Information Note on the Court’s case-law 14
January 2000
Daktaras v. Lithuania (dec.) - 42095/98
Decision 11.1.2000 [Section III]
Article 6
Criminal proceedings
Article 6-1
Impartial tribunal
Judge lodging an appeal and appointing the judges that will decide upon it: admissible
Article 6-2
Presumption of innocence
Statement by prosecutor in interlocutory decision that he considers the accused guilty: admissible
Impact of media campaign on criminal proceedings: inadmissible
Statements by high-ranking officials in connection with pending criminal proceedings: admissible
The applicant was twice convicted of affray in the 1970’s and had to serve a prison sentence for robbery until the early 1990’s. In 1996, with the authorisation of a Deputy Prosecutor General, he was arrested under the Code of Criminal Procedure, which at the time of arrest permitted preventive detention in matters relating to organised crime. Two sets of criminal proceedings were instituted against him, one for array and the other on suspicion of his being involved in claiming and obtaining a ransom of USD 7,000 for a stolen car. His detention on remand was ordered in respect of the ransom case and he was charged on four counts, notably for having obtained property by threats of force. After the closure of the pre-trial investigations in the ransom case, the applicant presented his pleadings to the prosecutor who, in an interlocutory decision in October 1996, declared that the evidence gathered clearly demonstrated his guilt. In February 1997 he was convicted by the Regional Court, on two of the four counts, and notably as a principal offender in obtaining property by threats of force. He was, inter alia, sentenced to seven years and six months’ imprisonment, being referred to in the judgment as being “one of the leaders of the underworld” following the testimonies of several witnesses. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeal which found that he should only be convicted as a secondary party with regard to the offence of obtaining property by threats of force; the prison sentence was confirmed. He lodged a further appeal with the Supreme Court. The judge who had delivered the first instance judgment asked the president of the Criminal Division of the Supreme Court to lodge a cassation petition to have the appeal judgment quashed and the Regional Court judgment upheld. The president of the Criminal Division did so and also appointed the three judges of the Criminal Division who were to examine the case. The Supreme Court eventually quashed the appeal judgment and upheld the Regional Court’s decision. The applicant, who had been depicted as a “Mafia boss” in the media since the early 1990s, was submitted to even closer attention from the media after these criminal proceedings were brought against him. High ranking officials, including the Deputy Prosecutor General who had approved his arrest, repeatedly described him in the press as a leader in organised crime.
Admissible under Article 6 § 1 (impartial tribunal) and § 2 as regards the prosecutor’s declaration in his decision of October 1996.
Inadmissible under Article 6 § 2: Bearing in mind the right to receive and impart information, this provision cannot prevent the authorities from informing the public about criminal investigations in progress, but it requires that they do so with all the discretion and circumspection necessary to preserve the presumption of innocence. A distinction has to be made between statements which convey the idea that the accused is guilty and those that merely evoke a “state of suspicion”. In this case, firstly, the reference by the Regional Court to the applicant as “one of the leaders of the underworld” merely reflected the evidence given by several witnesses and as such did not imply that the applicant was guilty of any specific offence. Secondly, the statements made by several high ranking officials and prosecutors in the media were not official declarations but were made in a political context with the aim of providing the public with an explanation for the applicant’s arrest and were referring implicitly to his criminal past without encouraging the readers to believe him guilty in the proceedings in issue or prejudging the assessment of the facts. When a virulent press campaign surrounds a trial, what should be considered decisive is not the subjective apprehensions of a suspect of the negative impact of the press coverage on the trial courts’ appraisal of his guilt, but whether, in the particular circumstances of the case, his fears can be held to be objectively justified. In the present circumstances, the press had presented the applicant as a “Mafia boss” throughout the 1990s. The charges against him however were to be determined by professional judges who were less likely to be influenced by the media coverage of the case than a jury. The first instance judge took due account of the particular circumstances of the case and assessed the evidence carefully, convicting the applicant on two counts only out of the four that had been brought against him. Thus, the applicant’s fears of prejudice by the courts based on the negative media campaign could not be objectively justified: manifestly ill-founded.
© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
Click here for the Case-Law Information Notes
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy