FIRST SECTION
FINAL DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 67399/01
by Strahinja DJURIČIĆ
against Croatia
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 9 October 2003 as a Chamber composed of
MrC.L. Rozakis, President,
MrP. Lorenzen,
MrG. Bonello,
MrsF. Tulkens,
MrsN. Vajić,
MrsE. Steiner,
MrK. Hajiyev, judges,
and Mr E. Fribergh, Deputy Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 16 February 2001,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Strahinja Djuričić, a Croatian[Note1] citizen, who was born in 1924, died on 24 October 2002. His wife, Ms Zorka Djuričić expressed a wish to pursue the application. The Respondent Government are represented by their Agent Ms Lidija Lukina-Karajković.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
On 28 April 1995 the applicant instituted civil proceedings before the Bjelovar Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Bjelovaru) seeking damages from the Republic of Croatia.
Before 5 November 1997, when the Convention entered into force in respect of Croatia, the first instance court adopted a judgment which was quashed upon the applicant’s appeal . The first instance court then adopted a new judgment which was upheld upon the applicant’s appeal by the Bjelovar County Court (Županijski sud u Bjelovaru) on 12 November 1996.
On 25 November 1996 the applicant filed a request for revision on points of law.
On 17 December 1997 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s request. On 7 April 1998 the decision to that effect was forwarded to the Supreme Court’s Case-Law Study Department (Služba evidencije, praćenja i proučavanja sudske prakse) in order to secure its conformity with the Supreme Court’s case-law.
On 4 May 1998 the above-mentioned Department forwarded the decision to the Supreme Court’s Civil Department Registry.
On 12 May 1998 the decision was forwarded to the Bjelovar County Court and from there, on 28 May 1998, to the Bjelovar Municipal Court. The latter served the decision on the applicant on 8 June 1998.
On 17 June 1998 the applicant filed a constitutional complaint.
On 22 July 1998 the Constitutional Court invited the applicant to file additional submissions. The applicant did so on 31 August 1998.
On 7 October 1998 the Bjelovar Municipal Court sent the case-file to the Constitutional Court.
On 21 October 1998 the Constitutional Court forwarded the applicant’s complaint to the State Attorney’s Office (Državno odvjetništvo Republike Hrvatske).
On 10 May 2001 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s complaint.
COMPLAINT
The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the length of the proceedings.
THE LAW
The applicant complains that the length of civil proceedings instituted by him in 1995 and terminated by the Constitutional Court’s decision of 10 May 2001 lasted unreasonably long contrary to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
The Government firstly argues that the State authorities cannot be held responsible for the events which occurred prior to 5 November 1997 when the Convention entered into force in respect of Croatia. Since after that date the applicant’s case had been examined only by the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court which should be considered extraordinary remedies, the whole application is out of the Court’s competence ratione temporis.
They argue further that the applicant has no victim status since he suffered no negative consequences.
They further assert that Article 6 is not applicable to the present case because both a request for revision before the Supreme Court and a constitutional complaint are extraordinary remedies.
The Government finally submit that the applicant failed to exhaust domestic remedies because he did not file a constitutional complaint concerning the excessive length of the proceedings.
As to the merits of the case the Government dispute that the length of the proceedings in question had been excessive. They claim that the domestic authorities showed due diligence in dealing with the applicant’s case. As to the proceedings before the Supreme Court they maintain that in the circumstances the period of six months that elapsed from the date when the Supreme Court’s judgment had been adopted until it was served on the applicant satisfies the reasonable time requirement from Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. As to the length of proceedings before the Constitutional Court, the Government emphasise the special role of such a court as a guardian of the Constitution and argue that a period of less than three years during which the proceedings were pending before that court does not appear excessive.
The applicant disagrees with the Government and insists that the proceedings had lasted unreasonably long although the case did not involve either legal or factual complexity.
The Court does not have to address the objections raised by the Government concerning the Court’s competence ratione temporis, personae or materiae. Nor does it have to examine the issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies because the application is in any event inadmissible for the following reasons.
The Court observes that the proceedings commenced on 28 April 1995. However, the period which falls within the Court’s jurisdiction did not begin on that date, but on 6 November 1997, after the Convention entered into force in respect of Croatia (see Horvat v. Croatia, no. 51585/99, § 50, ECHR - 2001-VIII). The proceedings were concluded on 10 May 2001 and had therefore lasted for six years and twelve days of which a period of three years, six months and five days falls within the Court’s competence ratione temporis.
The Court reiterates that in order to determine the reasonableness of the length of time in question, regard must be had, however, to the state of the case on 5 November 1997 (see, among other authorities, Styranowski v. Poland, no. 28616/95, p. 3376, § 46, ECHR 1998-VIII). In this connection the Court notes that at the time of the entry into force of the Convention in respect of Croatia the proceedings had lasted for two years, six months and seven days.
The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the criteria established by its case-law, particularly the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, pp. 189, 190, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
The Court considers that the case did not involve any particular legal or factual complexity.
As to the behaviour of the applicant, the Court considers that within the period after the Convention entered into force in respect of Croatia, no delays can be attributable to the applicant.
As to the behaviour of the domestic courts, the Court reiterates that only delays for which the State can be held responsible may justify a finding that a “reasonable time” has been exceeded (see, inter alia, Monnet v. France, judgment of 27 October 1993, Series A no. 273, p. 12 § 30).
The Court notes that within the period to be taken into consideration the case was examined by two instances, the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court.
The Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s request for revision on 17 December 1997 and the decision was served on the applicant on 8 June 1998.
Although a period of about six months for delivery of such a decision might appear excessive, the Court considers that the overall duration of the proceedings before the Supreme Court which, together with the period which elapsed before the Convention entered into force in respect of Croatia, amounted to about a year and a half, does not appear excessive for the highest ordinary court in a legal system.
The Court further notes that the proceedings before the Constitutional Court lasted for two years, ten months and twenty-three days. As regards the conduct of the Constitutional Court, the Court recalls that, as it has repeatedly held, Article 6 § 1 imposes on Contracting States the duty to organise their judicial systems in such a way that their courts can meet each of its requirements, including the obligation to hear cases within a reasonable time.
Although this obligation applies also to a Constitutional Court, when so applied it cannot be construed in the same way as for an ordinary court. Its role as guardian of the Constitution makes it particularly necessary for a Constitutional Court sometimes to take into account considerations other than the mere chronological order in which cases are entered on the list, such as the nature of a case and its importance in political and social terms. Furthermore, while Article 6 requires that judicial proceedings be expeditious, it also lays emphasis on the more general principle of the proper administration of justice (see, for example, Gast and Popp v. Germany, no. 29357/95, ECHR 2000-II, p. 487, § 75).
As to the instant case, the Court notes further that the Constitutional Court had to ask the applicant to file additional submissions and also had to ask the State Attorney’s Office as a representative of the defendant for their reply.
Having regard to all the circumstances of the case the Court does not consider excessive the total length of the proceedings.
It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
Erik FriberghChristos Rozakis
Deputy RegistrarPresident
[Note1]To be checked.
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