AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 12391/86
by John DI STEFANO
against the United Kingdom
The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on
13 April 1989, the following members being present:
MM. S. TRECHSEL, Acting President
F. ERMACORA
G. SPERDUTI
E. BUSUTTIL
G. JÖRUNDSSON
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
J.C. SOYER
H.G. SCHERMERS
H. DANELIUS
H. VANDENBERGHE
Mrs. G.H. THUNE
Sir Basil HALL
MM. F. MARTINEZ
C.L. ROZAKIS
Mrs. J. LIDDY
Mr. L. LOUCAIDES
Mr. H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 14 October 1985
by John DI STEFANO against the United Kingdom and registered on
27 August 1986 under file No. 12391/86.
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the
Rules of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is an Italian citizen born in 1955 and resident
in Cambridge. The applicant is represented by the Legal Department
of United Air Travel (Services) Ltd. The facts as submitted by the
parties may be summarised as follows.
On 19 June 1984, the applicant was arrested on a charge of
fraud. He was released on bail. On 21 August 1984, the applicant was
arrested again and charged with offences committed in July and August
1984. His solicitor was informed of his arrest that day and was
present when the police searched the applicant's home and her own
office under warrant. The applicant appeared before the Magistrates
Court the same day. The police asked for conditions of bail to ensure
his future attendance since they feared he would abscond. These
conditions included surrender of his passport, reporting to the police
station and £15,000 bail. The applicant however could not fulfil
these conditions and remained in police custody.
The applicant was brought before the Guildhall Justices on
23 August 1984. The notes of the court clerk record that the charge
which the applicant faced was a holding charge. The Detective
Inspector in court gave an assurance that a decision on the
substantive charges would be made next day and the applicant brought
to court again as soon as possible. The Detective Inspector is also
recorded as explaining that the applicant had been arrested with
others in connection with a worldwide fraud and that he had refused
access to the applicant by his solicitor as that could prejudice his
enquiries. The Court granted bail subject to conditions. Since these
conditions were not fulfilled, the applicant was retained in custody
until 24 August 1984, when a full bail application was made on his
behalf by a legal representative. The application was refused.
In September 1984, a bail application before Mr. Justice Otten
was adjourned and in November 1984, bail was subsequently refused when
the police informed the judge that the applicant was part of organised
crime with connections in the United States and that they feared that
he might abscond.
In February 1985 the applicant was committed for trial without
another application for bail being heard. In March 1985, a bail
application was heard in the Central Criminal Court but refused.
Following a complaint by the applicant that remand in custody for
such a long period was oppressive and illegal, it was ordered by
Mr. Justice John Owen that his trial date be fixed for 23 September
1985. The prosecution applied unsuccessfully to break the fixture in
May 1985. In June 1985, a bail application failed following an
allegation by the prosecution that the applicant had written to
prosecution witnesses offering money to them in return for failing
to appear. The letters however were not produced in Court.
Further bail applications were refused by Mr. Justice Tudor
Price on 2 August, 8 August and 28 August 1985 on the grounds that the
trial was fixed for September. The prosecution did not inform the
Court that an application was to be made to the Court to postpone the
trial. On 6 September 1985, the prosecution informed the Court that
they wished to join another defendant to the indictment and that this
person was awaiting "extradition" in Gibraltar. The judge ordered the
trial to be postponed to the Spring.
On 20 September 1985, the applicant applied for bail once
more. The applicant alleges that, when the judge appeared willing
to grant bail, the prosecution stated that they preferred in such
circumstances to proceed without waiting for the "extradition" to be
completed. The trial was subsequently fixed for November 1985. The
trial began on 13 November 1985 and lasted until 19 March 1986, the
indictment against the applicant containing 11 counts of fraud. The
trial involved over 100 witnesses and approximately 3,000 pages of
documents.
The applicant was convicted on 19 March 1986 of three counts
and acquitted of the rest. He was sentenced to a total of five years'
imprisonment: fraudulent trading (2 years imprisonment), conspiracy
to obtain property by deception (3 years) and obtaining £80,000 by
deception (18 months concurrent to the first two consecutive
sentences). On 14 August 1986, he was granted leave to appeal against
conviction. His appeal was heard on 27 January 1987 but was dismissed
by the Court of Appeal.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains that, by the time his trial was
concluded, he had been in custody for almost 19 months. The applicant
contends that this is an unreasonable time to be held in custody
awaiting trial and invokes Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention. He
contends that the police allegations against him were false, and that
since his family were settled in England, there would have been no
risk that he would abscond.
The applicant also complains that on his arrest he was refused
access to his lawyer or the Italian consulate. He alleges that he was
not allowed to see a solicitor from 21 to 24 August 1984 and that he
did not in fact see a solicitor until after his bail application on
24 August had been refused and he had been remanded in custody.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The application was introduced on 14 October 1985 and
registered on 27 August 1986. On 13 July 1987, the Commission decided
to invite the respondent Government to provide information on the
application pursuant to Rule 42 para. 2 (a) of the Commission's Rules
of Procedure. The Government submitted the information on 8 September
1987 and the applicant submitted his comments in reply on 11 October
1987.
The Commission considered the admissibility of the application
on 9 March 1988 and decided to invite the Government to submit
observations on the admissibility and merits of the applicant's
complaint of refusal of access to his solicitor. The Government
submitted their observations on 13 May 1988 and the applicant
submitted his observations in reply on 20 July 1988 after a one month
extension of the time-limit.
On 10 March 1989, the Commission again examined the
admissibility of the application and decided to adjourn its
examination.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
A. The respondent Government
1. The facts
The applicant was the Director and Controller of a company
called Mastbid Limited. Whilst the company was insolvent from May to
June 1984 the applicant purchased by deception video tapes valued in
excess of £500,000. This was the offence of fraudulent trading for
which he was arrested on 19 June 1984 and later granted bail. Between
July and August 1984 the applicant with others operated an
organisation which purported to be a bank and was also known as
Mastbid Limited. The applicant and his associates circulated banking
documentation throughout Western Europe, the Far East and the United
States of America. The face value of the documentation was in excess
of £25 million; and the eventual loss to customers was put at between
2 and 3 million US dollars. The applicant was arrested in respect of
these offences in August 1984 and remained in custody until his
conviction.
The applicant was arrested at 11.40 on 19 June 1984 and taken
to Wood Street police station in the City of London. His custody
record shows that on that date he was permitted to telephone his
solicitor, Miss Robinson, at 22.50. He received a visit from his
solicitor at 10.40 on 20 June and made a comprehensive statement to
the police in the presence of his solicitor between 10.50 and 14.50 on
that day. The applicant was charged at 21.41 on 20 June and remained
in custody until his appearance before the Guildhall Justices at 9.00
on 21 June.
It was necessary to delay giving permission for the applicant
to contact his solicitor on 19 June because, during that period, other
persons suspected of involvement in the crime were being arrested and
premises suspected of containing material evidence were being searched.
It was feared that knowledge of the applicant's arrest could have led
to suspects absconding and evidence being destroyed.
On 21 August 1984 at 17.05 the applicant was arrested in
connection with offences of obtaining property by deception and
conspiracy. His solicitor, Miss Robinson, was informed of his arrest
at 20.00 on that day. She was present when, at 20.10 that evening,
the applicant's home was searched by police acting under a warrant.
Immediately following the search of the applicant's home, Miss
Robinson's office was also searched under a warrant and property
relating to the crimes was seized.
The applicant was brought before the Guildhall Justices at
10.10 on 23 August 1984, when he was remanded back into police custody
until he could meet the conditions of his bail. He was permitted
access to his solicitor while he was at the Guildhall court. He
appeared before the justices again on 24 August, when he was further
remanded into prison custody until 30 August.
Notwithstanding the note taken by the clerk of the court,
Detective Inspector's recollection remains that the applicant's
solicitor was not denied access to him between 20 and 23 August 1984.
There is no police record which supports the applicant's solicitor's
contention in this respect. The applicant must have had legal advice
by 24 August because he was legally represented when an application
for bail was made on that day.
2. Domestic law and practice
The law governing the right of access to legal advice for
persons in custody is now contained in Section 58 of the Police and
Criminal Evidence Act 1984. That Act came into force on 1 January
1986. However, the events in issue in this application took place in
1984, and were accordingly not governed by the Police and Criminal
Evidence Act.
At the relevant time a detained person's access to a solicitor
was covered by the Judges' Rules. These Rules, which related to the
treatment of persons suspected of crime, were issued by the judges of
the Queen's Bench Division in 1964.
The Rules are preceded by a number of principles, which are
statements of the common law, against which the Rules are to be read.
Paragraph (c) recalls:
"That every person at any stage of an investigation
should be able to communicate and to consult privately
with a solicitor. This is so even if he is in custody
provided that in such a case no unreasonable delay or
hindrance is caused to the processes of investigation
or the administration of justice by his doing so."
3. Admissibility and merits
The Government submit firstly that the fact that the applicant
did not have access to his solicitor in relation to his bail
application of 23 August 1984 could not in itself constitute a
violation of the Convention. In the Neumeister judgment, Series A no.
8, paras. 22-24, the Court, in relation to the principle of equality
of arms inherent in Article 6 para. 1, did "not consider however that
this principle is applicable to the examination of requests for
provisional release". (See also the Decision of the Commission on the
admissibility of Application No. 6541/74, X v. FRG, D.R. 1, p. 82).
The Government accordingly submit that the provisions of Article 6
para. 3 (b) and (c), which are specific applications of the principle
set out in Article 6 para. 1, have no application to proceedings
relating to the examination of requests for provisional release, such
as bail applications. In the circumstances, the fact that the
applicant was not legally represented in relation to his bail
application on 23 August 1984, and that such representation was not
available until his next application on the following day, did not
constitute a violation of Article 6 para. 3 (b) or (c) of the
Convention.
Second, the Government submit that the reason recorded for the
denial of access was sufficient, and that this did not affect the
fairness of the applicant's trial, when the proceedings are taken as a
whole. The Government also note that the applicant has not complained
that the trial which took place between November 1985 and March 1986
was itself unfair. His complaint relates solely to the denial of
access to a solicitor for three days in August 1984; it does not
appear to be related to the fairness of the applicant's trial.
The reason recorded for the denial of access, namely that
contact with his solicitor could be prejudicial to the police
inquiries, was sufficient to justify the measure taken. It was known
that the applicant was involved with a number of others suspected of
involvement in crimes involving substantial amounts of money. The
applicant's solicitor's office had been searched and property relating
to the applicant's offences was seized. In the circumstances, it is
submitted that denial of access to a solicitor during the limited
period in question was not a disproportionate measure, having regard
to the aim pursued and having regard to the substantial amount of time
that the applicant had to prepare a defence to the charges on which he
was ultimately tried.
As regards the position under Article 6 para. 3 (b), it
appears that when the applicant appeared in court on 23 August 1984 he
was only subject to a holding charge. Other charges may have been
preferred on 24 August and possibly later. Whenever the charges were
preferred, the applicant would not have been aware of the full extent
of the prosecution case against him until he was committed for trial
in February 1985. Although a defendant is made aware of the nature of
the allegations against him when he is charged, it is only at the
committal proceedings that he receives copies of the statements of
witnesses who are to give evidence against him. The greater part of
the preparation of the applicant's case would have taken place between
the committal in February 1985 and the start of the trial in November
1985. Given that the applicant was, until 24 August 1984, detained
only on a holding charge and could not therefore have known the
greater part of the prosecution's case against him, it is difficult to
see how denial of access to a solicitor during the period in question
could have had any effect on the preparation of a defence to the
charges which were the subject of the trial. The Government therefore
submit that denial of access to a solicitor between his arrest on 21
August and the second appearance in court on 24 August cannot have had
any effect on the applicant's ability to prepare his defence, nor to
defend himself at trial.
As regards Article 6 para. 3 (c), it appears that the
applicant had access to legal assistance of his own choosing at least
from 24 August when he did have the services of a lawyer to make a
full bail application. There is no suggestion that the applicant
experienced any difficulties in obtaining legal assistance of his own
choosing after the period 21 to 23 August 1984, or indeed at any other
time before his trial started in November 1985. As explained above,
the greater part of the preparation of the applicant's case would have
taken place in the period from February to November 1985. In the
circumstances, the Government submit that the applicant has failed to
show that, if he was denied access to his solicitor from 21-23 August,
this affected his ability to defend himself in person or through legal
assistance of his own choosing at his trial or at any stage of his
preparation for that trial.
B. The applicant
1. The facts
While the applicant had access to a solicitor on 24 August
1984 when he was represented at a bail application, he was not
permitted to speak to his solicitor before or during the application.
He was only able to speak to the solicitor briefly after the
application. In such circumstances the bail application was bound to
be jeopardised, the applicant not being in a position properly to
instruct his legal advisers.
2. Domestic law and practice
i) The Judges' Rules
The main purpose of the Judges' Rules is to give guidelines as
to when evidence may be deemed inadmissible by reason of having been
obtained in potentially unproper circumstances. Paragraph c of the
Rules sets out a fundamental principle unaffected by the Rules.
The Judges' Rules were however established as guidelines
without the force of law. They are prefixed by a letter to the police
force in general whereby the police officers are exhorted "to try to
be fair" and "scrupulously to avoid any method which could be regarded
as in any way unfair or oppressive".
ii) Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 came into force on
3 January 1986. Whilst it is conceded that at the time of the
applicant's detention by the police that Act was not in force, it is
submitted that its provisions are relevant in determining whether or
not in the circumstances of this matter the police were justified in
refusing access to lawyers for a period of some three days. It is
submitted that the Act is a valuable source in this regard because it
codifies existing practice, and establishes the guidelines that the
British Parliament recognises as constituting proper procedure. In
this respect it is based to some extent on the pre-existing Judges'
Rules, and is relevant in providing a benchmark of approved practice
against which the practice in the circumstances of this matter can be
considered. The relevant provisions of the Police and Criminal
Evidence Act relied upon are set out below:
"58 (1) A person arrested and held in custody in a police
station or other premises shall be entitled, if he so
requests, to consult a solicitor privately at any time.
(4) If a person makes such a request, he must be permitted
to consult a solicitor as soon as is practicable except to
the extent that delay is permitted by the Section.
(5) In any case he must be permitted to consult a solicitor
within 36 hours from the relevant time, as defined in
Section 41 (2) above.
(6) Delay in compliance with a request is only permitted:
(a) in the case of a person who is in police
detention for a serious arrestable offence; and
(b) if an officer of at least the rank of
superintendent authorises it."
The applicant will submit that the enactment of the Police and
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 evidences an approved code of practice, and
that deviance from the code will constitute an unacceptable breach,
and potentially a violation of a human right.
iii) Criminal Law Act 1977
Section 62 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 provides:
"Where any person has been arrested and is being held in
custody in a police station or other premises, he shall
be entitled to have intimation of his arrest and of the
place where he is being held sent to one person reasonably
named by him, without delay or, where some delay is
necessary in the interest of the investigation or of
prevention of crime or the apprehension of offenders,
with no more delay than is so necessary."
3. Admissibility and merits
The Government contend that the entitlement under para. 3 (c)
of Article 6 to legal assistance is not an entitlement to such legal
assistance for the purposes of bail applications, but is simply an
entitlement to enable a proper defence to be prepared. The applicant
denies that such a construction is to be placed on the provisions of
Article 6. The decision in Neumeister simply concerns the proper
construction to be placed on "equality of arms". The applicant knows
of no authority for the proposition that access to a lawyer may be
refused when a bail application is pending. However, even if the
Government's interpretation of Article 6 is in this respect correct,
the applicant was denied access to a solicitor altogether, and not
merely for the purposes of the pending bail application. The
applicant was unfamiliar with police procedure and the provisions of
the criminal law; his denial of access to a legal adviser coupled with
his first period of imprisonment in police custody, constituted a
severe violation of his rights, and jeopardised his ability adequately
to prepare his defence.
The applicant denies that the reasons given for denial of
access to a lawyer were sufficient and submits that the fairness of
his trial was affected. The reasons given for denial of access - that
access "may be prejudicial to enquiries" - were vague and ambiguous.
Reading between the lines of the Court record however, it is to be
inferred that the involvement of "others" and the "worldwide" nature
of the alleged offence may have been features thought by the police to
warrant a denial of access. The Government have submitted no evidence
to substantiate their allegations that the applicant was involved with
a number of others suspected of involvement in crimes concerning large
amounts of money. The applicant alone was charged and tried in
relation to this matter. The only connection with "worldwide"
offences was the maintenance of accounts or connections with banking
corporations in London, whose head offices are located overseas. In
the circumstances, it is almost impossible to meet the Government's
submission that denial was justified for the reasons recorded, as it
is far from clear what reason is relied upon.
The applicant submits that the reasons given on later
occasions for the refusal of bail following an objection was by the
police to the granting of bail were erroneous, misconceived or plainly
wrong.
It is also suggested that the fact that the applicant's
solicitor's office was searched in itself was reason to prevent the
applicant from having access to that solicitor. The applicant would
not have insisted upon access to that particular solicitor, but simply
required access to competent legal advice which was denied him.
The applicant submits that it is not for him to establish how
a solicitor, had he had access to such a solicitor at an early stage,
would have assisted him. It is sufficient for him to establish that
he was denied access in circumstances which establish a violation of
his rights. The applicant submits that a fair trial was thereby
precluded and that had he had earlier access the outcome would have
been very different.
The applicant submits that the primary basis of his conviction
was the evidence of police officers Couling and Randall. The police
officers referred to alleged conversations, unsigned statements and
alleged admissions made in the three day period of incommunicado. The
police notes of these conversations were not produced at the trial,
and were alleged to have been lost. The applicant submits that if he
had been granted proper legal representation for the duration of those
three days, evidence would have been available to the Court in a
proper form on the basis of a note of the question and answer
session. Those notes would have shown that no admissions or other
concessions were given by the applicant. The applicant's counsel
challenged the police evidence on the basis of breach of the Judges'
Rules but with no success. Moreover, the applicant submits that
police officers seized a number of documents in the three day period
and did not provide a proper receipt for those documents, thereby
hindering the applicant's preparation of a defence.
The Government maintain that from 24 August 1984 full and free
access was given to legal advice. The applicant denies that full and
free access to legal advisers was made available to him thereafter; it
was only available to him on an intermittent basis.
The applicant submits that by reason of the refusal of access
to a lawyer at an early and crucial stage in the proceedings, the
applicant's trial was thereby prejudiced. The applicant contends that
the police conduct in maintaining him in communicado for a period of
more than three days constitutes a prima facie breach of the Judges'
Rules. The Judges' Rules declare that everyone is entitled to
communicate and to consult privately with a solicitor. This was not
permitted. It is submitted by the applicant that "no unreasonable
delay or hindrance" would have been caused to the process of
investigation or the administration of justice by such access, and
that the police have failed to prove that there was even a reasonable
suggestion that such hindrance or delay would have thereby occurred.
The applicant also submits that no intimation of his whereabouts was
given to the solicitor of his choosing contrary to Section 62 of the
Criminal Law Act. It is also clear that the proper procedure as
recognised in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 was not
observed.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complains that he was prevented from contacting
the Italian consulate and from seeing his solicitor during the first
four days of his arrest.
The Commission has examined these complaints under Article 6
para. 3 (b) and (c) (Art. 6-3-b, 6-3-c) of the Convention which provides that:
"Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following
minimum rights:
...
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation
of his defence;
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance
of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to
pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the
interests of justice so require..."
As regards his complaint concerning the Italian consulate, the
Commission notes that the applicant has lived in England for many
years and has apparently no difficulty with the English language.
There is no indication that the applicant was in any way prejudiced in
the criminal proceedings against him by the temporary refusal of
access to the consulate.
As regards the applicant's complaint concerning access to his
solicitor, the Commission first observes that the Convention does not
expressly guarantee the right of an accused to communicate freely with
his defence counsel for the preparation of his defence, though the
fact that this right is not specifically mentioned does not mean that
it may not be implicitly inferred from its provisions, in particular those of
Article 6 para. 3 (b) and (c) (Art. 6-3-b, 6-3-c). The right for an accused to
communicate with his lawyer has been recognised by the Commission as a
fundamental part of the preparation of his defence. However such a right to
have conversations with one's lawyer and exchange confidential instructions
cannot be said to be insusceptible of restriction (see e.g. Can v. Austria,
No. 9300/81, Comm. Rep 12.7.84, Eur. Court H.R., Series A no. 96, p. 17 and
Egue v. France, No. 11256/85, Dec. 5.9.88, to be published in D.R.).
As held by the Commission in the Can case (loc. cit.), the guarantees
enshrined in Article 6 para. 3 (Art. 6-3) are not an aim in themselves but must
be interpreted in light of the general principle of fairness laid down in
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.
The Commission must therefore consider whether the restrictions imposed
on the applicant's access to his solicitor were in conformity with these
provisions of the Convention.
It appears that the applicant was held in custody from 17.05 p.m. on 21
August until 24 August 1984 without seeing his solicitor. The Commission
recalls that the note of the court clerk records that the applicant had been
refused access to his solicitor as the police feared that it could prejudice
their enquiries. The Commission notes in this regard that on 21 August 1984
the police had already searched the applicant's solicitors office under warrant
concerning the offences with which the applicant was charged.
The period during which the applicant was denied access to his
solicitor was comparatively short, at most two and a half days. Thereafter, he
had the possibility for over one year prior to his trial to communicate with
his solicitor and to prepare his defence. The applicant has not contended that
he had insufficient contact with his solicitor to enable him to prepare his
defence.
The applicant alleges, however, that during the short initial period in
which he was denied access to his solicitor the police took certain documents
and that at his trial, police officers referred to alleged admissions made by
him during this period, which he could have refuted if his solicitor had been
present to note his answers to police questioning. The Commission finds
however that these allegations, the latter of which is somewhat hypothetical,
have not been substantiated.
In light of the above circumstances, the Commission finds that, on the
facts of the case, the applicant has not established that the non-access to his
solicitor during the initial period of two and a half days of detention
prejudiced the preparation of his defence or the fairness of his trial.
The possibility of communicating with a lawyer at the initial stage of
the proceedings may also be required by Article 6 para. 3 (c) (Art. 6 -3-c) of
the Convention in respect of the important function which defence
counsel may perform in challenging the lawfulness of any measures
taken in the course of the investigations, and in particular, the
legality of any detention. The Commission notes in the present case
however that on 24 August 1984 a full bail application was made to the
Court on behalf of the applicant by his legal representative.
The Commission consequently finds no appearance of a violation
of Article 6 para. 3 (b) and (c) (Art. 6-3-b, 6-3-c)of the Convention.
It follows that these complaints are manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
2. The applicant also complains of the length of his detention on
remand prior to his trial. He invokes Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the
Convention. The Commission has however examined this complaint under
Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention.
Insofar as relevant, Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention
provides:
"Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the
provisions of para. 1, sub-para. c of this (Art. 5-1-c) Article
shall be ... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release
pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to
appear for trial."
The period, the reasonableness of which the Commission is
called upon to consider, starts on the 21 August 1984, when the
applicant was arrested. The period ends on 18 March 1986, the date of
the applicant's conviction. Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) does not apply to the
period subsequent to the conviction in first instance. After the
conviction the applicant was detained in accordance with Article 5
para. 1 (a) (Art. 5-1-a) of the Convention, which provides for "the lawful
detention of a person after conviction by a competent court" (cf. Eur.
Court H.R., Wemhoff judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A No. 7). The
relevant period therefore lasted almost nineteen months.
The applicant alleges that the length of his detention on
remand exceeded a "reasonable time" as guaranteed by Article 5 para. 3 (Art.
5-3). Whether the length of detention pending trial is reasonable cannot be
determined in abstracto. It is primarily on the basis of the reasons stated in
the decisions relating to applications for release and of the facts mentioned
by the applicant in his appeals that the question of violation must be
considered (Eur. Court H.R., Neumeister judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A no.
8, p. 37, para. 5).
The applicant made numerous applications for release on bail during his
detention but these were consistently refused. It appears that, in opposing
bail, the police relied on the gravity of the charges and also stated that the
applicant had links with organised crime in the United States. The police
further relied on the risk that the applicant would abscond alleging that he
had no ties with the United Kingdom. The Commission notes in this regard that,
while the applicant contends that he has strong ties with the United Kingdom
since he and his family have been settled there for 20 years, the applicant is
still an Italian citizen. On another occasion, during the applicant's
detention, the police informed the Court that the applicant had been making
improper approaches to prosecution witnesses.
The Commission also notes that in the present case the charges against
the applicant were of significant complexity. The applicant was charged on 11
counts of fraud involving large sums of money. The complexity of the matter is
also indicated by the length of the trial, which appears to have taken four
months, from 13 November 1985 to 19 March 1986, and involved 100 witnesses and
over 3,000 pages of documents. As regards the handling of the case by the
authorities, the Commission notes that, although the police requested a
postponement of the trial to Spring 1986 in order to join another defendant to
the indictment, who was awaiting extradition from Gibraltar, the prosecution
nonetheless allowed the trial to begin in November 1986 when it became apparent
that on further delay the judge would grant the applicant bail.
The Commission finds that the reasons given by the authorities for
refusing bail were relevant and sufficient to justify the applicant's continued
detention, and that, the length of time in detention prior to trial was not
unreasonable given the complex fraud charges in issue. The Commission
therefore concludes that there is no appearance of a violation of Article 5
para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
Secretary to the Commission Acting President of the Commission
(H.C. KRÜGER) (S. TRECHSEL)