THIRD SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 36120/97
by Christopher CROSSLAND
against the United Kingdom
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section) sitting on 8 June 1999 as a Chamber composed of
MrJ-P. Costa, President,
SirNicolas Bratza,
MrL. Loucaides,
MrP. Kūris,
MrW. Fuhrmann,
MrsH.S. Greve,
MrK. Traja, Judges,
withMrsS. Dollé, Section Registrar;
Having regard to Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 24 April 1997 by Christopher CROSSLAND a gainst the United Kingdom and registered on 15 May 1997 under file no. 36120/97;
Having regard to the reports provided for in Rule 49 of the Rules of Court;
Having regard to the respondent Government’s letter of 29 May 1998 waiving the admissibility of the application;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a British citizen, born in 1959 and resident in Dulwich. He is represented before the Court by Mr P. Leach of Liberty. The facts of the application, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
A.Particular circumstances of the case
The applicant and his wife were married in 1981 and had three children, born in 1984, 1986 and 1990. The applicant’s wife died in 1995.
The applicant’s wife worked until the birth of her first child, paying full social security contributions as an employed earner. The applicant gave up his full-time job in respect of which he earned approximately GBP 50,000 per annum in February 1996 to care for the children. He is now self-employed; in his first year of trading he made a loss of about GBP 8,000. He receives Income Support and Child Benefit, bringing his total weekly income to GBP 107 per week.
The applicant telephoned the Inland Revenue on 7 August 1996, and was informed on 13 August 1996 that bereavement tax allowance was only granted to women on the death of a husband. On 13 November 1996, he queried the position with the Inland Revenue, which replied by letter dated 23 December 1996, stating:
“I can confirm that bereavement tax allowance is exclusive to widows and there is no alternative tax allowance of equal value for widowers. The reason this allowance is only given to widowers [sic] is because generally speaking the financial problems caused by the bereavement of the spouse are greater for a woman than for a man. This is because the husband is usually the main breadwinner so the loss of his income has greater effect.”
The applicant received a further letter dated 15 April 1997 from the Salisbury District Office of the inland revenue informing him that the matter was under enquiry with their personal tax division.
B.Relevant domestic law and practice
Section 262(1) of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 provides:
“Where a married man whose wife is living with him dies, his widow shall be entitled –
(a)for the year of assessment in which the death occurs, to an income tax reduction calculated by reference to an amount equal to the amount specified in section 257A(1) for that year, and
(b)(unless she marries again before the beginning of it) for the next following year of assessment, to an income tax reduction calculated by reference to an amount equal to the amount specified in section 257A(1) for that year.”
The amount specified for the tax year 1997/7 was GBP 1,790.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains that British tax legislation discriminates against him on grounds of sex, in breach of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with both Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
PROCEDURE
The application was introduced on 24 April 1997 and registered on 15 May 1997.
On 15 January 1998, the Commission decided to communicate the application to the respondent Government.
By a letter dated 29 May 1998 the Government indicated that they did not intend to contest the admissibility of the application and accordingly would not submit any observations on admissibility. They did, however, reserve the right to submit observations before the merits were examined.
On 1 November 1998, by operation of Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, the case fell to be examined by the Court in accordance with the provisions of that Protocol.
THE LAW
The applicant complains that the lack of provision for bereavement tax allowance for widowers discriminates against him on grounds of sex, in breach of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with both Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
Article 14 states:
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”
Article 8 provides (as relevant):
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life ... .
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of ... the economic well-being of the country ... .”
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 states:
“1. Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
2. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
The Court observes that the Government do not contest the admissibility of the application and have submitted no observations in this connection.
The Court considers that the application raises complex issues of law and fact under the Convention, the determination of which should depend on an examination of the merits. It concludes, therefore, that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other grounds for declaring it inadmissible have been established.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits of the case.
S. DolléJ-P. Costa
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy