Information Note on the Court’s case-law No. 147
December 2011
De Donder and De Clippel v. Belgium - 8595/06
Judgment 6.12.2011 [Section II]
Article 2
Positive obligations
Article 2-1
Life
Suicide of prisoner with mental-health problems held in an ordinary cell: violation
Facts – The applicants were the parents of a young man undergoing psychiatric treatment who was arrested on suspicion of attempted theft. In May 1999 he was found guilty and his detention was ordered under the Social Protection Act since, on account of his mental disturbance, he was incapable of controlling his actions and posed a danger to himself or society. He was temporarily detained in the psychiatric wing of a prison before being admitted to a psychiatric clinic as a “resident patient”. He was subsequently allowed to live away from the clinic at weekends, provided that he adhered to certain requirements. However, the deputy public prosecutor ordered his return to the prison psychiatric wing as he was not complying with the prescribed conditions. In July 2001 the young man was admitted to the ordinary section of the prison and was placed in a cell shared with three other people. The following day, after a violent dispute with one of his fellow inmates, he was placed in segregation in a punishment cell. A psychiatrist altered his medication, and he was then moved to an individual cell. In August 2001 the applicants’ son hanged himself in his cell. An investigation was opened, in the course of which charges were brought against two psychiatrists and a prison governor. The case was eventually discontinued and all subsequent appeals were to no avail.
Law – Article 2
(a) Substantive aspect – The Indictments Division of the Court of Appeal had examined whether the prisoner’s suicide had been foreseeable and had found that, on account of his complex personality, there had been no reason to conclude that any of the accused should have known that he would commit suicide. However, that reasoning did not stand up to scrutiny in the circumstances of the case. There had been a real risk that the prisoner would attempt to kill himself, seeing that he had been doubly vulnerable, first as a person deprived of his liberty since the suicide rate was very high among the prison population, and, even more so, as a person suffering from mental disorders making him incapable of controlling his actions. Admittedly, the immediacy of such a risk had been difficult to determine, but that criterion should not be applied categorically in cases of suicide. In addition, it could not be inferred from the prisoner’s lack of previous suicide attempts that the authorities could not have known that such a risk existed. They must have been aware of the prisoner’s considerable fragility on account of his mental illness, given that he had been “compulsorily admitted” to the prison under the Social Protection Act. Furthermore, his previous conduct had prompted the deputy public prosecutor to recall him to the psychiatric wing of the prison. The day after his arrival, he had assaulted one of his cellmates, an act that had very probably been a reflection of his unease.
The prisoner had been detained under the Social Protection Act, which provided that the persons to whom it was applicable were subject not to the rules on ordinary detention but to the rules on compulsory admission, so that they could be given the psychological and medical support their condition required. In addition, the deputy public prosecutor’s decision of July 2001 recalling him to prison had specified that he should be admitted to the psychiatric wing. Accordingly, the applicants’ son should never have been held in the ordinary section of a prison. By acting in this way, outside the rules of domestic law, the authorities had contributed to the risk of the young man’s committing suicide. Therefore, by definition, they had not done all that could reasonably be expected of them to prevent that risk, by that very fact breaching Article 2 of the Convention. Furthermore, while in prison the young man had been treated without much regard for his mental disorder or his status as a person detained under the rules on compulsory admission; this was illustrated by his placement in a punishment cell, the fact that the psychiatrist who had seen him four days before his suicide had been unaware of his status and the fact that this had been his only meeting with a psychiatrist during his detention. Admittedly, his detention in the ordinary section of the prison had also been due to a chronic shortage of places. However, circumstances of that nature could not dispense a State Party from complying with its obligations under Article 2; to find otherwise would amount to accepting that it could disclaim responsibility by means of its own failings.
Accordingly, while remaining aware both of the respondent State’s efforts to assist the young man – who had, for example, had access to specialist clinics, where he had received support and therapy appropriate to his condition – and of the serious difficulties faced by the prison authorities and medical staff on a daily basis, the Court concluded that there had been a violation of Article 2 in its substantive aspect.
Conclusion: violation (unanimously).
(b) Procedural aspect – The Court could not find any evidence to suggest that the investigation conducted in the present case had not satisfied the requirements of an effective investigation.
Conclusion: no violation (unanimously).
Article 5 § 1: The deprivation of liberty had had a legal basis in the Social Protection Act, which authorised the investigating judicial authorities to order the detention of a person charged with a serious or lesser criminal offence “where there [were] reasons to believe that the accused [was] suffering from a mental disorder or from a severe mental disturbance or defect making him incapable of controlling his actions”. Firstly, however, the Act in question clearly specified that the detention should not take place in an ordinary prison environment but in a specialised institution or, as an exceptional measure and subject to restrictive conditions, in a prison psychiatric wing. Secondly, the deputy public prosecutor’s decision of July 2001 recalling the applicants’ son to prison had specified that he was to be placed in the psychiatric wing. Accordingly, his detention in an ordinary prison environment had been manifestly in breach of domestic law. Further reiterating that in principle, the “detention” of a person as a mental-health patient was “lawful” for the purposes of Article 5 § 1 (e) only if effected in a hospital, clinic or other appropriate institution, the Court held that the circumstances of the case disclosed a breach of that provision, which required “detention” to take place “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law” and to be “lawful”.
Conclusion: violation (unanimously).
Article 41: EUR 25,000 to each of the applicants in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
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