Published on 22 September 2025
FOURTH SECTION
Application no. 21591/23
Clarisse DE JESUS SECA
against Portugal
lodged on 24 May 2023
communicated on 1 September 2025
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
The applicant is the widow of A.M.J. and is acting before the Court as his heir. The application concerns her alleged inability to challenge the judicial decision convicting A.M.J. of false accusation, which led to her being required to pay civil damages.
On 25 October 2011, A.M.J. filed a report with the High Council of the Judiciary (Conselho Superior da Magistratura) exposing allegedly unlawful conduct on the part of his brother F.M.J., a judge at the material time. On 18 November 2011, he also filed a criminal complaint against him for assault.
On a non-specified date, F.M.J. lodged a criminal complaint together with a claim for damages against A.M.J. for false accusation. On 6 February 2018, he was acquitted by the Lisbon Criminal Court.
On 7 May 2019, following appeals lodged by both the Public Prosecutor’s Office and F.M.J., the Lisbon Court of Appeal reversed the Lisbon Criminal Court’s decision, revised the findings of facts, convicted A.M.J. of the offence and remanded the case to the first-instance court for sentencing and determination of the civil compensation owed to F.M.J.
On 11 October 2019 the Lisbon Court of Appeal rejected an appeal for judicial review lodged by A.M.J. to the Supreme Court, holding that the judgment of 7 May 2019 was not amenable to appeal, as it was not final. On 4 December 2019, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the judgment of 7 May 2019 could not be appealed.
On 3 December 2020, following A.M.J.’s death, the Lisbon Criminal Court issued a judicial order declaring the proceedings terminated in the criminal part (extinção do procedimento criminal).
On 18 March 2022, the Lisbon Criminal Court ordered A.M.J.’s heirs - among which the applicant - to jointly pay 20,000 euros (EUR) in damages to F.M.J. on account of the prejudice sustained due to the false accusations at issue.
On a non-specified date, the applicant appealed to the Lisbon Court of Appeal, arguing that A.M.J. should not have been convicted for false accusation and alleging several errors in the judgment of 7 May 2019.
On 26 January 2023, in a summary decision, the Lisbon Court of Appeal, rejected the appeal on the grounds that the judgment of 7 May 2019 had already acquired res judicata status.
Relying on Article 6 of the Convention, the applicant complains that the Lisbon Court of Appeal’s summary decision of 26 January 2023 violated her right to a fair trial and her right of access to a court because she was unable to substantively challenge the Lisbon Court of Appeal’s judgment of 7 May 2019.
Relying on Article 13 of the Convention, the applicant complains that the Lisbon Court of Appeal’s summary decision of 26 January 2023 violated her right to an effective remedy.
QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES
Has there been a breach of the applicant’s right of access to a court on account of the Lisbon Court of Appeal’s decision of 26 January 2023 whereby her appeal was found inadmissible?
In particular:
(a) Did the domestic courts apply procedural rules in an excessively formalistic way thereby restricting the right of access to a court in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of that right has become impaired (compare Labergère v. France, no. 16846/02, § 17, 26 September 2006; Walchli v. France, no. 35787/03, § 29, 26 July 2007; Evaggelou v. Greece, no. 44078/07, § 19, 13 January 2011; Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others v. Romania [GC], no. 76943/11, §§ 89-90, 29 November 2016; and Zubac v. Croatia [GC], no. 40160/12, §§ 76-79, and 96-99, 5 April 2018)?
(b) Did the limitations applied pursue a legitimate aim and is there a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved (see Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others, cited above, § 89, and Zubac, cited above, §§ 78, 98)?
(c) Could the application of the procedural rules by the domestic courts be regarded as foreseeable from the point of view of the litigant in the light of an existing and coherent domestic judicial practice (see Zubac, cited above, §§ 87-88)?