AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 31721/96
by Margit ERICSSON
against Sweden
The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting
in private on 21 May 1997, the following members being present:
Mrs. G.H. THUNE, President
MM. J.-C. GEUS
G. JÖRUNDSSON
A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
H. DANELIUS
F. MARTINEZ
M.A. NOWICKI
I. CABRAL BARRETO
J. MUCHA
D. SVÁBY
P. LORENZEN
E. BIELIUNAS
E.A. ALKEMA
A. ARABADJIEV
Ms. M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 26 February 1996
by Margit Ericsson against Sweden and registered on 4 June 1996 under
file No. 31721/96;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, a Swedish citizen born in 1929, resides in Västra
Frölunda. Before the Commission she is represented by her lawyer,
Ms. Ulla Jacobsson, Mölle.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be
summarised as follows.
On 26 October 1990 the applicant's father, E.O., was beaten to
death in his flat in Lindome. Two persons, P.L. and L.L., were later
arrested and charged. The estate of E.O., in which the applicant owned
a share, claimed damages.
By judgment of 31 January 1991, the District Court (tingsrätten)
of Mölndal sentenced P.L. to life imprisonment for murder, but
acquitted L.L. of the charge of aiding and abetting murder. P.L. was
ordered to pay damages to the estate of E.O. in the amount of 56,662
Swedish crowns (SEK).
P.L. appealed to the Court of Appeal (hovrätten) for Western
Sweden. On 26 April 1991 the appellate court reversed the District
Court's judgment. P.L. was accordingly acquitted and the estate's
claim for damages rejected.
In January 1992 the applicant requested that the proceedings
against P.L. and L.L. be reopened. She alleged that the public
prosecutor had been negligent in formulating the charges against P.L.
and L.L., which had prevented the courts from examining the case in
full. She further claimed that there was new evidence in the case.
On 16 March 1995 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant's
request in so far as it concerned L.L. On 28 September 1995 the
Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen) refused leave to appeal against this
decision.
On 28 September 1995 the Supreme Court further refused to reopen
the proceedings against P.L.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant claims, under Article 6 of the Convention, that she
did not have a fair and impartial hearing in the criminal proceedings.
THE LAW
The applicant claims that she did not have a fair and impartial
hearing in the criminal proceedings. She refers, inter alia, to the
public prosecutor's alleged negligence and invokes Article 6 (Art. 6)
of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows:
"1. In the determination of his civil rights ... or of any
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair
... hearing ... by an ... impartial tribunal ..."
The Commission recalls that the applicant, as party to the estate
of her deceased father, claimed damages from P.L. and L.L. in the
criminal proceedings. The Commission therefore considers that her
"civil rights" were determined in these proceedings and that, thus,
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1), per se, applies to her complaint.
The Commission is, however, not required to decide whether the
facts alleged by the applicant disclose any appearance of a violation
of the said Article as, under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention,
it "may only deal with the matter ... within a period of six months
...".
According to the established case-law of the Commission
(cf., e.g., No. 10326/83, D.R. 35, p. 218), an application for
reopening of proceedings cannot, as a general rule, be taken into
account in the application of Article 26 (Art. 26). The Commission
does not find any special circumstances in the present case which would
justify a departure from that general rule.
Accordingly, the final judgments determining the estate's claims
were the District Court's judgment of 31 January 1991 in so far as L.L.
was concerned and the Court of Appeal's judgment of 26 April 1991 with
regard to P.L. The present application was introduced on 26 February
1996, which is more than six months after these judgments.
It follows that the application has been introduced out of time
and must be rejected under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the
Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
M.-T. SCHOEPFER G.H. THUNE
Secretary President
to the Second Chamber of the Second Chamber
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy