AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 30526/96
by Ervin and Olga DE LACZAY
against Sweden
The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting
in private on 4 March 1998, the following members being present:
MM J.-C. GEUS, President
M.A. NOWICKI
G. JÖRUNDSSON
A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
J.-C. SOYER
H. DANELIUS
Mrs G.H. THUNE
MM F. MARTINEZ
I. CABRAL BARRETO
J. MUCHA
D. SVÁBY
P. LORENZEN
E. BIELIUNAS
E.A. ALKEMA
A. ARABADJIEV
Ms M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 19 April 1995 by
Ervin and Olga DE LACZAY against Sweden and registered on 20 March 1996
under file No. 30526/96;
Having regard to the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent
Government on 16 July 1997 and the observations in reply submitted by
the applicants on 8 August and 8 September 1997;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The first applicant, a United States citizen, was born in 1909
and died on 5 December 1995. The second applicant, the first
applicant's sister, was born in 1911. A Canadian citizen, she resides
in Montreal.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be
summarised as follows.
The applicants' brother, Tibor de Laczay, was employed by the
Swedish company AGA between 1946 and 1967. He was in charge of the
management and exploitation of certain radio and television patents.
Agreements reached between Tibor de Laczay and AGA in 1961 stated that,
in addition to a monthly salary, he received 15 per cent of the
continuous profits on patent licensing contracts concluded by him on
behalf of AGA. According to the agreements, he was entitled to his
share of the profits even if his employment at AGA would end before the
expiration of the licensing contracts. Any disputes arising out of the
agreements between Tibor de Laczay and AGA were to be settled by
arbitration by the Swedish Technical and Industrial Institute of
Arbitration (Sveriges Tekniskt Industriella Skiljedomsinstitut;
hereinafter "the Arbitration Board").
Tibor de Laczay died on 10 June 1967 and his wife, Irma de
Laczay, on 10 December 1967. Thereafter, the estates, i.e. the present
applicants and Irma de Laczay's two brothers, claimed that, under the
terms of the 1961 agreements, they were entitled to Tibor de Laczay's
share of the continuous profits on contracts still in force. AGA,
however, maintained that the agreements did not entail a right to a
share of the profits after Tibor de Laczay's death. The dispute was
brought before the Arbitration Board in December 1971. The estates
requested that AGA be ordered to account for profits accrued after
31 December 1966 and the estates' share of those profits.
By award of 25 October 1972, the Arbitration Board found that the
wording of the 1961 agreements and the other circumstances of the case
did not convincingly show that there was a right to profit shares after
Tibor de Laczay's death. Noting that AGA had accounted for profits
accrued until 30 June 1967, the board accordingly rejected the estates'
request.
In December 1972 the estates lodged a protest action
(klandertalan) against the award in the District Court (tingsrätten)
of Södra Roslag. Maintaining that a representative of AGA had given
false evidence before the Arbitration Board and that AGA had submitted
falsified documents to the board, the estates claimed, inter alia, that
the award should be declared null and void. By judgment of 15 October
1974, the District Court rejected their claim. The judgment was upheld
on appeal by the Svea Court of Appeal (Svea hovrätt) on 14 November
1978. The appellate court found that, under the Arbitration Act (Lag
om skiljemän, 1929:145), an arbitration award could not be declared
null and void on account of criminal or other undue conduct during the
arbitration proceedings, including the giving of false evidence or the
submission of falsified documents. On 19 March 1982 the Supreme Court
(Högsta domstolen) refused leave to appeal and on 5 June 1985 it
refused to reopen the case.
On 21 March 1983 the estates brought an action for damages
against AGA, two of its representatives and a third person in the
District Court, basically relying on the same grounds as in the protest
action, i.e. that false evidence and falsified documents had been
invoked by AGA before the Arbitration Board which had led the Board to
take an erroneous decision. Following a preparatory hearing on
10 December 1985, the District Court, on 5 February 1986, decided that
the claims against the third person should be dealt with as a separate
case. This case was dismissed on formal grounds on 16 March 1989.
On 16 September 1986 the remaining defendants requested that the
estates' claims should be dismissed as they had already been examined
by the Arbitration Board and were thus res judicata. The District Court
held a further preparatory hearing on 11 September 1989.
On 9 March 1990 the District Court dismissed the action for being
res judicata. However, the estates appealed and on 28 February 1991 the
Court of Appeal quashed the District Court's decision, finding that the
claims for damages had not been examined on the merits by the
Arbitration Board or by the District Court in the protest proceedings.
Accordingly, the case was referred back to the District Court for re-
examination. On 11 July 1991 the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen)
refused leave to appeal against the appellate court's decision.
Preparatory hearings were held by the District Court on
28 October and 6 November 1992. Subsequent to the estates' withdrawal
of their claims against the two AGA representatives, the court, on
8 March 1993, rejected these claims.
Following a further preparatory hearing on 11 January 1994 and
main hearings on 15-20 June 1994, the District Court, by judgment of
15 July 1994, rejected the estates' claims against AGA. The court
considered that it had not been established that the representative of
AGA before or during the arbitration proceedings had known or ought to
have known that evidence given or documents invoked before the
Arbitration Board were false. The estates had thus failed to show any
negligence for which AGA could be held responsible. The court further
found one of the estates' claims to be time-barred.
The Parliamentary Ombudsman (Justitieombudsmannen) examined the
District Court's handling of the case at the request of counsel for the
estates. In his decision of 29 August 1994, the Ombudsman heavily
criticised the court for the delay notwithstanding the special
circumstances of the case. In particular, the Ombudsman noted that it
had taken the court three and a half years to decide on the res
judicata objection raised by the defendants.
On 2 August 1994 the estates appealed to the Court of Appeal. The
court held preparatory hearings with the parties' lawyers on 7 and
29 February 1996. Main hearings in the case were held on 23-27 January
1997. By judgment of 21 February 1997, the Court of Appeal upheld the
District Court's judgment.
On 14 July 1997 the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal.
COMPLAINTS
The applicants claim that, in the case concerning damages, they
have not had a fair hearing within a reasonable time as required by
Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The application was introduced on 19 April 1995 and registered
on 20 March 1996.
On 9 April 1997 the Commission (Second Chamber) decided to bring
the application to the notice of the respondent Government and to
invite them to submit written observations on its admissibility and
merits. The Government were asked to deal with the question whether,
in the case concerning damages, the applicants had had a hearing within
a reasonable time.
The Government's observations were submitted on 16 July 1997,
after an extension of the time-limit fixed for that purpose. The
applicants replied on 8 August and 8 September 1997.
THE LAW
The Commission first observes that the first applicant died on
5 December 1995. The Commission has not been able to obtain a statement
from his legal successors as to whether they wish to pursue the
application on his behalf. However, as the application is identical for
the two applicants, the Commission considers that it is not necessary
to take a separate decision, under Article 25 (Art. 25) of the
Convention, as to whether or not to examine the complaints in regard
to the first applicant. Therefore, the Commission will deal with the
application in the same way as if it had been pursued by his legal
successors (cf. No. 6166/73, Dec 30.5.75, D.R. 2, p. 58 at p. 61).
The applicants claim that, in the case concerning damages, they
have not had a fair hearing within a reasonable time. They invoke
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention which provides, in
relevant parts, as follows:
"1. In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing
within a reasonable time ..."
As regards the alleged unfairness of the proceedings, the
applicants state that the presiding judge of the Court of Appeal on
several occasions expressed his agreement with the views of AGA and
that, consequently, that court cannot be considered to have been
impartial.
The Commission considers, however, that the applicants'
submissions fail to substantiate this complaint.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-
founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
With respect to the length of the proceedings, the respondent
Government submit that the case was extremely comprehensive and raised
complex questions of fact and law. Still, in view of the time that
elapsed before the District Court held a main hearing and delivered its
judgment and having regard to the opionion of the Parliamentary
Ombudsman and the other circumstances of the case, the Government do
not object to the application being declared admissible. Further, with
regard to the merits of the case, the Government do not argue that it
was heard within a reasonable time by the District Court, but leave
this question for the Commission to decide. However, the Government do
not see any reason to criticise the subsequent proceedings in the Court
of Appeal and the Supreme Court.
The applicants state that the case did not involve any complex
questions, but was delayed by the District Court's failure to decide
on procedural questions in due time and its otherwise inactive handling
of the case. Allegedly, the time that elapsed before the Court of
Appeal - two and a half years - was also excessive.
The Commission considers, in the light of the criteria
established by the case-law of the Convention organs on the question
of "reasonable time", and having regard to all the information in its
possession, that an examination of the merits of this complaint is
required.
For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,
DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits of the case,
the applicants' complaint that the case concerning damages was
not determined within a reasonable time;
DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.
M.-T. SCHOEPFER J.-C. GEUS
Secretary President
to the Second Chamber of the Second Chamber
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy