SECOND SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 38937/97
by Zoltán ERDŐS
against Hungary
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 3 May 2001 as a Chamber composed of
MrC.L. Rozakis, President,
MrA.B. Baka,
MrsV. Strážnická,
MrP. Lorenzen,
MrM. Fischbach,
MrA. Kovler,
MrE. Levits, judges,
and Mr E. Fribergh, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application introduced with the European Commission of Human Rights on 16 August 1993 and registered on 10 December 1997,
Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Zoltán Erdős, born in 1972, is a Hungarian national and living in Budapest. The application was originally lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights by his late father.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
In October 1984 the applicant’s father brought an action against an upholstery workshop. He claimed some outstanding royalty fees on account of the workshop’s manufacturing and selling a series of foldable beds developed as his innovation.
In September 1986 the Buda Central District Court informed the plaintiff that the upholstery workshop as such had no capacity to conduct legal proceedings and that its members were personally required to enter the proceedings as defendants.
On 28 April 1987 the District Court, for reasons of competence, discontinued the proceedings and transferred the case to the Budapest Regional Court. On 4 February 1988 the Regional Court held that it had no competence in the case, either, and applied to the Supreme Court so that it designate the competent court.
On 5 May 1988 the Supreme Court designated the Buda Central District Court to hear the case. On 10 November 1988, 16 February, 26 April, 21 June, 20 October 1989, 20 March and 29 June 1990 the District Court held hearings. Meanwhile, on 13 February 1989 and 15 June 1990 the plaintiff extended his claims.
In its judgment of 6 July 1990 the District Court awarded the plaintiff 714,000 Hungarian forints (HUF) plus accrued interests.
Upon appeals, on 22 May 1991 the Budapest Regional Court held a hearing, quashed the first-instance judgment and arranged for the re-hearing of the case by the competent panel of the Regional Court. It pointed out that, due to the plaintiff’s repeated extensions of his claims, the case was no longer within the District Court’s competence.
On 20 December 1991, 17 June, 15 July and 4 November 1992 the Regional Court held hearings. On the latter date a 30-day time-limit was granted to the plaintiff in order that he should further elaborate his claims.
On 7 December 1992 the plaintiff again extended his action and, on 27 January 1993, he filed a memorandum with the Regional Court submitting the precise figures of his claims.
On 17 February and 28 April 1993 the Regional Court held hearings.
The hearings scheduled for 1 September and 10 December 1993 and 9 March 1994 were adjourned.
On 4 May 1994 the Regional Court decided to seek technical expertise.
On 28 September 1994 the Regional Court specified its questions to the expert institution. On 27 October 1994 the expert institution indicated that it was unable to deal with the matter. On 7 November 1994 another expert was appointed who presented his opinion on 19 December 1994.
On 1 March 1995 the Regional Court held a hearing. On this occasion the plaintiff again modified his claims.
A hearing scheduled for 17 May 1995 was adjourned. On 16 June 1995 the plaintiff again extended his action.
On 27 September 1995 and 26 January and 3 July 1996 the Regional Court held further hearings. On the latter date the plaintiff was granted a 15-day time-limit with a view to further elaboration of his quantified claims. His memorandum on that subject was returned for supplementation on 1 August 1996. The revised memorandum reached the Regional Court on 9 September 1996.
On 20 November 1996 the Regional Court held a further hearing and appointed an expert accountant. On 24 January 1997 the Regional Court ordered the plaintiff to advance payment for the expert.
On 6 June 1997 the Regional Court declared that the proceedings were interrupted on account of the death of one of the defendants.
On 12 December 1997 the proceedings were resumed and a hearing was held. On 13 February 1998 the Regional Court discontinued, on account of the plaintiff’s partial waiver, the proceedings in respect of some of the defendants.
On 25 February 1998 the Regional Court gave a partial judgment and awarded the plaintiff HUF 858,000 plus accrued interests.
On 18 March 1998 the plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court.
On 27 December 1998 the plaintiff died.
On 15 February 1999 the applicant informed the Registry that he wished to pursue his late father’s application before the Court.
On 20 October 1999 the applicant and his late father’s widow entered the domestic proceedings as the plaintiff’s successors, of which the Registry was informed on 21 February 2000.
On 10 November 1999 the Supreme Court held a hearing.
On 22 February 2000 the Supreme Court passed a second-instance judgment, partly quashing the decision of 25 February 1998.
THE LAW
1.The applicant’s first complaint relates to the length of the proceedings.
Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, in its relevant parts, provides:
“The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law ...”
The Government argue that the applicant has not exhausted the domestic remedies available to him under Hungarian law in that he did not bring an official liability action under Article 349 of the Hungarian Civil Code, seeking compensation for the protracted proceedings. The applicant contests this.
The Court reiterates that, in respect of the length of civil proceedings still pending, a remedy can only be considered effective if it can be brought rapidly while these proceedings are pending and if it provides direct and speedy protection of the rights guaranteed by Article 6 § 1. A further set of civil court proceedings, like an official liability action under Article 349 of the Hungarian Civil Code, cannot be regarded as such redress and, therefore, an effective remedy (see Úri v. Hungary, application no. 31973/96, Commission decision (final) of 10 September 1998, unpublished; Mr T.K. and Mrs T.K. v. Hungary, application no. 26209/95, Commission decision of 21 May 1997, unpublished).
The complaint cannot, therefore, be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
2.The proceedings began in October 1984 and ended in February 2000 with the Supreme Court’s second-instance decision. They therefore lasted about fifteen years and four months. The Court observes that, when examining the length of the proceedings, the period to be considered begins only on 5 November 1992, the date of the Convention’s entry into force in respect of Hungary. However, in assessing the reasonableness of the time that elapsed after this date, account must be taken of the then state of proceedings (see the Foti and others v. Italy judgment of 10 December 1982, Series A no. 56, p. 18, § 53).
According to the applicant, the length of the proceedings is in breach of the “reasonable time” requirement laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The Government reject the allegation.
The Court considers, in the light of the criteria established in its case-law on the question of “reasonable time” (the complexity of the case, the applicant’s conduct and that of the competent authorities), and having regard to all the information in its possession, that an examination of the merits of this complaint is required.
3.The second complaint concerns the applicant’s allegation that the domestic courts reached erroneous conclusions in the case. He invokes Article 6 § 1 of the Convention which in its relevant parts, provides:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal...”
The Court reiterates that, in so far as the applicant’s complaint may be understood to concern assessment of the evidence and the result of the proceedings before the domestic courts, its duty is to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties to the Convention, according to Article 19 of the Convention. In particular, it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. Moreover, while Article 6 of the Convention guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence or the way it should be assessed, which are therefore primarily matters for regulation by national law and the national courts (García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999-I).
In the present case, the applicant’s submissions do not disclose any appearance that the domestic courts lacked impartiality or that the proceedings were otherwise unfair.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and must be rejected under Article 35 § 4.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares admissible, without prejudging the merits, the applicant’s complaint relating to the excessive length of the proceedings;
Declares inadmissible the remainder of the application.
Erik Fribergh Christos Rozakis
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy