FIFTH SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 28643/23
Maria Dolores CUARTERO LORENTE and Others
against Spain
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 3 April 2025 as a Committee composed of:
Gilberto Felici, President,
María Elósegui,
Kateřina Šimáčková, judges,
and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 28643/23) against the Kingdom of Spain lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 17 July 2023 by the applicants listed in the appended table (“the applicants”) and were represented by Mr P. Catalan Ramos, a lawyer practising in Cartagena.
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The case concerns labour proceedings in which the applicants raise Article 6 of the Convention.
2. On 29 September 2020 the applicants lodged a case with the Cartagena Labour Court no. 1. They complained about a breach of their fundamental rights and their “indemnity guarantee” (garantía de indemnidad) in the context of a labour dispute. They further claimed compensation for the closure of the centre they were employed in. The complaint was rejected in the first instance and the Murcia High Court of Justice upheld the judgment. The Supreme Court declared the appeal on points of law inadmissible.
3. On 19 December 2022 the applicants lodged an amparo appeal before the Constitutional Court. In a decision of 16 March 2023, the Constitutional Court declared the amparo appeal inadmissible. It further ordered that the decision be notified to the applicants and the proceedings be archived unless the prosecutor acting before the Constitutional Court (fiscal ante el Tribunal Constitucional) lodged a request for review (recurso de súplica) within a time-limit of three days.
4. On the same day, the inadmissibility decision was notified to the applicants’ representative via the electronic system of communication Lexnet. The electronic certificate provided detailed information on the history of the electronic communication. In particular, it stated (i) that the communication was sent on 16 March 2023 at 10:21 a.m. and (ii) that the communication was received (lo recoge) by the applicants’ representative on 16 March 2023 at 11:09 a.m.
5. On 4 May 2023 the applicants submitted a letter to the Constitutional Court in which they stated: (i) that they had received the communication of the inadmissibility decision of the amparo appeal on 16 March 2023; (ii) that they had the intention to lodge an application before the European Court of Human Rights raising Article 6 of the Convention; (iii) that they had to justify the starting point of the time-limit to bring the application to the Court; (iv) that the Constitutional Court’s decision was unclear in that respect because the applicants could not possibly know whether or not the prosecutor (see paragraph 3 above) had lodged a request for review of the inadmissibility decision. The applicants requested that the Constitutional Court determine that date (“se necesita precisar dicha fecha”).
6. On 9 May 2023 the Constitutional Court sent the applicants a copy of the inadmissibility decision of 16 March 2023 with an attached statement noting that the final decision had been notified to the representative on 17 March 2023 and that it was final because the prosecutor had not requested its review (súplica).
7. The applicants lodged the application to the Court on 17 July 2023 via registered postal mail.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
8. The applicants complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the findings of the domestic courts were wrong and that the proceedings were unfair. They further alleged that the final decision in their case was the Constitutional Court communication of 9 May 2023 (see paragraph 6 above) by which the latter certified that the prosecutor had not lodged a request for review within a period of three days after the inadmissibility decision.
9. They claimed that according to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the domestic procedural rules, the decision should be considered to have been notified on the following day, that is on 10 May 2023. In particular, they relied on a plenary decision of 6 July 2016 in which the Supreme Court clarified that the notification of a communication made via Lexnet is deemed to have happened on the next working day after accessing it, and the time‑limit should start on the following working day.
10. The applicants added that in any case the inadmissibility decision of the amparo appeal had been received via Lexnet on 16 March 2023 and that this meant that it had been notified on 17 March 2023, according to the above‑mentioned interpretation of the Supreme Court.
11. They also relied on the procedural rules of the Court, according to which the starting point of the four-month time-limit is the day following the notification of the final decision. Consequently, they argued that, in the alternative, the first day of the time-limit in their case was 18 March 2023 and that the final day to submit their application was on 17 July 2023 at midnight. They underlined that the application form was duly completed and sent by registered post on 17 July 2023, and should therefore be considered to have been submitted in due time.
12. In addition, the applicants relied on the Constitutional Court’s statement that the inadmissibility decision had been notified to their representative on 17 March 2023 (see paragraph 6 above).
13. The Court observes that there seems to be a contradiction regarding the date of notification of the inadmissibility decision of the amparo appeal. According to the electronic certificate it was notified on 16 March 2023 but according to the Constitutional Court communication of 9 May 2023 it was notified on 17 March 2023.
14. It reiterates that the four-month rule is a public policy rule and the Court has jurisdiction to apply it of its own motion (see Sabri Güneş v. Turkey [GC], no. 27396/06, § 29, 29 June 2012). The rule marks out the temporal limit of the supervision exercised by the Court and signals, both to individuals and State authorities, the period beyond which such supervision is no longer possible (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, § 138, 20 March 2018).
15. The four-month period runs from the final decision in the process of exhaustion of domestic remedies (see Lekić v. Slovenia [GC], no. 36480/07, § 65, 11 December 2018). Remedies the use of which depends on the discretionary powers of public officials and which are, as a consequence, not directly accessible to the applicant cannot be considered as effective remedies within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention (see Williams v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 32567/06, 17 February 2009). As a rule Article 35 § 1 does not require applicants to have applied for the reopening of proceedings or to have used similar extraordinary remedies and does not allow the four-month time-limit to be extended on the grounds that such remedies have been used (see Haász and Szabó v. Hungary, nos. 11327/14 and 11613/14, §§ 36-37, 13 October 2015).
16. The Court notes that a request for review against the inadmissibility decision of the amparo appeal in a three-day time-limit (see paragraph 3 above) was a legal avenue not available to the applicants but only to the prosecutor acting before the Constitutional Court. Moreover, the applicant’s submission of 4 May 2023 (see paragraph 5 above) cannot be regarded as a remedy against the previous inadmissibility decision but rather a letter to request information. Lastly, the communication issued by the Constitutional Court on 9 May 2023 could not have led to a different outcome of the amparo appeal. In these circumstances, the Court finds that the final decision in the applicants’ case was the inadmissibility decision of 16 March 2023.
17. The Court recalls that the four-month rule is autonomous and must be construed and applied to the facts of each individual case, so as to ensure the effective exercise of the right to individual petition. While taking account of domestic law and practice is an important aspect, it is not decisive in determining the starting point of the four-month period (see Sabri Güneş, cited above, § 52 and 55).
18. The Court notes the applicants’ argument that according to the Supreme Court and in accordance with the domestic procedural rules, a decision must be considered to have been notified on the first working day following the day on which it is received via Lexnet. However, the Court recalls that compliance with the four-month deadline is determined using criteria specific to the Convention, not those of each respondent State’s domestic legislation (see BENet Praha, spol. s r.o. v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 38354/06, 28 September 2010). Indeed, the domestic interpretation of the national procedural rules regarding notifications is not determinative regarding the first day of the four-month time-limit.
19. The Court reiterates that the four-month period starts running from the date on which the applicant and/or his or her representative has sufficient knowledge of the final domestic decision (see Koç and Tosun v. Turkey (dec.), no. 23852/04, 13 November 2008) and that the four-month period runs from the date on which the applicant’s lawyer became aware of the decision completing the exhaustion of domestic remedies, notwithstanding the fact that the applicant only became aware of the decision later (see Çelik v. Turkey (dec.), no. 52991/99, ECHR 2004-X).
20. The Court finds that in the applicants’ case there is no doubt that the representative had access to the content of the final decision on 16 March 2023 at 11:09 a.m. This fact has been acknowledged by the applicants in their allegations and is – first and foremost – attested by the certificate issued by the electronic system Lexnet.
21. The Court is therefore satisfied that the applicants had all the elements necessary to lodge the application with the Court as of 16 March 2023; and that this is the date which is relevant from the aspect of the four-month rule, irrespective of the indication given by the Constitutional Court pointing to another date.
22. For the calculation of the four-month time-limit, it is constant case‑law of the Court that time starts to run on the day following the date on which the final decision has been pronounced in public, or on which the applicant or his/her representative was informed of it, and expires four calendar months later, regardless of the actual duration of those calendar months (see Otto v. Germany (dec.), no. 21425/06, 10 November 2009 and Ataykaya v. Turkey, no. 50275/08, § 40, 22 July 2014).
23. In the applicants’ case, time started to run on 17 March 2023 because the representative had access to the content of the final decision on 16 March 2023. Therefore, the time-limit expired on Sunday, 16 July 2023. The fact that the last day of the four-month period falls on a Saturday, a Sunday or an official holiday and that in such situation, under the domestic law, time-limits are extended to the following working day, does not affect the determination of the dies ad quem (see Sabri Güneş, cited above, § 43 and 61). The Court notes that the application was submitted on 17 July 2023, which was the date when the applicants dispatched a duly completed application form to the Court by registered postal mail. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the application was submitted outside the time-limit allowed and must therefore be declared inadmissible.
24. It follows that the application must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 9 May 2025.
Martina Keller Gilberto Felici
Deputy Registrar President
Appendix
List of applicants:
No.
Applicant’s Name
Year of birth
Nationality
Place of residence
1.
Maria Dolores CUARTERO LORENTE
1969
Spanish
Cartagena
2.
Eloisa Elvira CANO CONESA
1965
Spanish
Cartagena
3.
Josefina FERNANDEZ SANCHEZ
1971
Spanish
Cartagena
4.
Eugenia GARCIA MARTINEZ
1971
Spanish
Cartagena
5.
Miguel HERNANDEZ ROS
1972
Spanish
Cartagena
6.
Josefa Vicenta IVARS LLINARES
1972
Spanish
Cartagena
7.
Benita MARTINEZ CEBRIAN
1968
Spanish
Cartagena
8.
Natalia MARTINEZ VALEROS
1971
Spanish
Cartagena
9.
Gloria MONTALBAN ALVAREZ
1971
Spanish
Cartagena
10.
Francisca MUÑOZ RODRIGUEZ
1965
Spanish
Cartagena
11.
Ana Maria RUBIO CEREZO
1968
Spanish
Cartagena
12.
Jaime SABORIDO MAYOR
1969
Spanish
Cartagena
13.
Maria Angeles SANCHEZ BRIONES
1957
Spanish
Cartagena
14.
Maria Alfonsa SEVILLA MOLINER
1969
Spanish
Cartagena
15.
Dulce Nombre de Maria TRIGO MATEO
1978
Spanish
Cartagena
16.
Angela VIUDES SANCHEZ
1972
Spanish
Cartagena
17.
Rosa Maria ZAPLANA VERGARA
1971
Spanish
Cartagena