Legal summary
March 2026
D.A. and R.A. v. the United Kingdom - 46692/19
Judgment 17.3.2026 [Section II]
Article 14
Discrimination
Non-exemption of lone parents working under 16 hours per week, with children under the age of two, from scope of revised monetary cap on the amount of annual welfare household benefits: no violation
Facts – In 2013 the Government introduced secondary legislation imposing a cap of 26,000 British pounds (“GBP”) per annum on the total amount of welfare benefits households other than those comprising a sole adult could receive (“the original benefit cap”). The cap did not apply to lone parents if the lone parent claiming benefits worked at least 16 hours per week. In 2016 primary legislation was introduced reducing the benefit cap to GBP 23,000 per annum for households other than those comprising a sole adult in London and GBP 20,000 for such households outside of London (“the revised benefit cap”). Lone parents who worked at least 16 hours per week continued to be exempt from the cap.
The first applicant is the mother of the second applicant, who was born in June 2017. Between June 2017 and June 2019, the first applicant was therefore the lone parent of a child under the age of two years old and was subject to the revised benefit cap. She was not entitled to any free childcare during this period as at that time the Government offered free childcare in respect of all children aged three and four years old and certain children aged two years old but not in respect of children under two years old.
In January 2017 a number of individuals including the first applicant issued a claim for judicial review arguing that: (i) the application of the revised benefit cap to lone parents of children under the age of two – who, because of their caring responsibilities, found it unduly difficult to work the 16 hours per week necessary to exempt themselves from the revised benefit cap – constituted unlawful discrimination contrary to Article 14 of the Convention read with Article 8 and/or Article 1 of Protocol No. 1; and (ii) the application of the revised benefit cap to children under the age of two with lone parents constituted unlawful discrimination contrary to Article 14 read with Article 8. Although successful on both grounds at first instance that decision was overturned on appeal. Subsequently the Supreme Court upheld the appellate judgment finding that there had been no Convention-related discrimination on account of the application of the revised benefit cap to lone parents of children under the age of two.
Law – Article 14 in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and/or Article 8:
(1) Whether the applicants enjoyed a “status” for the purposes of Article 14 – Although the treatment of which the applicants complained did not fall within one of the specific grounds listed in Article 14, the Court, referring to its relevant case-law, found that they enjoyed an “other status” within the meaning of that provision. However, it noted in that connection that the question of “status” did not operate in isolation from other aspects of the discrimination inquiry. In particular, it might inform the scope of the margin of appreciation to be afforded to the Contracting State when assessing whether a difference in treatment (or failure to treat differently) was justified on objective and reasonable grounds.
(2) Whether the Government had failed to treat differently persons whose situations were significantly different – Benefit claimants were able to escape effects of the revised benefit cap if they worked for at least 16 hours per week. However, lone parents of children under the age of five years old – i.e. children who were not yet in compulsory full-time education and who, by virtue of their young age, were particularly dependent on their primary caregivers – were likely to face greater difficulty in working a 16-hour week than others subject to the revised benefit cap, such as lone parents with children in full-time education and couples with children of any age. That difficulty was particularly pronounced for lone parents of children under the age of two because they had not been entitled to any free childcare unlike all lone parents of children aged three and four and certain lone parents of children aged two (entitled to 15 hours of free childcare per week) and working lone parents of children aged three and four (entitled to 30 hours of free childcare per week). As a result, lone parents of children under the age of two faced a considerable additional barrier to being able to work 16 hours a week and thereby exempt themselves from the effects of the revised benefit cap. That was a factor which differentiated, to a significant extent, lone parents of children under the age of two – and, by virtue of the interwoven nature of the first and second applicants’ claims, children under the age of two with lone parents – from all others subject to the cap.
Accordingly, the Court found that the applicant cohorts had been in a significantly different situation as compared to the generality of those subject to the revised benefit cap. The fact that the precise impact of that cap on a particular household would have depended on a range of factors, was not sufficient to displace its finding. Furthermore, although after the lodging of the present application, the Government had begun to progressively expand the availability of free childcare for eligible working parents of young children, non-working parents of children under the age of two remained ineligible for free childcare.
(3) Whether the Government’s failure to exempt the applicant cohorts from the effects of the revised benefit cap was objectively and reasonably justified –
(a) Status and the margin of appreciation – Each of the applicants’ statuses was based on a combination of characteristics that were neither inherent nor immutable. Moreover, the Court was unable to conclude that the applicant cohorts formed part of distinct groups historically subject to prejudice with lasting consequences, resulting in their social exclusion, such that – irrespective of whether their characteristics were inherent or immutable – a particularly narrow margin of appreciation ought to apply. In that regard, although the first applicant’s situation might entail certain practical vulnerabilities, there was no allegation of indirect discrimination on grounds of sex. Therefore, in the circumstances the Government were not required to show “very weighty reasons” for their failure to treat the applicant cohorts differently.
(b) General measures of economic or social strategy and the margin of appreciation – In a case such as the present one concerning a general measure of socio-economic policy, the margin of appreciation afforded to Contracting States was, in principle, wide, especially in circumstances where the Government were not required to show “very weighty reasons” for their failure to treat the applicant cohorts differently. The Court had previously held in the context of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 8 that it would generally respect the legislature’s policy choice in matters of general measures of economic or social strategy unless that choice was “manifestly without reasonable foundation”. In Savickis and Others v. Latvia [GC] it had observed, however, that it’s application of the “manifestly without reasonable foundation” standard in the context of Article 14 read with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 had usually been limited to circumstances where an alleged difference in treatment had resulted from a corrective transitional measure.
As it was disputed whether that standard should be applied to the facts of the present case, the Court considered it necessary to examine its relevant case-law. It that connection it observed that J.D. and A v. the United Kingdom and Savickis and Others, in which it had not applied the standard outside the context of corrective transitional measures, had both involved statuses which had required “very weighty reasons” to be advanced by the respondent State to justify a difference in treatment. Conversely, in cases where “very weighty reasons” had not been required to be shown, the Court had applied the standard outside the context of corrective transitional measures. The Court therefore considered that the “manifestly without reasonable foundation” standard might be applied outside the context of corrective transitional measures where the respondent State was not required to show “very weighty reasons” to justify a difference in treatment or failure to treat differently.
In addition, the Court observed that the revised benefit cap had been subject to considerable legislative and judicial scrutiny at the domestic level. It had been adopted following examination by both Houses of Parliament, including by parliamentarians who had heard evidence from interested parties regarding the effect of the cap on lone parents with young children and who had specifically considered a proposal to exempt carers of children under the age of two from its application. The effect of the revised benefit cap on the Convention rights of the applicant cohorts had been subsequently assessed in detail by the High Court, the Court of Appeal and a seven-judge panel of the Supreme Court. Such factors further reinforced the appropriateness of a wide margin of appreciation being afforded to the Government. Finally, although a number of the recommendations of the House of Commons Work and Pensions Select Committee (“the Select Committee”) regarding the benefit cap had not been accepted, its findings had been carefully considered by the Government.
(c) The best interests of the child – The Court had regard to the best interests of the child when assessing proportionality in the present case. The revised benefit cap was a measure which concerned children, even if indirectly, and there was a broad consensus, including in international law, in support of the idea that, in all decisions concerning children, their best interests was of paramount importance. During the parliamentary process, the introduction of the revised benefit cap had been actively justified by reference to the best interests of the child.
(d) The assessment of proportionality – The Court found that the Government’s decision not to exempt the applicant cohorts from the revised benefit cap had not been “manifestly without reasonable foundation” and had fallen within their wide margin of appreciation.
Firstly, it had not been disputed that the Government had demonstrated a causal connection – even if modest – between the imposition of the benefit cap and capped households moving into work. In any event, the work incentivisation objective had not been the only aim of the Government’s policy. Notably, the cap had been introduced to achieve fairness between benefit claimants and the taxpayer, having regard to the need to maintain public confidence in the benefits system. Although the applicants and the Select Committee had suggested the fairness objective had been flawed because families in work had been already better off and the cap had not accounted for additional benefits that in-work families could receive, the precise level at which the benefit cap had been set had been within the Government’s margin of appreciation.
Secondly, the Government had had regard to the impact of the revised benefit cap on households with young children when the relevant Bill was passing through Parliament. A proposal to exempt carers (including lone parents) of children under the age of two from the cap’s application, motivated expressly by the fact that such carers faced particular barriers to working, had been rejected in the House of Commons. Other amendments in the House of Lords seeking to exclude certain parents of young children and child-related benefits from the cap had been either rejected or withdrawn. In response to amendments and concerns raised during the parliamentary process regarding the revised cap’s impact on parents with young children, the Government had expressed the view that it was in the best interests of children overall to have parents in work and that work remained the surest route out of poverty, noting that reducing spending on welfare would allow the Government to protect expenditure on education, childcare and health, which would in turn have a positive impact on children and their best interests.
Thirdly, at the time the present application had been lodged, other childcare-related State support had been available to the applicant cohorts. Lone parents who worked at least 16 hours per week could recover up to 70% of eligible childcare costs up to a certain limit, and lone parents in receipt of Universal Credit who had been either in paid work or had an offer of paid work could recover up to 85% of eligible costs up to a certain limit regardless of the precise number of hours they had worked. The Government had also made financial support by way of Discretionary Housing Payments (“DHP”) funding available for benefit cap claimants which had not been contingent on recipients being in work. During debates in Parliament, the Government had noted that DHP funding had been available to deal with hard cases such as those involving parents with young children. In addition, as at the time of the Supreme Court’s judgment and the Government’s observations, Government guidance had specifically listed households with children under the age of two as possible recipients of DHP funding.
Finally, after the present application had been lodged and the parties had submitted their observations, the Government had introduced free childcare for eligible working parents of children under the age of two. Although not available for non-working parents, the increased provision of free childcare for the parents of very young children would have further alleviated the effect of the revised benefit cap as it applied to the applicant cohorts.
Conclusion: no violation (unanimously).
(See Thlimmenos v. Greece [GC], 34369/97, 6 April 2000, Legal Summary; Paulík v. Slovakia, 10699/05, 10 October 2006, Legal Summary; Stummer v. Austria [GC], 37452/02, 7 July 2011, Legal Summary; J.D. and A v. the United Kingdom, 32949/17 and 34614/17, 24 October 2019, Legal Summary; Popović and Others v. Serbia, 26944/13 et al., 30 June 2020, Legal Summary; Šaltinytė v. Lithuania, 32934/19, 26 October 2021, Legal Summary; Savickis and Others v. Latvia [GC], 49270/11, 9 June 2022, Legal Summary)
© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
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