SECOND SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 42079/98
by E. H.
against Greece
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 12 October 2000 as a Chamber composed of
MrB. Conforti, President,
MrC.L. Rozakis,
MrG. Bonello,
MrsV. Strážnická,
MrsM. Tsatsa-Nikolovska,
MrE. Levits,
MrA. Kovler, Judges,
andMrP. Mahoney, Deputy Registrar of the Court, acting as Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application introduced with the European Commission of Human Rights on 8 April 1998 and registered on 7 July 1998,
Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a Greek national, born in 1963 and living in Veroia (Greece).
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant graduated in 1991 from the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Bari (Italy) with a Bachelor’s Degree in Literature. On 20 June 1991 he submitted his degree to DIKATSA, a public body empowered to award to Greek students recognition of diplomas obtained from foreign schools and Universities. On 14 October 1991 the committee of history and archaeology of DIKATSA examined the degree and proposed to recognise it as equivalent to a Greek degree; however, the committee considered that the applicant should take part in fourteen supplementary examinations. On 9 July 1992 the committee of classical literature of DIKATSA decided that the applicant should take eighteen supplementary examinations. On 30 July 1992, the Chairman of the Board of Directors of DIKATSA considered the degree as equivalent to a Greek degree but not fully corresponding to such a degree and, accordingly, invited the applicant to take nine supplementary disciplines. On 4 December 1992 the applicant introduced an application for review of the decision of 30 July 1992, but on 25 May 1993 DIKATSA reiterated its refusal to recognise the applicant’s degree and invited him to sit eighteen supplementary examinations (decision N° 11/55/93).
On 24 April 1995 the applicant applied to the Supreme Administrative Court asking it to set aside decision N° 11/55/93 of DIKATSA. He also requested the Supreme Court to refer to the Court of Justice of the European Communities the prejudicial question of Community law raised by the case. He alleged that the above-mentioned decision was not taken in conformity with Council Directive 89/48/EEC of 21 December 1988 setting up “a general system for the recognition of higher-education diplomas awarded on completion of professional education and training of at least three years’ duration”; in particular, he stressed that the Greek State had not yet taken the necessary measures to comply with the Directive although two years had elapsed since its notification to the member States of the EEC. He also maintained that following that decision, it was impossible for him to find a job or to work in a public school because he did not meet any longer the condition of the age limit.
The Supreme Administrative Court fixed the date of the hearing on 24 September 1996. On that date, the hearing was adjourned ex officio and the case was referred to an enlarged formation of the Chamber because of its major importance. Then the Chamber set down the hearing for 7 October 1996 but on that date three more actions aiming at setting aside decisions of the DIKATSA having the same subject-matter with that concerning the applicant were introduced before the same Chamber. The hearing was thus adjourned until 13 January 1997. However, the Chamber decided to relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the Plenary for the three new cases and, accordingly, the hearing in the applicant’s case was adjourned again until 17 March 1997, 2 June 1997, 1st December 1997, 6 April 1998, 1st June 1998 and 7 December 1998.
On 20 May 1994 the applicant had introduced an action for damages before the First Instance Administrative Court of Veroia. He claimed a substantial amount for the pecuniary damage he had suffered as a result of the omission of the State to implement Directive 89/48/EEC and alleged that the amount sought corresponded to the loss of income he would have earned if he had been able to work as a teacher in a private school. The hearing was listed for 24 September 1996. However, on that date the Administrative Court adjourned the consideration of the case due to the parliamentary elections. A new hearing date was fixed on 21 July 1997 but the hearing was adjourned by agreement of both parties awaiting the Supreme Administrative Court’s judgment. On 29 September 1997, 17 March 1998 and 24 November 1998 the Court adjourned again the examination of the action.
On 11 January 1999 the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the above-mentioned application because the applicant was not represented by a lawyer at the hearing. The judge rapporteur had, however, proposed to have the decision of the DIKATSA set aside for lack of reasoning.
The hearing before the Administrative Court of Veroia took place on 22 June 1999. In its judgment of 24 September 1999 the Administrative Court declared that it was incompetent to deal with the case and referred it to the Administrative Court of Athens.
COMPLAINT
The applicant complains of the length of proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court and the First Instance Administrative Court of Veroia. He invokes Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
THE LAW
The applicant complains of the length of proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court and the First Instance Administrative Court of Veroia. He invokes Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which in its relevant part reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
1.In the first place, the Government contest the applicability of Article 6 § 1 in the present case. They maintain that the proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court had the characteristics of a public law dispute. These proceedings, which aimed at contesting the validity of a decision of an administrative body relating to the recognition of a degree awarded by a foreign University, were undoubtedly related to a dispute of an administrative nature. The right in issue, namely the recognition of the equivalence of a degree, was an autonomous right with indirect financial consequences only.
According to the Government, EEC Council Directive 89/48/1989 determines the conditions under which Member States are obliged to recognise the equivalence between the forms of vocational training, within a minimum period of three years, certified by third degree educational diplomas awarded by institutions of another Member State. However, a distinction should be made between the academic recognition and the vocational recognition. The former falls within the competence of Member States. As regards the latter, the Member States should abide by the provisions of the community law on the mutual recognition of diplomas for the practice of a profession and those concerning free provision of services and free establishment. The above-mentioned Directive concerns the certification of vocational training and it aims at preventing the host country to refuse the access to a legislatively secured profession to a citizen of another EU Member State on the ground of lack of vocational qualifications. There has been no such refusal by the defendant in the present case, so that the Directive would apply to the applicant. Moreover, the applicant did not meet the requirements for access to a profession since he did not have any titles of studies equivalent to those awarded by the domestic Universities. Consequently, in the present case, the applicant failed to establish any right based on the said Directive.
In the event that the equivalence between degrees is found to be partial, the authorities of the host State are entitled to request from the applicant to prove that he has obtained the missing knowledge and qualifications by passing an examination if necessary. The European Court of Justice has also confirmed this approach in its judgments in the cases of Aguirre Borrell and Vlassopoulou (judgments of 7 May 1991 and 7 May 1992, C-104/91 and C‑340/89 respectively).
Accordingly, the question of recognition of equivalence of a determined title of studies is not subject to regulation by European Communities law. Such an issue is not included in the regulatory framework of the primary and derivative community law and remains subject to national regulation. As a result, the procedural guarantees of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention cannot be invoked by the applicant in the present case.
Thus, the competent committee of DIKATSA obliged the applicant, despite his unfounded allegations to the contrary, to be examined in certain disciplines which were considered as optional in Italy. However, these subjects were considered as compulsory by the Greek Universities and the applicant’s degree could not have been recognised as equivalent in Greece, without examinations in these disciplines. In any case, the recognition of the applicant’s degree, which fell within the competence of DIKATSA, did not automatically mean that he would have access to a specific profession. Besides, DIKATSA is not empowered to deal with matters of recognition of vocational training. Accordingly, such matters have no causal link with the recognition of the applicant’s degree.
The applicant contends that his degree was subject to the regime which should have been established by the Directive. He maintains that when he started studying, he aspired to working as soon as he would have obtained his degree. In 1991 the Ministry of Education would have informed him already that the competent institution for the recognition of vocational training provided for in the Directive was not set up in Greece yet. However, it was impossible for him to find a job even in a private-owned preparatory school (frontistirio), because, without the equivalence, any possible engagement would have been illegal as the Directive was not yet in force.
As regards the proceedings before the First Instance Administrative Court of Veroia, the Court considers that the applicant’s complaints consisted in claims for purely pecuniary rights : the sole aim of the action was to obtain compensation for pecuniary and non‑pecuniary damages. Accordingly, Article 6 § 1 of the Convention applies in these proceedings.
As regards the proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court, the Court recalls that according to the its case-law, the expression “determination of …civil rights and obligations” covers all proceedings the result of which is decisive for private rights and obligations (see the judgment of Ringeisen v. Austria of 16 July 1971, A Series N° 13, p. 39, § 94). A tenuous connection or remote consequences do not suffice for Article 6 § 1 : civil rights and obligations must be the object - or one of the objects - of the dispute ; the result of the proceedings must be directly decisive for such a right (see the judgment of Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere of 23 June 1981, A Series N° 43, p. 21, § 47). On the other hand, the Court has already held that where legislation lays down conditions for the admission to a profession and a candidate for admission satisfies those conditions, he has a right to be admitted to that profession (see the judgment of De Moor v. Belgium of 23 June 1994, A Series N° 292-A, p. 15, § 43). Furthermore, the Court has held that where a State provides for rights which may be submitted to a judicial review, these rights can be classified as civil rights within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 (see the judgment of Tinnelly & Sons Ltd and Others and Mc Elduff and Others of 10 July 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑IV, p. 1656, § 61).
In the present case, the applicant, a graduate from an Italian University, was refused the recognition of the equivalence of his degree with that delivered by Greek Universities ; this equivalence would have eventually permitted him to have access to the profession of a teacher, either in a public school -in which case Article 6 § 1 would not apply - or in a private school. The applicant lodged an application with the Supreme Administrative Court complaining of the omission of the Greek State to implement measures in order to comply with the EEC legislation concerning recognition of higher education diplomas. Undoubtedly, the applicant did not have a right to obtain the equivalence or to exercise the profession of a teacher ; however, he was entitled to have his case examined according to the standards provided for by the EEC legislation which is directly applicable in Greece. As compliance with these standards could be subject to judicial review - and the applicant made use of this possibility - (see, mutatis mutandis, the above-mentioned Tinnelly & Sons Ltd and Others and McElduff and Others judgment), a “contestation” arose on a “civil right” which would have been “determined” by the Supreme Administrative Court, if that Court had not dismissed the application on procedural grounds.
Accordingly, the Court considers that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention applies to both proceedings.
2.As for the allegation of the excessive length of the proceedings, the Government submits that the complexity of the case as well as the major importance of the issue pending before the Supreme Administrative Court, and on which that Court would deliver a final judgment (Articles 3 § 2 and 5 § 1 of Law No. 2717/1999) imposed the adjournment of the consideration of the case before the Administrative Court of Veroia. When the Supreme Administrative Court rendered its decision on 11 January 1999, the Court of Veroia heard the case immediately (on 22 June 1999) and delivered its judgment three months later, on 24 September 1999. As to the proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court, the numerous adjournments were due to the importance of the case and the introduction, pending these proceedings of three new applications raising similar issues, but whose prior determination by the Plenary of the court was necessary.
The applicant contends that his case was not complex and could have been examined independently from the other similar cases which were introduced before the Supreme Administrative Court. He maintains that 27 March 1996 he invited that Court to deal with his case in priority.
Having examined the parties' observations, the Court considers that the application raises serious questions of fact and law, which are of such complexity that their determination should depend on an examination of the merits. The application cannot, therefore, be regarded as being manifestly ill founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention, and no other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits of the case.
Paul MahoneyBenedetto Conforti
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy