evidence as to the likeable nature of the mother ... . But unfortunately she is hopelessly and
irretrievably addicted for the foreseeable future.
By the same token it was quite obvious that the father was an
intelligent and sensitive person, though for all intents and
purposes an incurable alcoholic. I entirely accept the
genuineness of his concern that the child should lose his culture
and I am satisfied that the father has made a study of the
language, folklore and culture of the travelling people. ...
I now turn to the adoptive parents. They are eminently suitable
to act as parents, ... I am satisfied that they have given love
and affection to the child while in their fosterage. There will
be no damage to the child whatsoever if an adoption order is
made. On the contrary any residual insecurity in the child by
reason of any fear that he might be removed from the foster
parents would be gone and the only parents which he knows will
become his permanent parents."
The Adoption Board subsequently made an adoption order in favour
of E's foster parents.
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicant complains under Article 8 of the Convention:
(a) mainly about the order of the High Court under the Adoption
Act 1988 which led to the non-consensual adoption of E by a non-
traveller family. He submits that that Act should have provided
a secure long term fostering option as an alternative to
adoption;
(b) that the efforts of the relevant Health Boards to reintegrate
the family were inadequate; and
(c) in relation to the fostering arrangements in respect of E and
P;
2. The applicant also complains:
- under Article 10 of the Convention that the adoption violated
his right to impart information and ideas to E about the
traveller culture, heritage, language and way of life;
- under Article 11 of the Convention that the adoption of E
prevents E from associating as an equal with other members of the
travelling community into which he was born; and
- under Article 2 of Protocol 1 that the adoption of E violated
the applicant's right to educate his son in his traveller
heritage;
3. In addition, the applicant complains under Article 14 of the
Convention that the failure to attempt to match E's background to that
of his adoptive parents demonstrated discrimination because in the
consensual adoption process every effort is made to match the
background of the child and the adoptive parents.
4. Finally, the applicant complains under Article 13 of the
Convention that the constitutional immunity of the Adoption Act 1988
meant that he had no effective domestic remedy.
THE LAW
1. The applicant raises a number of complaints under Article 8
(Art. 8) of the Convention.
(a) In the first place, the applicant complains about an unjustified
interference with his private and family life. In particular, he
complains about the adoption of his son, E, submitting that the High
Court should have had a secure long term fostering option available to
it for consideration.
The applicant submits that he has suffered as a result of the
adoption. He claims, inter alia, that because E was adopted by a non-
traveller family and has not retained his name, E has lost access to
his traveller heritage, natural parents and background. The applicant
has also lost his right to educate E in the traveller culture and
heritage. The applicant further submits that with secure long term
foster care E could have felt secure with the foster parents to whom
he had grown attached and, on reaching adulthood or when the applicant
had the resources (both personal and financial) to offer a home to E,
E could have chosen which life he wished to lead. In addition, such an
option would have meant continued contact visits between E and P.
However, such visits are, according to the applicant, likely to cease
pursuant to E's adoption and the brotherly bond that had developed
between E and P will be lost.
Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, insofar as is relevant,
provides as follows:
"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family
life ...
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the
law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of
the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others."
The Commission considers that the applicant's complaints in
relation to his private life do not raise any issues separate to those
considered below in the context of his family life.
As regards the applicant's complaints in relation to his family
life, the Commission finds in accordance with its established case-law
that the decision of the High Court of 5 November 1993 allowing the
Adoption Board to make an adoption order in relation to E constitutes
an interference with the applicant's right to respect for his family
life as guaranteed in Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention
(cf., for example, Eur. Court H.R., Eriksson judgment of 22 June 1989,
Series A no. 156, p. 27, 59).
It is then necessary to consider whether this interference is
justified under Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention, namely,
whether it is "in accordance with the law", pursues one or more of the
legitimate aims set out in Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) and whether it
is "necessary in a democratic society" for one or more of those
reasons.
The Commission recalls that the applicant accepts that the High
Court did not err in law and that the order of the High Court was taken
in accordance with the Adoption Act 1988 ("the 1988 Act"). The
Commission also considers it clear from the terms of the judgment of
Mr. Justice Geoghegan that the decision of the High Court was taken in
the best interests of the child. Accordingly, the Commission can
conclude that the decision in question was taken "in accordance with
law" and pursued the legitimate aims of protecting the child's health
and rights.
As to whether the measure was necessary within the meaning of
Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention, the case-law of the
Convention organs establishes that the notion of necessity implies that
the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and that it is
proportionate to the aim pursued. Furthermore, in determining whether
an interference is necessary, the Convention organs take into account
that a margin of appreciation is left to the Contracting States who are
in principle in a better position to make an initial assessment as to
the necessity of a given measure (see eg. Eur. Court H.R., W. v. the
United Kingdom judgment of 8 July 1987, Series A no. 121, p. 27,
para. 59).
Moreover, in determining whether or not the decision allowing
adoption was necessary, the Commission observes that it is not its task
to take the place of the competent national courts and make a fresh
examination of all the facts and evidence. The Commission's task is to
examine whether the reasons adduced to justify the interference at
issue are "relevant and sufficient" (see eg. Eur. Court H.R., Olsson
judgment of 24 March 1988, Series A no. 130, p. 32, para. 68).
The Commission recalls the evidence before the High Court as to,
inter alia, the natural parents' past and current circumstances, the
impact an adoption order would have on their ability to pass on the
traveller heritage to their child and as to their wish that the child
remain in foster care in order to avoid this scenario. The conclusions
of the High Court on the evidence are also recalled and, in particular,
the Commission notes that despite the "favourable impression" made in
court by the applicant and the mother, the court felt bound to conclude
that the mother was hopelessly and irretrievably addicted for the
foreseeable future and that the applicant was an incurable alcoholic
in which circumstances neither was capable of rearing the child within
the foreseeable future. Satisfied that all the requirements of
section 3(1) of the 1988 Act had been met, that an adoption order would
be in the best interests of the child and that the foster parents were
"eminently suitable", the court made the order allowing for E's
adoption.
The Commission is therefore satisfied that the order of the High
Court pursuant to section 3(1) of the 1988 Act was not arbitrary or
unreasonable and was supported by "relevant and sufficient" reasons.
As regards the applicant's specific submission that the
consequences of an adoption were so extreme that a secure long term
fostering option was required as an alternative, the Commission does
not consider, in view of the margin of appreciation open to the
Contracting States in this area, that the lack of such a statutory
option rendered the court decision allowing for the adoption of E
disproportionate and unnecessary within the meaning of Article 8
para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention. In any event, the Commission
notes that the High Court could have refused the application in which
case the child would have remained in de facto long term foster care
with the same foster parents. Moreover, the Commission recalls the
court's specific conclusion as to the benefit to the child of removing
any "residual insecurity in the child by reason of the fear that he
might be removed from the foster parents".
The Commission therefore finds, even assuming exhaustion of
domestic remedies, that in the circumstances of the present case the
interference was justified as being "necessary in a democratic society"
for the protection of the health and rights of the children.
Accordingly, the Commission concludes that this part of the application
is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2
(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
(b) Secondly, the applicant complains about the lack of effort by the
relevant Health Boards to re-integrate the children with the applicant
and the mother (prior to the adoption application) or to help the
applicant and the mother overcome their various problems in order to
make such re-integration possible.
The Commission recalls that, while Article 8 (Art. 8) of the
Convention imposes certain positive obligations on the State to act in
a manner calculated to allow family ties to develop normally, it does
not oblige the State to positively reestablish conditions of family
life already damaged by the people concerned (cf., Eur. Court H.R.,
Marckx judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31, para. 310 and
No. 6577/74, Dec. 19.12.74, D.R. 1, p. 91).
In this respect, the Commission notes the facilities and support
services made available to the applicant and the mother by the
authorities both in relation to their continued addictions and as
regards contact with and information about their children. In contrast,
the Commission recalls the parents' continued alcohol and solvent
abuse, their failure to attend a number of pre-arranged contact visits
with E, their respective conditions during meetings with the social
worker from the Southern Health Board and their respective periods of
imprisonment.
Accordingly, the Commission considers that, in the circumstances
of this case, there has been no lack of respect for the applicant's
family life. The Commission therefore concludes that this part of the
application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27
para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
(c) Thirdly, the applicant also makes a number of complaints in
relation to the fostering arrangements in respect of E and P. In
particular, he complains, inter alia, about the initial placement of
E with a non-traveller family and about the length of time E was left
with that foster family. As a result E bonded with that family and a
transfer to a travelling family was not an option by the time of the
adoption proceedings before the High Court. The taking into care and
subsequent fostering of E and P in different districts contributed to
the break-up of the family.
The Commission notes that as regards E's initial placement, and
even assuming that the applicant had no effective domestic remedy, his
complaint in this respect is outside of the time limit set down by
Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention. As regards E's subsequent care
and P's placement and subsequent care, the Commission notes that the
applicant did not make an application for guardianship pursuant to the
Status of Children Act 1987 and, as such, did not exhaust domestic
remedies as required by Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.
Therefore the Commission must declare this complaint inadmissible
pursuant to Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.
2. The applicant also complains under Articles 10 and 11
(Art. 10, 11) of the Convention and under Article 2 of Protocol 1
(P1-2) that the adoption of E violated the applicant's right to impart
information and ideas to E in relation to his traveller heritage, that
E is precluded from associating as an equal with other members of the
travelling community and that the applicant no longer has the right to
educate E in his traveller heritage. However, in the circumstances of
the present case, the Commission does not consider that these
complaints of the applicant give rise to any issues separate to those
considered above under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.
3. The applicant further complains under Article 14 (Art. 14) of the
Convention about a failure to attempt to match E's background to that
of the adoptive parents. He submits that, in contrast, every effort is
made to match the background of the child and the adoptive parents in
a consensual adoption process.
The Commission notes that the applicant accepts that by the time
of the adoption proceedings the child had already bonded with his
foster parents and that there was therefore no reality in any
suggestion that E should be moved to different parents. The question
raised by this complaint is, therefore, whether the applicant took any
steps to challenge E's initial committal to care or E's ongoing
fostering at a time when it could have been reasonably said that E had
not bonded with those foster parents. In view of the conclusions in
these respects at paragraph 1(c) above, the Commission therefore
considers that this complaint must also be declared inadmissible as out
of time and on grounds of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies pursuant
to Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.
4. Finally, the applicant complains that the constitutional immunity
of the 1988 Act meant that he had no effective domestic remedy in
violation of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.
The Commission recalls that Article 13 (Art. 13) of the
Convention does not go so far as to guarantee a remedy allowing a
Contracting State's laws as such to be challenged before a national
authority on the ground of being contrary to the Convention or to
equivalent domestic legal norms (Eur. Court. H.R., James and Others
judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A no. 98, p. 47, para. 85).
Accordingly, the Commission finds this complaint manifestly ill-founded
and inadmissible pursuant to Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
For these reasons the Commission, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
Secretary to the First Chamber President of the First Chamber
(M. F. BUQUICCHIO) (C. L. ROZAKIS)
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy