Legal summary
December 2025
Danileţ v. Romania [GC] - 16915/21
Judgment 15.12.2025 [GC]
Article 10
Article 10-1
Freedom of expression
Disciplinary sanction imposed on judge by National Judicial and Legal Service Commission for posting two messages on his Facebook page: violation
Facts – At the relevant time the applicant was a County Court judge. He was known for his active participation in debates on democracy, the rule of law and the justice system, and enjoyed significant nationwide renown on account, among other things, of his various former positions.
In January 2019 he posted two messages on his Facebook page, where he had some 50,000 followers. The messages were quoted and discussed by some media outlets and gave rise to a plethora of comments.
As a result of those posts, the Judicial Inspection Board, an organisation within the National Judicial and Legal Service Commission (Consiliul Superior al Magistraturii – “the CSM”), took up the case, of its own motion, with a view to disciplinary proceedings against the applicant for impairing the honour and image of the justice system. It conducted a disciplinary investigation, following which it referred the matter to the CSM’s Disciplinary Board for Judges.
On 7 May 2019 the CSM’s Disciplinary Board for Judges found that, in his first message, posted on 9 January 2019, the applicant had – unequivocally and in the minds of thousands of readers – cast doubt on the credibility of State institutions, insinuating that they were controlled by politicians and proposing as a potential solution that the army intervene to preserve constitutional democracy. As to the second message, which was posted on 10 January 2019 and contained a hyperlink to an interview with a prosecutor, along with a comment by the applicant, the disciplinary body found that the language he had used, namely the expression “sânge în instalaţie” (“[to have] blood in one’s veins”), had overstepped the limits of propriety and had been unworthy of a judge.
The disciplinary body accordingly noted that, by posting the messages on his Facebook page, the applicant had failed to comply with his duty of discretion and had committed a disciplinary offence without direct intent which had had an impact on public confidence in – and respect for – the courts and on the image of the justice system, under Article 99 (a) of Law no. 303/2004 on the rules governing judges and public prosecutors. It ordered his pay to be cut by 5% for two months in accordance with Article 100 (b) of Law no. 303/2004.
Following an appeal by the applicant, the High Court of Cassation and Justice (“the High Court”) upheld those findings on 18 May 2020.
In a judgment delivered on 20 February 2024, a Chamber of the Court held, by four votes to three, that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. They found that the national judicial authorities had not provided relevant and sufficient reasons to justify the alleged interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression.
The Court also decided to dismiss the applicant’s complaint under Article 8 of the Convention as incompatible ratione materiae, given that the grounds for the sanction were unrelated to the applicant’s “private life” and that it had not had severe negative consequences for his “inner circle”, for his ability to establish and develop relationships with others or for his reputation.
On 24 June 2024 the case was referred to the Grand Chamber at the Government’s request.
Law –
Scope of the case – In its judgment of 20 February 2024, the Chamber had declared the applicant’s complaint under Article 8 of the Convention inadmissible and solely his complaint under Article 10 admissible. Accordingly, the case referred to the Grand Chamber concerned the merits of the Article 10 complaint.
Article 10:
1. Whether there had been an interference – The applicant’s disciplinary sanction had constituted an interference with his right to freedom of expression.
2. Whether the interference had been lawful – The disciplinary sanction imposed on the applicant following the disciplinary investigation had had a legal basis, namely Articles 99 (a) and 100 (b) of Law no. 303/2004, which had been accessible to the applicant.
Article 99 (a) of Law no. 303/2004, which had characterised disciplinary offences as “any behaviour that impair[ed] the honour, the professional integrity or the image of the justice system, displayed either in or outside the performance of professional duties”, had not expressly specified what conduct was subject to sanctions, and had lent itself to several interpretations. In the present case, the competent domestic judicial authorities had interpreted it in a manner that was consistent with the practice of the domestic courts in similar disputes. The High Court had examined the applicant’s right to freedom of expression in the light of his duty of discretion as a judge and had reviewed, in the specific circumstances of the case, the content and form of his messages and the manner in which they had been disseminated to the general public.
Furthermore, given the guidance that was available in the domestic legal system, the applicant, who was an expert in the field of law, could have foreseen the potential risks and adjusted his conduct to prevent them from materialising.
Moreover, where ethical standards and the rules governing disciplinary offences converged with respect to extrajudicial conduct potentially compromising public confidence in the judiciary, there should be a threshold criterion to demarcate misconduct that might warrant disciplinary sanctions from other forms of misbehaviour. That had been the case at the level of the disciplinary body, of the legislature and of the High Court in the present case.
Having regard to all of the foregoing considerations, the Court found that the provisions serving as the legal basis for the interference in issue had been formulated with sufficient precision to enable the applicant, who had actually been a judge, to regulate his conduct in the circumstances of the present case.
3. Whether the interference had pursued a legitimate aim – Having regard to the importance of the proper functioning of the domestic justice system, the disciplinary measure imposed on the applicant had pursued the legitimate aim of maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
4. Whether the interference had been necessary in a democratic society –
(a) Specific features of the present case and approach to be adopted by the Court – The applicant had had a sanction imposed on him for expressing a personal opinion on his Facebook page, which had been accessible to the general public and where he had had several thousand followers. In his first message he had also expressed a personal opinion on a matter of public interest that was not directly related to the functioning of the justice system. The present case therefore had to be distinguished from others previously dealt with by the Court concerning judges and prosecutors who had publicly expressed their views in their capacity as presidents of courts, chief prosecutors, representatives of professional associations or members of judicial councils, and cases concerning sanctions imposed on judges and prosecutors for public remarks made or positions adopted outside publicly accessible social-media fora.
The specific features of the present case offered the Grand Chamber an opportunity to confirm and consolidate the principles established in its case-law with regard to the freedom of expression of judges and prosecutors on the internet, while providing certain clarifications and defining a set of criteria that took into account the limits imposed on that freedom by the duty of discretion inherent in their office.
The criteria in question – applicable to the various manifestations of the freedom of expression of judges and prosecutors that could be found on the internet and social media (Facebook posts and interactions with the posts of other social-media users, including remarks, photos, videos and even mere “likes”) – were intended to guide domestic courts in striking a balance between the competing rights and interests at stake. The Court emphasised that this balancing exercise had to involve weighing up the right to freedom of expression of judges and prosecutors, which they were guaranteed like any other individual under Article 10 § 1 of the Convention, against the duty of discretion, a social value rooted in the ethical obligation for judges and prosecutors to protect public confidence in the justice system and thus forming part of the “duties and responsibilities” referred to in Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.
(b) Criteria to be applied in weighing up the competing rights and interests – There was no reason to establish a hierarchy among the various criteria or to lay down any order for their examination.
i. Content and form of remarks or other manifestations of freedom of expression of judges and prosecutors on social media – Remarks by judges and prosecutors on matters of public interest generally enjoyed a high degree of protection under Article 10 of the Convention.
Matters relating to the functioning of the justice system and judicial reforms were undeniably of public interest. Judges and prosecutors could, however, legitimately exercise their freedom of expression in relation to other issues. Where democracy or the rule of law was under serious threat, judges were entitled to speak out in defence of judicial independence, the constitutional order and the restoration of democracy, at both national and international levels. And where warranted by the historical, political or legal context of a debate with serious political implications, they could express specific opinions on issues about which the general public had a legitimate interest in being informed.
Nevertheless, the question that should always be asked was whether, in a particular social context and in the eyes of a reasonable, informed observer, the judge had engaged in an activity which could objectively compromise his or her independence or impartiality.
The right of judges to speak out in order to protect the very basics of the rule of law went hand in hand with their duty of discretion, which was equally necessary for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the justice system.
Judges and prosecutors had a duty to be circumspect and prudent in tone and language and to consider, in respect of each social-media post or other interaction with users on such platforms, what its consequences might be for judicial dignity.
ii. Context of disputed remarks and capacity in which they had been made – The domestic courts had to examine the disputed remarks in the light of the case as a whole, giving special consideration to the context in which they had been made and the position held by the judge or prosecutor who had made them.
The historical context was of particular importance in weighing up the competing rights and interests. The passage of time was a circumstance capable of increasing the scope of freedom of expression enjoyed by participants in a debate.
The Court’s case-law as it stood acknowledged that judges and prosecutors who held certain positions in the justice system (such as president of a court or chief prosecutor) enjoyed greater protection of their freedom of expression. But that did not mean that “ordinary” judges and prosecutors, who did not hold specific positions within the justice system and were not speaking in any particular capacity, could not publicly express their views on matters of public interest.
Judges and prosecutors did, however, have an obligation to exercise restraint in the context of pending cases.
iii. Consequences of the disputed remarks – The domestic courts should take into account, when weighing up the competing rights and interests, the detrimental effects, taken as a whole, that remarks by a judge or prosecutor on social media had entailed or had been likely to entail. It was for the domestic courts to distinguish between statements by judges and prosecutors made on open social networks, accessible to an indefinite number of users, on the one hand, and those made in closed social networks, reserved for a private circle of “friends”, or closed to the general public and accessible only to legal professionals, on the other. Such a distinction could be decisive in determining whether the measures taken in response had been proportionate.
iv. Severity of the sanction – The nature and severity of the penalties imposed or likely to be imposed on judges and prosecutors were factors to be taken into account when assessing whether an interference with freedom of expression had been proportionate to the legitimate aim or aims pursued. The chilling effect that a sanction could have, not only on the judge or prosecutor concerned but also on the profession as a whole, was another factor to be taken into account in assessing whether the interference had been proportionate to the legitimate aim or aims pursued.
v. Whether procedural safeguards had been afforded – Any judge or prosecutor who faced disciplinary proceedings had to be afforded effective and adequate safeguards against arbitrariness. That included the ability to have the measure which had been imposed on him or her scrutinised by an independent and impartial body competent to review all the relevant questions of fact and law, in order to determine the lawfulness of that measure and censure any abuse on the part of the authorities. Before that review body, the judge or prosecutor concerned needed to have the benefit of adversarial proceedings in order to present his or her views and counter the arguments of the authorities. It was also for the national authorities to provide relevant and sufficient reasons for their decisions in order to justify the necessity of the disciplinary proceedings and sanctions imposed, and their proportionality in relation to the legitimate aims pursued.
(c) Application of those principles to the present case – The Court’s task, in keeping with the principle of subsidiarity, would be to apply to the present case the new enumeration of review criteria that it had thus defined.
Noting that the applicant’s two messages had different content and did not share the same context, the Court considered it appropriate, in applying the criteria set out above, to examine each message separately where made necessary by its specific features.
i. Content and form of the messages –
α. The first message – By posting this message, the applicant had participated in a political controversy. In the reasons given by the national authorities for restricting the applicant’s freedom of expression, there was nothing to indicate how his remarks could have undermined the proper functioning of the domestic justice system or could have impaired the dignity and honour of judicial office or the public confidence that this office should inspire.
In the absence of evidence supporting the premise either that the applicant had in any way sought to incite his readers to take to the streets or to use violence, or that the remarks in issue actually had had such an effect on his readers, those mere references to the army, however ambiguous they might appear, were not sufficient to upset the requisite balance between the degree to which the applicant, as a judge, could be involved in society and the need for him to remain – and to be seen as – independent and impartial in the discharge of his duties.
β. The second message – The applicant’s message – which was an endorsement of the content of the article in question and, in particular, the ideas expressed by the prosecutor as to the problems being faced by Romanian judges and prosecutors at the material time – had concerned matters of public interest, namely legislative reforms of the justice system. It had thus related to the functioning of the justice system, an issue which called for a high degree of protection under Article 10.
The domestic judicial authorities had not explained how the expression “sânge în instalaţie” used by the applicant, which had been the main factor behind the domestic judicial authorities’ decision to impose a sanction on him, had “significantly overstepped the limits of propriety inherent in the office” held by the applicant and why it had been so serious as to call for disciplinary sanctions.
ii. Context of the applicant’s remarks and the capacity in which he had made them –
α. The first message – The applicant’s remarks could reasonably have been understood as aiming to defend the democratic order because they had drawn attention to the Constitution and the need to maintain the separation of powers. They had been expressed in the context of a debate on a matter of public interest, namely the extension of the Army Chief of Staff’s term of office, which had triggered an institutional dispute at the national level and had made headline news.
The fact that at the material time the applicant had held no high-ranking position in the justice system and was neither a spokesperson for his court nor the chair of any professional association did not deprive him of the protection of his freedom of expression – a freedom afforded to all judges and prosecutors provided that its limits were not overstepped.
Furthermore, the message had not concerned judicial proceedings that had been “ongoing” at the time it had been posted. The mere fact that, at the time the applicant had posted his message online, a press article had mentioned the possibility of judicial proceedings was not a sufficient reason to consider that the applicant had acted imprudently.
β. The second message – The applicant’s remarks had clearly fallen within the context of a debate on matters of public interest, concerning legislative reforms of the justice system, which had also attracted attention at European level. The domestic judicial authorities had not taken that context into account in their assessment of the message, which had not, therefore, been given the careful consideration required by the circumstances of the case.
The applicant had expressed a personal opinion, as part of his human-rights awareness-raising endeavours, on issues relating to the functioning of the justice system, during a debate of public interest. He had thus been entitled, generally speaking, to greater freedom of expression.
iii. Consequences of the applicant’s remarks –
α. The first message – There was nothing in the case file to substantiate the claim that the applicant’s message had undermined judicial independence and impartiality, the right to a fair trial or public confidence in the judiciary. The mere fact that the applicant’s remarks had been the subject of some press articles and had allegedly “prompt[ed] readers to make a connection with other historical events” was not sufficient in itself to impair the dignity of his office as judge or the impartiality and independence of the justice system.
β. The second message – There was nothing in the case file to support the allegation that the message in question had actually undermined the impartiality and independence of the justice system or public confidence in the judiciary, or that it had reached the threshold for a disciplinary sanction to be warranted.
iv. Severity of the sanction – While the sanction imposed on the applicant had not been the most severe, it had been such as potentially to discourage him from making similar remarks in the future. Moreover, it had been capable of having a chilling effect on the profession as a whole.
v. Compliance with procedural safeguards – The applicant had had the opportunity to submit his arguments and adduce evidence both before the Judicial Inspection Board and before the CSM’s Disciplinary Board for Judges, an independent and impartial body. He had also been able to have the measure in question scrutinised by the High Court, an independent and impartial body competent both to determine whether the measure imposed on him by the CSM’s Disciplinary Board was lawful and well founded, and to set it aside if appropriate.
Yet although they had had the opportunity to do so, neither the CSM’s Disciplinary Board nor the High Court had examined whether the value judgments made by the applicant in his first message had had a sufficient “factual basis”.
Moreover, the domestic judicial authorities had been silent as to how, specifically, the expression “sânge în instalaţie” had, in their view, “significantly overstepped the limits of propriety inherent in the office” held by the applicant. They had also failed to examine the context in which the applicant had made those remarks, confining themselves to observing that the mere use of the disputed expression by the applicant was sufficient to justify a disciplinary sanction. In view of those findings, the Court had doubts as to the quality and the scope of the judicial review conducted in the present case, neither of which appeared to have been adequate.
vi. Conclusion – In view of the foregoing, the Court considered that the applicant’s remarks in the two messages posted on his Facebook page had not been such as to upset the requisite reasonable balance between, on the one hand, the degree to which the applicant, as a judge, could be involved in society in order to defend the constitutional order and State institutions and, on the other, the need for him to be and to be seen as independent and impartial in the discharge of his duties. Whether in the first message, which had aimed to defend the constitutional order and preserve the independence of State institutions, or in the second, which had related to the functioning of the domestic justice system, his remarks had concerned matters of public interest about which the general public had had a legitimate interest in being informed. In the reasons given by the national authorities for restricting the applicant’s freedom of expression, there was nothing to indicate convincingly how his remarks had allegedly disrupted the proper functioning of the domestic justice system and impaired the dignity and honour of judicial office or the public confidence that office should inspire.
After weighing up the various interests at stake and taking account of the content and form of each of the applicant’s two messages, the context in which they had been posted, their consequences, the capacity in which the applicant had posted them, the nature and severity of the sanction imposed on him and its chilling effect on the profession as a whole, and the safeguards against arbitrariness he had been afforded, the Court considered that the interference in issue had not been based on “relevant and sufficient” reasons and consequently had not met a “pressing social need”.
Conclusion: violation (ten votes to seven).
Article 41: no claim in respect of damage.
(See Kayasu v. Turkey, 64119/00 and 76292/01, 13 November 2008, Legal Summary; Baka v. Hungary [GC], 20261/12, 23 June 2016, Legal Summary; Kövesi v. Romania, 3594/19, 5 May 2020, Legal Summary; Non-Binding Guidelines on the Use of Social Media by Judges, established by the Global Judicial Integrity Network of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, published in January 2019; Resolution on Judicial Ethics, adopted by the Plenary Court of the European Court of Human Rights on 21 June 2021; Opinion No. 27 of the Consultative Council of European Judges to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the disciplinary liability of judges of 6 December 2024)
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This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
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