FOURTH SECTION
FINAL DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 47402/99
by Irena DOJS
against Poland
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 24 June 2003 as a Chamber composed of
SirNicolas Bratza, President,
MrM. Pellonpää,
MrsE. Palm,
MrR. Maruste,
MrS. Pavlovschi,
MrL. Garlicki,
MrJ. Borrego Borrego, judges,
and Mr M. O’Boyle, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 12 November 1998,
Having regard to the partial decision of 28 June 2001,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a Polish national, who was born in 1936 and lives in Bydgoszcz, Poland. The respondent Government were represented by Mr K. Drzewicki, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
In February 1986 the applicant and her husband divorced.
In June 1987 she filed with the Bydgoszcz District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) a petition in which she sought the division of the spouses’ property.
In 1988 and 1989 the court ordered expert opinions.
On 3 June 1992 it refused a request that the shares in the property be unequal.
On 28 May 1993 the court declined the applicant’s challenge to the participation in the proceedings of one of the judges. Her appeal against that decision was subsequently rejected.
On 9 June 1993, in reply to the applicant’s complaint, the President of the Bydgoszcz Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) informed her that due to the excessive length of the proceedings they had been taken under his administrative supervision.
On 16 July 1993 the Bydgoszcz Regional Court rejected the applicant’s appeal against the decision of 28 May 1993.
On 4 and 20 October 1993, as well as on 13 April and 25 May 1994, the District Court held hearings. In October 1993 the parties to the proceedings requested that certain further expert opinions be ordered. On 18 April 1994 the applicant changed her claim.
On 10 January 1994 an expert appointed by the court submitted his opinion concerning the value of real property.
On 8 June 1994 the court gave judgment in respect of part of the claims.
On 31 August 1994 the applicant requested the court to appoint an expert to assess the value of movables.
On 16 September 1994 the applicant’s former husband lodged an appeal against the judgment of 8 June 1994.
On 1 December 1994 the Bydgoszcz Regional Court quashed that judgment and remitted the case for re-examination.
The District Court held hearings on 5 April, 25 October and 6 December 1995, 14 February, 24 April, 24 May, 3 July and 8 November 1996, as well as 5 February, 18 June, 9 July and 9 September 1997. It ordered four expert opinions.
On 21 May 1996 the applicant changed her claim.
On 23 September 1997 the court gave judgment. In the reasoning it pointed out that the applicant on several occasions had changed her claims. She appealed against that judgment.
The Regional Court held hearings on 25 February, 25 June and 9 July 1998.
On 9 July 1998 the parties reached a friendly settlement in respect of a part of the District Court’s judgment. The applicant was to receive 26,150 Polish zlotys from her former husband as payment for transferring her share in the disputed property to him. She withdrew her appeal in respect of the remainder of the District Court’s judgment.
COMPLAINT
The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the proceedings had exceeded a reasonable time.
THE LAW
The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings was incompatible with the “reasonable time ” requirement, provided in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
A. As to whether the applicant can consider herself a “victim” within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention
The Government noted that by concluding a friendly settlement the applicant had obtained the satisfaction of her claims relating to the length of the proceedings complained of. They were of the view that as a consequence she could not claim under Article 34 of the Convention to be the victim of a violation of Article 6 § 1. The Government made reference to the Commission reports in the cases of Preikhzas v. Germany and Dores and Silveira v. Portugal (no. 6504/74, 13 December 1978, Decisions and Reports (DR) 16, p. 5 and nos. 9345/81 and 9346/81, 6 July 1983, DR 41, p. 60).
They further emphasised that the applicant had not raised the issue of the length of the proceedings while concluding that settlement. In the Government’s opinion, that showed that the applicant had agreed to the settlement “as a whole package concerning the proceedings at issue”, including also claims in respect of their length.
The applicant did not agree.
The Court observes that, as the Government themselves noted, the length of the proceedings was not taken into account in the terms of the settlement between the applicant and her former husband. It follows that, despite that settlement, the applicant can still claim to be the victim of a violation of the right to a trial within a reasonable time (see Dores and Silveira, cited above, p. 83, §§ 91-93).
B. As to the alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
The period to be taken into consideration began only on 1 May 1993, when the recognition by Poland of the right of individual petition took effect. However, in assessing the reasonableness of the time that elapsed after that date, account must be taken of the state of proceedings at the time (see, among other authorities, Humen v. Poland [GC], no. 26614/95, § 59, 15 October 1999, unreported). The Court notes that the proceedings began in June 1987 and ended on 9 July 1998. They therefore lasted over 11 years and 1 month, out of which a period of 5 years, 2 months and 9 days falls within the Court’s jurisdiction ratione temporis.
According to the applicant, the length of the proceedings is in breach of the “reasonable time” requirement laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The Government reject the allegation.
The Court considers, in the light of the criteria established in its case-law on the question of “reasonable time” (the complexity of the case, the applicant’s conduct and that of the competent authorities), and having regard to all the information in its possession, that an examination of the merits of this complaint is required.
For these reasons, the Court by a majority
Declares the remainder of the application admissible, without prejudging the merits of the case.
Michael O’BoyleNicolas Bratza
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy