FIFTH SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 30632/23
Alice CRITES and Michael RABINOVITZ
against the Czech Republic
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 25 September 2025 as a Committee composed of:
María Elósegui, President,
Kateřina Šimáčková,
Gilberto Felici, judges,
and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 30632/23) against the Czech Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 28 July 2023 by two American nationals, Ms Alice Crites and Mr Michael Rabinovitz (“the applicants”), who were born in 1963 and 1960 respectively, live in Bethesda (United States) and were represented by Mr M. Kojan, a lawyer practising in Prague;
the decision to give notice of the complaint concerning the right of access to the Constitutional Court to the Czech Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr P. Konůpka, of the Ministry of Justice, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The application concerns the applicants’ alleged lack of access to the Constitutional Court resulting from its rejection of their constitutional appeal, in so far as it had been directed against decisions of the lower courts, for non‑exhaustion of available remedies, on the grounds that they had lodged a formally defective appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court. The applicants relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
2. In 2014 the applicants lodged a civil action, seeking compensation for unjust enrichment on account of the defendant’s overuse of its share of a property co-owned by them. In 2020 and 2021 courts at two levels of jurisdiction dismissed their action, referring mainly to an expert opinion regarding the normal rental value of the property in question.
3. The applicants challenged the appellate court’s judgment by an appeal on points of law, which the Supreme Court rejected as inadmissible in accordance with Article 243c § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter “the CCP”) on 13 December 2022. It concluded that the appeal had not complied with the obligatory formal requirements set out in Article 241a §§ 1-3 of the CCP since the applicants had not specified which of the admissibility criteria defined in Article 237 of the CCP they considered to have been met and on which grounds. Furthermore, the Supreme Court gave an extensive explanation – while acknowledging that this went beyond what was procedurally necessary given the applicants’ failure to specify the relevant admissibility criteria – as to why the appeal on points of law could not have been found admissible on the basis of the procedural defects claimed by the applicants, that is, the appellate court’s refusal of their request to suspend the proceedings and their argument that the expert opinion had been unreviewable and should have been declared inadmissible.
4. By decision no. III. ÚS 644/23 of 28 March 2023, the Constitutional Court dismissed a subsequent constitutional appeal lodged by the applicants (nos. I. ÚS 2892/20, I. ÚS 83/23 and III. ÚS 644/23). Referring to its plenary opinion no. Pl. ÚS-st. 45/16 of 28 November 2017, it held that the constitutional appeal was manifestly ill-founded in so far as it was directed against the decision of the Supreme Court, since that court had duly rejected the applicants’ appeal on points of law as inadmissible without an examination on the merits (a conclusion which the applicants had not challenged in any way). In so far as the constitutional appeal was directed against the decisions of the lower courts, it was inadmissible for non‑exhaustion of available remedies since the applicants had failed to duly challenge those decisions before the Supreme Court.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
5. The applicants complained, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, that their right of access to the Constitutional Court had been violated, in that that court had failed to address the substance of their complaints against the lower courts’ decisions.
6. The relevant principles emerging from the Court’s case-law concerning the right of access to a court, and in particular, access to superior courts, are summarised in Zubac v. Croatia ([GC], no. 40160/12, §§ 76-86, 5 April 2018). Specifically, the right of access to a court is not absolute but may be subject to limitations, which must not restrict the access left to the individual in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired. Furthermore, a limitation will not be compatible with Article 6 § 1 if it does not pursue a legitimate aim and if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved (ibid., § 78).
7. The Court notes that in the Czech Republic access to the Constitutional Court is secured through the possibility of lodging a constitutional appeal. That access is, however, restricted by certain admissibility conditions for such an appeal.
8. The Court also observes that following its judgment in Adamíček v. the Czech Republic (no. 35836/05, 12 October 2010), and given that the Constitutional Court’s case-law relating to the interpretation of the procedural rule of exhaustion of available remedies had been somewhat inconsistent, the plenary Constitutional Court delivered opinion no. Pl. ÚS-st. 45/16 on 28 November 2017. Referring to the principle of subsidiarity, the court held that if an appeal on points of law did not specify, in accordance with Article 241a § 2 of the CCP, on which of the grounds enumerated in Article 237 of the CCP it should be considered admissible, a subsequent rejection by the Supreme Court of that appeal on the basis of formal defects would not amount to a violation of the right to judicial protection. In such cases, a subsequent constitutional appeal directed against the decisions of the lower courts should be declared inadmissible for non‑exhaustion of available remedies, pursuant to section 75(1) of the Constitutional Court Act, and the Constitutional Court should only assess whether the Supreme Court’s rejection of the case on formal grounds was justified.
9. That rule, which admittedly restricts access to the Constitutional Court, is not per se incompatible with the Convention. Its aim is to ensure the proper administration of justice by preventing the Constitutional Court from becoming overburdened with a large number of cases raising human rights issues which could have been resolved by the Supreme Court upon the submission of an appeal on points of law complying with all the relevant formal requirements. The only issue in the applicants’ case is whether the manner in which the Constitutional Court applied the rule in question was proportionate to that aim and, more specifically, whether it was foreseeable.
10. In the present case, the Court observes, first, that the Constitutional Court declared the applicants’ constitutional appeal manifestly ill-founded in relation to the decision of the Supreme Court. It notes in this connection that, in their constitutional appeal, the applicants did not raise any objections against that decision and did not in any way challenge the manner in which their appeal on points of law had been dealt with (see paragraph 4 above). Thus, the Constitutional Court had no choice but to consider their constitutional appeal manifestly ill-founded in so far as it was formally directed against the Supreme Court’s decision.
Second, and in response to the complaint as submitted to it (see paragraph 5 above), the Court observes that in relation to the lower courts’ decisions, the applicants’ constitutional appeal was rejected as inadmissible for non-exhaustion of available remedies, exactly as envisaged by plenary opinion no. Pl. ÚS-st. 45/16. On the basis of that opinion, the applicants, who were represented by a qualified lawyer, should have been aware of their obligation to lodge an appeal on points of law duly complying with all the formal requirements set by the relevant provisions of the CCP, and, in particular, of the consequences of their failure to do so for the outcome of a subsequent constitutional appeal. It follows that no issue arises as regards the foreseeability of the requirement to lodge a fully compliant appeal on points of law before turning to the Constitutional Court.
11. The Court acknowledges that the applicants asserted that they had lodged a fully compliant appeal on points of law, which the Supreme Court had not rejected on the basis of formal defects. For that reason, they maintained that the Constitutional Court should have examined the substance of their complaints directed against the lower courts’ decisions. The Court accepts in this connection that the applicants could have been misled by the extensive reasoning of the Supreme Court’s decision, which went beyond what was procedurally necessary in the given circumstances (see paragraph 3 above), and by the fact that the Supreme Court rejected their appeal on points of law as inadmissible without distinguishing, as the Constitutional Court had invited it to do in its plenary opinion, between two situations envisaged by Article 243c § 1 of the CCP: one where the appeal is rejected on purely formal grounds (for non-compliance with formal requirements), and the other where the Supreme Court concludes, after a substantive examination, that the admissibility grounds duly specified by the appellant have not been met. The Court observes, nevertheless, that it is clear from the text of the Supreme Court’s decision of 13 December 2022 that the applicants’ case pertained to the former situation.
12. Having regard to its case-law on the matter (see Trevisanato v. Italy, no. 32610/07, §§ 32-47, 15 September 2016), the Court considers that in the given circumstances it cannot be said that the Constitutional Court’s decision declaring the applicants’ constitutional appeal partly inadmissible for non‑exhaustion of available remedies amounted to excessive formalism involving an unreasonable and particularly strict application of procedural rules unjustifiably restricting the applicants’ access to its jurisdiction.
13. It follows that this complaint is inadmissible under Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention as manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 23 October 2025.
Martina Keller María Elósegui
Deputy Registrar President