Communicated on 1 December 2016
THIRD SECTION
Application no. 29329/14
Oleg Nikolayevich DE
against Russia
lodged on 7 April 2014
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The applicant, Mr Oleg Nikolayevich De, is a Russian national, who was born in 1963 and lives in Khabarovsk.
The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
On 22 April 1992 the Khabarovsk Enamel Factory sold certain immovable property to the Poisk LLC. The property included a basement classified as a bomb shelter measuring 290.5 sq. m and located at 3 Ulitsa Lazo in Khabarovsk.
On 31 March 1999 the Commercial Court of the Khabarovsk Region recognised the Poisk’s title to the immovable property sold to the latter by the Khabarovsk Enamel Factory.
On 9 June 2004 the Poisk LLC sold the basement to K. On 8 July 2004 the state registration authorities registered K.’s title to the basement.
On 7 April 2005 K. sold the basement to the applicant. His title to the property was registered by the state registration authorities. The applicant reconstructed the basement and opened a sauna complex in it.
On an unspecified date in 2013 the Federal Agency for Management of State Property brought an action on behalf of the Russian Federation seeking the restitution of the basement to the state.
On 28 June 2013 the Zheleznodorozhniy District Court of Khabarovsk recognised the State’s title to the basement and ordered the applicant to return it to the State. The court established that, de jure, the basement, being a bomb shelter, had always been federal property and that it had not been transferred by the State to the Khabarovsk Region or to the City of Khabarovsk and could not have been sold to any private party.
On 11 October 2013 the Khabarovsk Regional Court upheld the judgment of 28 June 2013, in substance, on appeal.
COMPLAINT
The applicant complains that the restitution of his real property to the state was in contravention of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES
1. Has the applicant been deprived of his possessions (real property) in the public interest, in accordance with the conditions provided for by law and in accordance with the principles of international law, within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1?
2. If so, was that deprivation necessary to control the use of property in the general interest? In particular, did that deprivation impose an excessive individual burden on the applicant (see Gladysheva v. Russia, no. 7097/10, §§ 64-83, 6 December 2011)?
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