992. The neurologist considered that the applicant's
symptoms were compatible with arachnoiditis.
On 20 December 1993 counsel advised that it was impossible to
resolve the essential problem in the applicant's case, namely whether
there was evidence of arachnoiditis outside the area of surgery to an
extent necessary to exclude this as being the cause of the problem. As
a result, he could not advise that the case met the essential clinical
criteria.
On 13 May 1994 the applicant was examined by a second
neurologist, who considered that, although the applicant had
arachnoiditis, her pain was due to a facet joint problem. He
recommended that she should undergo CT radiculography using a water
soluble dye. The applicant wrote to Dr B, an arachnoiditis specialist
in the United States. In the light of his reply, she decided that it
was dangerous to undergo the further examination recommended.
The applicant contacted the Legal Aid Board with a view to
obtaining funding for further medical advice. On 13 July 1994 the Board
replied that such a request had to be submitted by her solicitors.
The applicant solicitors did not pursue the matter and on
12 September 1994 the Legal Aid Board discharged the applicant's legal
aid certificate with her consent.
The applicant obtained further expert opinion which confirmed
that there was evidence of arachnoiditis and had another MRI scan. On
14 February 1995 the MRI centre informed her that, although facet
joints are not ideally assessed by MRI, her joints appeared normal on
the pictures they had taken.
On 10 April 1995 the applicant's Legal Aid Area Office advised
her that if she obtained further evidence she could lodge a new legal
aid application with a view to participating in the "minor litigation".
However, the office was of the view that on the information available
her claim appeared unlikely to succeed and that legal aid could not be
reinstated.
On 3 May 1995 the applicant was advised by Dr B that the
essential criteria used for the Myodil litigation in the United Kingdom
were wrong. According to Dr B, adhesive arachnoiditis had to be
distinguished from ordinary arachnoiditis. Post-myelographic
arachnoiditis was typically adhesive. Since myelography was a prelude
to spine surgery, it would not be surprising if adhesive arachnoiditis
was in proximity to the surgical site.
On 11 February 1997 the Legal Aid Board refused another
application for legal aid lodged by the applicant. The applicant
appealed.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains that she was not allowed to take part in
the Myodil litigation. She argues that the essential criteria were
unduly restrictive. She does not invoke any provisions of the
Convention.
THE LAW
The applicant complains that she was not allowed to take part in
the Myodil litigation.
The Commission considers that the applicant's complaint should
be examined under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention which
provides that "in the determination of his civil rights and obligations
..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by a tribunal
established by law." In accordance with the Court's case-law, this
provision guarantees the right of access to a court, i.e. the right to
have a claim relating to civil rights and obligations brought before
a court or tribunal (Eur. Court HR, Golder v. United Kingdom judgment
of 21 February 1975, Series A no. 18, p. 18, para. 36). Moreover, there
can be no doubt that the applicant had a claim for compensation against
Glaxo which was of a civil nature.
The Commission notes that the main thrust of the applicant's
complaints is that the essential criteria were unduly restrictive and
it recalls that these criteria were agreed by the Steering Committee
of the Myodil Solicitors Group, which was conducting the group action,
and the defendants, Glaxo. However, it appears that the essential
criteria were also approved by court order. Moreover, it is clear that
they were used by the domestic legal aid authorities to determine the
applicant's prospects of success if she were to join in the group
action. As a result, the responsibility of the United Kingdom under the
Convention could be engaged.
However, the Commission considers that Article 6 para. 1
(Art.6-1) does not preclude the authorities from deciding various
issues affecting participation in a group action on the basis of
criteria established with the agreement of the defendant, provided that
the criteria are reasonable and that potential litigants who do not
fall within the criteria preserve the right to sue independently. The
applicant has not established that the criteria agreed between the
Steering Committee and Glaxo were unreasonable. Moreover, it clearly
emerges from the applicant's submissions that persons who were excluded
from the group action did not automatically lose the possibility of
suing Glaxo independently.
The Commission accepts that the applicant's financial situation
was such that, on the basis of all available indications, she could
not contemplate instituting proceedings Glaxo without legal aid.
However, the applicant was issued with a legal aid certificate.
This certificate appears to have been limited to all steps up to but
excluding the issue of proceedings including obtaining counsel's
opinion. Thus, its aim was to enable the applicant to assess her
prospects of joining in the group action, always with reference to the
essential criteria. The Commission notes that the certificate was
discharged with the applicant's consent and, as a result, an issue
could arise as to whether the applicant can still claim to be a victim
of a violation of her right of access to a court, within the meaning
of Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention. However, the Commission does
not consider it necessary to determine the issue because, in any event,
the application is manifestly ill-founded.
The Commission recalls in this connection that Article 6
(Art. 6) does not always guarantee legal aid in civil cases. The means
by which a State ensures effective access to civil courts is within its
margin of appreciation (Eur. Court HR, Airey v. Ireland judgment of
9 October 1979, Series A no. 32, p. 15, para. 26). Moreover, even where
legal aid may be available for certain types of civil action, it is
reasonable to impose conditions on its availability involving, inter
alia, the financial situation of the litigant or the prospects of
success of the proceedings (No. 8158/78, Dec. 10.7.80, D.R. 21, p. 95;
No. 10871/84, Dec. 10.7.86, D.R. 48, p. 154; No. 10594/83,
Dec. 14.7.87, D.R. 52, p. 158).
The Commission considers that the discharge of the applicant's
legal aid certificate must have been related to a finding that she did
not fulfil the essential criteria for participation in the group
action. This finding was reached after obtaining expert medical and
legal opinion on the matter and both the medical and legal opinions
were covered by the applicant's legal aid certificate. In these
circumstances, it cannot be argued that the applicant's prospects of
success in the group proceedings were not properly weighed and that the
conditions imposed on availability of legal aid in this connection were
unreasonable.
A final issue which remains to be examined is whether the
applicant, once excluded form the group action, retained a realistic
possibility of instituting proceedings against Glaxo. The Commission
is, of course, not unaware of the financial implications of suing Glaxo
independently. However, the Commission notes that the domestic legal
aid authorities appear to have always seriously considered the
possibility of financing such litigation, if it had prospects of
success. The applicant has applied for legal aid and her application
has not been finally determined.
It follows that no appearance of a violation of the applicant's
right of access to a court under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the
Convention is disclosed. As a result, the application must be rejected
as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2
(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
M.F. BUQUICCHIO J. LIDDY
Secretary President
to the First Chamber of the First Chamber
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy