SECOND SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 62796/00
by Ludmila ERMANNOVÁ
against the Czech Republic
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 17 February 2004 as a Chamber composed of:
MrJ.-P. Costa, President,
MrL. Loucaides,
MrC. Bîrsan,
MrK. Jungwiert,
MrV. Butkevych,
MrsW. Thomassen,
MrsA. Mularoni, judges,
and Mrs S. Dollé, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 20 June 2000,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Ludmila Ermannová, is a Czech national, who was born in 1950 and lives in Dymokury.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
Proceedings concerning the applicant’s action for damages
On 4 June 1996 the applicant brought an action for damages against Ms H. for payment of CZE 30,000 for baby clothes and two baby seats which the applicant had allegedly brought at her request from Germany in April 1995.
On 26 May 1997 the Hradec Králové District Court (okresní soud) requested the Dymokury Municipal Office (obecní úřad) to submit an official statement on the applicant’s reputation in the municipality, referring to section 128 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
On 28 May 1997 the mayor of the municipality submitted a statement which read as follows:
[Translation]
“The reputation of Ludmila Ermannová, living in Dymokury, Na Ohrádkách 62, is very bad in the municipality. Ms Ermannová systematically looks for and initiates conflicts with inhabitants. This is proved by a number of minor offences concerning the cohabitation with other inhabitants, which were dealt with by the municipal office. One can easily doubt most of the information given by Mr Ermannová.”
[Original]
“Pověst Ludmily Ermannové, bytem Dymokury, Na Ohrádkách 62, je v obci velmi špatná. Paní Ermannová systematicky vyhledává a je iniciátorem konfliktů s obyvateli obce. Toho dokladem je množství přestupků na úseku občanského soužití, které byly na místním úřadě řešeny. Také o pravdivosti většiny informací paní Ermannovou poskytovaných lze s úspěchem pochybovat.”
On 16 July 1997, in her final submissions to the District Court, the applicant denied the truthfulness of the information provided by the mayor in his statement.
By judgment of 25 July 1997 the District Court, having heard the parties, Ms H.’s parents, the applicant’s daughter and son and two other witnesses, Mr and Ms P., and having assessed certain documentary evidence, dismissed the applicant’s action. It found that the applicant had not shown that she had a contractual relationship with Ms H. which would have obliged her to meet a specific financial obligation. The court found therefore that there was no need to re-hear Mr P. and Ms P. or to watch a video recording of Ms H.’s children sitting in the baby seats and wearing the clothes in question.
The District Court made no reference in its judgment to the statement issued by the Municipal Office.
On 24 September 1998 the Hradec Králové Regional Court (krajský soud), upon the applicant’s appeal, quashed the judgment of the District Court and remitted the case with a binding opinion that the applicant, in order to be successful in the proceedings, had to prove that there was an agreement between her and Ms H., in the sense that the applicant would sell children’s clothes and baby seats for an agreed price, and that Ms H. had asked her father to order the goods. To that effect, the Regional Court instructed the District Court to re-hear the applicant, Ms H’s father and another witness.
By judgment of 27 July 1999 the District Court, having taken additional evidence in accordance with the Regional Court’s instruction, dismissed the applicant’s action for damages. It held, inter alia, that:
“The plaintiff did not prove ...that she had concluded a purchase contract with Ms H. On the contrary, her rehearing again confirmed that, if there was a contract, it would have been concluded with the defendant’s father as it appears, in particular from the plaintiff’s evidence, [that the] money for the clothes brought would be deducted from the sum which would be paid to Ms H.’s father for his work done for ... the plaintiff’s son. It is to be noted that her later statement completely differed from what she said during her first hearing, when she contended that Ms H. had promised to pay the purchase price after her return from holiday. This fact and the evidence given by the other witnesses, which rebutted her contentions, together with the statement of the Dymokury Municipal Office, definitely did not increase the credibility of the plaintiff. Moreover, the rehearing of Ms H.’s father proved that he had not ordered any goods from the plaintiff for the defendant.”
On 19 January 2000 the Regional Court upheld this judgment endorsing the reasoning of the lower court in the main.
Proceedings concerning the applicant’s action for the protection of her personal rights
On 29 July 1997 the applicant sued the municipality before the Prague Regional Court (krajský soud), seeking the protection of her personal rights within the meaning of section 11 et seq. of the Civil Code. She claimed that the information contained in the mayor’s statement did not correspond to the reality, that it was of a defamatory nature and that it interfered with her dignity and civil reputation. She further claimed that the municipality should be ordered to present a written apology and an undertaking to refrain, in future, from committing similar interferences.
The Regional Court requested the District Court to submit the court file concerning the applicant’s action for damages, from which it appeared that the Municipal Office had submitted its statement upon the District Court’s request, with a view to obtaining an official opinion on the reputation and credibility of both parties to the proceedings.
It further requested the Poděbrady Town Office (městský úřad) to submit the case files relating to minor offences involving the applicant’s family which had been dealt with by the Municipal Office. It established from the documents before it that the applicant and her children had had a number of disputes with their neighbours, a local family and three other persons, and that the administrative proceedings had been, for the most part, discontinued.
The Regional Court also had before it a case file with a claim brought by Ms H.’s father against the applicant, in which he alleged that the latter had verbally abused him. These proceedings had also been discontinued.
On 2 December 1998 the Regional Court, after having heard the parties and examined the aforesaid documentary evidence, dismissed the applicant’s action. In its view, the municipality had not unjustifiably interfered with the applicant’s right to the protection of her personal rights, as it had fulfilled the obligation imposed on it by the District Court pursuant to Article 128 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The court further noted that the municipality had not misused its power when issuing the statement, the content of which was in substance truthful, and which the applicant could challenge in the course of the proceedings for damages.
On 6 January 1999 the applicant appealed, arguing that the Regional Court had not assessed the evidence correctly and that, consequently, had wrongly dealt with the factual and legal issues of the case.
On 8 April 1999 the Prague High Court (vrchní soud), admitting in evidence a decision of the Town Office of 27 August 1997 and the text of note no. 6 published in a local newsletter in March 1999, found the applicant’s appeal unsubstantiated. It held, inter alia, that it had not been proved that the municipality did not believe that the information about the applicant’s reputation contained in its statement was incorrect or that it had intended to damage the applicant.
On 15 November 1999 the Supreme Court (Nejvyšší soud) rejected the applicant’s appeal on points of law (dovolání) in which the applicant challenged, inter alia, the lower courts’ finding that the content of the mayor’s statement had not been published, and claimed that the local newsletter had reported that the District Court had requested the Municipal Office to submit an appraisal of her, and that local deputies had suggested that the appraisal be based on a previous one to which new relevant facts should be added.
On 21 June 1999 the applicant filed a constitutional appeal (ústavní stížnost) alleging, inter alia, a violation of Article 10 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (Listina základních práv a svobod) and Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention, in that the statement of the municipality containing its opinion about her reputation and credibility had been used in the court proceedings held in public and published in the local newsletter.
On 24 February 2000 the Constitutional Court (Ústavní soud) rejected the applicant’s constitutional appeal as manifestly ill-founded. Although it expressed certain doubts as to the suitability of requesting third persons to issue statements on the reputation and credibility of an individual pursuant to Article 128 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Constitutional Court considered, in particular, that the municipality had acted on the District Court’s request under this provision and, having regard to the actual situation in the municipality and relations between inhabitants, it had done it the way which was hardly violating the principle of social proportionality. It was indisputable that between 1997 and 1998 the applicant and members of her family had been involved in eighteen proceedings relating to minor offences. The fact that these proceedings had eventually been discontinued was, in the court’s view, irrelevant. It further noted that the statement issued by the mayor, and subsequently approved by the municipal board of representatives (zastupitelstvo obce), reflected the prevailing opinion of the local inhabitants.
B. Relevant domestic law
1. The Code of Civil Procedure
Under section 128 of the Code of Civil Procedure, when answering a court’s questions, everyone is obliged to communicate to the court facts which are important for the proceedings and the judicial decision. A natural person may refuse to communicate facts to the court on the same grounds as a witness under section 126(1).
2. The Civil Code
The right to protection of a person’s dignity, honour, reputation and good name is guaranteed by section 11 et seq. of the Civil Code.
Under section 11 of the Civil Code, a natural person has the right to the protection of his or her personality, in particular of his or her life and health, civil and human dignity, privacy, name and his or her personal characteristics.
Pursuant to section 13(1), a natural person has the right to request that an unjustified interference with his or her personality should be stopped, that the consequences of such interference be eliminated, and that appropriate satisfaction be granted.
The existence of an unjustified interference, objectively capable of affecting a person’s rights under section 11 et seq. of the Civil Code, is a prerequisite for a successful claim for the protection of the plaintiff’s personality.
3. The Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms
Everyone is entitled to
- the protection of his or her human dignity, personal integrity, good reputation, and his or her name;
- protection against an unauthorized interference with his or her personal and family life; and
- protection against the unauthorized gathering, publication or other misuse of his or her personal data.
COMPLAINTS
1. Invoking Article 8 of the Convention, the applicant complained that the statement of the mayor of the Municipal Office, which had been submitted to the District Court, interfered with her moral integrity and violated her right to private life. She alleged that the statement had contained untrue and defamatory information about her reputation in the municipality, on her inclination to provoke conflicts between the local inhabitants and on the mayor’s doubts about the reliability of any information given by her.
She said that the negative aspect of the interference was aggravated by the fact that the statement had been adduced as evidence in the proceedings for damages which were held in public.
The applicant further claimed that the national courts had failed to ensure respect for her right to the protection of her personality, in that they had found that the interference with her rights had not been unjustified and that she should have challenged the statement during the proceedings for damages. According to the applicant the interference in question was not necessary in the democratic society.
2. Invoking Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant complained that she had been denied effective access to a court as, in the proceedings for protection of personality, the national courts had not examined in detail the statement of the Municipal Office, and had found that the latter had fulfilled its legal obligation, acted in good faith and had not intended to damage the applicant. She also challenged the national court’s finding that she could have pursued this issue in the proceedings for damages which was, according to her, inappropriate.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complained that the statement of the mayor of the Local Office which had been submitted to the District Court interfered with her moral integrity and violated her right to private life. She invokes Article 8 of the Convention which, insofar as relevant, states:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private ... life, ...
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society ... for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
The Court recalls that “private life” includes a person’s physical and psychological integrity (see Botta v. Italy, judgment of 24 February 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-I, p. 422, § 32; (see Stjerna c. Finlande, judgment of 25 November 1994, Series A no. 299-B, § 38). It further recalls that while the essential object of Article 8 is to protect the individual against arbitrary interference by public authorities, it does not merely compel the State to abstain from such interference. In addition to this negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in effective respect for private life. These obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life.
In the instant case the Court notes that the statement in question was issued by the Municipal Office at the request of the District Court, pursuant to section 128 of the Code of Civil Procedure, with a view to obtaining an opinion of the municipality on the applicant’s reputation and credibility. The Court observes that the statement contained not only the facts relating to the applicant’s behaviour in the municipality, but also the Municipal Office’s own opinion on her credibility. It considers therefore that the statement involved an interference with the applicant’s Article 8 rights.
The applicant brought an action for the protection of her personality rights, within the meaning of section 11 et seq. of the Civil Code, against the municipality. The Hradec Králové Regional Court dismissed her action, finding in particular that the municipality had not unjustifiably interfered with her right to the protection of her personality as it had fulfilled the lawful obligation imposed on it by the District Court. It further noted that the municipality had not misused its power when issuing the statement, the content of which was in substance truthful, and which could be challenged by the applicant in the course of the proceedings for damages. The Prague High Court held, inter alia, that it had not been proved that the municipality did not believe that the information about the applicant’s reputation was incorrect or that it had sought to damage the applicant. The Constitutional Court expressed certain doubts as to the suitability of requesting third persons to make such statements under Article 128 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but held that the municipality had acted on the District Court’s request and, having regard to the actual situation in the village and relations between its inhabitants, the statement had not violated the principle of social proportionality. The court noted that it was indisputable that between 1997 and 1998 the applicant and members of her family had been involved in a number of proceedings relating to minor offences, and that the statement issued by the mayor, subsequently approved by the local council, reflected the prevailing opinion of local inhabitants.
The Court stresses that the unsuccessful outcome of the applicant’s proceedings against the municipality does not mean that the respondent State has failed in its obligation to provide adequate protection for her rights under Article 8 of the Convention.
The Court considers that the national courts carefully examined all the facts and evidence submitted to them, weighing the applicant’s interest in protecting her personal rights on the one hand, and the Municipal Office’s interest to fulfil its obligation under Article 128 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the other hand. In the Court’s opinion, there is nothing to show that the national courts, in striking a balance between these interests, gave inadequate consideration to the applicant’s right to respect for her private life. It considers that the proceedings before the national courts were reasonable, enabling them to collect a sufficient number of elements to decide as to the allegedly defamatory contentions of the Municipal Office.
Turning to the applicant’s allegation that the gravity of the interference with her personal rights was amplified by the fact that the proceedings were held in public and received media coverage, the Court notes that the information concerned was published by a local newsletter beyond the direct control of the Czech authorities, and that the respondent State has therefore no responsibility for the content of that publication. It further notes that the proceedings for the protection of the applicant’s personal rights were normal civil proceedings which are generally held in public and, like the national courts, the Court considers that the statement was presented in the course of these proceedings as a piece of evidence and that it was for the applicant to challenge its content.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
2. Invoking Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant complained that she had been denied effective access to a court as the national courts had not examined in detail the statement of the Local Office, yet found that the latter had fulfilled its legal obligation, acted in good faith and had not intended to damage the applicant. The applicant also challenged the national courts’ finding that she could have raised this issue in the proceedings for damages which was, according to her, inappropriate.
The Court notes that this complaint has the same factual basis as that made under Article 8 of the Convention. The Court found above that the latter complaint must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded. On the same considerations, the Court sees no reason to reach a different conclusion in respect of the applicant’s complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
It follows that this complaint must be also be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court by a majority
Declares the application inadmissible.
S. DolléJ.-P. Costa
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy