AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 36524/97
by Józsefné DARNAY
against Hungary
The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting
in private on 16 April 1998, the following members being present:
MM M.P. PELLONPÄÄ, President
N. BRATZA
A. WEITZEL
C.L. ROZAKIS
Mrs J. LIDDY
MM L. LOUCAIDES
B. MARXER
I. BÉKÉS
G. RESS
A. PERENIC
C. BÎRSAN
K. HERNDL
Mrs M. HION
Mr R. NICOLINI
Mrs M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 16 May 1997 by
Józsefné DARNAY against Hungary and registered on 17 June 1997 under
file No. 36524/97;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a Hungarian citizen born in 1929 and living in
Budapest. She is a pensioner. In the proceedings before the Commission,
she is represented by Mr. J. Somogyi, a lawyer practising in Budapest.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be
summarised as follows.
In 1995 the applicant, in the context of an inheritance dispute,
brought an action against the Budapest Israelite Community before the
Pest Central District Court (Pesti Központi Kerületi Bíróság).
On 5 June 1996 the District Court gave its judgment partly
dismissing the applicant's claims. The judgment was pronounced in the
presence of the applicant and her then representative.
In early July 1996 the postman unsuccessfully attempted, on two
occasions, to deliver the letter containing the judgment to the
applicant, then on holidays. Thereupon the postman returned the letter
to the post-office, leaving behind a notification for the applicant.
In mid-July 1996 the applicant returned from her holidays and
found the notification. On 26 August 1996 the applicant, allegedly
following some unsuccessful attempts to get access to the case-file,
obtained the judgment directly from the District Court's office.
On 2 September 1996 the applicant's lawyer lodged an appeal
against the first instance judgment.
On 5 September 1996 the District Court rejected the appeal,
holding that, according to S.99 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (a
polgári perrendtartásról szóló 1952. évi III. törvény), the judgment
was to be considered as having been delivered on 11 July 1996, i.e. on
the fifth weekday from the date of the second unsuccessful attempt to
deliver it (4 July 1996). Accordingly, the statutory 15-day deadline
for lodging an appeal had expired on 26 July and, on 27 July 1996, the
first instance judgment became final. Since the applicant's lawyer
lodged the appeal only on 2 September 1996 and filed no application for
the reinstatement of the proceedings (igazolási kérelem), the appeal
had to be rejected as having been lodged out of time.
Section 99 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that, in
case the service of a court document has been unsuccessful on account
of the addressee's failure or refusal to receive it, the document shall
be regarded as served on the fifth weekday from the date of the second
unsuccessful attempt to deliver it.
The applicant's lawyer brought an appeal against the decision of
5 September and, simultaneously, applied for the reinstatement of the
proceedings. He argued that the service of the first instance judgment
had not been in compliance with the law. Consequently, the first
instance judgment had unlawfully been declared final in that the mere
failure of the postal service should not have prevented the applicant
from lodging an appeal. He submitted that in summertime it was not
unusual for citizens to be absent from their permanent address for
longer periods and that the applicant had filed her appeal without any
delay, once she had, after some unsuccessful attempts, managed to
obtain the judgment from the District Court's office. On 6 March 1997
the Budapest Regional Court (Fovárosi Bíróság), sitting in camera,
upheld the decision of 5 September 1996, holding that the delivery
procedure had been in compliance with the relevant Section 99 (2) of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
The Regional Court also rejected the application for the
reinstatement of the proceedings, observing that, according to the
relevant Section 107 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, in her
application the applicant should have made statements as to the reasons
for her omission and as to the circumstances warranting that the
omission in question had not been her fault. In the present case,
however, the applicant failed to advance any specific reasons for not
having received the first instance judgment. The statement that in
summertime it was not unusual for citizens to be absent from their
permanent address for longer periods was of a general character and was
insufficient to exculpate the applicant.
The Regional Court also recalled that the applicant, accompanied
by her then representative, had been present when the first instance
judgment had been pronounced. She could have, therefore, taken steps
to ensure the ensuing receipt of the judgment by appointing a
representative to this end or by leaving behind her temporary address.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention
that the proceedings before the Budapest Regional Court concerning her
application for the reinstatement of the proceedings were unfair and
were not public. She also submits under Article 13 of the Convention
that, as a result of the rejection of her appeal, the first instance
court judgment was declared final and her case thus cannot be reviewed
by the Supreme Court.
THE LAW
The applicant complains that the proceedings before the Budapest
Regional Court concerning her application for the reinstatement of the
proceedings were not fair and public. She also submits that, as a
result of the rejection of her appeal, the first instance court
judgment was declared final and her case thus cannot be reviewed by the
Supreme Court.
Expressed this way, the applicant's complaints essentially
concern an alleged violation of her right of access to a court. The
Commission will therefore examine these complaints under
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, which provides, in so
far as relevant, as follows:
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... ,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ... ."
The Commission observes at the outset that the Convention does
not guarantee the right to appeal (No. 10515/83, Dec. 2.10.84, D.R. 40,
p. 258). Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention does not
require States to establish courts of appeal or cassation. If, however,
such courts are created, the requirements of Article 6 (Art. 6) must
be respected (No. 9177/80, Dec. 6.10.81, D.R. 26, p. 255). Moreover,
the Commission recalls that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the
Convention does not prevent Contracting States from regulating access
to appeal jurisdictions, in order to ensure the proper administration
of justice (No. 12275/86, Dec. 2.7.91, D.R. 70, p. 47), especially, as
far as time limits are concerned (No. 8407/78, Dec. 6.5.80, D.R. 20,
p. 179).
The Commission also recalls that the failure of service of a
court order may, under certain circumstances, give rise to an issue
under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, in so far as the
right of access to a court is concerned (cf. Eur. Court HR, Hennings
v. Germany judgment of 16 December 1992, Series A no. 251-A).
In the present case, the Commission notes that on 5 June 1996 the
first instance judgment was pronounced in the applicant's presence. In
mid-July 1996 she found the postman's notification about the attempts
to serve this judgment. She obtained the judgment from the District
Court's office on 26 August and her lawyer lodged an appeal on
2 September 1996. On 5 September 1996 the District Court rejected the
appeal, holding that it had been lodged out of time, as the first
instance judgment had become final on 27 July 1996 and the applicant
had lodged no application for the reinstatement of the proceedings.
Subsequently the applicant's lawyer appealed and also filed an
application for the reinstatement of the proceedings. On 6 March 1997
the Regional Court dismissed both. The Regional Court considered that
the delivery procedure itself had been in compliance with the relevant
S. 99 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Moreover, the Regional Court
found that the application for the reinstatement of the proceedings
failed to meet the requirements contained in the relevant S. 107 (2)
of the Code of Civil Procedure in that no specific reasons were
advanced to substantiate that the applicant had been prevented by any
fault save her own from filing an appeal in time.
The Commission notes that the applicant did not have access to
the appeal court in a civil law case due to her failure to lodge an
appeal in time. In this respect the Commission observes that the
Hungarian Code of Civil Procedure provides the possibility of seeking
reinstatement of the proceedings.
The Commission considers that the applicant, being aware that the
first instance judgment would be served upon her, could reasonably have
been expected to make arrangements during her holidays in order to have
ready access to any mail addressed to her. The authorities cannot be
held responsible for barring her access to a court because she failed
to take the necessary steps to ensure receipt of her mail and was
thereby unable to comply with the requisite time-limits laid down under
Hungarian law (cf. Eur. Court HR, Hennings judgment, op. cit., p. 11,
para. 26). Moreover, the applicant's appeal was rejected at first
instance given her failure to seek reinstatement of the proceedings.
Furthermore, the Regional Court dismissed the appeal against this
decision and also the lawyer's application for the reinstatement of the
proceedings on the ground that the request for reinstatement was not
properly substantiated and did not meet the statutory requirements.
In these circumstances the Commission finds that the applicant
was not denied her right of access to a court contrary to Article 6
(Art. 6) of the Convention.
It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
M.F. BUQUICCHIO M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
Secretary President
to the First Chamber of the First Chamber
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy