SECOND SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 55220/00
by Lajos CSANÁDI
against Hungary
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 18 March 2003 as a Chamber composed of
MrJ.-P. Costa, President,
MrA.B. Baka,
MrL. Loucaides,
MrK. Jungwiert,
MrV. Butkevych,
MrsW. Thomassen,
MrM. Ugrekhelidze, judges,
andMrs S. Dollé, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 22 December 1999 and registered on 29 February 2000,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Lajos Csanádi, is a Hungarian national, who was born in 1947 and lives in Budapest. The respondent Government are represented by Mr L. Höltzl, Deputy State-Secretary, of the Ministry of Justice.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
On 20 April 1995 the applicant was driving his car and had a collision with a bus. Some passengers suffered injuries. The Székesfehérvár Police inspected the scene of the accident. Subsequently the applicant’s blood alcohol level was tested.
On 6 May 1995 criminal investigations were instituted in which the applicant was accused of having negligently caused a traffic accident. On 12 May 1995 a motor-vehicle expert presented his opinion in the case.
On 22 December 1995 the Fejér County Public Prosecutor’s Office preferred a bill of indictment. In the meantime, in view of the conclusions of a medical expert, on 29 May 1996 the Public Prosecutor’s Office completed the indictment charging the applicant with having caused permanent disability.
On 15 January 1997 the Székesfehérvár District Court held its first hearing. Subsequently experts were appointed who presented their opinions on 30 June 1997.
A hearing scheduled for 15 April 1998 was adjourned on account of the applicant’s motion for bias, which was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 6 July 1998.
On 26 November 1998 the District Court held a hearing.
On 10 December 1998 and 28 January 1999, respectively, the applicant and the Prosecutor’s Office proposed that an on-site experiment be carried out.
On 10 February 1999 the District Court adjourned the hearing scheduled for 25 February and ordered an expert institute to reconcile the earlier expert opinions. On 23 February 1999 the applicant submitted his further proposals concerning the taking of evidence.
A hearing scheduled for 20 May 1999 was adjourned on account of the applicant’s illness.
On 26 July 1999 the expert institute presented its report.
On 24 November 1999 the District Court adjourned a hearing scheduled for 9 December 1999, since the applicant could not be summoned.
On 13 February 2000 the applicant submitted his further proposals concerning the taking of evidence and his new address. On 9 June 2000 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s further motion for bias, introduced on 21 February.
On 17 January 2001 the applicant proposed that the investigations be completed and an inspection of the accident scene be held.
A hearing scheduled for 25 January 2001 was adjourned on account of the applicant’s illness.
On 17 May 2001 a hearing took place. The District Court held that, on account of the lapse of time since the accident, the taking of evidence needed to be repeated completely. It decided not to make an on-site inspection before certain witnesses could be heard.
On 16 July 2001 an examination of the applicant’s fitness to drive was ordered.
On 13 September 2001 a hearing at the scene of the accident was re-scheduled for 3 October 2001.
On 27 September 2001 the Fejér County Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s further motion for bias.
On 3 October 2001 the District Court held a hearing and heard witnesses and experts. On the same day, the scene of the accident was also inspected.
The proceedings are still pending before the District Court.
COMPLAINT
The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the criminal proceedings against him have been unreasonably long.
THE LAW
The applicant complains that the criminal proceedings against him have lasted an unreasonably long time, in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention which, in its relevant part, provides:
“In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
The Government submit that the case was rather complicated, particularly in view of the need to repeat the expert examinations. Moreover, the applicant contributed to the protraction of the proceedings by requesting adjournments, submitting motions for bias, filing several proposals as to the method of taking evidence and by remaining unavailable for summoning for part of the procedure. In contrast, the Government maintain, no particular periods of inactivity attributable to the domestic authorities occurred.
The applicant contests these views.
The Court observes that the proceedings were instituted on 6 May 1995 and that they are still pending at first instance.
The Court considers, in the light of the criteria established in its case-law on the question of “reasonable time” (the complexity of the case, the applicant’s conduct and that of the competent authorities), and having regard to all the information in its possession, that an examination of the merits of the application is required.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application admissible, without prejudging the merits of the case.
S. DolléJ-P. Costa
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy