FIRST SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 21951/17
Antalné CSITE
against Hungary
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 9 July 2024 as a Committee composed of:
Alena Poláčková, President,
Péter Paczolay,
Gilberto Felici, judges,
and Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 21951/17) against Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 14 March 2017 by a Hungarian national, Ms Antalné Csite (“the applicant”), who was born in 1952, lives in Ajka and was represented by Mr D. Kiss, a lawyer practising in Budapest;
the decision to give notice of the application to the Hungarian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr Z. Tallódi, of the Ministry of Justice;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The case concerns the restriction on the use of the applicant’s plot of land.
2. In January 1995 the applicant bought a real estate situated in the urban area of the municipality of Ajka. The building was designated as “unused commercial centre” and registered under plot no. 4064. On 1 July 2001 the Municipal Self-Government of Ajka adopted its local building code and town development plan (Municipal Decree no. 11/2001). According to the town development plan, certain part of the applicant’s plot of land was designated for the development of a public road.
3. In May 2016 the applicant was informed by the Ajka Mayor’s Office that since 2001 only maintenance works could be carried out on her property. On 21 November 2016 the applicant inquired with the Mayor’s Office about the exact nature of the restrictions on her land, why she had not been informed about them, and whether they had been registered in the land registry. On 5 December 2015 the Mayor’s Office informed the applicant that her land was affected by the planned expansion of a public road and that only maintenance works, not requiring a building permit, could be carried out on her land. In accordance with relevant regulations, information about the town development plan had been disseminated through the local media and procedures concerning the planned development of public roads did not need to be entered in the land registry.
4. The applicant addressed a couple of letters to the National Infrastructure Developing Private Company Limited, a State-owned company responsible for the expropriation of private property for public infrastructure development purposes, inquiring about the expropriation of her property and offering her real estate for sale. On 25 November 2016 she was informed that since the planned infrastructural development did not concern her property, the company did not envisage either the purchase or the expropriation of her real estate.
5. In 2016 the applicant’s request to the municipality to lift the construction ban was rejected.
6. On 30 July 2018 the municipality adopted Municipal Decree no. 10/2018 amending the local building code and the town development plan, removing the applicant’s plot of land from the road construction development plan.
7. The applicant complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that her right to peaceful enjoyment of her possessions had been violated because of a “building restriction” on her plot of land.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
8. The Government submitted that the application should be considered inadmissible on the ground that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, namely, to seek compensation for the restriction of use of her property or request the expropriation of her plot of land.
9. The applicant maintained that for about seventeen years there had been a “building prohibition” on her plot of land pursuant to section 20(1)(b) of Act no. LXXVIII of 1997 (“the 1997 Act”), introduced by Municipal Decree no. 11/2001. She had not been informed about the imposition of the ban on construction, which had not been registered in the land registry contrary to section 20(6) of the 1997 Act. She had no effective remedy against the restriction of the use of her property since compensation or expropriation could have only been possible if the restriction had been in the public interest. In any event, the one-time payment of compensation could not offset her subsequent inability to make use of her property.
10. The Court notes that the applicant has not produced any documents, such as the relevant Municipal Decree of 2001, which supposedly introduced a “building prohibition” on her property. Nor does it appear from the public documents that at the relevant time there had been a “building prohibition” under section 20(1)(b) of the 1997 Act on properties in the municipality. Moreover, according to the information conveyed to the applicant by the Mayor’s Office, her plot of land had been designated for the planned public road construction, which regulation had not required an entry in the land registry, unlike restrictions under section 20(1)(b) of the 1997 Act.
11. However, even accepting the applicant’s argument that her property was subject to a “building prohibition” pursuant to section 20(1)(b) of the 1997 Act, the Court notes that the application is inadmissible on another ground.
12. Under section 30 of the 1997 Act, as in force at the material time, if the local building regulation amended (through redesignating the land) or restricted (through imposing a ban on construction or on subdivision) the use of property, the owner of the property was entitled to compensation for damage, corresponding to the change in the market value of the property, or if those changes took place seven years following the acquisition of the property title, to compensation for disturbance in the use of the property.
13. Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the applicant did not attempt to initiate any proceedings to obtain compensation either for the loss of market value of her property or for any disturbance in its use.
14. As to the applicant’s argument that she was not in the position to initiate those proceedings as the prohibition in question had not been entered in the land registry, the Court notes that the applicant became aware that there was some sort of restriction on the use of her property in 2016. There is no indication that she was prevented to seek compensation after that date. As to the applicant’s contention that any compensation would have constituted a one-time payment, inadequate to redress the lengthy period during which she could not make use of her property due to the “building prohibition”, the Court notes that the amount of compensation was subject to the parties’ agreement and in the absence of an agreement compensation proceedings were to be initiated before the relevant administrative authority.
15. In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the applicant was required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention to seek compensation under the relevant sections of the 1997 Act for the alleged “building prohibition”. Furthermore, there do not appear to be any exceptional circumstances capable of exempting her from the obligation to exhaust the available domestic remedies.
16. The Court therefore considers that the application is inadmissible for non‑exhaustion of domestic remedies and must be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 12 September 2024.
Liv Tigerstedt Alena Poláčková
Deputy Registrar President